TIRATH RAM GUPTAversusGURBACHAN SINGH & ANR.

                         TIRATH RAM GUPTA
A
                                 v.
                       GURBACHAN SINGH & ANR.

                             FEBRUARY 6, 1987

B        [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. NATRAJAN, JJ.]

           East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949-S.13(2)-
    Eviction of sub-tenant--Not permissible if sub-tenancy created before         'r
    A ct came into force.

          Transfer of Property Act-Ss.JOB(j), 111(e) & 115-Lessee has
c   right to transfer by sub lease even a part of his interest in the property-
    W hether surrender of part interest under a lease permissible.

         The appellant-lamdlord first let out a shop-cum-flat to the second
   respondent (teuant) and subsequently leased out the adjoining two flats
D to him. The second respondent sub-let the two flats to the first respon-
   dent (sub-tenant) prior to the coming into force of the East Punjab
  -Urban Rent Restriction Act, l949 in the area where the property is
   situate.

           The landlord filed a suit seeking eviction of both the respondents,
E   inter alia, on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting, who contested the
    petition. However, there was a compromise between the appellant and
    the second respondent, the appellant giving up his claim for eviction of
    the second respondent from the shop-cum-flat in his occuption and the
    second respondent conceding that he has sub-let the two flats to the first
    respondent without the consent .of the appellant-landlord. The Rent
F   Controller passed an order of eviction of the first respondent from the
    two flats sub-leased to him. An appeal to the Appellate Authority
    having failed, the first respondent filed ·a revision under s. 15(5) of the
    Act. The High Court allowed the revision, set aside the order of eviction
    and held that no order of eviction can be passed under s. 13(2) as the
    sub-tenancy had been created before the Act came into force in the
G   area where the property is' situate.

          In the appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it was                ~
    contended; (i) that when the second respondent had admitted the
    factum of the unauthorised sub-lease and when the Rent Controller and
    the Appellate Authority had acted on his admission, the High Court was
H   in error in interfering with the order of eviction concurrently passed by

                                        190
                         T.R. GUPTA v. GURBACHAN SINGH                     191

     the Courts below; (ii) that even without reference to s. 13(2) the sub- A
     lease was not lawful because the lease deed entered into between the
     parties contained a clause interdicting any sub-lease without the written
     consent of the landlord; (iii) that the sub-lease was not lawful even
     under s. !OS(J) of the Transfer of Property Act because the lease deed
     contained a prohibition; (iv) that even if it is taken that there was no
     lease deed prohibiting the creation of a sub-lease, the sub-tenancy had B
     become unlawful from the date when the second respondent was served
     a notice of termination of tenancy by the appellant; (v) that a sub-
     tenant does not have rights independent of the tenant and as such when
     the second respondent suffered an order of eviction, the first respon-
     dent was equally bound by the order; (vi) that when there was a surren-
     der of tenancy rights restricted to the two Oats in question, the first C
     respondent is bound by the surrender and cannot claim the sub-tenancy
     rights any further; (vii) and that the Act gives protection only to tenants
     and not to sub-tenants against unreasonable eviction and hence the first
     respondent cannot claim protection under the Act from eviction.

             Dismissing the Appeal,                                              D

           HELD: I. l An order of eviction cannot be passed under s. 13(2)
     of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 if the sub-letting
     was prior to the Act coming into force in the area concerned. lt94F]

             Surjit Singh v. Rattan Lal, AIR 1980 P & H .l 19, approved.         E

             Gurcharan Singh v. V.K. Kaushal, [1981] 1 SCR 490, relied
     upon.
·~
            1.2 In the instant case, the sub-lease had been effected before the
     notice of termination of tenancy was issued. The notice of termination F
     of tenancy subsequently issued would not make the sub-lease created
     earlier unlawful in any manner. lt95Cl

           2. Against a common decree of ejectment passed against a tenant
     and the sub-tenant, the sub-tenant alone can appeal in his own right
     against the decree and have the same set aside even though the tenant G
     decides not to file an appeal. lt95F]

           Devaraja Bhatt v. V.S. Raja & Ors., AIR 1953 Madras 356 (Vol.
     40, C.N. 122), Express Estates Ltd. v. Modern Furnishing House, AIR
     1953 Madras 414 and G.L. Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander Nijhawan &
     Ors., All-India Rent Control Journal 1972 Page 887, referred to.    H
    192                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1987] 2 S.C.R.

          Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand, AIR 1964 S.C. 1305, followed.
A
        3.1 A lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property. It creates
  an interest in the property by virtne of the contract of lease which may
  be either oral or written. The interest created in the property can be put
  an end to by terminatin11 the contract. The contract however, cannot be
B terminated in part. l195H; 196AJ

          3.2 In this case though the two items of property were given on
    lease at different times, lhe parties had treated the lease as a composite
    one and that was why a mmmon notice had been issued for terminating
    the tenancy of both the items and furthermore a single petition had been
    filed under s. 13(2) to se,ek an order of eviction in respect of both the
c   items of the lease property. [196A-B]

          4. In this case the lease deed has not been tiled in Court and
    m11rked as an Exhibit in evidence. The explanation given by the appeJ-
    lant that the lease deed was shown to the Rent Controller and the
D   Appellate Authority but it was not tiled as an Exhibit because proceed-
    ings under the Act are n~t conducted In meticulous observance of the
    provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot be accepted and the Court
    eannot act on the basis that a valid lease deed had been executed and it
    contained a contract to the contrary in so far as the tenants' right to       j-
    sub-lease is concerned. [H14G; 195A-B]
E
          5. The lessee has a right to transfer by sub-lease even a part of his
    interest in the property as provided in s. IOS(J) of the Transfer of Pro-
    perty Act. Atransferee from the lessee has a right to claim the benefit of
    contract to the lessee's interest, vis-a-vis the landlord. Thus a sub-lease   ~··

    who bas obtained a part of the interest of the head tenant will be entitled
F   to claim the benefit of th'e contract vis-a-vis the lessor, as the lessee
    cannot surrender the lease in part. Section lll(e) contemplates a sur-
    render of the entire interest under the lease and not a part of the
    interest alone. Moreover, a lease can be determined only by restoring
    possession in respect of the entire oroperty which was taken on lease
    (see.) 108(m). [196B-Dl
G
        6. Section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the          .f-·
  surrender of a lease does not prejudice an under-lease of the property
  or in part thereof previously granted by the lessee. The lessee, having
  parted with a part of the interest in the property in favour of the
  sub-lessee, cannot surrender that part of the property which is in the
H possession of the sub-lessee for he cannot restore possession of the same
                      T.R. GUPTA v. GURBACHAN SINGH [NATARAJAN, J.]             193

             to the Iesssor apart from the fact that he can terminate the contract of
      ...,   lease only as a whole and not in respect of a part of it. [196D-F I
                                                                                      A
        '
                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3182
             Of 1984.

                  From the Judgment and Order dated 17.1.1984 of the Punjab           B
             and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 907 of 1977.
       ~

                 Anil Dev Singh, R.C. Misra and Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the

-·   ··-(    Appellant.

                  Prem Malhotra for the Respondents.
                                                                                      c
     ·-r          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,

                   NATARAJAN, J. This appeal by Special Leave is by a landlord
             and is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and
             Haryana in Civil Revision No. 907 of 1977. In an eviction suit filed     D
             under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
             (for short the 'Act') against the tenant and the sub-tenant (Respon-
             dent 2 and 1 respectively) in respect of two premises, there was a
     . -<    compromise between the landlord and the tenant and in terms thereof,
             the Rent Controller decreed the eviction of the first respondent from
             the premises sub-leased to him. An Appeal to the appellate Authority     E
             proved of no avail and hence the first respondent filed Civil Revision
             No. 907 of 1977 under Section 15(5) of the Act to the High Court. The
             High Court allowed the revision holding that no order of eviction can
     ~       be passed under Section 13(2) of the Act as the sub-tenancy had been
             created before the Act came into force in the Union Territory of
             Chandigarh where the property is situate. The High Court's order is      F
             challenged in this appeal.

                    The brief facts requiring notice may now be seen. The appellant/
             landlord let out in the first instance a shop-cum-flat No. 7 to the
             second respondent in 1963 and subsequently in 1967 he leased out the
             adjoining two flats also to him. The second respondent sub-let the two G
     1,      flats to the first respondent. It is common ground that the sub-letting
             was long prior to 4.11.1972 when the Act came into force in the Union
             Territory of Chandigarh.

                  On March 8, 1973 the appellant filed a suit and sought eviction of
             both the respondents on various grounds but all of them except the H
    194                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A ground of unauthorised sub-letting were given up. The petition was
  contested by both the respondents. However, at the stage of argu-            \.
  ments the appellant and the second respondent entered into a com-
  promise between themselves and in terms thereof the appellant gave
  up his claim for eviction of the second respondent from the shop-cum-
  flat in his occupation. Thereafter the second respondent conceded that
B he had sub-let the two flats to the first respondent without the consent
  of the appellant and hence an order of eviction confined to the two
  flats sub-leased to the first respondent may follow. An appeal to the
  Appellate Authority having failed the first respondent filed a revision
  to the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act and succeeded in
  having the order of eviction set aside.                               ·
c           Mr. Anil Dev Singh, learned counsel for the appellant sought to
    assail the order of the High Court on various grounds. The first ground
    was that when the second respondent had admitted the factum of the
    unauthorised sub-lease and when the Rent ,Controller and the Appel-
    late Authority had acted on his admission, the High Court was in error
D   in interfering with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the
    courts below. This argument is devoid of merit because the admitted
    position is that the Act came into force in the area concerned only on
    4.11.1972 whereas the sub-lease had been effected much earlier. Jn
    view of that position the High Court was entitled to set right the error
    committed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in
E   ordering eviction under Section 13(2) of the Act. As a matter of fact
    the High Court was bound to set right the error in view of its own
    decision in Surjit Singh v. Rattan Lal, AIR 1980 P & H 319 and this
    Court's decision in Gurcharan Singh v. V.K. Kaushal, [1981] 1 SCR
    490. In both these cases it has been laid down that an order of eviction
    cannot be passed under Section 13(2) of the Act if the sub-letting was     ·--r-·
F   prior to the Act coming into force in the area concerned.

         The second ground urged was an alternative plea and it was
  argued that even without reference to Section 13(2) of the Act the
  sub-lease was not lawful because the lease deed entered into between
  the parties contained a dause interdicting any sub-lease without the
G written consent of the landlord. In other words, the argument was that
  the sub-lease was not lawful even under Section 108(J) of the Transfer         ~
  of Property Act because the lease deed contained a prohibition. We
  cannot countenance this argument for more than one reason. In the
  first place the lease deed has not been filed in court and marked as an
  Exhibit in evidence. Learned counsel stated that the lease deed was
H shown to the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority but it was
          T.R. GUPTA v. GURBACHAN SINGH [NATARAJAN. J.I               195


 not filed as an Exhibit because proceedings under the Act are not
                                                                           .A
 conducted in meticulous observance of tlie provisions of the Civil Pro-
,cedure Code. We can hardly accept the explanation given and act on
 the basis that a valid lease deed had been executed and it contained a
 contract to the contrary in so far as..the tenant's right to sub-lease is
 concerned.
                                                                            B
      It was then argued by Mr. Anil Singh Dev that even if it is taken
that there was no lease deed prohibiting the creation of a sub·lease, the
sub-tenancy had become unlawful from 24.1. 72 when the second res-
pondent was served a notice of termination of tenancy issued by the
appellant. This argument is also not tenable because the sub·lease had
been effected before the notice of termination of tenancy was issued.
Hence the notice of termination of tenancy subsequently issued
                                                                            c
would not make the sub-lease created earlier unlawful in any manner.

       Another argument advanced· was that a sub-tenant does not have
rights independent of the tenant and as such when the second respon-
dent has suffered an order of eviction, the first respondent was equally D
bound by the order. Three decisions were cited to fortify this conten-
tion viz. Devaraja Bhatt v. V.S. Raja & Ors., AIR 1953 Madras 356
(Vol. 40, C.N. 122); Express Estates ltd. v. Modern Furnishing
House, AIR 1953 Madras 414 and G.L. Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandet
Nijhawan & Ors., All· India Rent Control fournal 1972 Page 887.
                                                                         E
      These authorities cannot advance the case of the appellant in any
manner. The sub-tenancies which were respectiyely imugnei:I in the
cited cases had come into existence after the Rent Control Act in the
respective States had come into force and hence they are distinguish-
able on facts. As regards the right of a sub-tenant to file an appeal
independently of the tenant this Court has ruled in Karam Singh v. F
Pratap Chand, AIR 1964 S.C. 1305 that against a common decree of
ejectment passed against a tenant and the sub-tenant, the sub-tenant
alone can appeal in his own right against the decree and have the same
set aside even though the tenant decides not to file an appeal.

      There was also a contention that when there was a surrender of G
tenancy rights restricted to the two flats in question, the first respon-
dent is bound by the surrender and cannot claim sub·tenancy rights
any further. The contention is unsustainable for a host of reasons. A
lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property. tt creates an interest
in the property by virtue of the contract of lease which may be either
oral or written. The interest created in the property can be put an end· H
            "i




    196                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1987] 2 S.C.R.

  to by terminating the contract. The contract, however, cannot be
A terminated in part. In llhis case though the two items of property were
  given on lease at different times, the parties had treated the lease as a
  composite one and that was why a common notice had been issued for
  terminating the tenancy of both the items and furthermore a single
  petition had been filed under Section 13(2) to seek an order of evic-
B tion, in respect of both the items of the lease property.

           The lessee has a right to transfer by sub-lease even a part of his
    interest in the property as provided in Section 108(j) of the Transfer of
    Property Act. A transferee from the lessee has a right to claim the
    benefit of contract to the lessee's interest, vis-a-vis the landlord, (yide
    Section 108 second paragraph of clausse (c) of the Tan sfer of Property
C   Act) Thus a sub-lessee who has obtained a part of the interest of the
    head tenant will be entitled to claim the benefit of the contract vis-a-vis
    the lessor, as the lessee (head tenant) cannot surrender /he lease in
    part. Section 111 (e) contemplates a surrender of the entire interest
    under the lease and not a part of the interest alone. Moreover, a lease
D   can be determined only by restoring possession in respect of the entire
    property which was taken on lease (see Section I08(m). Section 115 of
    the Transfer of Property Act provides that the surrender of a lease
    does not prejudice an under-lease of the property or in part thereof
    previously granted by the lessee. The lessee, having parted with a part
    of the interest in the property in favour of the sub-lessee, cannot
E   surrender that part of the property which is in the possession of the
    sub-lessee for he cannot restore possession of the same to the lessor
    apart from the fact the he can terminate the contract of lease only as a      ·-
    whole and not in respect of a part of it. Having regard to all these
     factors, even without going into the question of the partial surrender
    of lease being vitiated by collusion, it is not open to the appellant in
F    law to contend that the second respondent is entitled to and had
     validly surrendered a portion of the lease-hold property and the first
     respondent, being the sub-tenant is bound by the surrender and should
     deliver possession.

       The la.st argument of the appellant's counsel was that the Act
G gives protection only to tenants and not to sub-tenants against
  unreasonable eviction and hence the first respondent cannot claim
  protection under the Act from eviction. Reference was made in this
  connection to Section 2(ii) of the Act which excludes a sub-tenant
  from the definition of tenant. The argument stems from an erroneous
  assumption that the first respondent is seeking protection under the
H Act from being evicted. The true position is that the first respondent
          T.R. GUPTA v. GURBACHAN SINGH [NATARAJAN, J.)                197

 has only taken the stand that the appellant is not entitled to evict him     A
 under section 13(2) of the Act since the sub-lease in his favour had
 been created before the Act came into force.

         We are, therefore, of the view that none of the contentions of the
  appellant has merit or substance. Consequently, the appeal fails and is
                                                                              B
  dismissed. The parties \viii, however, pay and bear their respective
. costs.

 A.P.J.                                                 Appeal dismissed.