TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN & ORS.versusM. CHINNIYAN & ANR.

                              (2016] l S.C.R. 18



A            TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN & ORS.
                                      v.
                         M. CHINNIYAN & ANR.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 5158 OF 2009)
B                           JANUARY 28, 2016.
    [J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
          Rent Control and Eviction:
            Revision - Revisional jurisdiction - Exercise of, by the High
c   Court in rent matters - Held: High Court is entitled to satisfy itself
    as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or
    order impugned before it, however, to satisfy itself, the High Court
    shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate
    or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts -
    Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of
D
    re-consideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal -
    On facts, in revision petition, the High Court set aside the concurrent
    findings of facts recorded in landlords' favour by Rent Controller
    and First Appellate Court - Revision was allowed on the grounds
    of non-joinder of one of the co-owners of the suit property and
E   non-establishment of relationship of landlord and tenant by
    appellant-wife and sons of deceased landlord with respondent no.
     1 in relation to suit premises - Non-joinder of one of the co-owners
    of the suit property would have no effect and relationship of landlord
    and tenant is established between the parties, thus, the revision
    petition is dismissed - Concurrent findings of facts recorded by
F
    Rent Controller and First Appellate Court in appellants' favour on
    the issue of appellants bona fide need and default committed by
    respondent No. 1 in paying rent to the appellants, binding on the
    High Court - Findings were based on proper appreciation of
    evidence, thus, does not call for any interference.
G         Title of the landlord of the suit premises - Examination of -
    As to whether the tenancy was between the appellants-wife and
    sons of deceased landlord and respondent No. 1-tenant or between
    the power of attorney holder of landlord and respondent No. I -tenant
    - Held: Tenancy was between the landlord-original owner and
H   respondent No. I-tenant and on the death of landlord it was created
                                      18
   TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                              19



between the appellants being the Class-I heirs of landlord and              A
respondent No. I-tenant by operation of law - Power of attorney
holder of original owner executed the tenancy agreement on behalf
of the original owner in favour of respondent No.I in relation to
the suit premises - Such execution was for and on behalf of his
principal-original owner, which resulted in creating a relationship
                                                                            B
of landlord and tenant between original owner and respondent No.
 I -tenant in relation to the suit premises - Such act done by power
of attorney holder did not create any right, title and interest in his
favour and nor he ever asserted any such right in himself - Effect
of execution of tenancy agreement by an agent was as if original
owner himself had executed with tenant - More so, tenant in clear           c
terms admitted his status as being the tenant - Thus, the High Court
was not right in holding that the tenancy in relation to suit premises
was with the power of attorney holder - Appellants were able to
prove that the tenancy in relation to the suit premises was between
the original owner and respondent No.I-tenant and on the death of           D
original owner, it was created between the appellants and respondent
No.I by operation of law which entitled the appellants to maintain
 the eviction petition against respondent No.I - Judgment of the
High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is restored
- Eviction petition by appellants against the respondent No. I -tenant
 in relation to the suit premises allowed.                                  E
      Party/Parties - Non-impleadment as necessary parties - Effect
of - Eviction petition under the Rent Laws by wife and sons of
deceased landlord - Failure to implead daughter of the deceased
landlord was a necessary party to the eviction petition - Order of
High Court that the eviction petition was not maintainable - On F
appeal, held: It is not necessary to implead all the co-owners/
landlords in the eviction petition - It was not necessary for the wife
and sons of deceased landlord to implead the daughter - More so,
the High Court should not have allowed respondent No. I-tenant to
raise such objection for the first time in the revision - Daughter
having been later impleaded in the proceedings, this objection was G
not even available to respondent No. 1 - Eviction petition is
maintainable - Order of the High Court set aside.
      Power of Attorney Act, 1982 - Power of attorney - Nature
and scope of - Held: An agent acting under a power of attorney
                                                                            H
20               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] I S.C.R.


A    executed ur done in the name of principal, i.e., by the principal
     himself - It is never construed or/and treated to have been done by
     the agent in his personal capacity so as to create any right in his
     favour - An agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit uf
     any nature.
B          Dhannalal v Ka/awatibai and others (2002) 6 SCC 16;
           Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar
           Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78; Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm Prahlad
           Rai Prem Prakash (2002) 3 SCC 375:2002 (2) SCR
           177; Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) vs.
           State of Haryana & Anr (2012) 1 SCC 656:2011 (11)
c          SCR 848; Church of Christ Charitable Trust and
           Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman
           Educational Trust (2012) 8 SCC 706:2012 (6)
            SCR 404 - relied on.
                              Case Law Reference
D
     (2014) 9 sec 78                    relied on.                Para 33
     2002 (2) SCR 177                   relied on.                Para 34
     (2002i 6 sec 16                    relied on.                Para 37, 38
     2011 (11) SCR 848                  relied on.                Para 42
E
     2012 (6) SCR 404                   relied on                 Para 42
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5158
     of2009
           From the Judgment and Order dated 11.07.2007 of the High Court
F    of Judicature at Madras in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 337 of
     2002
            Nikhil Nayyar, Gautam Nayyar, T. Sen. for the Appellants.
          B. Adinarayan Rao, Jayanth Muth Raj. Malavika J., P. V. Dinesh,
G    Amit Gupta, Sarwa Mitter, Mitter & Mitter Co. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ABBAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. This appeal is filed by
     the plaintiffs against the final judgment and order dated l 1.07 .2007 passed
     by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil Revision Petition No.
H    337 of 2002 whereby the High Court allowed the revision petition filed
   TMT. KASTHURJ RADHAKRJSHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                  21


by respondent No. I herein and set aside the judgment dated 28.06.200 I         A
of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode in R.C.A. No. 5 of 2001 and
order of eviction dated 31.10.2000 passed by the Rent Controller (I Add!.
District Munsif), Erode in RCOP No. 26 of 1998.
       2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal, it is
necessary to set out in brief the relevant facts in relation to eviction case   B
out of which this appeal arises and also state the facts of three cases
filed by the parties in respect of the suit premises because they were
referred to in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises.
       3. The appellants (plaintiffs) are the wife and sons of one A.
Radhakrishnan. The suit premises bearing Door No. S-3, Periyar Nagar            c
Housing Unit, Erode Town, comprised in T.S. No. 90913, Block No. 17
and 598/2 Part, Ward 1, Block 20, Surarnpatti Village, Erode Taluk, Erode
sub-District, Erode Registration District was allotted to A. Radhakrishan
by Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In fact, entire area was acquired by the
Housing Board and one house site therein was allotted to A.
Radhakrishnan. Subsequently, A. Radhakrishnan made construction on              D
the site allotted to him.
       4. On 22.02.1987, A. Radhakrishnan executed a general power
of attorney in favour of one V. Dhanapal and nominated him to administer
and manage the suit premises on his behalf.
                                                                                E
       5. One N. Kalidass was in occupation of the suit premises as
tenant. On 04.02.1988, he vacated and surrendered the possession of
the suit premises to Dhanapal. Thereafter respondent No. I took the
suit premises on lease rent from Dhanapal under a written lease deed
dated 12.02.1989 for a period of 11 months on a rent of Rs.850/- and
paid Rs.4000/- as advance. Respondent No. I then obtained possession            F-
of the suit premises and started residing therein with his family.
        6. The appellants, however, came to know that A. Radhakrishnan
without their knowledge entered into a sale agreement dated 30.07.1987
to sell the suit premises to one A.S. Pongianna. The appellants, therefore,
instituted a suit being O.S. No. 53 of 1989 (re-numbered as O.S.549/            G
1989) in the Court of District Judge, Erode and sought a declaration that
the sale agreement dated 30.07.1987 was neither valid and nor binding
on them and also sought a permanent injunction against A. Radhakrishnan
restraining him from executing the sale deed in favour of A.S. Pongianna
and delivering possession of the suit property to him. In this suit,
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22               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2016] I S.C.R.



A    respondent No. 1 was impleaded as one of defendants.
            7. Respondent No. l filed a written statement in the aforesaid suit
     reiterating therein that he was inducted in the suit premises as a tenant
     under a lease deed dated 12.02.1989 for a period of 11 months at monthly
     rent of Rs.850/- and on the expiry of the contractual period of lease, he
B    continued to remain in the suit premises as a tenant.
            8. Respondent No. I also, in the meantime, filed a suit being O.S.
     No. 87 of 1989 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Erode against A.
     Radhakrishnan and the appellants herein seeking permanent injunction
     restraining the appellants from dispossessing them from the suit premises.
c    According to respondent No. I, he was a tenant and was put in possession
     of the suit premises by Dhanapal, the power of attorney holder of A.
     Radhakrishnan, pursuant to a lease deed dated 12.02.1989 for a period
     of 11 months at a monthly rent of Rs.850/-. He also alleged that since
     the appellants were dissatisfied with the rent fixed under the lease deed,
     therefore, they were attempting to dispossess him from the suit premises.
D    In this suit, on 22.02.1990, A. Radhakrishnan filed a written statement
     stating inter alia that respondent No. I was put in possession of the suit
     premises as his tenant and that he had already cancelled the power of
     attorney executed by him in favour of Dhanapal by executing a registered
     cancellation deed dated 13.03.1989.
E          9. Since A. Radhakrishnan was refusing to accept the rent from
     February 1989, respondent No. l filed a petition bearing R.C.O.P. No. 2
     of 1991 under Section 8(5) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
     Rent Control) Act in the Court of the Rent Controller of Erode. In the
     meantime on 23.09.1994, A. Radhakrishnan expired intestate leaving
F    behind him the present appellants as his class I heirs and one daughter --
     Tmt. R. Kanjana. The appellants thus became the owners of the suit
     premises by inheritance.
            10. On 14.10.1998, respondent No. I through his advocate sent a
     notice to the appellants herein and Tmt. R. Kanjana, the daughter of late
     A. Radhakrishnan, claiming that upon payment of Rs. 1 lakh on
G
     08.05.1988, A.S. Pongainna had assigned his rights in the agreement
     dated 30.07.1987 executed between him and late A. Radhakrishnan, in
     his favour, therefore, he called upon the appellants to execute the sale
     deed of the suit premises in his favour.
            11. The appellants then filed Eviction Petition bearing R.C.O.P.
H
   TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                  23
             [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

No. 26 of 1998 in the Court of the Rent Controller (District Munsif)            A
Erode against respondent No. 1 out of which the present appeal arises
seeking eviction of respondent No. I from the suit premises under Sections
10 (2) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act 1960 (in Short "the Act"). The eviction was sought
essentially on two grounds, namely, willful default in paying monthly rent
                                                                                B
since 12.02.1989 and secondly, bona fide need for the use and residence
of the appellants in the suit premises because according to the appellants
they were residing in rented accommodation and had no other suitable
house of their own in the city where they could live.
       12. Vide order dated 21.12.1998, the Court of the Subordinate
Judge, Erode decreed O.S. No. 87 of 1989 filed by respondent No. I              c
against the appellants on the basis of an endorsement made by the
appellants and passed a permanent injunction restraining the appellants
from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of respondent No. I over
the suit property and from dispossessing him till he was evicted under a
due process of law.                                                             D
       13. Vide order dated 05.01.1999, O.S. No. 53/1989 (which was
renumbered as O.S. No. 549/1989) was dismissed as not pressed by the
appellants.
       14. So far as the eviction petition out of which this appeal arises
is concerned, the Rent Controller allowed RCOP No. 26 of 1998 filed by          E
the appellants vide order dated 31.10.2000 and directed the eviction of
respondent No. I from the suit premises. It was held that the appellants
are the owners/landlords of the suit premises. It was also held that
respondent No. I is in occupation of the suit premises as tenant. It was
further held that respondent No. 1 has committed willful default in paying      F
the monthly rent and being a defaulter in payment of rent is liable to be
evicted from the suit premises. It was aJso held that the appellants have
proved bona fide need for their personal residence in the suit premises
because they were living in the rented house at a place called Salem.
The appellants were, therefore, held entitled to claim eviction of respondent
No. 1 from the suit premises on these findings.                                 G

       15. Against the said order, respondent No.I filed an appeaJ bearing
T.C.A. No. 5 of 2001 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Erode. Vide
order dated 28.06.2001, the subordinate Judge, Erode dismissed the said
appeaJ and confirmed the judgment passed by the Rent Controller.
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24               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20I6J l S.C.R.


A          I6. Against the said order, the respondent filed a revision petition
     being C.R.P. No. 337 of 2002 before the High Court. The High Court,
     by judgment dated l 9. I2.2003, dismissed the revision petition filed by
     respondent No. I.
            l 7. Respondent no. l then filed an application seeking review of
B    the order dated I9. l 2.2003 passed by the High Court in C.R.P. No. 337
     of2002.
           18. The High Court by judgment dated 05.02.2007, allowed Review
     Application No. 9 l of 2004 filed by the respondent No. I.
             19. As a result of review being allowed C.R.P. No. 337/2002
c    was restored to file for its hearing on merits. The High Court, this time,
     by impugned order dated I 1.07.2007 allowed the revision filed by
     respondent No. I on two legal grounds and set aside the order of the first
     appellate Court and also of Rent Controlling Authority. As a consequence,
     thereof, the eviction petition (RCOP No.26 of l 998) filed by the appellants
D    was dismissed. It was held that the eviction petition filed by the appellants
     is not maintainable because the daughter of Late A. Radhakrishnan,
     Tmt. R. Kanjana was not made a party to the eviction petition. According
     to the High Court she being one of the co-owners of the suit premises
     was a necessary party to eviction petition. It was also held that appellants
     failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant with the
E    respondent No. I and on the other hand it appeared thattenancy in relation
     to suit property was between Dhanapal and respondent No. I. The High
     Court thus allowed the respondents' revision essentially on these two
     grounds
           20. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have filed this
F    appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
          2 I. Heard Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel for the appellants
     and Mr. B. Adinarayan Rao, learned senior counsel for respondent No. I
     and Mr. Amit Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
G           22. Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
     while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned order urged
     three submissions.
            23. In the first place, learned counsel submitted that the High
     Court having rightly dismissed the revision petition filed by respondent
     No. I in the first round erred in allowing the review petition of respondent
H
   TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                     25
             [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

No. I and in any event after its restoration erred in allowing the said            A
revision petition. It was his submission that the High Court committed
jurisdictional error in interfering in its revisionary jurisdiction in upsetting
well reasoned concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller
and the first appellate Court in appellants' favour and that too on two
grounds, which were not urged before the Rent Controller and the
                                                                                   B
appellate Court by respondent No. I.
       24. In the second place, learned counsel urged that two legal
grounds on which the High Court allowed the revision petition, namely,
that non-joinder of one of the co-owners of the suit property (daughter
of late A. Radhakrishnan) to the eviction petition was fatal to the filing
of eviction petition and secondly, the appellants were not able to establish       c
the relationship of landlord and tenant with respondent No. I in relation
to the suit premises, have no merit and deserve rejection.
       25. Elaborating this submission, learned counsel contended that
so far as the first ground is concerned it is untenable in the light of the
law laid down by this Court in Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai and Others,               D
(2002) 6 sec 16, wherein it is laid down that it is not necessary to
implead all the co-owners of the suit premises in eviction petition and
even if some of the co-owners have filed the eviction petition, it is
maintainable in law. According to learned counsel since this finding was
recorded by the High Court without taking into consideration the law               E
laid down by this Court in the case of Dhanalal (supra). the same
deserves to be set aside.
       26. Learned counsel also pointed out that in any event, the
aforementioned infirmity was cured by the appellants factually because
the daughter of late A Radhakrishnan, Tmt R. Kanjana was later added               F
as a party in the eviction proceedings.
       27. In the third place, learned counsel urged that so far as the
second ground is concerned, namely, respondent No. 1 was inducted by
Dhanapal in the suit premises and not by the appellants and, therefore,
the appellants were not able to establish their relationship of landlord           G
and tenant with respondent No. I also has no merit for the reason that
Dhanapal did not execute the tenancy agreement with respondent No.I
in his capacity as owner/landlord of the suit premises but executed the
said tenancy agreement on behalf of late A. Radhakrishnan as his power
of attorney holder.
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26                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] l S.C.R.


A           28. Learned counsel pointed out that in these circumstances any
     act done by Dhanapal in relation to suit premises including creation of
     tenancy was an act done for and on behalf of A. Radhakrishnan. It was,
     therefore, urged that the tenancy was, as a fact, between A.
     Radhakrishnan being owner/landlord of suit premises and respondent
     No. I as his tenant which later devolved on the appellants after the death
B
     of A. Radhakrishanan by operation of law thereby conferring a right on
     the appellants as co-owners of suit premises to file the eviction petition
     against respondent No. I for his eviction from the suit premises.
            29. Lastly, learned counsel contended that on the aforementioned
     grounds, which had no substance, the High Court could not have set
c    aside the concurrent findings of facts recorded in appellants' favour by
     the Rent Controller and the first appellate Court, which had ordered the
     eviction of respondent No. I from the suit premises.
            30. In reply, learned counsel for respondent No. I supported the
     impugned judgment and contended that it deserves to be upheld, calling
D    no interference therein.
            31. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
     of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions urged by
     learned counsel for the appellants.
E           32. Before we proceed to examine the issues raised in this appeal,
     we consider it apposite to take note of the law laid down by this Court on
     three issues which are involved in this appeal, viz., issue in relation to
     revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in rent matters; second,
     the scope of inquiry to examine the title of the landlord of the suit premises
     in eviction matters; and third, whether all the co-owners/co-landlords of
F    suit premises are necessary parties in the eviction petition filed under
     the Rent Laws and lastly law relating to power of attorney executed by
     principal in favour of his agent.
            33. So far as the issue pertaining to exercise of revisional
     jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing revision petition arising out
G    of eviction matter is concerned, it remains no more res integra and
     stands settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hindustan
     Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC
     78. Justice R.M. Lodha, the learned Chief Justice speaking for the
     Bench held in para 43 thus:
H           "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
  TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                 27
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the              A
      findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first
      appellate authority because on reappreciation of the
      evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below.
      The consideration or examination of the evidence by the
      High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is
                                                                              B
      confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
      court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer
      from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/
      authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without
      consideration of the material evidence or such finding is
      based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is                c
      grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result
      in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because
      it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event,
      the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
      under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set
                                                                              D
      aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The
      High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness
      or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned
      before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to
      the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the
      impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not                E
      exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate
      or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding
      on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated
      with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as
      a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to
                                                                              F
      be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may
      examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from
      procedural illegality or irregularity."
       34. Similarly, so far as the scope and nature of inquiry, which is
required to be undertaken to examine the title of the landlord in eviction
matter is concerned, it also remains no more res integra and stands           G
settled in the case of Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem
Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375. Justice R.C.Lahoti (as His Lordship then
rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is
entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of
someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use     H
28               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         12016] I S.C.R.


A    the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of
     ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough
     to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit.
            35. Likewise, so far as issue pertaining to joinder of all co-owners
     in eviction petition filed against the tenant under the Rent Laws is
B    concerned, the same also remains no more res lntegra and stands settled
     by several decisions of this Court. In Dhannalal vs. Kalawathibai Ors.,
     (Supra), this Court took note of all case laws on the subject and explained
     the legal position governing the issue. Justice R.C.Lahoti (as His Lordship
     then was) speaking for the Bench held in paragraph 16 as under :
c          "16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this
           Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath,(1976) 4 SCC
           184 Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 and Pal
           Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444 that one of the co-
           owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment
           of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to
D          question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that
           the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit.
           When the property forming the subject-matter of eviction
           proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner
           owns every part and every bit of the joint property along
E          with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-
           owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the
           property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a
           suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-
           owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Sri Ram
           Pasricha case reliance was placed by the tenant on the
F          English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit
           for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is
           required for occupation of one of them as a residence the
           suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords.
           The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by
G          the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts
           have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law.
           This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of
           the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner
           of the premises because he required the premises for his
           own use and also satisfied the requirement of being "if he
H
  TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                  29
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE. J.]

       is the owner", the expression as employed by Section                    A
       13(1)(/) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956."
       36. The issues involved in this case need to be decided keeping in
view the law laid down in the aforesaid three cases and the one cited
infra.
       37. Coming to the first question, in our considered opinion, the        B
High Court erred in holding that the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan,
i.e., Tmt. R. Kanjana was a necessary party to the eviction petition filed
by the appellants and hence failure to implead her rendered the eviction
petition as not maintainable. This finding of the High Court, in our view,
is against the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhannalal            c
(supra), wherein it is laid down that it is not necessary to implead all the
co-owners in the eviction petition.
        38. In the light oflaw laid down in the case ofDhannalal (supra),
in our view, it was not necessary for the appellants to implead the Tmt.
R. Kanjana - the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan in the eviction             D
petition. Even otherwise, as rightly argued by learned counsel for the
appellants, the High Court should not have allowed respondent No. I to
raise such objection for the first time in the revision because it was not
raised in the courts below. Be that as it may, the daughter having been
later impleaded in the proceedings, this objection was not even available
to respondent No. I.                                                           E

       39. In view of foregoing discussion, we can not concur with the
finding of the High Court and while reversing the finding hold that the
eviction petition can not be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of
Tmt. R. Kanjana - the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan and is held
maintainable.                                                                  F
       40. Now coming to the question as to whether the tenancy was
between the appellants and respondent No. I or whether it was between
Dhanapal and respondent No.I, we are of the considered view that to
begin with the tenancy was between A. Radhakrishanan and respondent
No. I and on the death of A. Radhakrishnan, it was created between the         G
appellants being the Class-I heirs of A. Radhakrishnan and respondent
No. I by operation of law.
       41. In our opinion, Dhanapal was a power of attorney holder of
A. Radhakrishnan. He executed the tenancy agreement on behalf of
the original owner - A. Radhakrishnan in favour of respondent No. I.           H
30               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          12016] I S.C.R.


A    Such act done by Dhanapal did not create any right, title and interest in
     his favour and nor he ever asserted any such right in himself and indeed
     rightly qua A. Radhakrishnan or the appellants in relation to suit premises.
     That apart, respondent No. I in clear terms admitted in his evidence and
     in the pleading of cases filed by him against the appellants about his
     status as being the tenant. In the light of this legal position, the High
B
     Court should have held this issue in appellants' favour.
             42. The law relating to power of attorney is governed by the
     provisions of the Power of Attorney Act, 1982. It is well settled therein
     that an agent acting under a power of attorney always acts, as a general
     rule, in the name of his principal. Any document executed or thing done
c    by an agent on the strength of power of attorney is as effective as if
     executed or done in the name of principal, i.e., by the principal himself.
     An agent, therefore, always acts on behalf of the principal and exercises
     only those powers, which are given to him in the power of attorney by
     the principal. Any act or thing done by the agent on the strength of
D    power of attorney is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have
     been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as to create any right
     in his favour but is always construed as having done by the principal
     himself. An agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit of any
     nature. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court in Suraj Lamp and
     Industries Private Limited (2) vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (2012)
E    I SCC 656 held in paragraphs 20 and 21 as under:
           "20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in
           regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable
           property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency
           whereby the grantor authorises the grantee to do the acts
F          specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed
           will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see Section
           1-A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It
           is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made
           irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable
G          attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the
           grantee.
            21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC
            77, this Court held: (SCC pp. 90 & 101, paras 13 & 52)
           "13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed
H          by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of
  TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                               31
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for          A
      the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions
      or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring
      necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power
      of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the
      agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all
                                                                            B
      acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the
      limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be
      read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is
      well known, a document of convenience.

      *                  *                *                                 c
      52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the
      provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers of
      Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed
      hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the
      donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of
      attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee D
      in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only
      acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers
      granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power
      of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity.
      Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between E
      the donor and the donee."
      An attorney-holder may however execute a deed of
      conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the
      power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor."
     This was followed by this Court in Church of Christ Charitable         F
Trust and Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman
Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706 (para 20)
       43. When we apply this well settled principle of law to the facts
of the case in hand, we are of the considered view that when Dhanapal,
who was acting as an agent of A. Radhakrishnan on the strength of           G
power of attorney, executed the tenancy agreement with respondent
No. I in relation to the suit premises then he did such execution for and
behalf of his principal - A Radhakrishnan, which resulted in creating a
relationship of landlord and tenant between A. Radhakrishnan anu
respondent No. I in relation to the suit premises. In this execution.
                                                                            H
32               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] I S.C.R.



A    Dhanapal being an agent did not get any right, title and interest of any
     nature either in the suit premises or in tenancy in himself. The effect of
     execution of tenancy agreement by an agent was as if A. Radhakrishnan
     himself had executed with respondent No. I.
            44. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
B    opinion that the High Court was not right in holding that the tenancy in
     relation to suit premises was with Dhanapal. We cannot thus concur
     with the finding of the High Court and accordingly reverse the finding
     and hold that the appellants were able to prove that the tenancy in relation
     to the suit premises was between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent
     No. l and on the death of A. Radhakrishnan, it was created between the
c    appellants and respondent No. l by operation of law which entitled the
     appellants to maintain the eviction petition against respondent No. I seeking
     his eviction on the grounds available to them under the Act.
            45. Since the High Court allowed the revision filed by respondent
     No. I on the aforementioned two grounds only, which we have reversed
D    in preceding paras, the revision petition filed by the respondent No. l
     deserves to be dismissed. That apart keeping in view the law laid down
     by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Case
     (supra), the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller
     and affirmed by the first appellate Court in appellants' favour on the
E    issue of appellants bona fide need for their personal residence and default
     committed by respondent No. I in paying rent to the appellants were
     binding on the High Court.
            46. We have also perused these findings with a view to find out
     as to whether there is any perversity in these findings. We, however,
F    find that these findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence as
     is required to be done in eviction matters and hence, they do not call for
     any interference in this appeal.
           4 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent made attempt to support
     the impugned judgment and urged submissions but we were not impressed
G    by any of the submissions urged.
            48. In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and
     is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and that of the
     judgment of the first appellate Court dated 28.06.2001 in R.C.A. No. 5
     of2001 is restored. As a consequence thereof, the eviction petition filed
     by the appellants against respondent No. l in relation to the suit premises
H
  TMT. KASTHURI RADHAKRISHNAN v. M. CHINNIYAN                                   33
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

is allowed. Respondent No. I is, however, granted three months' time to         A
vacate the suit premises from the date of this judgment subject to furnishing
of the usual undertaking in this Court to vacate the suit premises within
3 months and further on depositing all arrears of rent (if there are any
arrears still due and not paid) till date at the same rate at which they had
been paying monthly rent to the appellants and would also deposit three
                                                                                B
months' rent in advance by way of damages for use and occupation.
Let the undertaking, arrears of rent, damages for three months and cost
awarded by this Court be deposited within 15 days from the date of this
judgment. The appellants on such deposit being made would be entitled
to withdraw the same after proper verification.
       49. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs which is quantified
                                                                                c
at Rs.5000/- to be paid by respondent No.I to the appellants.
Nidhi Jain                                                   Appeal allowed.