Holding

The Board's liability under Section 61B is that of a bailee, and Section 87(2) limits its immunity only to acts of employees appointed under the Act, so the Board is liable for the negligence of its other employees.

Summary

Premier Automobiles imported a heavy grinding machine that was taken into the custody of the Bombay Port Trust Board upon landing. While the Board's employees were moving the case on a trolley, it fell and the machinery was severely damaged. Premier sued the Board for damages, alleging negligence, misfeasance and non‑feasance of the Board's employees. The Board claimed immunity under paragraph 2 of Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, arguing that its liability under Section 61B was that of a bailee and that the statute exempted it from responsibility for acts of employees appointed under the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 61B makes the Board a bailee and that Section 87(2) shields the Board only for acts of those few employees specifically appointed under the Act, not for the negligence of other workers. Consequently, the Board could not rely on the statutory immunity and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decree and dismissing the suit.

Issues considered

The nature of the Board's liability under Section 61B of the Bombay Port Trust Act – whether it is that of a bailee subject to tort law.
Whether Section 87(2) of the Act provides immunity to the Board for tortious acts of its employees appointed under the Act.
Whether the claim by Premier is for breach of a statutory duty or an action in tort (negligence).
Whether the employees involved in the damage were appointed under the Act, thereby invoking Section 87(2).
The applicability of contractual bailment provisions of the Indian Contract Act to the Board's duties.

Legislation cited

Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879s. 61A, s. 61B, s. 87
General Clauses Act
Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 151, s. 152, s. 161
Indian Railways Act, 1890

Subjects

bailmentstatutory dutynegligencevicarious liabilityimmunitySection 61BSection 87tortcontractual bailment

Judgment

532

A

THE TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY
v.
THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD.
B
August 26. 1980
[P. N. SHINGHAL & D. A. DESAI, JJ.]

Bombay Port Trust Act- Sections 61B and 87 para 2-Scop~ of-Plaintiff's
machinery damaged in transit from docks to godown-Plaintifjs claimed
damages from Board as bailee-Board claimed immunity for tortious acts of
employees under para 2 of section 87-Liability of the Board-No11-co11tracted
bailment-Nature of.
Section 4 of the Bombay Port Trust Act provides for the creation of a
Trust Board. It is a body corporate with perpetual succession and can sue
and be sued. Section 61A(l) charges the Board with the duty of carrying
D out the provisions of the Act. Section 6 IB provides that the responsibility
of the Board for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which it has
taken charge shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act. be that .:if a
bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Contract Act, 1872 omitting the
words "in the absence of any special contract", in section 151 of the Contract
Act. Paragraph 2 of section 87 provides that the Board shall not be re~ponsible
for any misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance of any employee appointed
E under this Act.
A case containing machinery imported by the respondent was taken charge
of by the Board upon its landing in the Bombay Port. While being transported
by the Board's employees on a four-wheeler trolly to one of the sheds in the
docks the case fell down and the machinery was badly damaged.
After carrying out a survey of the damage caused to the machinery, the
respondents gave notice to the Board claiming a large sum as damages. 'Invok-
ing the provisions of section 87 of the Act the Board denied all liability for
the damage caused to the machineiy.
In the course of th(: trial of the plaintiff-respondent's suit the 9arties drew
up certain "consent terms" which formed the basis of the decision at the trial
and appeal. Summarising the finding of the consent terms the appellate court
stated that (i) the trust Board admitted an element of negligence on the part
of its employees; (ii) 1he employees,· who were with the trolly at the time of
the accident, were: appointed under the Act and (iii) while the Board merely T
claimed that the persons accompanying its trolly were employees. the respondents
claime~ that they were employees as well as agents of the Board.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the liability of the Board
was that of a bailee. As regards the applicability of the provisions of para-
H graph 2 of section 87 on which the appellant relied the High Court was ot
the view that this provision related to a totally different subject with which sec-
cion 6IB was not concerned and, therefore, the provisions of that s~ction did not
TRUSTEES· OF PORT V. PREMIER 'AUTOMOBILES 533

afford any protection to the Board and that since a master is always liable for A
the torts committed by his servants in the course of the employment the
Board was responsible for the damage caused to the machinery by its emJlloyccs
fo the course of their employment. ·
Allowing the Board"s appeal
HELD: (l)(a) Section 61B ma!ies it clear that the responsibility of the
Board was that of a bailee under three sections of .the Contract Act and no B
more. It was not the case of the plaintiff that there was a contract of bailment
· as contemplated by section 148 of the Contract Act. Since there was no such
contract between the parties, neither .section 151, nor section 152 or section 161
would have been attracted as such: nor would the provision in section 61B
nave been applicable in a case of coniractual bailment. Ev~n though there
'was no contractual bailment, the responsibility of the Board for the loss, destruc·
t:ion or deterioration of the goods was clearly that of a bailee subject to the c
Teservations provided by the section. [539 A-DJ
(b) The essence of bailment is possession. A bailment may arise even
'When· the owner of the goods has not consented to their possession by the bailee
at all. A bailment is not, therefore, technically and essentially subject to the
limitations of an agreement and the notion of privily need not be introduced
in an area where it is unnecessary to do so. It follows that a bailment may D
exist without the creation of a contract between the parties and it essentially
gives rise to remedies which cannot be said to be contractual. That is why
it is said that bailment is predominantly a. tortious relation and that the two
are fundamentally similar. Therefore, since the. claim in the present case was
not based upon a mere breach of statutory duty under section 61B but was
based on the Board's liability as bailee, it was no other than by way of an
action in tort. [539 F-H]
E
(c) It may be that section 61B has fastened certain obligations on the BC'ard
which in ·truth are not contractual because they did not rest on an agreement
but which by virtue of the same section were to be treated as if they were so
and were made the subject matter of liability under sections 151, 152 and l 62 of
ihe Contract Act. Such a relationship may well be called as one arising , out
of an implied contract. But that does not mean that an altogether new c~use
of action arises merely because a duty to take· charge of the goods is cast on F
the Board. By the very nature of that relationship it was essentially a delictal
obligation, a civil wrong for which the remedy is an action in damages and
not by way of an action of breach of contract. [540 B-DJ
(d) In casting a duty on the Board to take charge for the goods immediatelv
i1pon landing, the Legislature took care to lay down and define the nature and
extent of the liability which is set out in terms to be that of a bailee. It is
well settled that non-contractual bailment is predominantly a tortious action. G
1541 A-BJ
~ In the instant case the plaintiff's claim was founded not upon a breach
of statutory duty under section 61B apart from tort but on negligence, malfeas·
ance and nonfeasance and the acts of misconduct on the part of its employees.
In short the claim was based on careless handling by the appellants when the
case slipped and fell while it was being removed by them as bailees. [541C]
H
2(a) The words "any person" in section 87 include the Board. The benefit
of the limitation prescribed in paragraph I of this section is available to other
..persons" also. But unlike paragraph I, the protection of paragraph 2 is not
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A extended to cover "any person" but is confined to the Board. Yet another
and more serious restriction is that the Board is made responsible for the mis-
feasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance of only those of its employees who have
not been "appointed under this Act" which means that the protection does not
extend to any tortious act if it has been committed by an employee who has. -+
not been appointed under the Act. [542 A-DJ
(b) Section 21 empowers the Soard to appoint employees whom it deems
B necessary and proper to maintain for the purposes of the Act. But that could•
not possibly include all the employees like artisans, porters, labourers etc., who·
under the proviso to the section "shall not be deemed to be within the meaning ,~·
of this section." The protection which the Board enjoys is therefore confined
to the tortious acts of the employees appointed under the Act. Therefore, the
loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which the Board has taken charge·
would clearly amount to the Board's responsibility under section 61.B. But
c section 87 paragraph 2 has its resonance in section 61B and vice versa. Both•
the sections are :interconnected and have to be read together as a whole.
~~ ~
(c) The view of the High Court that the provisions of paragraph 2 of sec-
tion 87 are upon a totally different subject with which section 51B is not at all
concerned, runs counter to the clear provisions of the two sections if read
together and is wholly unsustainable. It is section 61B which make; the
D responsibility of the Board for the goods of which it has taken possession
subject to the other provisions of the Act. There is no occasion or justification
for reading the clause regarding the subjection to the other provisions of the-
Act so as to exclude section 87 as if it were outside the Act. [543 B-,E]
(d) When the High Court, while interpreting the consent terms stated
that it was admitted that those employees at whose hands the machinery suffered
E damage in the courBe of transport "were appointed under the said Act" it was
a short and inevitable step for it to hold that the Board was entitled to be
absolved of its liability for the acts of those employees by virtue of paragraph 2
of section 87. [543 H]
(e) The liability of the master for the acts of· his servants would not possibly-
arise in a case where the statute intervenes and provides in express terms that
the master would not be responsible for any act of misfeasance, malfeasance or-
F non-feasance committed by a special class of its employees. The omission on
the part of the High Court to appreciate this aspect of the matter arose because·
it based its findings on the mistaken impression that it was concerned with the
act of an ordinary employee of the Board and not a special category of employee-
referred to in paragraph 2 of section 87. The High Court also failed to. notice
that paragraph 2 of section 87 related essentially to acts of misfeasance, mal-
feasance and nonfeasance of only those employees who had been appointed
G under the Act, and, as such employees were very few, the restriction on the
Board's liability was limited and confined quite substantially. [5440-F;c
545 DJ T
3. Moreover, the: so called statutory duty 1s not unequi•rocal and even·
assuming that it took the case outside the purview of the law of torts and made
it an innominate o~ligation, that would not take the case out of the exception ·
provided by paragraph 2 of seption 87. ·Section 61B and section 87 are parts
H of the same statute. [546 B-C]
Gulam Hussain Ahmedali & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Trustus of the Port of Bombay.
64 Bombay L.R. 67-0 overruled.
TRUSTEES OF PORT V. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shinghal, 1.) 535

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1282 of 1971'.. A
From the Judgment and Order dated 17-7-1978 of the Bombay
"-t High Court in Appeal No. 40 / 65.

Dr. Y. S. Chitale, 1. B. Dadachanjl and K. 1. :John for the
Appellant. B

Anil B. Diwan, Rameshwar Nath and Ravinder Nath for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
SHINGHAL, J.-This appeal by certificate is directed against the
judgment of the Bombay High Court dated July 17, 1970, by which it
upheld the judgment of the trial court dated March 3, 1965, decreeing
the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents for Rs. 35,000 and interest with a
part of their costs. It so happened that although there was initially
much controversy about the facts. the parties realised the futility of D
disputing some glaring facts and agreed to take a decision, even in
the trial court, on what they once described as "interim consent terms",
but to which they have stuck all through. We shall refer to them in
a while, after stating some of the facts on which both the trial and
the appellate courts have placed reliance. That will bring out the
significance of the "consent terms" and make them more intelligible. .E
The Premier Automobiles Ltd, hereinafter referred to as the
plaintiffs, imported 13 cases of machinery from Italy. Case No~ 249,
which is the subject-matter of the controvercy before us, contained
an internal grinding machine weighing over 3 tonnes. It arrived in
Bombay on February 21, 1960, by S. S. Jalsilton Hall. The "Board", F-
constituted under section 4 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879.
for short the Act, was a body corporate with a perpetual succession
and a common seal. It was called "the Trustees of the Port of
Bombay" and could sue and be sued by that name. We shall,
however, refer to it as "the Board" for that is how it lias been- referred
to in the Act and the impugned judgment. .Since the Board was G.
charged with the duty of carrying out the provisions of the· Act, and
had, ·in particular, the duty, under section 61A(l) of tlie Act, to take
/' charge immediately upon the landing of any goods, it took charge of
case No. 249 also on its landing in Bombay on February 2f,,i960. The
Board has in fact filed document Ex. K to prove !ha! theccase .was in
a damaged condition when it landed on February 21, 1960(i'add ·that ff,
attention to that fact was drawn of the handling agents M f s~india
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. It purports to be· a: irontempcif,aneous;
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981} 1 S.C.R.

A document. The case was placed on a four-wheeler trolly and was
being carried to one of the sheds in the docks when it feJr down and
the machine contained in it was severely damaged. Several employees
of the Board were in charge of the case and the trolly at that time.
It is said that a survey of the damage was carried out ·at the
B instance of the plaintiffs, who then took delivery on February 29, 1960.
They carried- the ca!le to their factory and had the machinery examined
by another firm. That firm valued the machinery at Rs. 65,000 and
.the damage at Rs. 55,000. The plaintiffs gave a notice claiming
Rs. 65,774.10. The Board denlet' the claim in their reply and aUeged
that the machinery was in a broken condition at the time of the
landing. and it was due to the damaged condition of the case that it
slipped and fell from the trolly accidentaliy. They relied on the
aforesaid report Ex. K and pleaded, further, that they were not liable
because of section 87 and certain bye-Jaws of the Board.
The controversy led to the suit which was instituted Jn August
19, 1960. We shall refer to the pleadings in the.fr proper context to
the extent they bear on the controversy before us. Issues were framed
and the parties went to trial. They Jed "considerable" evidence, but
during the cours(!. of the trial they drew up certain "consent terms''
on October 7, 1964 and limited the trial to them. Those terms have
formed the li>asis of the decision at the trial and in the appeal. It
E seems there was some controversy regarding the admissions contained
in the consent terms, and we have accepted the interpretation
concurrently placed on them by both courts. The appellate court
has summarised its findings on paragraph II(b) of the consent terms
as follows,-
"The .contents of this paragraph leave much to be desired. But
three things are clear from this paragraph (I) that in deciding
issue No. l (we are concerned with issue No. 2 now) the Court
had to assume that there had been some misfeasance or
malfeasance (there is no case of non-feasance anywhere pleaded)
on the part of persons handling the case No. 249, that is to say,
the employees of the Port Trust. In other words, the element of
negligence on the part of the employees of the Port Trust was
admitted. (2) It is also admitted that those employees were
appointed under the said Act. (3) The defendants merely alleged
that they were employees while the plaintiffs alleged that they
were employees as well as the agents of the Trust and that this
side;~1ssue will have to be decided."
The Bigh Court has given its interpretation of paragraph Il(c) also
in regard to the applicability of bye-law No. 82 to the benefit· of the
TRUSTEES OF PORT v. PREM!ER AUTOMOBILES; (Sliinghal, ].) 537

Board, but it does not really matter in the view we have taken of A.
the case in other respects. The High Court took note of the fact
that the loss or damage to the goods was not pointed' out by the
plaintiffs or acknowledged by the Docks Manager before the removal
of the goods from the docks with reference to bye-law No. 98. That
court however noticed the fact that both parties had agreed that if
damages were to be awarded, the amount thereof should be Rs. 35,000.
As regards evidence, it was agreed that, except as indicated' in the
preceding terms of consent, no other evidence "hithertol" recorded
would be taken into consideration in the future proceedings in the
suit or for decision· of the remaining issues. That led the High Court
to observe that the parties somewhat narrowed dbwn the controversy
by confining it to the points of Iaw, and· the learned Single Judge
c
decided the case only upon those points of law which were referred ·
to in the judgment.

The High Court, in appeal, took the view that the principal and
substantial point before it was the true scope and effect of section 6 IB
D·
and paragraph 2 of section 87 af the Act. It arrived at a number of
conclusions with refer~nce to those provisions, namely, that the
piaintiffs founded their claim upon the breach· of statutory duty. under
section 6IB also, that. the provision of paragraph· 2 of section 87 was
upon a totally different subject with which section 6 IB was not at all
concerned, that the liability of the Board was that of a bailee, that E
a master or employer was always fiable for all torts committed
by the servant provided it was in the course of his employment and
that any other view of paragraph 2 of section 87 would render the
provision of section 6IB nugatory. In reaching its conclusions the
High Court relied heavily on its Division Bench decision in Gulam
Hussain Ahmedadi & Co. Pvt. Ltd~ v. Trustees of tlie Port of B'omhay.( 1) F
We shall examine whether these conclusions of the High Court
are correct and whether it was justified in upholding the judgment and
decree of the trial court and dismissing the- appeaL

The first point for consideration is whether the High Court was
right in taking the view that "aparti from the claim in, tort, the
plaintiffs also claimed for the breach of the Trusts' statutory liability
under section 61B." In reaching that conclusion the High Court
noticed the obvious facts tha.t in paragraph II(b) of the consent terms
the trial court was required to assume that there was some misfeasance,
malfeasance or non-feasance oE the persons handling case· No. 249. H
The High Court also noticed the· two further facts. (i) that there were
(I) 64 Bom L. R. 670.
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

three clear heads under which torts could be classified, and by using
them in paragraph 2 of section 87 of the Act, "the Legislature provided·
for immunity of th1~ Port Trust from torts committed by its employees'",
and (ii) that in .so far as the plaintiffs' claim in tort was concerned
there could be no doubt that "it would fall within the ambit of
paragraph 2 of section 87 because misfeasance, malfeasance or non-
B f~asance (was) specifically admitted", We have therefore to examine
whether the plaintiffs in fact, or in substance, founded their claim on
the alleged breach of the statutory duty under section 61B and, if so,
what is its bearing on the suit.
j
A reference ,to the plaint (paragraph 4) shows that the plaintiffs
c pleaded that case No. 249 arrived by S.S. Jalsilton Hall and that the
Board took charge of it "in accordance with the provisions of the
Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 and the dock bye-laws framed there-
under." Then (in paragraph 5) the plaintiffs pleaded that after taking
charge of the case, the defendants placed it on a trolly for removing
it to their open shed, and that, while it was being so removed, "on
D accoqnt of careless handling by the defendants, the case slipped from
the trolly and fell on the ground" and its machine was "entirely
broken". While making that assertion, :the plaiintiffs categorically
:assorted that "the defendants moved the said. case as aforesaid in
their capacity as bailees thereof." This referenc~ to the Board's
responsibility was pleaded because section 61B provided that that
E
would be the' nature of the liability of the Board. The section clearly
states as follows,- ').
"61B. The responsibility of the Board for the 10s~. destructi0n
or deterioration of goods of which it has taken charge shall, subject ~~
to the other provisions of this Act and subject also in the case of ·
F goods received for carriage by railways to the provisions of the
Indian Railways Act, 1890, be that of a bailee under sections
151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, omitting the
words 'in the absence of any special contract' in section 152 of the
last mentioned Act."
G So if there was any loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
within the charge of the Board, its responsibility was that of a bailee
under the three speciJic sections of the Contract Act, excepting of
course the further provision about the omission of the words meant
to exclude a special contract to the contrary in section 152 of the
Contract Act and the relevant provisions of the Railways Act. The
H section thus makes it clear that, for purposes of the present case, ihe
responsibility of the Board was that of a bailee under the three sections
of the Contract Act, a:11d no more.
TRUSTEES OF PORT V. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shingha/, J.) 5 3 9

It has to be appreciated that the subject'-matter of contractual A
bailment has been dealt with in chapter IX of the Contract Act, and
:Section 148 defines "'bailment" to mean .the delivery of goods "upon
-f a contract". As it was nobody's case that there was any such
contract between the plaintiffs and the Board in this case, section 151
(regarding care to be taken by the bailee). section 152 (regarding the B
absence of that responsibility after taking the necessary care), and
section 161 (regarding responsibility when goods were not duly
retumed), would not have been .attracted as such. Nor would the
provision in section 6 lB that the aforesaid responsibility of the Board
shall be "subject to the other provisions of this Act", have been
, ;applicable in a case of contractual bailment.
So even though there was no contractual bailment either according
c
to the pleadings of the parties. or on the . wordings of section 6 lB,
the responsibility of the Board was of the nature aforesaid. !J.S the
bailee of the consignment by virtue of that section. In other words,
m so far as the "responsibility" of the Board for the loss, destruction
or deterioration of the goods of which it had taken charge was D
-concerned, it was, clearly that of a bailee, subject of course to the
reservations provided by the section. What then is the nature of a
bailment? It may be mentioned that we have gone through the
pleadings and there is no justification for the view that the plaintiffs
based their claim on the breach of a mere statutory duty of the
Board under section 61B. E
It is well settled that the essence of bailment is possession. It is
equally well settled that a bailment may arise, as in this case, even
when the owner of the goods has not consented to their possession
by the bailee at all : Palmer on Bailment, 1979 edition, page 2. There
may thus be bailment when a wharfinger takes possession of goods
F
unloaded at the quay side : (1970)2 All E.R. 826. A bailment is not
therefore technically and essentially subject to the limitations of an
,agreement, and the notion of privity need not .be introduced in an
area where it is unnecessary, for bailment. as. we. have said, arises
·out of possession, and essentially connotes the relationship between a
pe,rson and the thing in his charge. It is sufficient if that possession G
is within the knowledge of the person concerned. It follows that a
bailment may very well exist without the creation of a contract between
fue parties and it essentially gives rise to remedies which, in truth
and substance, cannot be said to be contractual. That is why Palmer
bas made the assertion ~hat "bailment is predominantly a tortious
relation" (page 36), and the two are fundamentally similar. H
It follows, therefore, that as the claim in the present case was not
based upon a mere .breach of statutory duty under section 6 lB of the
5 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [~981] l S.C.R.

A Act, and was based on the Board's liability .as bailee, it was no other
than by way of an action in tort. .

It may be that, as in the present case, certain obligatjons were -+
fastened on the Board under section 61B of the Act which were not
in truth contractual in as much as they did not rest on agreement,
B but which, by_ virtue of the same section, were to be treated as if they
were so, and were made the subject-matter of liability under three
sections (sections 151, 152 and 162) of the Contract Act. Such a~
relationship may well be called as one arising C'•lt of an implied
contract. But that does not justify the view of the High Court that
an altogether new cause of action arose merely because a duty to take ,
c charge of the landed goods was cast on the Board under section 61A(l)
and the Board's responsibility for them was defined in section GIB.
By the very nature of that relationship, which admittedly did not arise
out of agreement between the parties, it was essentially a de!ictal
obligation. It was a civil wrong, for· which the remedy was an action
in damages and not by way of an action for breach of contract, as it
D is no body's case that there was any such relationship -between the·
parties. It may be that the obligatio,n of the Board was of the
nature of a quasi--contract, but that also would not justify the view
that it arose merely because of the words of sections 61A and 61B,
as a statutory obligation quite apart from the sources of origin of
obligations defined! by Salmond (on Jurisprudence), twelfth edition,
E
page 452 as contractual, delictal, quasi-contractual and innominate.
In fact as Halsbury has put it (third edition. Vol. 37, page 111) while
dealing with the nature and elements of liability the position is a&
follows,-
"Those civil rights of action which are available under
F English common law for the recovery of unliquidated damages
by persons who have sustained injury .or loss from acts, statements
or omissions of others in breach of duty or contravention o!
right imposed and conferred by law rather than by agreement
are rights of action in tort."
(Emphasis supplied).
G
Reference may also be made to Street on Torts, sixth edition, page 5,
that an action for breach of a statutory duty is an action in tort.
As has further been pointed out on page 6, there is no fixed catalogue
of circumstances which alone and for all time mark the limit of
what are torts. Speaking simply and generally the law of torts is.
H concerned with those: situations where the conduct of one party causes
or threatens harm to the interests of the other party. As in this case
a duty was cast on the Board under section 61A to take cli.arge of
TRUS'l;EES OF PORT v. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shinghal, J.) 5 41
' - ·;-,··- -
--· -- ',.. . , ., - : (

the goods immediately upon landing, the Legislature took care to A
f'-. ,_- - ·..., ·•-1.:• ,,rl-.
•ir··~-- · ..,, _., ,,_.,.., ·•n·-- ·;-,- ·- . ._ ... -
~····!-
lay dowri and define the nature and ·the e'xterit of that liability, which
. was set out, in 'terms to be· that of a bailee. Palmer has ably brought
out the nature of bailment vis,-a-vis tort and'has rightly 'reached 'tile
conclusion that non'.coritractual bailment is predominantly
"'· ... '
atortious
-
action.

It would thus appear that it was not the case of the plaintiffs in
their pleadings that' their c!afm was founded merely' upon the breach
of the statutory duty under s'ection 61B of the Act, apart froni tort.
On the other hand, in their notice before the suit, the plaintiffs' case
was based on negligence, malfeasance and non-feasanc.e ort the part of
the Board's administration at the'docks·and/or the· acts of misconduct c
on the part of its employees. As has been' pointed out, in the plaint
the claim was based on careless handling by the defendants when
the case slipped and fell while it was being removed by them as
bailees.
So when the action was by way of tort, and was, at any rate, D
rested on section 61B, it was necessary for ·the High Court to give
full meaning to what that section provided and to give effect to
paragraph 2 of section 87 if it had a' bearing on
that section as was
canvassed at length all through the litigation.
. . '

We have extracted section 61B. It will appear that while it E
prescribes the responsibility of the Board for
the loss, destruction (as
in this case) and deterioration 0f goods of which it has taken charge,
it expressly provides. further, that that responsibility shall be "subject
to the other provisions" of the Act. The "other provisions" on which
reliance was placed by the Board, was section 87. It will be enough
to read the first two paragraphs of that section, for the arguments F
before us have be.en confined to paragraph 2. The two paragraphs
r\:ad as follows,~ · ·
"87. No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against
any person for any thing done, or pur.porting to have
been done,
in pursuance of this Act, without giving to such person one month's
previous notice in writing of the intended suit oi-' oih~r 'proceeding; G
and of the cause thereof, nor after: six months from the accrual
of the cause of su~h suit or other proceeding.
The Board shall not be responsible for any misfeasance,
malfeasance or non'.feasance of any employee appointed under
this Act."
H
It is not in dispute before us that the words "any person" at
the opening of sectfon 87 prohibiting the commencement of. a suit
14--647 S.C. India/80
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A or other proceeding; against it (or him), include the Board. Section 4
of the Act in fact 1~xpressly provides that the Board shall be a body
corporate and have perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall
sue and be sued by its long name mentioned in the section. The term +
"person" has been defined in the General Clauses Act to include any
company or associaition or body of individuals, whether incorporated
B or not. So the Bo.ard was a "person" within the meaning of section
87 and it was entitled to notice and the benefit of the limitation
prescribed in paragraph 1. But that benefit is available to other
"persons" also. Then comes paragraph 2, which expressly provides
that the Board shall not be responsible for any misfeasance, mal-
feasance or non-feasance of any employee appointed under the Act.
c It has to be noted that, unlike paragraph 1, the protection of paragraph
2 is not extended to cover "any person" and is confined to the Board.
Then there is another, and a more serious restriction, namely, that the
Board shall be responsible as aforesaid for the misfeasance, mal-
feasance or non-feasance of only those of its employees who have
D no.t been "appointed under ··this Act". It does not therefore extend to
any such tortious act if it has been committed by an employee who
has not been appointed under the Act.

Not all the Board's employees are appointed under the Act.
Thus a cross-reference to section 21, which deals with officers and
E servants of the. Board, shows that the Board is required to prepare
and sanction a schedule of the staff of employees whom they shall
deem it necessary .and proper to maintain for purposes· of the Act.
That could not possibly include all the employees of the Board, for
the proviso to the section states that artisans, porters and labourers
and mukadams of porters and labourers etc., and a person in tempo-
F rary employment other than those who are in receipt of the specified
monthly salary, "shall not be deemed to be within the meaning of
this section". The protection which the Board enjoys is thus con-
fined to the tortious acts of ·the employees appointed under the Act,
while the Board i~: answerable for any such act committed by the
vast majority of its lesser employees who do the main work of actual-
G· ly· handling, loadin:s, transpo11ting, storing etc. of the goods . handled
on behalf of the Board in the exercise of its statutory powers. The
protection is therefore very much restricted, in so far as the Board is
concerned, ancf there is no reason why it should be denied to i.t where
it is otherwise available by a direct and emphatic provision in the
Act. The section is clear and categorical in providing that if any
H misfeasance, malfeasance or non-feasance is committed by any ~m
ployee appointed under the Act, the Board shall not be resP?ns1ble
for it. Thus loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which the
TRUSTEES OF PORT v. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shinghal, J.) 543

Board has taken. charge, falling in one or the other of those three A
categories according to the facts and circumstances of each offending
act, would clearly amounti to the Board's responsibility under sec-
-+ tion 61B, but section 87 (paragraph 2) has its reasonance in sec-
tion 6IB, and vice versa, so that the sections are inter-connected and
have to be read together and as a whole. ·
B
The High Court, however, went to the extent of observing that
the .provis..ions o~ sectio? 8. 7 par~graph 2 are upon "a :otally different
· subiect with which sect10n 61B Is not at all concerned' and that was
'"""·why it took the view that they could not possibly be held ;(o control
section 61B. The High Court went on to hold that in its opinion one
and the same act may give rise to two liabilities, one for breach of c
_). statutory duties and the other for the commission of a civil wrong
or a tort ~d that while section 61B provides for the former, paragraph
2 .of section 87 provides for the latter and the two provisions do not
overlap. No justifiable reason has been given for this view and, if
we may say with ·respect, we find that it runs counter to the clear
provisions of the two sections if they are read together, and is wholly D
unsustainable. It is section 61B which deals with and prescribes the
responsibility of the Board for goods of which 'it has taken possession
under the statutory duty' under section 61A, and it is that section,
namely, section 61B, which makes that responsibility "subject to the
other provisions of (that) Act". There is no occasion or justification
for reading the clause regarding the subjection to the other provisions E
--( of the Act so as to exclude section 87 as if it were outside the Act.
So if it could be shown that the acts of misfeasance, malfeasance
and non-feasance compendiously used ~t the trial and in the consent

t terms, were committed by any employee appointed under the Act,
--_ there is no reason why the Board should not invoke paragraph 2 of
section 87 and successfully claim that it was not responsible for them.
A reference to paragraph II(b)i of the consent terms clearly shows
that issues Nos. I and 2, which related to the liability of the Board
F

'by reason of the provisions of section 87, were to be decided on the
assumption that there was some misfeasance, malfeasance or non-
feasance of ithe persons who handled the case in question and who G
\! -y according to the defendants were their "employees appointed under
'the Act" whilst who according to the plaintiffs were the employees
and the "agents" of the defendants. As we have mentioned earlier,
the contents of this part of the consent terms has been interpreted by
the High Court to mean that while negligence on the part of the
Board was admitted "it was also admitted that these employees were H
.appointed under the said.Act". When the High Court clearly reached
>that conclusion, it was a short and inevitable step for it to bold,
544 SUPREME COORT REPORTS [19~1] 1 S.CR.

A further, that the Board was therefore entitled to be absolved of its
' iiabi!ity for the acts of these employees by virtue of paragraph 2 of
section 87. So here again the High Court fell into an error for which
its judgment cannot be sustained.
The High Court has tried to interpret paragraph 2 of section 87
+
with reference to the law which was in operation prior to the enactment
B of section 87 by an Act of 1879 for till then the ordinary law was
'
in operation, and reference in that connection was made to Barwick/~
v. English jo,int Stock Ba.nk.( 1) There the law was stated as follows :
"The general rule is that the master is answerable for every
such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course
c of the s;~rvice and for the master's benefit, though no express
command or privity of the master be proved."
Reference has also been made by the High Court to Salmond on
Jurisprudence that actual benefit to the master need not be shown
in such cases. But what the High Court did not properly appreciate
was that such a liability or responsibility of the master could· not
D
( possibly arise in a case where 1the statute intervenes, and provides,
in express terms, that the master shall not be responsible for any act
of misfeasance, malfeasance or non-feasance committed by a special
class of its employees. This omission of the High Court to appreciate
the correct legal position with reference to the decision in Barwick
E (supra) and the text book relied upon by it, arose because it based
its finding on the mistaken impression that it was concerned with the
act of an ordinary employee of the Board and not the special category
of employee referred to in paragraph 2 of section 87 of the Act,
namely, the "employee appointed under the Act". This mistake runs
through the eil'tire judgment and, occurs at a dozen places where the
F question of tortious liability has been examined in regard to the
action of an ordinary employee and the master's vicarious liability
for the same.
Then the High Court went on to examine its decision in Gulam
Hussain's case (supra) and, while disagreeing with that portion of
that judgment where the Division Bench had stated that the "scope
G and the effect of the second paragraph of section 87 is to protect the
' Board from vicarious liabillty which they might have otherwise ._,.~
incurred for the torts committed by their employees in the course of
employment", the High Court chose to follow the view taken in that
judgment that the responsibility for the loss, destruction or deteriora-
tion of goods, which had been referred to in section 61 B of the Act.
H was the direct resp?nsibility of the Board itself and not that of any

(I) (1867) L.R. Vol. II 259 at 265.
'· ''·· ''.'l l i -,
TRUSTEES OF PORT v. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shinghal, J.) 54 5
l'I
ef its employees. But.we are constrained to say that in. Gufam Iiu~;ain's A
.case,(1) also, the High Court referred only ..to the ."employees of the
+ B~o~rd and th~.torts c9mmitte~ by ,tqe~)~;'.he co~r~e ~f,their empl9Y,-
ment, but failed to notice that even though a duty was cast on the
Board under sedlion 61B for the loss, destruction or deterior~tion of
· goods of which it had taken charge, that responsibility. was "subject
~.o the other provisions, of th~ Act", namely~ se,cti9n, 8}, pa~agr,aph 2 to "B
Which reference has been made by us at. son,t~ length, and which ,ex-
~l. . fs~ly, ~~solved ·.t~~)~p~~~- frq.m J7.spo~~!.l?ili~y fo~., ~ny misfe~. ~anc,~,
malfeasance or non-feasance of any employee appointed under the
Act. Gulam Hussa.i1i'.s case. (supra) wa~ therefore not d~cided cor·
rectly and as the High Co~rt, in the impugned, jwlgment, took, the
> ;ii~~ .tn~t ,~he conclusion, r~a·c.he<l in, dutqm Iiussain>.s .~~se (sppr~)
was binding on i1t, it naturally arrived at a decision with which. we
;are unable to agree. The High Court failed to notke that pfil.a-
graph 2 of section 87 related essentially to acts of misfeasance, ~ilI
feasance and non-feasance of only those employees who h~d been
appointed under the_ Act, and as such employees were very few, the (I

D
restricdon on the Board's liability wa~ limited and confined quite
substantially. The High Court went fa~ther, arid brought in tlie
<iu~stioil and concept of the Boa;<l·s "a~ents" even thaugh it ~as q~ii'e
foreign to par~graph 2 of section 87 and no e~idence was relied upo~
fo establish that it were .the Board's "~g~nts" who were responsible
for the damage :to the consignment Jn fact, in Gulam HussmJi's I
E
~ ~a~e (supra) the High Court presum ed th~t if the Board was r~s-ponsi-
0

ble for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the cause
of

t
action must be ihe failure of the. Board to take the requisite degree
~- of care by itself or t.hro.ug. h. ilts.·agents,and.. not~. . rely a tort c?m1?itt"e.d
.F
e.

by.an employee
,,,,t~.·. .,
for.which- ,,•the Board
: . . . :.. ·-.
,~"·
was sought
''.
to·.:.be ...held- v1canously
~."': ' .. ··-"
liable. With respect, we are unable to find any justification for such
a view. Gulam Hussain's case (supra) was therefore not decided on
a. proper appreciation of the provisions of section .61B and . para-
graph 2 of section 87 of the Act. One of the Judge~ who decided
that case was the Judge who tried the present case, and he naturally
followed his own earlier judgment in Gu1am Hussain's caose. (supra).
~ As the Division Bench, which gave the present judgment (under ap-
peal before us) in that very case held that the conclusion reached in
Gulam Hussain's case (supra) was binding upon it, if fell into the
error which had crept in the initial decision in Gu/.am Hussain's case
{supra). Gulam Hussain's cal"ie (supra) is therefore no authority or
basis for upholding the impugned judgment. I
H
It has to be appreciated and remembered all through. that
t>ection 6 lB which imposes the responsibility on the Board for loss.
546 SUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A destruction or deterioration of goods of which it has taken charge,
and states that that responsibility shall be that of a bailee under the
three sections of the Contract Act. states further that the responsibility -+·
shall be "subject to the other provisions of (the) Act". So the so-called
statutory duty is not unequivocal, and even if it were assumed that
it took the case outside the purview of the law of torts and made it
B what Salmond has classified as an "innominate obligation", that
would not take the case out of the exception provided by paragraph ~
2 of section 87. Sections 6 JB and 87 are both parts of the same
statute, and must be read together-particularly when that is the
clear direction of section 61B. By virtue of that section, the liability/'
of the Board is no more than that of a bailee under sections 151, 152
c and 161 of the Contract Act. As we have pointed out, bailment is
a concept correlated to possession, and when that is admittedly not ·-4_
contradicted in this case. it is really a liability in tort and the so-called
liability under section 61B of the Act means no more and no less
than this.
D
The High Court has observed that any other view would "virtually
render the provisions of sedt'ion 61B largely nugatory". But the very
next sentence giws out the reason for that view, for the High Court
has gone on to observe that that would be so if paragraph 2 of
section 87 is construed otherwise, namely, lthat "for any and every
E misfeasance, malfeasance or non-fea~ance of its employee, the Board

·-1
is given complete immunity." That, however, is not what section .,..
61B and paragraph 2 of section 87 provide for, as we have pointed
out earlier, only a very few of the Board's employees are appointed
under the Act and all that the paragraph provides is that the Board
shall not be responsible for any misfeasance, malfeasance or non-
F feasance on the part of only those employees. They may, for aught
one knows, be responsible personally for what they do, but it is not
· a com:ct proposition of law to say that the view which has found
favour with us would virtually render the provisions of section 6 lB
"largely nugatory".

G In the view ~ile have taken, it is not necessary for so to examine
the validity of the bye-laws to which reference has been made by the y
High Court. They were produced before us towards the close of the
hearing, for the arguments proceeded and were based on the true 1

meaning and con:;truction of sections 61B and 87 (paragraph 2) and
it was agreed that our decision thereon would govern the fate of this
.H case. We should not therefore be taken to have expressed any opinion
about the validity of the bye-Jaws in question. It will be sufficient for
us to say that the decision here ·or below will not be conclusive of
TRUSTEES OF PORT v. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES (Shinghal, ].) 5 4 7

their validity or invalidity for purposes of the present case or like A
controversy.
In the result, the appeal su~ceeds and is allowed. The judgment
+ and decree of the High Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed.
In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their
own costs throughout. .
B
Appeal allowed
P.B.R .

.,