TRIBHUVANSHANKARversusAMRUTLAL

                         [2013) 12 S.C.R. 368


A                       TRIBHUVANSHANKAR
                                   v.
                             AMRUTLAL
                  (Civil Appeal No. 10316 of 2013)

                        NOVEMBER 13, 2013
B
             [ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

        MADHYA PRADESH ACCOMMODATION CONTROL
    ACT, 1961:
c
        Suit for eviction - Defendant denying title of plaintiff over
   suit premises and setting up plea of adverse possession -
   Finding of trial court that there is no relationship of landlord
   and tenant between parties, not assailed - Held: Once a finding
0 was recorded that there was no relationship of landlord and
   tenant under the Scheme of the Act, there was no necessity
   to enter into an enquiry with regard to the title of the plaintiff
  based on the sale deed or the title of the defendant as put
  forth by way of assertion of long possession - High Court is
E justified to the extent that no equitable relief could be granted
  in a suit instituted under the Act - But, it has committed an
  illegality by affirming the judgment and decree passed by trial
  court because by such affirmation, defendant becomes owner
  of the premises by acquisition of title by prescription and,
  therefore, impugned judgment to that extent is vulnerable and
F accordingly the said affirmation is set aside - Judgment of
  High Court is affirmed only to the extent that as relationship
  of landlord and tenant was not established, defendant was not
  liable for eviction under the Act - The issue of right, title and
  interest is open - In the circumstances, plaintiff is entitled
G under law to file a fresh suit for title and recovery of
  possession and such other reliefs as the law permits and
  defendant is entitled to resist the same by putting forth all his
  stand and stance including the plea of adverse possession.

H                                 368
        TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                     369

    ADVERSE POSSESSION:                                         A

      Concept of adverse possession - Explained - Limitation
- Time spent in adjudication of suit and appeals - Held: In the
instant oase, the suit was instituted on the basis of purchase
-- The relief sought in the plaint was for delivery of possession B
-- It was not a forum that lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass
 a decree for delivery of possession -- It showed the intention
 of plaintiff to act and to take back the possession -- In the
 circumstances, after institution of the suit, the time for
 acquiring title by adverse possession has been arrested or
 remained in a state of suspension till the entire proceedings C
 arising out of suit are terminated - Therefore, appel/ant-
 plaintiff is permitted to institute a suit.

       The appellant instituted a suit under the M.P.
 Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for eviction of the D
 respondent from the suit-premises and for mesne profits.
 The case of the appellant-plaintiff was that he had
 purchased the suit property under a registered sale deed
 dated 1.4.1976 and the respondent-defendant was in
  possession of the said suit property as a tenant under E
 the vendor on a monthly rent of Rs.15/-. The defendant
  disputed the right, title and interest of the plaintiff, and
  denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. He further
  set up a plea of adverse possession. The trial court
  dismissed the suit holding that the sale deed relied upon F
  by the plaintiff was without any sale consideration; that
  the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
  parties had not been established; and that the
   respondent had become the owner of the suit
   accommodation on the basis of adverse possession. The G
   first appellate court allowed the appeal of the plaintiff and
   decreed the suit for possession holding that though the
   appellant-plaintiff had not been able to prove the
    relationship of landlord and tenant, the conclusion
    arrived at by the trial court that the sale-deed dated H
        370     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 12 S.C.R.


    A  1.4.1976 due to absence of sale consideration was invalid,
       was neither justified nor correct; and that there being no
       clinching evidence to establish that the defendant had
       perfected his title by adverse possession, the finding
       recorded by the trial court on that score was indefensible.
    B The second appeal filed by the defendant-respondent
      was allowed by the High Court holding that once the
      plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord
      and tenant, the plaintiff could not have fallen back on his
      title to seek eviction of the tenant.
    c      Allowing the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1.1 The finding returned by the courts below
   that has been concurred by the High Court to the effect
   that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant
 D between the parties is absolutely impeccable and, In fact,
   the legality and propriety of the said finding has not been
   assailed. [para 14] [380-G-HJ
         1.2 There is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction
E when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction
   brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of
   Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining
   to eviction on specified grounds. However, if alternative
   relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the
   position would be different. It would depend upon the
F Scheme of the Act whether an alternative relief is
   permissible. That apart, the court can decide the issue of
  title if a tenant disputes the same and the only purpose
  is to see whether the denial of title of the landlord by the
  tenant is bona fide in the circumstances of the case.
G Thus, a limited enquiry pertaining to the status of the
  parties, i.e., relationship of landlord and tenant can be
  undertaken. The dictum laid down in Bhagwati Prasad
  and Bishwanath Agarwalla are distinguishable, for in the
  said cases the suits were filed under the Transfer of
H
       TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                  371


Property Act where the equitable relief under 0. 7, r. 7 A
CPC could be granted. [para 22-23] [389-A-F]

    Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramau/ 1966 SCR 286 =AIR
1966 SC 735 Biswanath Agarwal/a v. Sabitri Bera and Others
2009 (12) SCR 459 = (2009) 15 sec 693 - distinguished.
                                                             B
    Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad and Another 2001 ~"*"'
(5) Suppl. SCR 243 = 2002 AIR 136; Abdul Ghani v.
Musammat Babni 25 All 256 and Balmukund v. Dalu 25 All
498; Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad 1951 SCR
277 = 1951 AIR 177; Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal 1995 C
Suppl. (3) SCR 847 = (1995) 6 sec 580; UC v. India
Automobiles & Co. 1990 (3) SCR 545 = (1990) 4 SCC 286 -
referred to.

      1.3 However, in the instant case, once a finding was 0
recorded that there was no relationship of landlord and
tenant under the Scheme of the Act, there was no
necessity to enter into an enquiry with regard to the title
of the plaintiff based on the sale deed or the title of the
defendant as put forth by way of assertion of long E
possession. The High Court is justified to the extent that
no equitable relief could be granted in a suit instituted
under the Act. But, it has committed an illegality by
affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial
court because by such affirmation the defendant
becomes the owner of the premises by acquisition of title F
by prescription and, therefore, the impugned judgment to
that extent is vulnerable and accordingly the said
affirmation is set aside.The judgment of the High Court is
 affirmed only to the extent that as the relationship of
 landlord and tenant was not established, the defendant G
 was not liable for eviction under the Act. The issue of
 right, title and interest is definitely open.[para 23 and 25]
 [389-F-G; 390-A-C; 391-C-D]

     2.1 The suit was instituted on the basis of purchase.   H
    372        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A A plea was advanced that the defendant had already
  perfected his title by prescription as he was in possession
  for 18 to 19 years. Under these circumstances the plaintiff
  is entitled under law to file a fresh suit for title and
  recovery of possession and such other reliefs as the law
B permits and the defendant is entitled to resist the same
  by putting forth all his stand and stance including the
  plea of adverse possession. [para 24-25] [390-E-F, H; 391-
    A, E]
       Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad and Another 2001
                           =
C (5) Suppl. SCR 243 2002 AIR 136 - relied on.
       2.2 Adverse possession fundamentally contemplates
  a hostile possession by which there is a denial of title of
  the true owner. By virtue of remaining in possession the
D possessor takes an adverse stance to the title of the true
  owner. In fact, he disputes the same. A party claiming
  adverse possession must prove that his possession is
  'nee vi, nee clam, nee precario', that is, peaceful, open
  and continuous. The possession must be adequate in
  continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that the
E possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with
  a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual,
  visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the
  statutory period. [para 25 and 27] [391-F-G; 392-C-D]
F         Secy. of State for India In Council v. Debendra Lal Khan
  (1933-34) 61 IA 78:AIR 1934 PC 23; S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi
                               =
  Sakina 1964 SCR 780 1964 AIR 1254; Karnataka Board
                                                         =
  of Wakf v. Govt. of India 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255 2(004)
  10 SCC 779; P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others v.
                                              =
G Revamma and Others 2007 (5) SCR 491 (2007) 6 SCC 59
  - referred to.
       2.3 The fundamental policy behind limitation is that
  if a person does not pursue his remedy within the
  specified time frame, the right to sue gets extinguished.
H In the case at hand, the appellant had filed the suit for
        TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                  373

eviction. The relief sought in the plaint was for delivery A
of possession. It was not a forum that lacked inherent
jurisdiction to pass a decree for delivery of possession.
It showed the intention of the plaintiff to act and to take
back the possession. In the circumstances, after the
institution of the suit, the time for acquiring title by B
adverse possession has been arrested or remained in a
state of suspension till the entire proceedings arising out
 of the suit are terminated. Be it ingeminated that if by the
 date of instant suit the defendant had already perfected
 title by adverse possession that would stand on a c
 different footing. [para 30 and 34] [393-F; 394-0-F]

    Babu Khan and Others v. Nazim Khan (dead) by L.Rs.
                                =
and Others 2001 (2) SCR 1199 2001 AIR 1740; Ragho
Prasad v. P.N. Agarwal 1969 All LJ 975 - relied on.
                                                              D
     Mst. ·sultan Jehan Begum and Ors. v. Gui Mohd. and
Ors. AIR 1973 MP 72; Sultan Khan s/o Jugge Khan v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Another 1991 MPLJ 81 - stood
approved.
                                                              E
    Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 28,
Para 605 - referred to.

     2.5 Therefore, the appellant-plaintiff is permitted to
institute a suit within a period of two months. [para 35]
                                                              F
     Punia Pillai vs. Panai Minor through Pandiya Thevan
AIR 1947 Madras 282, and Amulya Ratan Mukherjee and
ors. V. Kali Pada Tah and Ors. AIR 1975 Cal 200 - cited.

                    Case Law ~eference:
                                                              G
     AIR 1947 Madras 282       cited             para 8
     1966 SCR 286              distinguished     para 8
     AIR 1975 Cal 200          cited             para 8
                                                              H
    374      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 12 S.C.R.


A         2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 243 relied on               Para 10
          25 All 256                   referred to        para 15
          25 All 498                   referred to         para 15
          2009 (12) SCR 459            distinguished      para 16
B
          1951 SCR 277                 referred to        para 19
          1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 847 referred to             para 21
          1990 (3) SCR 545             referred to        para 21
c
          (1933-34) 61 IA 78:          referred to        para 25
          AIR 1934 PC 23
          1964 SCR 780                 referred to        para 26

D         2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255 referred to             para 27
          2007 (5) SCR 491             referred to        para 28
          AIR 1973 MP 72              approved            para 31
          1991 MPLJ 81                approved            para 32
E
          2001 (2) SCR 1199           relied on           para 33
          1969 All LJ 975             relied on           para 33

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
F 10316 of 2013.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 08.02.2008 of the
    High Court of M.P. at Indore in SA No. 33 of 1995.

      A.K. Chitale, Niraj Sharma, Sumi! Kr. Sharma for the
G Appellant.

          Puneet Jain, Christi Jain, Chhaya, Asgar Ali, Pratibha Jain
    for the Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
        TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                        375

    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.                              A
    2. This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and
order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore,
in Second Appeal No. 33 of 1995 passed on 8.2.2008.
        3. The appellant-plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 259A/86 B
in the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Mhow, District Indore, for ·
eviction of the respondent-defendant from the suit-premises and
for mesne profits. The case of the appellant-plaintiff was that
he had purchased the suit property vide registered sale deed
dated 1.4.1976 on payment of sale consideration of Rs.4500/ C
- to the vendor, one Kishanlal. The respondent-defendant was
 il"I possession of the said suit property as a tenant under the
earlier owner Kishorilal on payment of rent of Rs.15/- per month.
 It was averred in the plaint that it was an oral tenancy and after
 acquiring the title the appellant informed the respondent about D
the sale by the earlier owner. Despite assurance given by the
 respondent to pay the rent to him, it was not honoured which
compelled the appellant to send a notice on 14.12.1977 and,
 eventually, he terminated the tenancy with effect from
 31.1.1978. The respondent, as pleaded, had replied to the E
 notice stating, inter alia, that the appellant was neither the
 landlord nor the owner of the property. On the contrary, it was
 stated in the reply that the respondent was the owner of the
  premises.
       4. The grounds that were urged while seeking eviction F
were: {i) the defendant was in arrears of rent since 1.4.1976
and same was demanded vide notice dated 14.12.1977, which
was received on 3.1.1978 and despite receiving the notice, the
defendant defaulted by not paying the rent within two months;
{ii) that the said accommodation was bona fide required by the G
plaintiff for construction of his house and the accommodation
is an open land; {iii) the said accommodation was bona fide
required by the plaintiff for general merchant shop i.e. non-
residential purpose and for the said purpose the plaintiff did
                                                                    H
    376      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A not have any alternative accommodation in his possession in
  Mhow City.

        5. In the written statement, the defendant disputed the right,
  title and interest of the plaintiff, and denied the relationship of
B landlord and tenant. That apart, a further s.tand was taken that
  the appellant had no right under the M.P. Accommodation
  Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act") to file the suit for
  eviction. It was set forth by the respondent-defendant that he
  was never a tenant under Kishorilal and, in fact, the
C accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and a 'banjar'
  land and the respondent was in possession for 18 to 19 years
  and it was to the knowledg_e. of Kishorilal and his elder brother.
  For the purpos~ of business he had constructed a Gumti, got
  the gate fixed and when the business relating to sale of furniture
  commenced there was no objection from Kishorilal or his
D brother or any family member. The possession, as put forth by
  the respondent, was uninterrupted, peaceful and to the
  knowledge of Kishorilal who was the actual owner. It was also
  set forth that when Kishorilal desired to sell the premises, he
  was put to notice about the ownership of the defendant but he
E sold the property without obtaining sale consideration with the
  sole intention to obtain possession by colluding with the
  appellant-plaintiff. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the premises
  is situate in the Cantonment area and the Cantonment Board
  has the control over the land and neither Kishorilal nor the
F appellant had any title to the same.
       6. The learned trial Judge framed as many as 26 issues.
  The relevant issues are, whether the suit accommodation was
  taken on rent by the defendant for running his wood business
G in the year 1973 from the earlier landlord Kishorilal; whether
  defendant is in continuous, unobstructed and peaceful
  possession since 18 years which was within the knowledge of
  Kishorilal, his elder brother and their family members; whether
  defendant had become owner of the suit accommodation by
  way of adverse possession; and wheth«~r the sale deed had
H
              TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                           377
                     [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
been executed without any consideration for causing damage                 A
to the title of defendant.
     7. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of evidence
brought on record, came to hold that the sale deed executed
by Kishorilal in favour of the appellant was without any sale
consideration; that the relationship of landlord and tenant                B
between the parties had not been established; and that the
respondent had become the owner of the suit accommodation
on the basis of adverse possession. Being of this view, the trial
court dismissed the suit.
                                                                           c
      8. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and
decree the plaintiff preferred Civil Regular Appeal No. 5 of
1994 and the lower appellate court, reappreciating the evidence
on record and considering the submissions raised at the bar,
came to hold that the appellant- plaintiff had not been able to .. o
prove the relationship of landlord and tenant; that the conclysion
      '                         '   'It,'               ·'   ,   '

arrived at by the learned trial '.11.!.1!.ge that the. s~J,e-deed dated
1.4.1976 due to absence of sale ccinsiderati6n\vas invalid, was
neither justified nor correct; and that there being no clinching
evidence to establish that the defendant had perfected his title E
by adverse possession the finding recorded by the learned trial
Judge on that score was indefensible. After so holding, the
learned appellate Judge proceeded to hold that as the plaintiff
had established his title and the defendant had miserably failed
to substantiate his assertion as regards the claim of perfection F
of title by way of adverse possession, the plaintiff on the basis
of his ownership was entitled to a decree for possession. To
arrive at the said conclusion he placed reliance on Punia Pillai
vs. Panai Minor through Pandiya Thevan 1, Bhagwati Prasad
v. Chandramau/2 and Amu/ya Ratan Mukherjee and Ors. V. G
 Kali Pada Tah and Ors. 3

 1.       AIR 1947 Madras 282
 2.       AIR 1966 SC 735.
 3.       AIR 1975 Cal 200.                                                H
     378       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A        9. Facing failure before the appellate court the defendant
    preferred Second Appeal No. 33of1995 before the High Court.
    The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions
    of law: -
           "(1) Whether a decree could be passed in favour of
8          plaintiff though such plaintiff fails to establish the
           relationship of landlord and tenant?
           (2) Whether the 1st Appellate Court committed the error
           of law in pronouncing the error of law in pronouncing the
c          judgment and decree on question of title? And
           (3) Whether the 1st Appellate Court has erred in law in
           holding that the possession of the defendant is not proved
           and that the defendant has not acquired the title by adverse
           possession?"
D
         10. The learned single Judge by judgment dated 8.2.2008
  adverted to Sections 12(1 )(a) and 12(1 )(e) of the Act and came
  to hold that once the plaintiff had failed to establish the
  relationship of landlord and tenant which is the sine qua non in
E a suit for eviction, the plaintiff could not have fallen back on his
  title to seek eviction of the tenant. Be it noted, the learned single
  Judge placed reliance upon Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo
  Prasad and another wherein the decision in Bhagwati Prasad
  (supra) had been distinguished. The learned single Judge
F dislodged the judgment and decree passed by the lower
  appellate court and affirmed that of the learned trial Judge.
       11. We have heard Mr. A.K. Chitale, learned senior
  counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Puneet Jain,
G learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
          12. Questioning the legal acceptableness of the decision
    of the High Court the learned senior counsel has raised the
    following contentions: -
H   4.   AIR 2002 SC 136.
          TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                   379
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    (a)     The learned single Judge has erroneously opined A
            that a suit cannot be decreed by civil court for
            possession on the basis of general title even if the
            landlord-tenant relationship is not proved. A
            manifest error has been committed by the learned
            Judge not following the law laid down in Bhagwati B
            Prasad (supra) which is applicable on all fours to
            the case at hand, solely on the ground that the said
            decision has been distinguished in Rajendra
             Tiwary's case.
     (b)    Though three substantial questions of law were
                                                                 c
            framed, yet the learned single Judge without
            considering all the questionss affirmed the judgment
            of the trial court wherein it had come to hold that
            the defendant had established his title by adverse
            possession despite the same had already been D
            annulled on reappreciation of evidence by the lower
            appellate court.
     (c)    Assuming a conclusion is arrived at that there
            should have been a prayer for recovery of E
            possession by paying the requisite court fee, the
            appellant, who has been fighting the litigation since
            decades should be allowed to amend the plaint and
            on payment of requisite court fee apposite relief
            should be granted.                                    F
     13. Countering the aforesaid submissions Mr. Puneet Jain,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has proponed
thus: -
      (i)    The analysis made by the High Court that when the G
             relationship between the landlord and tenant is not
             proven in a suit for eviction, possession cannot be
             delivered solely on the bedrock of right, title and
             interest cannot be found fault with. There is a
             difference between a suit for eviction based on H
     380           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A                   landlord-tenant relationship and suit for possession
                    based on title, and once the relationship of landlord
                    and tenant is not proven there cannot be a decree
                    for eviction.

B
           (ii)     The High Court has correctly distinguished the
                    decision rendered in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) in
                    Rajendra Tiwary (supra) as the law laid down in
                    Bhagwati Prasad is not applicable to the present
                    case and hence, the submission raised on behalf
                    of the appellant that once the right, title and interest
c                   is established, on the basis of general title,
                    possession can be recovered is unacceptable.
           (iii)     The alternative submission that liberty should be
                    granted to amend the plaint for inclusion of the relief
D                   for recovery of possession would convert the suit
                    from one for eviction simplh~iter to another for right,
                    title and interest and recovery of possession which
                    is impermissible. That apart, when the suit was
                    c,lismissed and the controversy travelled to
E                   appellate court the plaintiff was aware of the whole
                    situation but chose not to seek the alternative relief
                    that was available which is presently barred by
                    limitation. It is well settled in law that the Court
                    should decline to allow the prayer to amend the
F                   plaint if a fresh suit based on the amended claim
                    would be barred by limitation on the date of
                    application.
        14. At the very outset, we may straight away proceed to
  state that the finding returned by the courts below that has been
G concurred by the High Court to the effect that there is no
  relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is
  absolutely impeccable and, in fact, the legality and propriety of
  the said finding has not been assailed by the learned senior
  counsel for the appellant. As far as right, title and interest is
H concerned, the learned trial Judge had not believed the sale
         TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                       381
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
deed executed by the vendor of the appellant-plaintiff in his A
favour for lack of consideration and also returned an affirmative
finding that the defendant was in possession for long and
hence; had acquired title by prescription. The learned appellate
Judge on reappreciation of the evidence brought on record had
 unsettled the findings with regard to the title of the plaintiff as B
 well .as the acquisition of title by the defendant by way of
 adverse possession. He had granted relief to the plaintiff on
 the ground that in a suit for eviction when the title was proven
 and assertion of adverse possession was negatived by the
 court, there could be a direction for delivery of possession. As c
 has been stated earlier the High Court has reversed the same
 by distinguishing the law laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra)
 and restored the verdict of the learned trial Judge.
       15. Keeping these broad facts in view, it is necessary to       .
 scrutinize whether the decision in Bhagwati Prasad which has        0
 been assiduously commended to us by Mr. Chitale is
 applicable to the case. In Bhagwati Prasad (supra) the
 defendant was the appellant before this Court. The case of the
 plaintiff was that the defendant was in possession of the house
 as the tenant of the plaintiff. The defendant admitted that the E
 land over which the house stood belongedi'o the plaintiff. He,
 however, pleaded that the house had been constructed by the
 defendant at his own cost and that too at the request of the
 plaintiff because the plaintiff had no funds to construct the
 building on his own. Having constructed the house at his own F
 cost, the defendant entered into possession of the house on
 condition that the defendant would continue to occupy the same
 until the amount spent by him on the construction was repaid
  to him by the plaintiff. In this backdrop, the defendant resisted
  the claim made by the plaintiff for ejectment as well as for rent. G
  The learned trial Judge held that the suit was competent and
  came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree
  for ejectment as well as for rent. The High Court agreed with
   the trial court in disbelieving the defendant's version about the
   construction of the house and about the terms and conditions H
    382         SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 12 S.C.R.

A on which he had been let into possession. The High Court
   opined that the defendant must be deemed to have been in
   possession of the house as a licensee and accordingly opined
  that a decree for ejectment should be passed. Dealing with
  various contentions raised before this Court it was ruled that
B the defendant could not have taken any other plea barring that
  of a licensee in view of the pleadings already put forth and the
  evidence already adduced. In that context, this Court opined that
  the High Court had correctly relied upon the earlier Full Bench
  decision in Abdul Ghani v. Musammat Babni5 and Balmukund
c v. Dalt!. An opinion was expressed by this Court that once the
  finding was returned that the defendant was in possession as
  a licensee, there was no difficulty in affirming the decree for
  ejectment, even though the plaintiff had originally claimed
  ejectment on the ground of tenancy and not specifically on the
  ground of licence. In that context it was observed thus: -
0
        "15 .... In the present case, having regard to all the facts,
       we are unable to hold that the High Court erred in
        confirming the decree for ejectment passes by the trial
        Court on the ground that the defendant was in possession
E      of the suit premises as a licensee. In this case, the High
       Court was obviously impressed by the thought that once
       the defendant was shown to be in possession of the suit
       premises as a licensee, it would be built to require the
       plaintiff to file another suit against the defendant for
F      ejectment on that basis. We are not prepared to hold that
       in adopting this approach in the circumstances of this
       case, the High Court can be said to have gone wrong in
       law."
       16. Before we proceed to state the ratio in Rajendra
G Tiwary's case, we think it seemly to advert to the principle
  stated in Biswanath Agarwal/a v. Sabitri Bera and Others7 as
   5.   25 All 256.
   6.   25 All 498.
H 7. (2009J 15 sec 693.
         TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                          383
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the same has been strongly relied upon by the learned senior A
counsel for the appellant. In the said case, the question that was
posed is whether a civil court can pass a decree on the ground
that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction.
 In the said case the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High
 Court, considering the issues framed and the evidence laid, had B
 held that although the plaintiffs had failed to prove the
 relationship of landlord and tenant by and between them and
 the defendant or that the defendant had been let into the
 tenanted premises on leave and licence basis, the respondent-
  plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession on the basis c
  of their general title. This Court took note of the relief prayed,
  namely, a decree for eviction of the defendant from the
  schedule premises and for grant of mesne profit in case the
  eviction is allowed at certain rates. The Court proceeded on
  the base that the plaintiff had proved his right, title and interest.
                                                                        0
  The Court observed that the landlord in a given case, although
  may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant,
  yet in the event he proves the general title, may obtain a decree
  on the basis thereunder. But regard being had to the nature of
  the case the Court observed that the defendant was entitled to
  raise a contention that he had acquired indefeasible title by E
  adverse possession. The Court referred to the decision in
  Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and, eventually, came to hold as
  follows: -

      "27. The question as to whether the defendant acquired F
      title by adverse possession was a plausible plea. He, in
      fact, raised the same before the appellate court.
      Submission before the first appellate court by the
      defendant that he hac,i acquired title by adverse
      possession was merely argumentative in nature as neither G
      there was a pleading nor there was an issue. The learned
      trial court had no occasion to go into the said question.
      We, therefore, are of the opinion that in a case of this nature
       an issue was required to be framed."
                                                                      H
    384       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 12 S.C.R.


A        Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench issued the following
    directions: -

          "29. However, we are of the opinion that keeping in view
          the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and as
          the plaintiffs have filed the suit as far back as in the year
B
          1990, the interest of justice should be subserved if we in
          exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of. the
          Constitution of India issue the following directions with a
          view to do complete justice to the parties.
c                (i) The plaintiffs may file an application for grant of
                 leave to amend their plaint so as to enable them to
                 pray for a decree .for eviction of the defendant on
                 the ground that he is a trespasser.

D                (ii) For the aforementione:d purpose, he shall pay
                 the requisite court fee in terms of the provisions of
                 the Court Fees Act, 1870.

                 (iii) Such an application for grant of leave to amend
                 the plaint as also the requisite amount of court fees
E                should be tendered within four weeks from date.

                 (iv) The appellant-defendant would, in such an event,
                 be entitled to file his additional written statement.

                (v) The learned trial Judge shall frame an
F               appropriate issue and the parties would be entitled
                to adduce any other or further evidence on such
                issue.
                (vi) All the evidences brought on record by the
G               parties shall, however, be considered by the court
                for the purposes of disposal of the suit.

                (vii) The learned trial Judge is directed to dispose
                of the suit as expeditiously as possible and
H               preferably within three months from the date of filing
             TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                        385
                    [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

                of the application by the plaintiffs in terms of the      A
                aforementioned Direction (i)."

          17. At this stage it is necessary to dwell upon the facet of
    applicability of the said authorities to the1 lis of the present
    nature. As per the exposition of facts, the analysis made and 8
    the principles laid down in both the cases, we notice that the
    civil action was initiated under the provisions of Transfer of
    Property Act, 1882. In Bhagwati Prasad's case the Court opined
    that a decree for ejectment could be passed on general title
    as the defendant was a licensee. In Biswanath Agarwa//a's
     case the Court took note of the concept of general title and the .C
     plausible plea of adverse possession and granted liberty to the
     plaintiff to amend the plaint seeking a decree for recovery of
     possession and pay the required court fee under the Court-fees
     Act, 1870. That apart, certain other directions were issued. We
     may repeat at the cost of repetition that the suits were instituted D
     under the Transfer of Property Act. The effect of the same and
     its impact on difference of jurisdiction on a civil court in
     exercising power under the Tra.nsfer of Property Act and under
     special enactments relating to eviction and other proceedings
     instituted between the landlord and tenant, we shall advert to E
     the said aspects slightly at a later stage.

          18. Presently, we shall analyse the principles stated in
     Rajendra Tiwary (supra). In the said case the respondent-
    . plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction under the Bihar Buildings   F
      (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on many a
      ground. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the evidence on
      record, dismissed the suit for eviction holding that there was
      no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and
      the defendant. However, he had returned a finding that the          G
      plaintiff had title to the suit premises. The appellate court
      affirmed the judgment of the learned trial Judge and dismissed
      the appeal. In second appeal the High Court reversed the
      decisions of the courts below and allowed the appeal taking
      the view that a decree for eviction could be passed against the         H




,
    386      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A defendant on the basis of the title of the plaintiff and,
   accordingly, remanded the case to the first appellate court on
   the ground that it had not recorded any finding on the question
   of the title of the parties. It was contended before this Court that
   as the trial court was exercising limited jurisdiction under the
B Rent Act, the question of title to the suit premises could not be
  decided inasmuch as that had to be done by a civil court in its
  ordinary jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court erred in law
   in remanding the case to the first appellate court for deciding
  the question of title of the plaintiff and passing an equitable
c decree for eviction of the defendant. The Court posed a
  question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
  case the High Court was right in law holding that an equitable
  decree for eviction of the defendant could be passed under
  Order VII Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code and remanding
  the case to the first appellate court for recording its finding on
0
  the question of title of the parties to the suit premises and for
  passing an equitable decree for eviction against the defendant
  if the plaintiffs were found to have title thereto. Answering the
  question the learned Judges proceeded to state thus: -

E       "It is evident that while dealing with the suit of the plaintiffs
        for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises under
        clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the
        Act, courts including the High Court were exercising
        jurisdiction under the Act which is a special enactment.
F       The sine qua non for granting the relief in the suit, under
        the Act, is that between the plaintiffs and the defendant the
        relationship of "landlord and tenant" should exist. The
        scope of the enquiry before the courts was limited to the
        question: as to whether the !Jrounds for eviction of the
G       defendant have been made out under the Act. The question
        of title of the parties to the suit premises is not relevant
        having regard to the width of the definition of the terms
        "landlord" and "tenant" in clauses (f) and (h), respectively,
        of Section 2 of the Act."
H
           TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                          387
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      19. In course of deliberation, the two-Judge Bench                  A
distinguished the authorities in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v.
Mahabir Prasad8 and Bhagwati Prasad (supra) by observing
thus: -

      "15. These are cases where the courts which tried the suits         B
      were ordinary civil courts having jurisdiction to grant
      alternative relief and pass decree under Order VII Rule 7.
      A Court of Rent Controller having limited jurisdiction to trv
      suits on grounds specified in the special Act obviously
      does not have jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court and          C
      therefore cannot pass a decree for eviction of the
       defendant on a ground other than the one specified in the
       Act. If. however. the alternative relief is permissible within
       the ambit of the Act. the position would be different."

                                               [Emphasis supplied]        D

        20. Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to express
thus:

        "16. In this case the reason for denial of the relief to the
        plaintiffs by the trial court and the appellate court is that     E
        the very foundation of the suit, namely, the plaintiffs are the
        landlords and the defendant is the tenant, has been
        concurrently found to be not established. In any event
        inquiry into title of the plaintiffs is beyond the scope of the
        court exercising jurisdiction under the Act. That being the           F
        position the impugned order of the High Court remanding
        the case to the first appellate court for recording finding
        on the question of title of the parties. is unwarranted and
         unsustainable. Further, as pointed out above, in such a
         case the provisions of Order VII Rule 7 are not attracted."      G

                                                 [Underlining is ours]

        21. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to the principles

 8.   AIR 1951 SC 177.                                                        H
        388     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 12 S.C.R.


 A stated in Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal9• In the said case the
     Court was dealing with the case instituted by the landlord under
     Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
     for eviction of the tenant who had disputed the title and the High
     Court had decided the judgment and decree of the courts below
 B and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff seeking eviction. While
     adverting to the issue of title the Court ruled that in a case
     where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based
     on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the
     suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be
c gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed
    even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the
    privily of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such
    relationship the Court has only to decide whether the defendant
    is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if
    disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the
0
    primary question for determining th1~ main question about the
    relationship between the litigating parties. In the said case the
    learned Judges referred to the authority in L/C v. India
    Automobiles & Co. 10 wherein the Court had observed that in a
    suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will
E take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to
    whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence
   of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it will
    have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It was further
   observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy
F itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has
   prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question.
   In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant
   is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant's contention
   on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title
G finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of
   title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case.
          22. On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the
   9.    (1995) a sec 580.
H 1o. (1990) 4 sec 286.
        TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                       389
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

aforesaid authorities, it is quite vivid that there is a difference A
in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis
relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of .
Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment
 pertaining to eviction on specified grounds. Needless to say,
 this court has cautiously added that if alternative relief is B
 permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be
 different. That apart, the Court can decide the issue of title if a
 tenant disputes the same and the only purpose is to see
 whether the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is bona
 fide in the circumstances of the case. We respectfully concur C
  with the aforesaid view and we have no hesitation in holding
  that the dictum laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and
  Bishwanath Agarwal/a (supra) are distinguishable, for in the
  said cases the suits were filed under the Transfer of Property
  Act where the equitable relief under Order VII Rule 7 could be D
  granted.

       23. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that it would
 depend upon the Scheme of the Act whether an alternative relief
 is permissible under the Act. In Rajendra Tiwari's case the E
 learned Judges, taking into consideration the width of the
 definition of the "landlord" and "tenant" under the Bihar
 Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, had
 expressed the opinion. The dictionary clause under the Act, with
 which we are concerned herein, uses similar expression. Thus,
 a limited enquiry pertaining to the status of the parties, i.e., F
 relationship of landlord and tenant could have been undertaken.
 Once a finding was recorded that there was no relationship of
  landlord and tenant under the Scheme of the Act, there was no
  necessity to enter into an enquiry with regard to the title of the
  plaintiff based on the sale deed or the title of the defendant as G
  put forth by way of assertion of long possession. Similarly, the
   learned appellate Judge while upholding the finding of the
   learned trial Judge that there was no relationship of landlord
   and tenant between the parties, there was no warrant to
                                                                    H
     390      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                '.2013] 12 S.C.R.

A reappreciate the evidence to overturn any other conclusion. The
  High Court is justified to the extent that no equitable relief could
  be granted in a suit instituted under the Act. But, it has
  committed an illegality by affirming the judgment and decree
  passed by the learned trial Judge because by such affirmation
B the defendant becomes the owner of the premises by
  acquisition of title by prescription. When such an enquiry could
  not have been entered upon and no finding could have been
  recorded and, in fact, the High Court has correctly not dwelled
  upon it, the impugned judgment to that extent is vulnerable and
c accordingly we set aside the said affirmation.
         24. Presently we shall proceed to address ourselves, which
    is necessary, as to what directions we should issue and with
    what observations/clarifications. In Rajendra Tiwary (supra), the
   two-Judge Bench had observed that the decision rendered by
D this Court did not preclude the plaintiff for filing the suit for
   enquiry of title and for recovery of possession of the suit
   premises against the defendant. In the said case a suit for
   specific performance of contract filed against the defendant was
   pending. The Court had directed that the suit to be filed by the
E plaintiff for which a three months' time was granted should be
   heard together with the suit already irstituted by the defendant.
   In the present case, the suit was instituted on the basis of
   purchase. A plea was advanced that the defendant had already
   perfected his title by prescription as he was in possession for
F 18 to 19 years. The trial court had accepted the plea and the
  appellate court had reversed it. The High Court had allowed the
  second appeal holding that when the relationship of landlord
  and tenant was not established, a decree for eviction could not
  be passed. We have already opined that the High Court could
G not have affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial
  court as it had already decided the issue of adverse possession
  in favour of the defendant, though it had neither jurisdiction to
  enquire into the title nor that of perfection of title by way of
  adverse possession as raised by the defendant. Under these
H circumstances we are disposed to think that the plaintiff is
        TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                        391
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
entitled under law to file a fresh suit for title and recovery of   A
possession and such other reliefs as the law permits.

      25. At this juncture, we think it apt to clarify the position,
for if we leave at this when a fresh suit is filed the defendant
would be in a position to advance a plea that the right of the
                                                                      8
plaintiff had been extinguished as he had not filed the suit for
 recovery of possession within the time allowed by law. It is
 evincible that the suit for eviction was instituted on 21.3.1978
 and if the time is computed from that day the suit for which we
 have granted liberty would definitely be barred by limitation. C
 Thus, grant of liberty by us would be absolutely futile. Hence,
 we think it imperative to state the legal position as to why we
 have granted liberty to the plaintiff. We may hasten to add that
 we have affirmed the judgment of the High Court only to the
 extent that as the relationship of landlord and tenant was not
  established the defendant was not liable for eviction under the D
  Act. The issue of right, title and interest is definitely open. The
  appellant is required to establish the same in a fresh suit as
  required under law and the defendant is entitled to resist the
  same by putting forth all his stand and stance including the plea
  of adverse possession. The fulcrum of the matter is whether the E
  institution of the instant suit for eviction under the Act would
  arrest of running of time regard being had to the concept of
  adverse possession as well as the concept of limitation. The
  conception of adverse possession fundamentally contemplates
  a hostile possession by which there is a denial of title of the F
  true owner. By virtue of remaining in possession the possessor
  takes an adverse stance to the title of the true owner. In fact,
  he disputes the same. A mere possession or user or
   permissive possession does not remotely come near the
   spectrum of adverse possession. Possession to be adverse G
   has to be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for
   the requisite frame of time as provided in law so that the
   possessor perfects his title by adverse possession. It has been
   held in Secy. of State for India In Council v. Debendra Lal
                                                                        H
     392       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  :2013] 12 S.C.R.


A Khan 11 that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse
  possession is that it should be nee vi, nee clam, nee precario.

        26. In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina 12 , it has been ruled
  that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in
  publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show
8
  when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point
  of limitation against the party affected can be found.

       27. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of lndia 13 it has
  been opined that adverse possession is a hostile possession
C by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true
  owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse
  possession must prove that his possession is 'nee vi, nee clam,
  nee precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The
  possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in
D extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true
  owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful
  owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued
  over the statutory period. Thereafter, the learned Judges
  observed thus: -
E
         "11 .... Plea of adverse possession is not a pure questic;i
         of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a
         person who claims adverse possession should show: (a)
         on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the
         nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of
F        possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his
         possession has continued, and (e) his possession was
         open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse
         possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying
         to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly
G        plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his
         adverse possession."

    11. (1933-34) 61 IA 78: AIR 1934 PC 23.
    12. AIR 1964 SC 1254.
H   13. (2004) 1o sec 779.
         TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                      393
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     28. It is to be borne in mind that adverse possession, as A
a right, does not come in aid solely on the base that the owner
loses his right to reclaim the property because of his willful
neglect but also on account of the possessor's constant positive
intent to remain in possession. It has been held in P. T.
 Munichikkanna Reddy and Others v. Revamma and Others14 • B

    29. Regard being had to the aforesaid concept of adverse
possession, it is necessary to understand the basic policy
underlying the statutes of limitation. The Acts of Limitation
fundamentally are principles relating to "repose" or of "peace".
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 28, Para C
605 it has been stated thus: -

     "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts. - The courts have
     expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
     existence of statutes of limitation, namely (1) that long       o
     dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
      (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
      disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
      causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
      diligence."                                              E

      30. These principles have been accepted by this Court
 keeping in view the statutory provisions of the Indian Limitation
 Act. The fundamental policy behind limitation is that if a person
 does not pursue his remedy within the specified time frame, the
 right to sue gets extinguished. In the present case the pivotal F
 point is whether a good cause because a litigant cannot deprive
 the benefit acquired by another in equity by his own inaction
 and negligence, as assumed by the plaintiff, has been lost
 forever as he has not been able to prove the relationship of
 landlord and tenant in a suit for eviction which includes delivery G
  of possession.

       31. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles it is required
  to be scrutinized whether the time spent in adjudication of the
  14. (2001) s sec 59.                                               H
          394       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 12 S.C.R.


    A    present suit and the appeal arrests the running of time for the
         purpose of adverse possession. In this regard, we may
         profitably refer to the decision in Mst. Sultan Jehan Begum and
         Ors. v. Gui Mohd. and Ors. 15 wherein following principles have
         been culled out: -
8
                "(1) When a person entitled to possession does not bring
                a suit against the person in adverse possession within the
                time prescribed by law his right to possession is
                extinguished. From this it only follows that if the former
                brings a suit against the latter within the prescribed period
c               of limitation his right will not be extinguished.

              (2) If a decree for possession is passed in that suit in his
              favour he will be entitled to possession irrespective of the
              time spent in the suit and the execution and other
D             proceedings.

             (3) The very institution of thE: suit arrests the period of
             adverse possession of the defendant and when a decree
             for possession is passed against the defendant the
             plaintiffs right to be put in possession relates back to the
E
             date of the suit.

              (4) Section 28 ofthe Umitation Act merely declares when
             the right otthe person out of possession is extinguished.
              It is not correct to say that that section confers title on the
F            person who has been in adverse possession for a certain
             period. There is no law which provides for 'conferral of title'
             as such on a person who has been in adverse possession
             for whatever length of time.
             (5) When it is said that the person in adverse possession
G
             'has perfected his title', it only means this. Since the person
             who had the right of possession but allowed his right to
             be extinguished by his inaction, he cannot obtain the

H       15. AIR 1973 MP 72.
          TRIBHUVANSHANKAR v. AMRUTLAL                        395
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
     possession from the person in adverse possession, and,           A
     as its necessary corollary the person who is in adverse
     possession will be entitled to hold his possession against
     the other not in possession, on the well settled rule of law
     that possession of one person cannot be disturbed by any
     person except one who has a better title."                       B

     32. In Sultan Khan slo Jugge Khan v. State of Madhya
Pradesh and Another16 a proceeding was initiated for eviction
of the plaintiff under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue
Code, 1959. Facing eviction plaintiff filed a suit for declaration
of his right, title and interest on the bedrock of adverse            C
possession. His claim was that he had been in uninterrupted
possession for more than 30 years. Repelling the contention
the learned Judge observed thus: -

     "It must, therefore, be accepted that filing of the suit for     o
     recovery of possession, by itself, is sufficient to arrest the
     period of adverse possession and a decree for
     possession could be passed irrespective of the time taken
     in deciding the suit. If this principle is applied to the
     proceedings under Section 248 of the Code, it must be            E
     held that in case a person has not perfected his title by
     adverse possession before start of the proceedings, he
     cannot perfect his title during the pendency of the
     proceedings. Adverse possession of the person in
     possession must be deemed to have been arrested by
     initiation of these proceedings."
                                                                      F

     33. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements
since they have been approved by this Court in Babu Khan and
Others v. Nazim Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and Others 17 wherein
after referring to the aforesaid two decisions and the decision       G
in Ragho Prasad v. P.N. Agarwa/1 6 the two-Judge Bench ruled
thus: -
16. 1991 MPLI 81.
17. AIR 2001 SC 1740.
18. 1969 All LJ 975.                                                  H
    396       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A         "The legal position that emerges out of the decisions
          extracted above is that once a suit for recovery of
          possession against the defendant who is in adverse
          possession is filed, the period of limitation for perfecting
          title by adverse possession comes to a grinding halt. We
B         are in respectable agreement with the said statement of
          law. In the present case, as soon as the predecessor-in-
          interest of the applicant filed an application under Section
          91 of the Act for restoration of possession of the land
          against the defendant in advEHse possession, the
c         defendant's adverse possession ceased to continue
          thereafter in view of the legal position that such adverse
          possession does not continue to run after filing of the suit,
          we are, therefore, of the view that the suit brought by the
          plaintiff for recovery of possession of the land was not
          barred by limitation."
D
        34. Coming to the case at hand the appellant had filed the
  suit for eviction. The relief sought in the plaint was for delivery
  of possession. It was not a forum that lacked inherent
  jurisdiction to pass a decree for delivery of possession. It
E showed the intention of the plaintiff to act and to take back the
  possession. Under these circumstances, after the institution of
  the suit, the time for acquiring title by adverse possession has
  been arrested or remained in a state of suspension till the entire
  proceedings arising out of suit are terminated. Be it
F ingeminated that if by the date of present suit the defendant had
  already perfected title by adverse possession that would stand
  on a different footing.

       35. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we permit the
G appellant-plaintiff to institute a suit as stated in paragraph 24
  within a period of two months from today.

         36. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed leaving the parties
    to bear their respective costs.

H R.P                                               Appeal allowed.