TRILOKI NATH SINGHversusANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.

650                      [2020]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    4 S.C.R. 650                  [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A                            TRILOKI NATH SINGH
                                         v.
                  ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.
                          (Civil Appeal No. 3961 of 2010)
B                                 MAY 06, 2020
            [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
             Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 23, r. 3 A – The appellant-
      plaintiff, stranger to a Compromise decree, filed suit seeking a
      declaration that the Compromise decree by the High Court on
C
      15.09.1994 in the second appeal was illegal, inoperative and
      obtained by fraud and misrepresentation – Held: The appellant was
      not a party to the stated Compromise decree – He was, however,
      claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in a stated
      sale deed dated 06.01.1984 which was purchased by him from one
D     of the party to compromise decree – It is well settled that the
      compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal
      would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the
      parties thereto – In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the
      best, he could seek relief against the person who sold property to
      him, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed
E
      by the High Court in the partition suit between the other parties –
      In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his
      right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed
      dated 06.01.1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the
      proceedings in partition suit, which could be examined
F     independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with
      law – That apart, the Trial Court in any case would not be competent
      to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the
      validity of compromise decree dated 15.09.1994 passed by the High
      Court in partition suit – It must, therefore, follow that suit instituted
      before the Civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in
G
      view of specific bar u/r. 3A of Or. 23 CPC – Also, findings were
      recorded by the Trial Court against the appellant in reference to
      issue regarding the right, title and interest of suit property and said
      findings were not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at the
      instance of the appellant – Thus, there were concurrent findings of
H
                                        650
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                        651
                     LRS. & ORS.

Courts below against the appellant-plaintiff – Consequently, the         A
appeal is dismissed.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. In the present case, the partition suit was filed
in 1978 and after the decision of the trial Court, the matter went
in first appeal and eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before          B
the High Court. During the pendency of first appeal being
continuation of the suit as stated, one of the parties to the pending
proceedings, allegedly entered into a sale deed with the appellant
on 6th January, 1984. Indubitably the issue regarding right, title
and interest in respect of the land which was the subject matter         C
of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, was still inchoate and not
finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to be
governed by the decision in favour of or against the party who
entered into a sale deed with him in the pending appeal. It must
follow that the alleged transaction effected in favour of the
appellant by a sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 ought to abide by       D
the outcome of the said proceedings which culminated with the
compromise decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal
No. 495/86 dated 15 th September, 1994. [Para 20][661-G-H;
662-A-C]
      2. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated             E
compromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and
interest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated
6th January, 1984, which was purchased by him from judgment
debtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromise
decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would               F
relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties
thereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best,
he could seek relief against the party who entered into a sale
deed, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree
passed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words,
the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or    G
interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th
January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the
proceedings in the partition suit, which could be examined
independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with
law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to               H
652            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the
      validity of compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed
      by the High Court in the partition suit. [Para 21][662-C-F]
             3. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his
      predecessor, to the extent of rights and remedies available to
B     her in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because the
      appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of
      the present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less
      give him a cause of action to question the validity of the
      compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a
      substantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent,
C     illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate about
      the validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to the
      partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted the
      compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the
      same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23
D     CPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the
      civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific
      bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned
      judgment. [Para 22][662-F-H; 663-A-B]
            Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai
E           (Smt) v. Rajinder Singh and Others (2005) 5 SCC 566:
            [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370; R. Rajanna v. S.R.
            Venkataswamy and Others (2014) 15 SCC 471 : [2014]
            14 SCR 535 – relied on.
                             Case Law Reference
F     [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370            relied on           Para 14
      [2014] 14 SCR 535                  relied on           Para 15
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3961
      of 2010.
G           From the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2009 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Patna in Second Appeal No. 153 of 2003.
            S. K. Bhattacharya, B. P. Yadav, Kumar Neeraj, L. K. Paonam,
      Ms. Seema Sharma, Niraj Bobby Paonam and Ms. Tomthinnganbi Koijam,
      Advs. for the Appellant.
H
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                               653
                     LRS. & ORS.

       M. Yogesh Kanna, Adv. for the Respondents.                               A
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       AJAY RASTOGI, J.
      1. The question arises in the appeal for our consideration is as to
whether the decree passed on a compromise can be challenged by the              B
stranger to the proceedings in a separate suit.
       2. The seminal facts which are relevant for the present purpose
and the circumstances in which it arises for our consideration are that
the appellant-plaintiff filed suit before 4th sub-judge, Chapra seeking a
declaration that the compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994               C
passed in Second Appeal No. 495/86 by the High Court is illegal,
inoperative and obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and also prayed
for injunction against the respondents-defendants restraining them from
entering into peaceful possession of the suit property.
       3. The case in shorn of the appellant-plaintiff is that the land         D
described in Schedule 1 of the plaint originally belonged to Lakhan Singh
who died leaving behind three sons, namely, Din Dayal Singh, Jalim Singh
and Kunjan Singh. Din Dayal Singh is said to have died issueless during
lifetime of his father and his other brother, namely, Jalim Singh also died
leaving behind a son Ram Nath Singh and two daughters Sampatiya and
Soniya. As regards the third son Kunjan Singh, he is said to have died          E
issueless but prior to his death he gifted the land of his share to Sampatiya
on the basis of a gift deed dated 10th July, 1978 which came on possession
over her.
       4. The further case of the appellant is that one Salehari wife of
Satyanarayan Prasad claiming herself to be the daughter of late Kunjan          F
Singh filed a partition suit 13/78 in the Court of Munsif, Chapra for setting
aside the aforesaid gift and for partition of her share in the ancestral
property. In that suit, Sampatiya, Dulari Devi, Ram Nath and Soniya
were impleaded as party respondents-defendants. Ram Nath died during
pendency of the proceedings and only Sampatiya contested the suit. It
                                                                                G
was further stated that suit was dismissed and it was held that Salehari
was not the daughter of Kunjan Singh and have no right in the properties.
      5. Salehari filed T.A. No. 19/84 which was dismissed on 7th April,
1986. The further case is that a total of 3 Bigha 6 Katha 3 Dhurs was
sold by Sampatiya to appellant-plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by a
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654             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     registered sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 and put the appellant-plaintiff
      in possession over the suit property. In July, 1995, when respondents-
      defendants started making interference in possession of the suit property
      of the appellant-plaintiff and on query it revealed that it was claimed on
      the strength of a compromise decree entered between Sampatiya and
      Salehari which was filed in second appeal before the High Court of
B
      Patna.
             6. The case of the appellant-plaintiff is that the said compromise
      decree was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation concealing the salient
      fact from the High Court that the sale deed was executed much prior to
      the compromise being executed between the parties to the proceedings
C     and as such the said compromise was liable to be declared to be void
      which was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.
              7. The respondents-defendants contested the suit on the ground
      that the suit was not maintainable. It was also alleged that the suit was
      hit by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and Order
D     23 Rule 3A Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter being referred to as
      “CPC”). It also urged that the appellant-plaintiff has no right to file the
      suit in the Court of Sub-Judge rather he ought to have filed an application
      before the High Court which passed the compromise decree and the
      appellant-plaintiff has no right to seek relief of injunction. That apart, it
E     was stated to bebarred by Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. The
      specific plea of the respondents-defendants in the written statement was
      that Kunjan Singh has not died issueless rather he had a daughter namely
      Salehari being his sole heir. It was also denied that he had executed a
      deed of gift in favour of Sampatiya and has delivered possession of the
      gifted land to her. It was, however, conceded that Salehari filed a partition
F     suit no. 13/79 in which she lost, whereafter she filed First Appeal No.
      19/84 which was dismissed. In Second Appeal No. 495/86 before the
      High Court, at her instance, a compromise was executed between the
      parties and accordingly, the compromise decree was passed by the High
      Court dated 15 th September, 1994. The extract of the terms of
G     compromise is reproduced ad infra:-
             “That the said compromise has been reached on following terms
             and conditions:-
             (i) That the respondent no. 1 (Sampatiya D/o Late Jalim Singh)
                 accepts that the plaintiff-appellant Salehari Devi is the
H                daughter of Kunjan Mahto.
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                              655
             LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

      (ii) That respondent no. 1 accepts the alleged deed of gift dated        A
           10.7.1987 executed by Kunjan Mahto in favour of respondent
           no. 1 is illegal, void and in-operative and that respondent no. 1
           derived neither title nor possession on account of the said
           deed of gift.
      (iii) That it is accepted by the respondent no. 1 that the plaintiff     B
            appellant Salehari Devi after the death of her father Kunjan
            Mahto came in possession of his properties as she was the
            sole surviving legal heir of her father,
      (iv) That the plaintiff-appellant accepts that she has got only half
           share in the entire suit properties and other half share belongs    C
           to respondent no. 1 Sampatiya Devi.
      (v) That to remove vagueness as to which suit properties will go
          to whose share, it is made clear that schedule-I property of
          the plaint which is made annexure-1 containing exhaustive
          details of properties will go to the share of plaintiff appellant    D
          and the rest of the suit properties as described in schedule-II
          of the plaint will go to the share of respondent no. 1,
      (vi) That according to their respective shares the appellant and
           respondent nos. 1 and 2 have come in possession thereof.”
        8. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge   E
in all framed 9 issues. The same are reproduced as under:-
      1. Is the plaintiff got any valid cause of action?
      2. Is the suit as framed maintainable?
      3. Is the Court fee paid sufficient?                                     F
      4. Is the suit barred by limitation?
      5. Is the suit u/s 34 S.R. Act.
      6. Is the compromise dated 30th May, 1994 and order dated
         15th September, 1994 in 2nd appeal 495/95 of the Hon’ble              G
         High Court is illegal, inoperative and inaffective due to
         fraud.
      7. Is the plaintiff got right, title and interest in the suit
         property?
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656             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A           8. Is the plaintiff entitle for decree as claimed
            9. To what over relief and reliefts plaintiff to?
              9. It is relevant to notice that issue nos. 4 & 5 were not pressed
      and rest of the issues were decided against the appellant-plaintiff after
      due appreciation of the evidence on record on merits by the trial Judge
B     by its judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1998 which was challenged
      by the appellant-plaintiff in appeal before the learned District Judge in
      Title Appeal No. 80/98(3/99). On due appreciation of evidence on record,
      the appeal came to be dismissed by the Court of Appeal by its judgment
      dated 5th May, 2003 that came to be challenged by the appellant in Second
C     Appeal No. 153 of 2003 before the High Court which came to be
      dismissed at the motion stage by judgment dated 20th April, 2009 which
      is a subject matter in appeal before us.
             10. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff submits that
      provision of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC is applicable only to the parties to
D     the suit and the said provision does not apply to a stranger to the
      compromise decree, therefore, the remedy is always open to a stranger
      to the compromise decree to file a separate suit to ventilate his grievance
      in the appropriate proceedings. In the given circumstances, the High
      Court has committed a manifest error in dismissing the appeal at the
      motion stage to non-suit the appellant-plaintiff and make him remediless
E     in questioning the compromise decree which has seriously affected his
      right over the subject property in question and the only remedy available
      with the appellant-plaintiff was to file a suit claiming his right over the
      subject land in question which was created on the basis of a sale deed
      executed by one of the party to the proceedings dated 6th January, 1984
F     much before the compromise decree was passed by the High Court.
             11. Learned counsel further submits that when the previous suit
      filed by Salehari was dismissed on merits on 30th December, 1983,
      thereafter on 6th January, 1984, Sampatiya sold the suit property to the
      appellant-plaintiff on the basis of the gift deed executed in her favour. It
G     was not open for Sampatiya to enter into the compromise against her
      pleadings without any consideration and such an act of Sampatiya clearly
      implies her collusion with Salaheri in order to dishonestly and fraudulently
      defeat the rights of her vendor/the appellant/plaintiff for no forceable
      reason whatsoever.

H
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                               657
             LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

       12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants           A
while supporting the findings recorded by the High Court under the
impugned judgment submits that at least the compromise decree which
was executed between the parties was not open to question even by the
stranger to the proceedings although suit could have been filed by the
appellant-plaintiff for the protection of his own rights admissible under
                                                                                B
the law but, in the instant proceedings, suit was filed seeking a declaration
that a compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed in Second
Appeal by the High Court of Patna be declared to be illegal which was
obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and that was not open to the
civil court for adjudication in view of bar under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC.
That apart, the learned trial Judge on the basis of pleadings of the parties    C
specifically framed issue nos. 6 & 7 and recorded a finding regarding
the effect of the compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed
by the High Court against the appellant. Even the finding in reference to
issue no. 7 with regard to right, title and interest in the suit property of
the appellant has been decided against him on merits. In the given
                                                                                D
circumstances, their appears no substance in the present appeal and
deserve to be dismissed.
       13. The precise question that falls for our determination is as to
whether the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff in seeking a declaration
against the decree of compromise dated 15th September, 1994 passed
by the High Court of Patna in Second Appeal was maintainable in view            E
of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A CPC. Order 23 Rule
3 and Rule 3A CPC may at this stage be extracted for ready reference:-
       “3.Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction
       of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any
       lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the              F
       parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of
       the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court
       shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be
       recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far
       it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-       G
       matter of the agreement, compromise, or satisfaction is the same
       as the subject-matter of the suit:
             Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied
       by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived
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658               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A              at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall
               be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the
               Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such
               adjournment.
                      Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void
B              or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall
               not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.
                     3A. Bar to suit – No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on
               the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based
               was not lawful.”
C            14. What is emerged as a legislative intent has been considered in
      extenso by this Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LR
      Sadhna Rai(Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh and Others1, after taking note
      of the scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A added with effect from
      1st February, 1977. The relevant paragraphs are as under:-
D              “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of
               Order 23 can be summed up thus:
                  (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having
                  regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
                  (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court
E
                  recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise)
                  in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
                  (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
                  compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was
                  not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
F
                  (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and
                  binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the
                  consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso
                  to Rule 3 Order 23.
G              Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree
               to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which
               recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and
               establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court
               which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide
      1
H         2005(5) SCC 566
        TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                            659
                LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

         the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not.        A
         This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between
         parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The
         validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the
         agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second
         defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was
                                                                                B
         fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting
         aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was
         no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none
         of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons
         best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days
         thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to     C
         pursue the application filed before the court which passed the
         consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not
         maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section
         96(3) of the Code.
                                                      (Emphasis supplied)       D
      15. The scope of intent of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A was
further considered by this Court in R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy
and Others2 wherein this Court held as under:-
         “11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms
         of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the      E
         other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful
         agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties,
         the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the
         same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order
         23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to          F
         be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void
         or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every
         case where the question arises whether or not there has been a
         lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the
         parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is
         lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful     G
         will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any
         infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the
         same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly,
         Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the
2
    2014(15) SCC 471                                                            H
660             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A            ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was
             not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to
             lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the
             court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement
             or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can
             examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the
B
             parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie
             in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is
             precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the
             appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of
             the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up
C            rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the application
             made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by
             the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the
             plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardly
             be heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant herein) ought to
             pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance
D
             of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been
             rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher
             court.”
                                                              (Emphasis supplied)
E            16. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code
      (Amendment) 1976 w.e.f. 1st February, 1977, the legislature has brought
      into force Rule 3A to Order 23, which create bar to institute the suit to
      set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree
      is based was not lawful. The purpose of effecting a compromise between
      the parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before the
F     Court of competent jurisdiction once and for all.
             17. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicating
      forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of a
      compromise between the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC put a specific
      bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the
G     compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme
      of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit
      parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing
      and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The Court can be
      instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality
H     attached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition of
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                            661
             LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

a compromise upon an unwilling party, still open to be questioned on an      A
application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC before the
Court.
       18. It can be further noticed that earlier under Order 43 Rule
1(m), an appeal which recorded the compromise and decide as to whether
there was a valid compromise or not, was maintainable against an order       B
under Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement,
compromise or satisfaction. But by the amending Act, aforesaid clause
has been deleted, the result whereof is that now no appeal is maintainable
against an order recording or refusing to record an agreement or
compromise under Rule 3 of Order 23. Being conscious of this fact that
the right of appeal against the order recording a compromise or refusing     C
to record a compromise was being taken away, a new Rule 1A was
added to Order 43 which is as follows:-
      “1-A. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal
      against decree.— (1) Where any order is made under this Code
      against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against       D
      such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal
      against the decree, contend that such order should not have been
      made and the judgment should not have been pronounced.
      (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording
      a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open      E
      to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the
      compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.”
       19. Thus, after the amendment which has been introduced, neither
any appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by
way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23    F
CPC. As such, a right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to
a party, who denies the compromise and invites order of the Court in
that regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC while preferring
an appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) CPC shall not be a bar to
such an appeal, because it is applicable where the factum of compromise      G
or agreement is not in dispute.
       20. In the present case, the partition suit was filed in 1978 and
after the decision of the trial Court, the matter went in first appeal and
eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before the High Court. During
the pendency of first appeal being continuation of the suit as stated, one
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662             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     of the parties to the pending proceedings, namely, Sampatiya allegedly
      entered into a sale deed with the appellant on 6th January, 1984.
      Indubitably the issue regarding right, title and interest in respect of the
      land which was the subject matter of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984,
      was still inchoate and not finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the
      appellant was to be governed by the decision in favour of or against
B
      Sampatiya in the pending appeal. It must follow that the alleged
      transaction effected in favour of the appellant by a sale deed dated 6th
      January, 1984 ought to abide by the outcome of the said proceedings
      which culminated with the compromise decree passed by the High Court
      in Second Appeal No. 495/86 dated 15th September, 1994.
C             21. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated compromise
      decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the land
      referred to in the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, which was
      purchased by him from Sampatiya-judgment debtor and party to the
      suit. It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High
D     Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of
      the suit between the parties thereto. In the suit now instituted by the
      appellant, at the best, he could seek relief against Sampatiya, but cannot
      be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court
      in the partition suit. In other words, the appellant could file a suit for
      protection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated
E     sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party
      (Sampatiya) to the proceedings in the partition suit, which could be
      examined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance
      with law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicate
      the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity of
F     compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed by the High Court
      in the partition suit.
             22. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his
      predecessor- Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies available
      to Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because
G     the appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of the
      present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him a
      cause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passed
      by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court to
      declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he
      could agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by the
H
     TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.                               663
             LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted      A
the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the
same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It
must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court by
the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A
of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment.
                                                                                B
       23. In the instant case, the suit was instituted in the year 1995 and
25 years have rolled by now and after the finding has been recorded in
reference to issue no. 7 regarding the right, title and interest of the suit
property against the appellant by the learned trial Judge devolved on the
basis of a stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 and not interfered by
the Court of Appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant, in the          C
given circumstances, remitting the matter back to the learned trial Court
to examine the suit filed at the instance of the appellant-plaintiff
independently for protection of his right, title or interest being devolved
on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 which as
alleged to have been executed by one of the party to the                        D
compromise(Sampatiya)in the changed circumstances may not serve
any purpose more so after the concurrent finding of Courts below have
been recorded against the appellant-plaintiff.
      24. Consequently, in our view, the appeal is without substance
and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.                                E
      25. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.


Ankit Gyan                                                  Appeal dismissed.

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