TRIDESHWAR DAYAL AND ANR.versusMAHESHWAR DAYAL AND ORS.

                TRIDESHWAR DAYAL AND ANR.
                                                                                A
                            v.
                MAHESHWAR DAYAL AND ORS.

                         DECEMBER 19, 1989

   [LAUT MOHAN SHARMA AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)                                    B

     Indian Stamp Act, 1899: Sections J3, 56 and 47-A (U.P. State
Amendment)-Arbitration award-Insufficiently stamped-Impound-
ing-Limitation for-Chief Controlling Revenue Authority-Whether
competent to interfere with the order of Collector.

      A dispute between the appellants and resp•mdent No. I was refer-          c
red to an arbitrator who made an award and filed it before the civil
court. On objection by the appellants, the prayer for making the award
a rule of the court was rejected. On appeal, the High Court confirmed
the same. This Court refused special leave and a petition for review was
also dismissed.                                                                 D

      Meanwhile, respondent No. 1 applied to the Collector fdr
summoning the award and for realising the escaped duty and penalty.
The application was allowed. The appellants moved the Chief Control-
ling Revenue Authority under Section 56 of the hidian Stamp Act, 1899
and the authority set aside the Collector's order. The respondents chal-        E
lenged the said order in a writ petition before the High Court which
allowed the same and remanded the case to the Collector for deciding it
afresh.

      Aggrieved, the appellants filed this appeal by special leave, con-
tending inter alia, that; (a) Respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to           F
move the Collector for impounding the award: (b) the Collector had no
authority to pass the impugned order after a decade; and (c) the
Collector did not have the power to enquire into the correct valuation of
the property which was subject matter of the award.

      Disposing of the appeal, this Court,                                      G

      HELD: J. I It is well settled that if a court acts without jurisdic-
tion, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have
been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i.e. an appeal would lie
to the court to which it would lie.if its order was with jurisdiction. [532A]
                                                                                H

                                     529
    530         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A        1.2 There is no question of limitation arising and it cannot be said
  that what had to be done promptly in 1976 could not be done later. The
  orders of the Collector dated 15.7.1983 and 22.7.1983 were passed as
  the follow-up steps iu pursuance of the civil court's direction dated
  18.3. 76 and no valid objection can be taken against them. The Col-
B lector,  therefore, shall have to proceed further for· realisation of the
  escaped duty. [532G J

          1.3 The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority had full power to
    interfere with the Collector's order, provided it was found to be errone-
    ous. But this Court does not find any defect in the Collector directing
    taking of steps for realisation of the stamp duty. [532B]
c
        Janardan Reddy and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad and Ors., [1951]
    SCR 344, relied on.

          2. The instant case comes from Uttar Pradesh where express pro-
D   visions have been made by the insertion of Section 47-A, authorising the
    Collector to examine the correctness of the valuation. Hence the Col-
    lector had the power to enquire into the valuation of the property which
    was the subject matter of the award. [533A-B]

         Himalaya House Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Chief Controlling Revenue
E   Authority, [1972] 3 SCR 332, referred to.

          3. It is clarified that on the strength of the present judgment it
    will not be open to the respondent to urge that the effect of the High
    Court decision dated 8.7.1981 and the order of this Court dismissing the
    special leave petition therefrom and later the review application have
    disappeared or have got modified. [533D-E]
F
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5055
    of 1989.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 27.2.1989 of the Allahabad
    High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 12322 of 1984.
G
         Salish Chandra, E.C. Agarwala, Atul Sharma, Ms. Purnima
    Bhatt and V .K Pan di ta for the Appellants.

         G.L. Sanghi, B.D. Agarwal, G. Ganesh, K.L. John and Ms. Shobha
H   Dikshit for the Respondents.
              TRIDESHWAR v. MAHESHWAR [SHARMA, l.J                 531

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                         A
     SHARMA, J. This case arises out of a proceeding under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Special leave is granted.

       2. A dispute between the appellants and the respondent No. 1,
who are members of a family, was referred to an arbitrator, who made B
 an award on 9.10.1973, and filed the same within a few days before the
civil court for making it a rule of the court. On objection by the
present appellants, the prayer was rejected on 18.3.1976 and the order
was confirmed by the High Court on 3. 7 .1981 in a regular first appeal.
An application for special leave was dismissed by this Court on
 18.4.1983 and a prayer for review was also rejected. It is stated on
behalf of the appellants that in the meantime the respondent No. 1 c
applied before the Collector for summoning the award and realising
the t'uty and penalty. A copy of the award was annexed to the applica··
tion. The respondent's prayer was opposed by the appellants but was
allowed by the Collector on 15.7.1983; and, on a request made to the
civil court for sending the award, the civil court asked the office to do D
so. The appellants moved the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
under s. 56 of the Indian Stamp Act (hereinafter referred to as the
Act) against the Collector's order dated 15.7.1983. The Authority in
exercise of its revisional power set aside the impugned order of the
Collector, inter alia, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The respon-
dent challenged this judgment before the High Court in a writ case E
which was allowed by the impugned judgment dated 27.2.1989. The
matter was remanded to the Collector to decide the case afresh in the
light of the observations. The High Court also doubted the power of
the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to entertain the appellants'
application under s. 56 of the Act. This judgment is the subject matter
of the present appeal.                                                    F

      3. Mr. Salish Chander, the learned counsel for the appellants,
contended that there cannot be any doubt about the power of the
Chief Controlling Authority to correct an erroneous order of the
Collector. Emphasis was laid on the language of s. 56 suggesting its
wide application. The learned counsel was also right in arguing that     G
the Authority is not only vested with jurisdiction but has the duty to
qua~h an order passed by the Collector purporting to be under
Chapters IV and V of the Act by exercising power beyond his jurisdic-
tion. To hold otherwise will lead to an absurd situation where a sub-
ordinate authority makes an order beyond its jurisdiction, which will
have to be suffered on account of its unassailability before a higher    H
    532         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

    authority. This Court in Janardan Reddy and Others v. The State of
A
    Hyderabad and Others, [1951] SCR 344, after referring to a number of
    decisions, observed that it is well settled that if a court acts without
    jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would
    have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i.e., an appeal
    would lie to the court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdic-
B   tion. We, therefore, agree with the appellants that the Chief Control-
    ling Revenue Authority had full power to interfere with the Collector's
    order, provided it was found to be erroneous. Their difficulty, how-
    ever, is that we do not find any defect in the Collector directing to take
    steps for the reaslisation of the stamp duty.

       4. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the respon-
c dent No.  1 had no locus standi to move the Collector for impounding
  the award and sub-section ( 1) of s. 33 of the Act had no application.
  The learned counsel proceeded to say that in the circumstances it has
  to be assumed that the Collector acted suo motu under sub-section (4)
  of the said section and since the proviso to sub-section (5) directs that
D no action under sub-section (4) shall be taken after a period of four
  years from the date of execution of the instrument, the Collector had
  no authority to pass the impugned order after about a decade. In reply,
  Mr. G.L. Sanghi urged that the order for impounding the award was
  passed by the civil court itself on 18.3.1976, and the further orders of
  the Collector dated 22.7.1983 and of the civil court dated 27.8.1983
E were passed merely by way of implementing the same. The learned
  counsel is right in relying upon the concluding portion of the order of
  the civil court dated 18.3.1976 directing the impounding of the award
  and sending it to the Collector for necessary action. It is true that
  further steps in pursuance of this judgment were not taken promptly
  and it was the respondent No. 1 who drew the attention to this aspect,
F but it cannot be legitimately suggested that as the reminder for imple-
  menting the order came from the respondent, who was motivated by a
  desire to salvage the situation to his advantag_e, further •teps could not
  be taken. There is no question oflimitation arising in this situation and
  it cannot be said that what had to be done promptly in 1976 would not
  be done later. The orders of the Collector dated 15.7.1983 and
G 22.7.1983 must, therefore, in the circumstances, be held to have been
  passed as the follow-up steps in pursuance of the civil court's direction
  dated 18.3.1976, and no valid objection can be taken against them.
  The Collector, therefore, shall have to proceed further for realisation
  of the escaped duty.

H         5. It was next contended that in any event the Collector did not
                 TRIDESHWAR v. MAHESHWAR (SHARMA, J.]                   533
i
    have the power to enquire into the correct ' valuation of the property      A
    which was the subject-matter of the award. Reliance was placed on the
    observations in Himalaya House Co. Ltd.. Bombay v. Chief Control-
    ling Revenue Authority, [1972) 3 SCR 332. There is no merit in this
    point eithe.r- The case comes from Uttar Pradesh where express provi-
    sions have been made by the insertion of s. 47-A, authorising the
                                                                                B
    Collector to examine the correctness of the valuation.

          6. Lastly Mr. Salish Chandra argued that the respondent No. 1 is
    taking keen interest in the present proceeding in an attempt to illegally
    re-open the question of making the award a· rule of the' court, which
    stood concluded by the impugned judgment of the High Court and the
    order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition therefrom and     c
    he can not be allowed to do so. The reply of Mr. Sanghi has been that
    this aspect is not relevant in the present proceeding for realisation of
    the duty and need not be decided at this stage. His stand is that an
    award which is not made rule of the court is not a useless piece of
    paper and can be of some use, say by way of defence in a suit. He said
                                                                                D
    that this question will have to be considered if and when the occasion
    arises. Having regard to the limited scope of the present proceeding,
    we agree with Mr. Sanghi that we may not go into this aspect in the
    present case, but we would clarify the position that on the strength of
    the present judgment it will not be open to the respondent to urge that
    the effect of the High Court decision dated 8.7.1981 and the orders of
    this Court dismissing the special leave petition therefrom and later the    E
    review application has disappeared or has got modified.

          7. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms, but the parties
    are directed to bear their own costs of this Court.

    G.N.                                                Appeal disposed of.     F