Holding

The Court held that the merit list must be prepared on the basis of composite marks from both the written examination and oral interview, that the appointments of already selected candidates stand, and that relief is available only to those who had previously contested the selection, not to fresh impleaders.

Summary

The State of West Bengal conducted a recruitment for Medical Technologists by first holding a written examination as a screening test and then empaneling candidates solely on the basis of marks obtained in an oral interview. Unsuccessful candidates challenged this procedure, arguing that the written test marks should also be considered in the merit list. The West Bengal Administrative Tribunal and the Calcutta High Court directed that a fresh merit list be prepared using composite marks from both the written and oral tests, while protecting the services of candidates already appointed. The Supreme Court upheld this direction, holding that the merit list must reflect both components and that the protection of already appointed candidates was justified. However, the Court limited the relief to those applicants who had previously approached the Tribunal and High Court, refusing to extend it to fresh impleaders who raised the issue for the first time, citing delay and laches. Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed, confirming the merit‑list preparation method and the limited scope of relief.

Issues considered

The legality of preparing a merit list solely on the basis of oral interview marks, excluding written test marks.
Whether the protection granted to already appointed candidates can be set aside.
Whether relief can be extended to applicants who did not earlier challenge the selection process, invoking principles of delay and laches.
The applicability of discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 and 136 of the Constitution in refusing relief.

Subjects

recruitmentselection processwritten examinationoral interviewmerit listadministrative tribunaldelaylachesdiscretionary jurisdictionfundamental rightsservice protection

Judgment

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 194

A TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. ;..--4(
\
II.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6444-6449 of 2008 etc)
NOVEMBER 4, 2008
B
[C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]
y
SeNice Law.- Selection - Written test as well as inteNiew
held - Selection made only on the basis of inteNiew -:- 40%
c marks allocated to inteNiew - Unsuccessful candidates
challenging selection on the ground that selection solely on ..
the basis of inteNiew was illegal - Plea of State that marks in
written test was not to be considered because it was in the
nature of elimination test - Tribunal directed preparation of
D fresh merit list on the basis of both the tests - The seNices
·of candidates already selected and appointed were protected
- The order of Tribunal not challenged by State - In the
......
appeals by the unsuccessful candidates challenging·
protection of selected candidates, High Court remitting the
E matter to Tribunal - Tribunal held the selection process on
the basis of oral test legal - In .appeal High Court directing
preparation of merit list on the basis of both the tests - On
appeal, held: Direction to prepare merit list on the basis of
both the tests was correct - It is just and equitable to protect (-
F the seNices of the selected and appointed candidates - High ).-A·
Court rightly directed to consider the cases of the candidates,
who obtained 40% marks in written test and oral test and who
could be placed with or above the selected candidates -
However, such benefit is available only to the candidates who
approached the court at the first instance - The benefit denied
G to those who approached this court by way of impleadment,
on the ground of delay and /aches - Constitution of India, >-.....,.
1950 - Articles 32, 226, 227 and 136.

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 32, 226, 227 and
.H 194
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 195
BENGAL & ORS.

136 - Discretionary jurisdiction under - Held: The Court in A
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction can refuse relief on
the ground of delay and /aches - Such refusal is applicable
even in case of infringement of fundamental rights.

Department of Health and Family Welfare of State 8
Government issued a Memo to the ·Director of
Employment Exchange for sponsoring candidates for the
post of Medical Technologist (Laboratory). Names were
received from the Employment Exchange. A written
examination was held. Thereafter oral interview was held
for the candidates who cleared the written examination. C
The empanelment was done on the basis of marks · 1

obtained in the interview. ·
The candidates who could not get entry in the select
list, approached State Administrative Tribunal contending 0
1
that preparation of the panel solely on the basis of the
marks obtained in interview, without considering the
marks in the written examination, was illegal and contrary
to law. Tribunal directed preparation of fresh merit list on
the basis of marks obtained in the interview as well as IE
written examination. The services of the candidates who
were already selected and appointed, were protected.

Appellants filed writ petition, wherein High Court
directed the Tribunal to consider the case of selected and
appointed candidates as the Tribunal had not assigned F
any reasons as to why they were protected and also to
consider the question whether 40% marks could have 1

been allotted to the oral test. Tribunal held that as the
written examination was in the nature of elimination test
which was decided to be resorted to pursuant to G
administrative decision in absence of Recruitment Rules,
the same was legal and proper; and that since the entire
selection process was found legal, there was no
question of cancellation of appointment of the candidates
who had already joined service. H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

>"~~
A The order was challenged by the appellants. High
Court held that the Tribunal committed an error of law in
not directing the authorities to prepare merit list on the
basis of marks obtained in the written test as well as
interview and hence directed preparation of fresh panel
B on the basis of both the tests.
Appellants filed a contempt pe.tition .alleging non- .
implementation of the direction. The High Court
protected the service of the selected and appointed
candidates and directed the remaining vacancies to be
c filled from the fresh panel which was stated to have been
prepared on the basis of marks obtained in written and
oral test. Thereafter, the present appeals were filed after
559 days from the order of the High Court.

D Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
,.' ,
~
HELD: 1. The Tribunal and ttje High Court werei right
in holding that the merit list was' required to be prepared
on the basis of composite marks obtained by candidates
at the written examination and oral interview both and not
E
only on the basis of marks at th~ oral interview. The plea
to the effect that written examination was for short-listing
the candidates and was in the nature of 'elimination test'
was raised by the State in the first round of litigation
before the first authority, viz. the Tribunal itself. But, in ~
F view of the fact that in the firs~ round of litigation, the
Tribunal held the action of the State Authorities to be
wrong and the High Court upheld it and the State did not
challenge the order in this Court, the High Court in the
second round, did not commit any error of law in directing
G the Authorities to prepare merit list on the basis of marks
obtained by the candidates in written examination as also
)<-°""
in oral interview. It was not open to the State Authorities
to reiterate and re-agitate in the sacond round, the same
ground. The said stage had 1already gone and the
H decision in the first round had attained finality so far as
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 197
BENGAL & ORS.
....,, ~"'
the nature of written examination was concerned. [Para A
34] (214-C-G]

2. The plea that there cannot be more than 15%
marks at the oral interview also cannot be accepted at
this stage. Such a direction was issued as early as in B
2000. The appellants, who were applicants before the
Tribunal and petitioners before the High Court accepted
the said decision and did not challenge the legality
thereof by approaching this Court. Even in the second
round, the same view was taken both by the Tribunal and
by the High Court. The decision of the High Court was
c
not challenged immediately. On the contrary, by filing a
Contempt Petition, implementation of the direction of the
High Court was sought by the appellant. The said
direction was, therefore, binding on all the parties
including the appellants. [Para 35] (214-H; 215-A-B] D
.,...._

Ajay Hasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors.,
[1981] 1 sec 722, referred to.

3.1. The Tribunal and the High Court were right in not E
setting aside the appointments of selected and appointed
candidates. The Tribunal was right in holding that in
absence of selected and appointed candidates and
without affording opportunity of hearing to them, their
=r 1 selection could not be set aside. The selected candidates
ought to have been joined as respondents in the Original
F
Application, which was not done. In any case, some of
them ought to have ceen!arsayee as sesponeenus!io a
'representative capacity'. That was also not done. [Paras
36 and 51] (215-0-E; 220-B]
G
3.2. High Court, in the first round of litigation directed
',_...,.. the Tribunal to reconsider the matter of 66 candidates
who were selected and appointed observing that the
Tribunal had not assigned any reason for granting
protection. It was not factually correct. In the second H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A round also, the Tribunal as well as the High C_ourt
protected them. Even in contempt proceedings, similar
orders were passed. [Paras 39, 40 and 43] [216-D-F; 218-
A]
3.3. The High Court. had directed the authorities to
8 consider the cases of th e candidates who had obtained
1

requisite 40% marks at written examination and oral test
and. who could be placed in the merit list along with or
above the selected and appointed candidates. By taking ·
such view, no illegality can .be said to have been
C committed by the High Court and there is no infirmity in
such a direction. [Para 46] [218-H; 219-P.]
3.4. It would be inequitable to set aside appointments
of candidates selected, appointed and are working since
0 1998-99. The selected a1;1d appQinted candidates have
completed ten years. They jlre thus having rich
experience in the field. There-are several vacancies.
· [Paras 51 and 52] [220-B-C]
Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
'
E Ors., (1984) 4 CC 251; Munindra Kumar and Ors. v. Rajiv
Govil and Ors., [1991] 3 SCC 368; Gujarat State Deputy
Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,
[1994] Supp 2 SCC 591; Buddhi Nath Cahudhary and Ors.
v. Akhil Kumar and Ors., [2001] 3 SCC 328 and M.S. Mudhol
F (Dr.) and Anr. V. S.D. Halegkar and Ors., [1993] 3 SCC 591,
relied on.
3.5. Service of 66 candidates who were selected and
appointed in 1998-99, who~e appointments were initially J'
'
not challenged and thereafter who were protected by the
G Tribunal and by the High Court have not been disturbed.
The appellants who are similarly situated to 66
respondents who are protected in the present
proceedings will be treated at par with those
respondents. And if on the basis of merit list prepared as
H per the order of the High Court, they are found eligible

,.
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 1~9
BENGAL & ORS.
.- ......_ and qualified, the State Government will consider their A
cases, i.e. the cases of the appellants and will appoiflt
them in accordance with law. Age bar, if any, will not come
in the way of those candidates. [Para 63] [223-D-E]

4.1. The said benefit, however, is limited to those
B
candidates who have challenged the selection by
approaching the Tribunal, the High Court and this Court.
-f The directions will not apply to those candidates who
have approached this Court for the firs.t time by filing
Interim Applications. [Para 63] [223-F]
c
<.
4.2. It is true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the
Constitution, this Court takes into account certain facto,rs
and one of such considerations is delay and laches on D
'-
~
""-..
the part of the applicant in approaching a writ-Court.
Power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds
for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 ·of the
Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches. [Para 54] [220-H; 221-A] E
4.3. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ-Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good grouhd
( ... F
for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction.
The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have I

already been disposed of or settled or where the rights
--(
of third parties have accrued in the meantime This
principle applies even in case of an infringement of G
fundamental right. [Paras 55 and 56] [221-C-E]

State of M.P. and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai, [1964] 6 SCR 261;
Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR (1967) SC 14~0;
Bhoop Singh v. Union of India and Ors., [1992] 2 SCR 969; H
200 SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A Tri/okchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [1969] 1 SCC 110;
Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, [1969] 1 SCC 185 and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCC 84, relied
on.

4.4. There is no upper limit and th~re is no lower limit
8
as to when a person can approach a <;:ourt. The question
is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis
of facts before the Court depending' on and vary from
case•
to case.
• .
It .will depend
. .
upon what
·I ..
the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy clajmed are and when
C and how the delay arose. [Para 57] [221-F]

P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., [1975] 1 SCC 152,
relied on.

0 4.5. More than a decade has passed since the
examination was held and the results were declared. The
applicants who had never challenged the selection before
the Tribunal, before the High Court and before this Court
and have applied for the first time in the present
E proceedings which were instituted in 2005 by filing
impleadment applications have thus accepted the
position as prevailed in 1996. Qua them, therefore, the
.
matter can be said to have been 's~ttled'. Initiation of.
proceedings at the instance of those candidates now will
'unsettle the settled position'. [Para 59] [222-C-E]
F
Case Law Referen~e :
[19811 1 sec 122 referred to Para 35
(1984) 4 cc 251 relied on. Para 38
G
[19911 3 sec 368 relied on: Para 47
[1994] Supp 2 sec 591 relied on Para 49
[20011 3 sec 328 relied on Para 49
H [19931 3 sec 591 relied on' Para 50
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A appellants being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Calcutta on August 11,
2003 in WPSR No. 630 of 2002 and companion matters and
an order, dated January 06, 2005 in CAP No. 1006 of 2004
and cognate petitions.
B
3. The case has a checkered history. In early nineties of
the last century, the Department of Health & Family Welfare,
State of West Bengal suffered acute shortage and non-
availability of adequate member of Medical Technologists. In
C their absence, laboratory and investigation work in Government
Hospitals, Laboratories, Medical Colleges, Primary Health
Centres, Blood Banks, etc. could not be performed
satisfactorily. The Government was worrying as to distress and
agony of patients visiting hospitals and dispensaries. It,
therefore, took an initiative to fill up requisite number of
D vacancies of Medical Technologists by taking up the matter with
the Employment Exchange. On October 5, 1993, the Assistant
Director of Health Services (Administration) issued a Memo to
the Director of Employment Exchange for sponsoring names
of candidates for the post of Medical Technologist (Laboratory)
E having requisite qualification of Madhyamik (Secondary)/Higher
Secondary with Science along with a certificate of Laboratory
Technology from a recognized University or Institution. The post
was in the basic pay of Rs.1040-1920 with other admissible
allowances. It was stated that the candidates were required to
F work in any District of West Bengal.

4. Pursuant to the above Memo and receipt of names from
Employment Exchange, a written examination was held on
August 20, 1995. A list of 1070 candidates was published who
G had cleared the examination. On August 1, 1996, oral interview
of the candidates who had cleared written examination was
taken and provisional select list was prepared which was
published on December 18, 1998. The empanelment was
made on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates at oral
interview.
H
.
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 203
.:... BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
r "(

""" 5. The candidates who could not get entry in the aelect list A
prepared by the authorities on the basis of marks obtained at
oral interview, approached West Bengal Administrative Tribunal,
Calcutta by instituting Original Application No. 1023 of 1999. It
was contended by them that the authorities had committed an
error of law in totally ignoring the marks obtained by candidates B
at written examination and panel was prepared only on the
~,

' basis of marks obtained by the candidates at oral interview
which was illegal and contrary to law. Preparation of panel,
therefore, was arbitrary, unreasonable and was liable to be set
aside. Interim order was passed by the Tribunal on April 9, 1999 c
granting liberty to the authorities to make appointment of
candidates selected and empanelled subject to the result in
Original Application. Liberty was also granted to the parties to
move the Tribunal for variation, vacation or modification of the
order.
.... D
6. Being aggrieved by the interim order date.cf April 9, 1999 .
granting liberty to the authorities to make appointment subject
· to final outcome of the proceedings, the appellants approached
the High Court of Calcutta by filing WPST No. 199 of 1999
contending that they had been treated with discrimination and E
different interim orders were passed in different matters. The
petition was disposed of by the High Court"'by issuing certain

- ~
directions. The Tribunal was requested to dispose of the main
matter expeditiously preferably before January 15, 2000.

7. By judgment and order dated June 30, 2000, main
F
matter was disposed of by the Tribunal. Merit list which was
prepared on the basis of marks obtained by candidates at oral
interview was set aside and a direction was issued by the
Tribunal to prepare fresh merit list of candidates by adding the
G
,.. ~...,.
marks obtained by them in both (i) written examination, and (ii)
oral interview, excluding those who were already in service. It
was observed that in the oral test 40% was fixed by the
Committee as pass marks. The said standard should be
applied on the total marks as pass marks. Appointment should
H
I"

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
,,.._
.l

A be given from the fresh panel so prepared in order of merit
subject to reservation and ,!to fill up vacant posts. Since
y~

-
(

. substantial period had gone in the meanwhile, a direction was .
also issued that age bar ~ill not come in the way of the
candidates in getting appointment. The persons who were
B selected, appointed and were in employment were protected.
It was also observed that every appointment would be subject l
to medical examination and police verification. A direction was y I-
\_
also issued that all appointments shourd be given within a period '
of four months from July 1, 2000. The case was thus finally
c disposed of.

8. The decision of th~ Tribunal was challenged in writ
petitions in the High Court and the High Court, by judgment and
order dated November 27,, 2000, disposed of the petitions. It 1--
observed that the question, of retaining those candidates who
D had been appointed, must be considered afresh by the Tribunal ...
_

since Tribunal had not assigned any reason as to why they
should be permitted to be' continued in service. According to
. the High Court, if the Tribunal was of the view that the selection
process was vitiated, no suth sympathy could have been shown
E to the candidates selected in the said selection process. It was
also observed that the question as to whether 40% marks could
have been allotted to the oral test also ought to have been
considered by the Tribunal keeping in view various decisions
. of the Apex Court. Taking' note of the grievance of some of the • \- ...
F petitioners, the High Court observed that the Tribunal would
consider whether 100% r'oster had been maintained. Request
was made to the Tribunal to dispose of the matter at an early
date preferably within 'a period of two months from the
communication of the order. That is how the first round of
G litigation came to an end.
9. The Tribunal again considered the matter. The main
~-~ ..
grievance of the applicants before the Tribunal, who were
unsuccessful in written examination or oral interview was that
the marks obtained by them in both written examination and oral
H
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 205
\.- -.....
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

interview ought to have been combined by the respondent A
authorities in preparation of the merit list and panel ought to
have been prepared on that basis which was not done. Since
uhe!semecuion!was!made only on the basis of oral interview,
the whole selection process was vitiated in law. The authorities
ought to have considered marks of both, written examination B
and oral interview and ought to have prepared merit list and in
~
that case, most of the applicants would have been empanelled
by finding place in the merit list. It was also contended that the
respondent authorities had followed a 'pick and choose' policy
by including names of their 'kiths and kins'. It was alleged that
certain applicants had cleared both written test as well as viva
c
voce and yet their names were not included in the panel
prepared for the selection. Other grievances were also made.

10. The case of the respondent authorities, on the other
,. hand, was that tho·se who had become successful in both written c
test and oral interview were selected and they were appointed
in due course. They were discharging their duties as Medical
Technologists faithfully since three years and had acquired right
to continue as such and they could not be deprived of their
livelihood for no fault on their part at the belated stage. It was E
also contended that once those candidates who participated
in the process and could not get themselves selected, had no
right to raise objection against such process which had been
- undertaken in accordance with law. They were estopped by the
"' doctrine of estoppel by turning round and challenging it being F
illegal or unlawful.

11. It was also contended by the counsel for the State that
since posts which were to be filled in were very limited (80) and

---...,.
J large number of candidates applied {approximately 4000
candidates), the State authorities had no alternative but to
G
screen candidates by holding written examination. Such a
'screening test' was perfectly legal, valid and it could not have
been objected. In other words, according to the State, written
examination was in the nature of 'elimination test'. So far as oral
H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A. interview was concerned, it was submitted that the Selection
Committee was consisting ofhightanking officials who.acted '
impartially, objectively and without malice. The allegation that .
the members of Selection Committee were instrumental in the
matter of selection of their close relations was totally baseless.
B Aggrieved candidates could not give any name of alleged close
relatives of the members of the Selection Committee. It was,
therefore, submitted that the action of the State was wholly legal
and valid.

12. The Tribunal considered the rival contentions of the
C parties and observed that. as against recriiitment of 80. Medical
Technologists, about 4000 candidates offered their respect've .
candidature for appointment. It was unprecedented and
perplexing situation. In absence of Recruitment Rules, an
administrative decision was taken by the Government for
D screening unsuccessful candidates by holding written test which .
was legal and proper. About 2500 candidates appeared at the
written test out of 4000 applicants and a list wa·s prepared
eliminating those candidates who had obtained less than
qualifying marks (40%) at the written examination. Since the
E object of the test was only to oust huge number of unsuccessful
candidates, there was no illegality in undertaking the said
exercise. A final list of eligible and qualified candidates was
prepared, who were called for,oral interview. According to the
Tribunal, the purpose of written test was only to eliminate huge
F number of unsuccessful candidates and it was not a. case of
selection based on written examination and oral interview. There
was no question of 'pick and choose' or showing discrimination
as alleged.

G 13. The Tribunal also not~d that about 190 candidates ~ad
already joined service as Medical Technologists and they were
working since more than three years. Since the entire selection
process had been found legal and lawful, there was no question
of cancellation of appointments of the candidates who had
H already joined service.
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 207
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
L. --.,
14. Moreover, unsuccessful candidates having participated A
in the selection process without any objection or protest, could
not be allowed to turn around and challenge the selection as
illegal or null and void. Following a decision of this Court in
Swaran Lata v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 165, the Tribunal
held that the applicants could not 'approbate and reprobate at 8
the same time'.

15. Taking overall view of the matter, the Tribunal found that
the selection process 'was bona fide and in accordance with
law and it was, therefore, required to be approved.
Appointments which had already been made by the authorities
c
of 190 candidates who had gained experience of more than
three years in the work of investigation entrusted to them also
could not be disturbed. Accordingly, a direction was issued to
the State authorities to offer appointments to successful
,. candidates in the waiting list subject to availability of vacancies D
following medical examination and police verification.

16. The above judgment and order was again challenged
by the unsuccessful candidates in the High Court and by the
impugned order, the High Court allowed the petitions. It E
observed that the Tribunal had committed an error of law in not
directing the authorities to prepare merit list on the basis of
marks obtained in the written test as well as viva voce. It was
.... urged that if the marks obtained at the written test had been
' kept out of consideration, proper selection could not be said F
to have been made and the entire panel would be invalid.
Referring to Raj Kumar & Ors. v. Shakti Raj & Ors., (1997) 9
SCC 527 and Praveen Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., [2000]
8 SCC 633, the High Court issued the following directions;

"We hold that a fresh panel of Medical Technologies G
:- '1" has to be prepared by the State Government on the basis
of qualifying marks both in the written test as well as in oral
te'st. We, therefore, dispose of all these writ applications
by giving the following directions:
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
I
•
v' J

A (i) The State Government must prepare within a period
of six weeks from 'the date of service of this order
upon them a fresh panel of Medical Technologies
on the basis of qualifying marks in the already held
written and oral test for appointment to the post of
B Medical Technologists;

(ii) 40% of such marks including the marks obtained y
in written and oral test should be the qualifying
marks and persons who have not obtained 40%
marks need not be empanelled;
c
(iii) After preparation of such panel, appointment is to
be made on the basis of such panel; ~
•
(iv) While preparing the panel the rule relating to
D reservation must be taken care of;
~ '
(v) In the matter of preparation of panel no candidate
who otherwise qualifies in the panel on the basis
I-
of the test made above should be disqualified
solely on the ground of age;
E
We are giving these directions since controversy is
pending for all these years and for which the petitioner or I-
\
candidates are not to be blamed".
~- t-'.'
17. It was also made clear that if those candidates who
F
had already been appointed did not find place in the panel,
consequential orders could be made by the State Government
but those who were in the panel could be accommodated if by
reason of existing vacancies, they could be accommodated.

G 18. It appears that certain candidates approached this
Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. (CC) 3728 of "f ._
(.
2004 challenging the judgment and order dated August 11,
2003. A two Judge Bench of this Court dismissed the Special
Leave Petition as withdrawn on April 29, 2004.
H
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 209
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
l- ""
19. Nothing was done by the appellant herein immediately A
against the order passed by the High Court on August 11,
2003. It further appears that implementation of the order passed
by the High Court was sought and a contempt petition was filed
by petitioners inter alia, alleging that the authorities had not
implemented the directions issued by the High Court. A prayer B
was, therefore, made to call upon the respondents/ contemnors
to show cause why they should not be committed to prison or
otherwise dealt with for having violated the judgment and order
dated August 11, 2003 passed by the High Court and why they
should not be directed to prepare fresh panel in accordance c
with those directions.
20. An affidavit was filed by the State asserting that they
had followed the directions of the Court. It was stated that there
was some delay on the part of the authorities because of
. procedural difficulties and practical problems but it was D
""' unintentional. They were always ready and willing to carry out
the directions of the Court. An unconditional apology was also
tendered by the respondents.
21. The High Court passed an interim order on December E
21, 2004. Reading of the order made it clear that the Court was
not inclined to issue any direction for removal/termination of
services of 66 persons who were working since 3-4 years. The
- ~
Court directed the State to make inquiries and to report to the
Court on January 06, 2005 as to the exact number of vacancies F
which were available for the appointment of the panel to be
prepared. It also directed the State to inform the Court whether
nine vacancies which had become defunct, could be revived.

22. On January 06, 2005, again the matter was placed
before the Court as per the order dated December 21, 2004. G
- "'(' The High Court heard learned counsel for the parties and noted
that a panel of 586 candidates had been prepared on the basis
of 40% marks obtained both in the written test as well as oral
interview. It also observed that sixty-six persons who were
appointed should be allowed to be accommodated by granting H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

-r·-'
A liberty to the State Government in the manner it thought best
without disturbing their seniority or continuity of their service. It
directed that the remaining vacancies should be filled up on the
basis of seniority position from the panel of 586 candidates.
Contempt petition was accordingly disposed of.
B
23. The appellants being aggrieved by the directions of the
High Court have approached this Court .. y

24. There was long delay of 559 days in approaching this .
Court by the appellants so far as the order passed in the Writ
c Petition. On July 15, 2005, notice was issued by this Court on
Special Leave Petition as well as on application for
condonation of delay. No stay of appointment, however, was
granted pursuant to the impugned order of the High court and
liberty was granted to the State to make appointments. It was,
D however, clarified that the appointments if any shall be subject
I

to further orders that may be passed in the Special Leave "'
Petition. The matter was thereafter adjourned from time to time.
Affidavits and further affidavits were filed. Considering the
nature of litigation and administrative problems of the State ~
\--
E Government on one hand and future of several candidates on \.
'
the other hand, it was thought fit to dispose of the matter finally
and accordingly the Registry was directed to place the matter
for final disposal on a non-miscellaneous day. That is how the
matter has been placed before us. ~- .~

F 25. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

26. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that
the orders passed by the High Court were not in consonance
with law. Moreover, even those orders had not been complied
G with by the authorities. The orders are, therefore, liable to be
set aside. It was stated th~t the action of the authorities of y .._
allocation of more than 15%.marks for oral interview was illegal
and contrary to the law laid down by this Court. Preparation of
merit list and panel of selected candidates was arbitrary and
H unreasonable. The action of the authorities and of the Tribunal
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 211
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
. . '-!
as well as of the High Court of protecting 66 selected and A
appointed candidates was unlawful and no such direction could
have been issued. It was submitted that since the action of the
respondent authorities was illegal and the Tribunal as well as
the High Court were wrong in protecting illegally selected
candidates, the doctrine of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence B
does not apply; The entire process of selection got vitiated and
directions are required to be issued by this Court to respondent
authorities to act in accordance with law.

27. It was stated that several vacancies are still there in
the cadre of Medical Technologists and almost all the appellants c
can be accommodated by the State authorities. It was,
therefore, submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed by
issuing consequential directions.

28. The respondent authorities, on the other hand, . D
supported the orders passed by the Tribunal and confirmed by
the High Court. It was stated that there is gross and unexplained
delay and laches on the part of the appellants in approaching
this Court.

29. So far as the order dated August 11, 2003 is E
concerned, it was submitted that certain directions were issued
which were complied with by the authorities. The appellants
herein did not challenge those directions at that time. In fact,
... their grievance was that the authorities had not complied with
the orders passed in August, 2003 and hence contempt petition F
was filed after about ten months. The prayer was to implement
the order passed by the High Court. Necessary directions w.ere,
therefore, issued by the High Court in January, 2005 ordering
the authorities to act in accordance with the directions of the
Court . G
..... ... 30. It was also contended that several candidates did not
challenge the orders of the High Court. It was urged that having
accepted the judgment and filed contempt petition, the
appellants were estopped under the doctrine of estoppel,
H
1
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

y ._

A waiver or acquiescence and they cannot challenge the order
of 2003 by approaching this Court after about two years. It was
urged that present case is one of 'approbate and reprobate', ·•t
i

'hot and cold', or 'fast and l'oose'. This Court, in exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
B may not entertain such prayer and dismiss all the matters.
31. It was further urg~d that in the order passed in
y
contempt petition, the High Court observed that if any person
is aggrieved by any action taken by the authorities in pursuanee
of the order, he is at liberty to take appropriate proceedings in
c accordance with law. Therefore, even on that ground, the
present appeals are not maintainable.

32. The learned counsel for the State stated that 66
persons have been retained who were selected and appointed.
D Initially, they were not made parties and were continued in
service. By now they have cqmpleted about ten years. He fairly ,,,;,
stated that in the circumstances, this· Court may direct the
authorities that those candidates who are similarly situated to
66 persons who are protected and who are in the merit list
E above those 66 ·candidates may be ordered to be appointed
inasmuch as there are several vacancies. He, however,
submitted that the. said benefit may be extended only to those
candidates who have· approached the Court by filing Original
Applications, Writ Petitions and by making grievance before
this Court. The candidates who had not approached the ~
F Tribunal, High Court and thi$ Court have no right to make any
grievance. Hence, the applicants who have sought
impleadment in the present proceedings for the first time cannot
claim the benefitwhich the appellants herein have claimed. a
was, therefore, submitted th~t an appropriate direction may be
G issued so that no prejudice will be caused to those employees
who were vigilant of their rights and who are otherwise qualified ~....-
·'
and eligible on the basis of protection granted to 66 employees.

33. The learned counselI appearing for 66 employees who
H were appointed, protected by the Tribunal and by the High Court
r
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 213
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
-~ "!
and who are still in service, submitted that the High Court was A
wholly right in protecting his clients. It was stated that their
names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange, they
cleared written examination as well as oral interview; they were
declared successful and were appointed. In the Original
Application, they were not made parties before the Tribunal. B
They were, therefore, protected by the Tribunal and there was
no illegality therein. The High Court, no doubt, directed the
Tribunal to consider the cases of those candidates but it is
equally true that they were in service and therefore they were
protected even in the second round. The High Court in the '.C
second round, expressly stated that since the employees were
in service, they needed protection and accordingly direction
was issued to that effect. Even during the course of
proceedings, it was stated on behalf of the petitioners before
the High Court that the protection granted in favour of selected D
candidates could be continued. It was, however, submitted that
similar benefit ought to be extended to them. The High Court
expressly protected them by directing the authorities to
consider the cases of eligible petitioners and to extend similar
benefit to them. Even thereafter, in the contempt proceedings,
the selected candidates were not disturbed. By now, they have E
completed about ten years of service. It was, therefore,
submitted that this Court, in exercise of power under Article 136
of the Constitution, may not interfere with the direction issued
4 by the High Court.
F
34. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our
opinion, the appeals deserve to be partly allowed. The
----\ contention on behalf of the State Government that written
examination was for short-listing the candidates and was in the
__, nature of 'elimination test' has no doubt substance in it in view G
of the fact that the records disclose that there were about 80
--....... posts of Medical Technologies and a huge number of
candidates, approximately 4,000 applied for appointment. The
State authorities had, therefore, no other option but to 'screen'
candidates by holding written examination. It was observed that H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 15 S.C.R.

y '·
A no Recruitment Rules were framed in exercise of the power
under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and hence
no such action could be taken. In our opinion, however, even in
absence of statutory provision, such an action can always be
taken on the basis of administrative instructions - for the
B purpose of 'elimination' and 'short listing' of huge number of
candidates provided the action is otherwise bona fide and
reasonable. It has also come on record that the administrative y
decision had been taken by the State to take 'elimination test'
to 'short list' huge number of candidates. It is further clear that
c the plea to that effect was raised by the State in the first round
of litigation before the first authority, viz. the Tribunal itself. But,
in view of the fact that in that round of litigation, the Tribunal held
the action of the State authorities to be wrong and the High
Court upheld it and the State did r:iot challenge the order in this
0 Court, in our opinion, the High Court in the second round, did
not commit any error of law in directing the authorities to
prepare merit list on the basis of marks obtained by the
candidates in written examination as also in oral interview. It
was not open to the State authorities to reiterate and re-agitate
in the second ro!Jnd, the same ground, that written examination
E was in the nature of 'elimination test' and it was limited to 'short
listing' of candidates and marks obtained by candidates at the
written examination could not be considered for preparation of
merit list. The said stage had already gone and the decision
in the first round had attained finality so far as the nature of
F written examination was concerned. The Tribunal and the High
Court were, therefore, right in holding in the second round that
the merit list was required to be prepared on the basis of
composite marks obtained by candidates at the written
examination and oral interview both and not only on the basis
G of marks at the oral interview.

35. The contention on behalf of the appellants that as per
the law laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid
Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., [1981] 1 sec 722 and other cases
H that there cannot be more than 15% marks at the oral interview
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 215
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
__,,. "'
also cannot be accepted at this stage. As already indicated A
earlier, such a direction was issued as early as in 2000. The
appellants, who were applicants before the Tribunal and
petitioners before the High Court accepted the said decision
and did not challenge the legality thereof by approaching this
Court. Even in the second round, the same view was taken both 8
by the Tribunal and by the High Court. The decision of the High
Court was not challenged immediately. On the contrary, by filing
a Contempt Petition, implementation of the direction of the High
Court was sought by the appellant. The said direction was,
therefore, binding on all the parties including the appellants. c
36. Regarding protection granted to 66 candidates, from
the record it is clear that their names were sponsored by the
Employment Exchange, they were selected and appointed in
1998-99. The candidates who were unable to get themselves
selected who raised a grievance and made a complaint before D
""" the Tribunal by filing applications ought to have joined them
(selected candidates) as respondents in the Original
Application, which was not done. In any case, some of them
ought to have been arrayed as respondents in a 'representative
capacity'. That was also not done. The Tribunal was, therefore, E
wholly right in holding that in absence of selected and appointed
candidates and without affording opportunity of hearing to them,
their selection could not be set aside .
....
37. The Tribunal stated; F
"In the case before us, the marks obtained in the written
test were excluded from consideration which preparing the
final list not in accordance with any policy which decision
of the Government. Moreover, the weight of the decision
of the Apex Court is on the side of consideration of the G
_,~ totality of the performance of the candidates in both oral
and written test, when rules do not provide against it and
appointment should be given from the merit list thus
prepared in accordance with the rules including
reservation rules. In our views same course should be H
216 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

y 4111
A followed in the cases before us; In this connection, it should
be mentioned that this finding will not affect the
appointments given to medical technologists (Laboratory)
already the appointments given as those person are not
parties to the proceedings before this Tribunal. It would be
B most improper for us to pass any judgment against to
them without giving them an opportunity of being heard.
So those appointments will remain unaffected by this y
Judgment".
'.

(emphasis supplied)
c
38. The learned counsel for the respondents, in this
connection rightly placed reliance on a decision of this Court
in Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,
[1984] 4 sec 2s1.
D
39. True it is that the High Court, in the first round, directed
the Tribunal to reconsider the matter of 66 candidates who were
selected and appointed observing that the Tribunal had not
assigned any reason for granting protection. With respect, it
was not factually correct. The Tribunal had recorded reasons,
E
namely, that they had been selected and appointed, they were
working since the date of their appointment; they were not
1

joined as respondents and no opportunity of hearing was
afforded to them and in their absence and without observing
principles of natural justice and fair play, their appointment could ~- '
F not be set aside.

40. Be that as it may, in the second round also, the Tribunal
as well as the High Court prote~ted them.

G 41. Dealing with the sele~ted candidates, the Tribunal
stated;
·f'-
"Taking an over-all v'ew of the matter as disclosed
from material on record, we find that the selection process
opted by the Respondent authorities was bonafide and in
H accordance with the law. Therefore, we approve the action
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 217
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
'> ....
taken by them in the matter. We hold th~t the entire A
selection process was not vitiated in law and hence there
was no question of quashing the selection process and
other action adopted by the respondents in the matter.
There was again no question of cancellation of the
appointments given by the State Respondent authorities 8
to 190 candidates. They have served for about 3 years and '

have hence gained sufficient experience in the work of
investigation entrusted to them. Again any other setting
aside their appointments was bound to affect adversely the
working of various medical Technologists in different c
Medical Units throughout the State of West Bengal. We
also hold that fixation of qualifying marks in both written and
oral test as 40% is quite lawful and valid in the facts and
circumstances of the case.

In the aforesaid background and scenario, we direct D'
"" that the appointees (in-service candidates) will continue
to do work as Medical Technologists. We also hold that
the panel of 240 candidates was quite lawful and valid.
Accordingly, we direct the State respondent authorities to
offer appointments to the successful candidates, who are E
not now waiting in the Panel (Namely from SI. No. 202-
240) subject to availability of vacancies and also subject
to medical examination and police verification. We also
i issue directions to the Respondents concerned, to relax
the age illegible of the empanelled successful candidates F
(namely from SI. No. 202-240), if so required;"

42. The High Court, in the writ petition also stated;

"It is further made clear that if those candidates who are
already appointed do not find a place in the panel in that G
_, T case consequential orders may be made by the State
Government. But those who were in the panel if they can
be accommodated by reason of existing vacancies in such
cases persons who have already been appointed should
not be disturbed. If is further made clear that appointments H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
y <'

.A · must be made on the basis of the panel as directed
above.".

43. Even in contempt proceedings, similar orders were
passed.
B 44. On December 21, 2004, the Court passed the
following orders; y
"After considering the facts and circumstances of the case
and also the affidavits filed by the State, it appears that in
c the panel which has been prepared, there are sixty-six
persons who do not qualify on the basis of the norms fixed
by this Court's order dated 11th August, 2003 and on the
basis of which the panel has been prepared. Bl.it the fact
remains that those sixty-six persons are now working.
D There were none vacancies which could not be filled up. It
also appears from the affidavit of the State that those ~ .
vacancies have become defunct. The Court is also not
inclined to pass any order for removal/termination of
services of those sixty-six persons who have been
working for last three to four years and have become
E
confirmed''.
(emphasis supplied)

45. Then while finally disposing of Contempt Petition, the
Court said;
r
F
"We, therefore, give liberty to accommodate those sixty six
persons in the manner it thinks best and without disturbing
their seniority or continuity of service."

G 46. In fact, it was stated at the Bar that on behalf of the
appellants a statement was m~de before the High Court that
appointment of 66 employees may not be disturbed but similar
-r ",
'
~

relief could be granted and benefit should be extended to the
candidates who had approached the Court. The Court, to that
extent, accepted the submission and directed the authorities
H
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 219
')
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
'I

to consider the cases of those candidates who had obtained A
requisite 40% marks at written examination and oral test and
who could be placed in the merit list along with or above 66
candidates. By taking such view, no illegality can be said to
have been committed by the High Court and we see no infirmity
in such a direction. B
47. In Munindra Kumar & Ors. v. Rajiv Govil & Ors., [1991)
3 sec 368, the selection comprised of written test, group
discussion and oral interview. The relevant rule fixed 40 per cent
of total marks for group discussion and oral interview (20 per
cent each). Though this Court held fixation of marks as arbitrary
c
being on higher side, it refused to set aside selection made
on that basis since selection had already been made, persons
were selected, appointed and were in service.
r
' ;..._ 48. In Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers' 0
Association v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1994] Supp 2 SCC 591,
this Court recorded a finding that appointments given underthe
'wait list' was not in accordance with law. It, however, refused
to set aside such appointments in view of length of service (five
ye2rs and more). E
49. In Buddhi Nath Cahudhary & Ors. v. Akhil Kumar &
Ors., [2001) 3 SCC 328, appointments were held to be
improper. But this Court did not disturb the appointments on
the ground that the incumbents had worked for several years
and had gained good experience. "We have extended F.
equitab~e considerations to such selected candidates who
have worked on the posts for a long period", said the Court.

50. In M.S. Mudhol (Dr.) & Anr. v. S.D. Halegkar & Ors.,
[1993] 3 sec 591, the petitioner sought a writ of quo warranto G
• "'r' and prayed for removal of a principal of a school on the ground
that he did not possess the requisite qualification and was
wrongly selected by the Selection Committee. Keeping in view
· the fact, however, that the incumbent was occupying the office
of Principal since more than ten years, this Court refused to H
220 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 15 S.C.R.
,,,. (

A disturb him at that stage.
t
l
51. In our con.sidered opinion: the law laid down by this
Court. in aforesaid and other casesJ
applies to the present
situation also. We are of the considered view that it would be
inequitable ifwe set aside appointments of candidates
8
selected,· appointed and are working since 1998-99. We,
.therefore, hold that the Tribunal and the High Court were right y
in not setting aside their appointments.

52. It is undisputed that by the time we are called upon to ...
c decide the matter, the selected and appointed candidates have "

completed ten years. They are tHus having rich experience in
the field. There are several vacancies. The stand of the State
. Government is equally fair and reasonable. It was stated that
those candidates who had grievance against the selection and
D had not waived their right to get similar treatment and had
approached the Tribunal, High <;ourt and this Court, may be
~ •
granted similar relief. We are also of the view that such relief
can be granted in favour of appellants who were agitated and
had raised voice against the. selection of candidates before the
E Tribunal, before the High Court and before us.
53. Those candidates wh.o had not approached the
Tribunal, High Court or this Court have now filed Interim
Applications in this Court The learned counsel appearing for
those applicants submitted that they may also be granted
F similar benefits. It was urged that equals must be treated
equally which is the fundamental right enshrined in Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. It was vehemently argued that it is
settled law that fundamental rig~ts cannot be waived. Hence,
eve·n if the applicants had not approached this Court earlier,
G they can come to this Court claiming similar re.lief by invoking
Part Ill of the Constitution. y ~.

54. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt
true that there can be no waiver :of fundamental right. But while
H exercising discretionary jurisdictjon under Articles 32, 226, 227
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 221
BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
... '\
or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain A
factors· and one of such co·nsiderations is delay and laches on
the part of the applicant i.n approaching a writ-Court. It is well
settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the
grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution is 'that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. B
55. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ-
Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably
possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for
a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle
c
is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed of or settled or
where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime
[vide State of M.P. & Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai, [1964] 6 SCR 261;
Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR (1967) SC 1450 D
an~ Bhoop Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (1992] 2 SCR 969].

; . 56. This principle applies even in case of an infringement
of fundamental right [vide Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi, [1969] 1 SCC 11 O; Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, E
[1969] 1 SCC 185 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
f19701 1 sec 84].
57. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as
~
to when a person can approach a Court. The question is one
F
of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the Court depending on and vary from case to case. It will
depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.

58. We are in respectful agreement with the following c
... ...,,- observations of this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N., [1975J 1 sec 152;

"It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts
.to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A there can never be a case where the Courts cannot
;:
a
interfere..iri matter after the passage of a certain length
·of time .. But It woulq be a sound and wise exercise of
discretion for the Co1Jrts to refuse to exercise their extra-
_o'rdinary powers· under Article 226 in the case of persons
· who do not approach it expeditiousiy for relief and who
· 'stand by and allow things to happen and then approach
the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle '( '
.settled matters"
(emphasis supplied)

.. 59. From the facts, it is clear that written examination for
..the selection of Medical Technologists was taken as early as
in_ August, 1995 and list of: more than 1,000 candidates was
puplished in June, 1996. By now more than _a decade has
0 passed. The applicants who had never challenged the selection
before the. Tribunal, before the High Court and before us and
have applied for the first time in the present proceedings which '
,1-
. were instituted in 2005 by filing impleadment applications have
thus accepted the position as prevailed in 1996. Qua them,
E therefore, the matter can be said to have been 'settled'. Initiation
of proceedings at the instance of those candidates now witl
'unsettle the settled position'.·

60. In our opinion, the learned counsel for the State is right r
in contending that even if this Court holds that the appellants
F ··who have approached this Court are entitled to some relief, such
relief could be granted to those candidates who had grievance
against the selection and who had challenged the action of the
respondent authorities but it .could not be extended to the
applicants who have approached this Court in the present
G. proceedings.
61. Though there is considerable force in the argument of y· .. --
the learned counsel for the State and contesting respondents
th.at there is substantial delay on the part of the appellants in
a pp.roaching this Court, In the light of factual scenario and the
,.. H. direction which we are inclined to issue, we have thought it fit
TRIDIP KUMAR DINGAL & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST 223
., BENGAL & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
-i·.

not to dismiss Special Leave Petitions on t~e ground of delay A
but considering merits of the case, we are issuing necessary
directions granting relief to the appellants. who were vigilant
about their rights.
62. Similarly, there is also substance in the contention of
the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants, by B
appearing in the wtitten examination and oral interview had
taken a chance and having failed have approached the
Tribunal. Again, a Special Leave Petition filed by some
candidates has already been dismissed by this Court. But in
the larger interest and keeping in view vacancies in the cadre, c
we have granted equitable relief in favour of eligible and
qualified applicants .
. 63. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed. Service
of 66 candidates who were selected and appointed in 1998-
)..
D
99, whose appointments were initially not challenged and
thereafter who were protected by the Tribunal and by the High
Court have not been disturbed. The appellants who are similarly
situated to 66 respondents who are protected in the present
proceedings will be treated at par with those respondents. And
if on the basis of merit list prepared as per the order of the High E
Court, they are found eligible and qualified, the State
Government will consider their cases, i.e. the cases of the
., appellants and will appoint them in accordance with law. Age
bar, if any, will not come in the way of those candidates. The
said benefit, however, is limited to those candidates who have F
challenge.d the selection by approaching the Tribunal, the High
Court and this Court. Our directions will not apply to those
candidates who have approached this Court for the first time
by filing Interim Applications. Their applications, therefore,
stand dismissed . G
.~ ~
64. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there
shall be no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeals partly allowed.
H