Holding

Section 439 CrPC does not authorize a bail court to order mandatory medical age determination or adjudicate the correctness of age documents in POCSO matters; such determinations are exclusively within the trial court's jurisdiction under the Juvenile Justice Act.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed against a High Court order that granted bail to the accused Anurudh and directed that a medical board determine the victim's age in all POCSO cases. The accused was charged under IPC sections 363 and 366 and POCSO sections 7 and 8 for allegedly abducting a 12‑year‑old girl. The High Court, invoking Section 439 CrPC, ordered a mandatory age‑determination test and held that the bail court could examine and challenge documents establishing the victim's age. The Supreme Court held that a bail court's jurisdiction under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail and cannot conduct a mini‑trial or decide substantive issues such as age determination, which is a matter for the trial court under the Juvenile Justice Act. Consequently, the High Court's directions were beyond its statutory power and were set aside, while the bail order itself was left undisturbed. The appeal was allowed and the directions were declared void.

Issues considered

Whether Section 439 CrPC empowers a High Court, while exercising bail jurisdiction, to issue directions mandating medical age determination in all POCSO cases.
Whether a bail court can entertain challenges to documents establishing the victim's age under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Whether the determination of a victim's age is a matter for the trial court rather than the bail court.
Whether the High Court's directions contravene the statutory scheme of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 and the POCSO Act.
Whether the High Court improperly fused constitutional and statutory jurisdiction in issuing the directions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164A, s. 439
Constitution of India
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 363, s. 366
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015s. 94
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007s. 12
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 27, s. 34, s. 7, s. 8

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether u/s.439, CrPC the High Court could have issued directions, mandating age determination test to be conducted in all cases involving the POCSO Act. This larger question involves twin considerations, one on the aspect of jurisdiction and the other on the aspect of law of the act regarding determination of age, and how the directions issued in the impugned judgement correspond to or are in contravention of the same. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.363, 366 – Protection of Children from

Subjects

Section 439 of CrPCSection 94 of JJ ActConstitutional PowerStatutory powerDetermination of age of victimCoram Non JudiceMini-TrialOssification TestSection 34 of the POCSO ActConsensual Adolescent RelationshipsBailJurisdictionAge of victimStatutory jurisdictionCircumscribed jurisdictionPrima facie evidenceDocumentsJurisdictional questionJudicial reviewProfessional EthicsBarResponsibility of advocatesRomeo – Juliet clause

Judgment

[2026] 1 S.C.R. 770 : 2026 INSC 47

The State of Uttar Pradesh
v.
Anurudh & Anr
(Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 2026)
09 January 2026
[Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether u/s.439, CrPC the High Court could have issued directions,
mandating age determination test to be conducted in all cases
involving the POCSO Act. This larger question involves twin
considerations, one on the aspect of jurisdiction and the other on the
aspect of law i.e., the postulate of the act regarding determination
of age, and how the directions issued in the impugned judgement
correspond to or are in contravention of the same.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.363, 366 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 – ss.7 and 8 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection)
Act 2015 – s.94 – Allegation of the mother of victim that her
12 year old girl was abducted from her home – Respondent
no.1 is the accused person – Bail rejected by the trial Court –
However, the High Court directed to constitute a medical board
for determination of the age of the victim and then released
the accused on interim bail – The High Court also issued
directions mandating age determination test to be conducted
in all cases involving the POCSO Act – Correctness:
Held: The High Court in bail jurisdiction was coram non judice
for issuing directions mandating the investigating authorities
within the State of Uttar Pradesh to necessarily have a medical
examination of the victim conducted, with the particular intent to
determine the age of the victim as also holding, that a bail Court
would be empowered to entertain challenges to the documents
produced to establish the age of the victim – The Court could not
have passed directions that go against clearly stated legislative

* Author
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 771

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

intent u/s.94 of the JJ Act – The determination of the age of the
victim is a matter for trial, and the presumption which is accorded
to the documents enumerated under the Section, has to be
rebutted there, for that is the appropriate forum to do so, not the
bail Court – If the question of age is raised at the stage of bail, it
is only open for the Court to, from the perusal of the documents,
take a prima facie view as to the age of the victim, not one on
the correctness of the documents since that would amount to a
mini trial – It could also not have fused statutory jurisdiction with
a constitutional one, lifting one to the other, or downgrading the
higher to the lower in order to grant itself the wherewithal, in an
otherwise fairly circumscribed jurisdiction, to do what could not be
done – The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside on grounds of transgression of the jurisdiction present and
thereby lacking the appropriate directions. [Paras 18, 19]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Jurisdiction of the
Court of Sessions or the High Court – Whether, in the instant
case, the High Court erred in undertaking an exercise of issuing
directions and getting the age of the victim examined in an
application seeking grant of bail:
Held: A Court’s jurisdiction, i.e., either the Court of Sessions or the
High Court u/s.439 CrPC is limited to adjudicating the question of
the person concerned being released into society pending trial or
whether they should continue to be incarcerated – In the instant
case the error of jurisdiction by the High Court was in exercise of
a statutory power and not under the Constitution – The powers
arising from the Constitution and those flowing from a statute are
distinct and separate – On the aspect of jurisdiction, the High Court
had erred in undertaking such an exercise of issuing directions
and getting the age of the victim examined in an application
seeking grant of bail – As far as determining the age of the victim
is concerned, it is settled that it is a matter of trial and not at the
stage of bail – If the age is under question, the bail Court may
examine the documents produced to establish age, but it will
not enter into the question of those documents being correct or
not so – The mandate of s.94 JJ Act is clear – The documents
provided therein are to be utilized for determination of the age of
the victim, and only in the absence thereof, will medical evidence
be resorted. [Para 16]
772 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2015 – s.94 –
Consideration of documents enumerated in s.94 – Whether
the High Court, in the instant case, fell in error in holding
that a Court in bail jurisdiction is empowered to entertain a
challenge to the documents at bail stage:
Held: The consideration of the documents enumerated in s.94,
JJ Act is a matter of consideration of evidence since it may
involve the examination of witnesses to prove the veracity of the
documents – That can only be done by the Trial Court – Contra
evidence to challenge the documents, can also be presented only
before the Trial Court – In considered view of this Court, therefore,
the High Court fell in error in holding that a Court in bail jurisdiction
is empowered to entertain a challenge to the documents as s.94
would not apply at the bail stage. [Para 14.10]

Bail – Mini Trial – Impermissible at the stage of Bail:
Held: Its trite in law that a Court, at the stage of bail cannot conduct
a mini trial – s.439 is limited to granting bail or anticipatory bail
and requires the Court to consider only prima facie evidence, the
risk of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence, or other
relevant factors – Since s.439 is narrower in scope, the Court
cannot undertake a mini trial at the bail stage. [Para 15.3]

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 –
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2015 – s.94 –
Medically Determining the Age of the Victim:
Held: A medical determination of age of a victim cannot be resorted
to as a matter of course, much less mandated – It can only be
employed in a given circumstance when the other stipulations of
s.94 JJ Act are not/cannot be met. [Para 17]

Constitutional Power – Statutory power – High Court –
Distinction between Constitutional Power and Statutory power:
Held: Constitutional powers are sovereign, foundational, and
insulated from the vicissitudes of ordinary legislation; they can
neither be curtailed nor expanded by parliamentary enactment –
Statutory powers, by contrast, are subordinate and mutable,
existing at the pleasure of the Legislature, which may at any time
amend, restrict, or repeal them through the ordinary legislative
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 773

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

process – Judicial review, while applicable to both, assumes different
contours in each case: in relation to constitutional powers, the
Courts examine whether their exercise conforms to constitutional
limitations including the protection of fundamental rights and the
inviolable tenets of the basic structure whereas, in the case of
statutory powers, the inquiry is confined to whether the authority
has acted within the scope and purpose of the statute from which
its power is drawn – The constitutional power cannot overshadow
the statutory power, enlarging its scope beyond what has been
envisaged by the statute – In other words, while both powers rest
with the High Court, one power cannot usurp the ambit of another,
unless otherwise permitted by law. [Para 11.3]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2015 – Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Difference
between – Discussed. [Paras 14.5.1-14.5.4]
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 –
Misrepresentation of age of victim – Law used by families
in opposition to relationships between young people –
Consenting adolescence – Discussed. [Para 19]
Professional Ethics – Bar – Responsibility of advocates –
Consensual relationships between teenagers – Exercise of
restraint, when grievance masks vengeance – Discussed.
[Para 19]
Judicial Notice – Misuse of POCSO Act – Consideration for
introduction of a Romeo–Juliet clause – Discussed. [Para 19]

Case Law Cited
State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 454 : (2005)
8 SCC 21; Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [2008] 17
SCR 369 : (2009) 2 SCC 281; RBI v. Coop. Bank Deposit A/C
HR. Sha [2010] 9 SCR 1107 : (2010) 15 SCC 85; Just Rights for
Children Alliance v. S. Harish [2024] 10 SCR 154 : 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2611; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2013] 8 SCR
1044 : (2013) 7 SCC 263; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v.
State of West Bengal [2012] 9 SCR 244 : (2012) 10 SCC 489;
Parag Bhati (Juvenile) through Legal Guardian-Mother-Rajni
Bhati v. State of U.P. [2016] 2 SCR 1089 : (2016) 12 SCC 744;
Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of U.P. [2021] 12 SCR 502 : (2022)
8 SCC 602 – relied on.
774 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. [2019] 9 SCR 735 : (2019)
12 SCC 370; Mukarrab v. State of U.P. [2016] 8 SCR 557 : (2017)
2 SCC 210; State v. M. Murugesan [2020] 2 SCR 553 : (2020) 15
SCC 251; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [2011]
15 SCR 540 : (2011) 14 SCC 770; Sangitaben Shaileshbhai
Datanta v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522; Union of India v.
Man Singh Verma [2025] 2 SCR 1534 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC
456; Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 17 SCR 667 : (2013)
14 SCC 637; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 :
(2021) 3 SCC 713; Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2025] 7 SCR
394 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1326; P. Yuvaprakash v. State [2023]
10 SCR 478 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846; Rajni v. State of UP,
2025 INSC 737; Rajesh Chaddha v. State of U.P [2025] 6 SCR
382 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094 – referred to.
Pradeep Kumar Chauhan & Anr. v. State Of U.P & Ors., Habeas
Corpus Writ Petition No. 733 of 2020; Chandrapal Singh v. State
of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 934; Satish alias Chand v. State of
U.P., Crl.Misc.Bail Appl.No.18596 of 2024; Aman@Vansh v. State
of UP, 2024:AHC:62260; Monish v. State of U.P., 2023:AHC:32270;
Mrigraj Gautam @ Rippu v. State of U.P., 2023:AHC:204171;
Sahil v. the State NCT of Delhi, 2024:DHC:6100; Jayantibhai
Babulbhai Alani v. State of Gujarat, 2018 SCC Online Guj. 1223 –
referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection) Act 2015; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Rules, 2007; Constitution of India; Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961.

List of Keywords
Section 439 of CrPC; Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection) Act 2015; Constitutional Power; Statutory power;
Determination of age of victim; Coram Non Judice; Mini-Trial;
Ossification Test; Section 34 of the POCSO Act; Consensual
Adolescent Relationships; Bail; Jurisdiction; Age of victim; Statutory
jurisdiction; Circumscribed jurisdiction; Prima facie evidence;
Documents; Jurisdictional question; Judicial review; Professional
Ethics; Bar; Responsibility of advocates; Romeo – Juliet clause.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 775

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
163 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.05.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRMBA No. 4880 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. Ruchira Goel, Sharanya, Ms. Veera Mahuli, Ms. Ritika Rao.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
D.S. Parmar, Saurabh Singh, Vedant Tiwari, Ms. Shambhavi
Shrivastava, Ms. Archana.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

For ease of reference, this judgment is divided into the following parts:

Contents*

The Appeal ....................................................................................... 3
Facts And Previous Proceedings ..................................................... 4
The Impugned Judgment ................................................................ 5
Question To Be Determined ............................................................ 8
Analysis And Determination ............................................................. 8
Relevant Provisions ......................................................................... 9
What were the bases for the High Court’s Conclusions and
Directions? ....................................................................................... 12
The Jurisdictional Question ............................................................. 20
Whether the impugned directions rest on sound legal grounds? ... 29
Determination of the age of the victim - At what stage and by
whom ....................................................................................... 31
Mini Trial- Impermissible at the stage of Bail ......................... 50
Medically Determining the Age of the Victim .......................... 51
Summation ....................................................................................... 58
A Necessitated Post-Script ............................................................... 60
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
776 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Sanjay Karol, J.

Leave Granted.

The Appeal
2. The State of Uttar Pradesh, in this appeal by special leave, challenges
the correctness of final judgment and order dated 29th May 2024 in
CRMBA No. 4880 of 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad, whereby the learned Single Judge granted bail to
Respondent No.1 in connection with the First Information Report1
No.622 of 2022, PS Kotwali, Orai, District Jalaun, dated 24th November
2022 and issued a number of directions.
3. The question presented in this appeal, however, is not one of relative
ease as an appeal against grant of bail and instead hinges on the
scope of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732. In
the High Court’s own words- “The question of law which arises for
consideration in this bail application is the nature of the legal duty
cast on the police to draw up a medical report determining the age
of a victim while investigating POCSO Act offences. The jurisdiction
of this Court to determine this question will predicate the discussion
on the merits of the bail.”

Facts And Previous Proceedings
4. The facts, in a nutshell, are that Respondent no. 1 is accused of
having committed offences under Sections 363, 366 of the Indian
Penal Code, 18603 and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 20124 in the subject FIR, lodged at the
instance of the mother of the victim, where the allegation is that her
12-year old girl had been abducted from her home. The Trial Court
rejected bail by order dated 29th September 2023. In the proceedings
for bail before the High Court, by order dated 22nd April 2024 the
Chief Medical Officer, Jalaun was directed to constitute a medical
board for determination of the age of the victim. On 8th May 2024
the Court then released the accused on interim bail, observing that

1 FIR
2 CrPC
3 IPC
4 POCSO Act
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 777

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

there was wide inconsistency in the age of the victim as in the school
records, or as stated by her in her statement under Sections 161
and 164 CrPC regarding age/intimacy with the accused among other
factors. In terms of the impugned judgment, the Court confirmed the
said order, while adjudicating on the issue indicated above.

The Impugned Judgment
5. The observations of the High Court can be summarised thus:
5.1 The Court began by affirming that the jurisdiction exercised
under Section 439 CrPC engages constitutional protection under
Article 21. The right to bail has evolved beyond a purely statutory
entitlement into a constitutionally safeguarded right. On this
basis, the Court reiterated that when issues affecting personal
liberty arise, such as legality of investigative procedures, they
must be addressed directly within bail adjudication.
5.2 In assessing the age of the victim, the Court evaluated prior
precedents of the High Court which collectively prescribe
that medical determination of age under Section 164-A CrPC
read with Section 27 POCSO Act is mandatory and is often
a more reliable indicator than documentary entries. Reliance
on Pradeep Kumar Chauhan & Anr. v. State Of U.P & Ors.5
(passed by a learned Single Judge of that High Court) is rejected
as misplaced due to its habeas corpus context and its non-
examination of statutory medical-age provisions.
5.3 The statutory scheme was analysed to conclude that Sections
164-A CrPC and 27 POCSO Act obligate police to obtain
the victim’s medical age report at the commencement of
investigation. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection) Act 20156 supplements this mechanism. Failure to
secure such a report rendered the statutory framework futile and
opens scope for false implication via manipulated age claims.
5.4 On the factual matrix, the Court noted recurring systemic lapses
wherein the police failed to obtain medical age reports, Trial
Courts ignored scientifically assessed age, and consensual

5 Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 733 of 2020
6 JJ Act
778 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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adolescent relationships were criminalised under the POCSO
Act due to falsified age records. This systemic malfunction,
according to the Court, necessitated corrective judicial directives.
5.5 Finally, applying law to fact, the Court accepted the medically
determined age of the prosecutrix as above 18 years and
consequently, allowed bail subject to conditions.
5.6 The directions issued are extracted in toto, as under:
“I) The police authorities/investigation officers shall
ensure compliance of the directions rendered by
this Court in Aman (supra) and ensure that the
medical report determining the age of the victim is
drawn up by the competent medical authority at the
commencement of the investigations of POCSO
Act offences in accordance with the provisions of
the Section 164-A CrPC read with Section 27 of the
POCSO Act.
II) The medical report of the victim determining her
age and drawn up under Section 164-A CrPC. read
with Section 27 of the POCSO Act shall be produced
by the police authorities/investigation officers before
the court hearing the bail application. The learned
courts while hearing bail applications shall make due
enquiries about the compliance of these directions
and Aman (supra) during the bail proceedings.
III) The judgement of this Court rendered in Monish
(supra), Aman (supra) as well as this case have to
be read together and not in isolation. The directions
in Aman (supra) as well as this case will be of little
avail, if not examined and implemented in light of the
directions made in Monish (supra).
IV) The age of the victim in bails arising out of POCSO
Act offences has been determined by a composite
reading of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act and Section 164-A
of CrPC. read with Section 27 of the POCSO Act in
light of the judgements rendered in Monish (supra),
Aman (supra) and this case.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 779

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

V) The court hearing the bail application has to accord
full weight to the medical age determination report
of the victim and also carefully examine all other
documents relating to the victim’s age. The court
has to determine the credibility of the respective
age related documents while deciding the bail
application in the facts of the case. In appropriate
facts and circumstances as in the instant case, the
age determined by the competent medical authority
under Section 164-A of CrPC. read with Section 27
of the POCSO Act can prevail over other agerelated
documents (including school records).”

Question To Be Determined
6. The question that this Court is called upon to consider is whether
under Section 439, CrPC the High Court could have issued
directions, mandating age determination test to be conducted in all
cases involving the POCSO Act. This larger question involves twin
considerations, one on the aspect of jurisdiction and the other on the
aspect of law i.e., the postulate of the act regarding determination
of age, and how the directions issued in the impugned judgement
correspond to or are in contravention of the same.

Analysis And Determination
7. We have heard the learned senior counsel and learned counsel for
the parties.

Relevant Provisions
8. Before proceeding further, the provisions of law involved in this
appeal must be referred to.
8.1 Section 27 of the POCSO Act
“27. Medical examination of a child.—(1) The medical
examination of a child in respect of whom any
offence has been committed under this Act, shall,
notwithstanding that a First Information Report or
complaint has not been registered for the offences
under this Act, be conducted in accordance with
780 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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section 164A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1973).
(2) In case the victim is a girl child, the medical
examination shall be conducted by a woman doctor.
(3) The medical examination shall be conducted in
the presence of the parent of the child or any other
person in whom the child reposes trust or confidence.
(4) Where, in case the parent of the child or other
person referred to in sub-section (3) cannot be present,
for any reason, during the medical examination of the
child, the medical examination shall be conducted in
the presence of a woman nominated by the head of
the medical institution.”
(emphasis supplied)

8.2 Section 164 of the CrPC
“[164A. Medical examination of the victim of rape.—
(1) Where, during the stage when an offence of
committing rape or attempt to commit rape is under
investigation, it is proposed to get the person of the
woman with whom rape is alleged or attempted to
have been committed or attempted, examined by a
medical expert, such examination shall be conducted
by a registered medical practitioner employed in a
hospital run by the Government or a local authority
and in the absence of such a practitioner, by any other
registered medical practitioner, with the consent of
such woman or of a person competent to give such
consent on her behalf and such woman shall be sent
to such registered medical practitioner within twenty-
four hours from the time of receiving the information
relating to the commission of such offence.
(2) The registered medical practitioner, to whom
such woman is sent, shall, without delay, examine
her person and prepare a report of his examination
giving the following particulars, namely:—
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 781

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

(i) the name and address of the woman and
of the person by whom she was brought;
(ii) the age of the woman;
(iii) the description of material taken from
the person of the woman for DNA profiling;
(iv) marks of injury, if any, on the person
of the woman;
(v) general mental condition of the woman;
and
(vi) other material particulars in reasonable
detail.
(3) The report shall state precisely the reasons for
each conclusion arrived at.
(4) The report shall specifically record that the consent
of the woman or of the person competent to give
such consent on her behalf to such examination had
been obtained.
(5) The exact time of commencement and completion
of the examination shall also be noted in the
report.
(6) The registered medical practitioner shall, without
delay forward the report to the investigating officer
who shall forward it to the Magistrate referred to in
section 173 as part of the documents referred to in
clause (a) of sub-section (5) of that section.
(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
rendering lawful any examination without the consent
of the woman or of any person competent to give
such consent on her behalf. Explanation.—For
the purposes of this section, “examination” and
“registered medical practitioner” shall have the same
meanings as in section 53.]”
(emphasis supplied)
782 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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8.3 Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act 2015
“94. (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or
the Board, based on the appearance of the person
brought before it under any of the provisions of this
Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence)
that the said person is a child, the Committee or the
Board shall record such observation stating the age
of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with
the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the
case may be, without waiting for further confirmation
of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has
reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether
the person brought before it is a child or not, the
Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall
undertake the process of age determination, by
seeking evidence by obtaining —
(i) the date of birth certificate from
the school, or the matriculation
or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination Board, if
available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority
or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and
(ii) above, age shall be determined
by an ossification test or any other
latest medical age determination
test conducted on the orders of the
Committee or the Board: Provided
such age determination test conducted
on the order of the Committee or the
Board shall be completed within fifteen
days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board
to be the age of person so brought before it shall,
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 783

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true
age of that person.
(emphasis supplied)

8.4 Section 29 of the POCSO Act
“29. Presumption as to certain offences.—Where a
person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or
attempting to commit any offence under sections 3,
5, 7 and section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall
presume, that such person has committed or abetted
or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may
be unless the contrary is proved.”

What were the bases for the High Court’s Conclusions and
Directions?
9. Although we have, in earlier paragraphs of this judgement, summarised
the reasoning of the High Court, let us now unpack the same with
reference to the earlier judgements of the Court in Aman@Vansh v.
State of UP7 and Monish v. State of U.P8. Both these judgments
as also the judgment impugned before us, have been passed by the
very same learned Single Judge. Since Monish (supra) was earlier
in point of time, we will take that up first.
9.1 The learned Single Judge in Monish (supra) held in substance,
as follows:
The Court examined two key questions of law: (i) whether the
age of a victim under the POCSO Act should be determined as
per Section 94 of JJ Act at the stage of bail, and (ii) whether
the presumption of culpable intent under Section 29 of the
POCSO Act applies at that stage. After extensive review, the
Court held that Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 which prescribes
a conclusive method for age determination does not apply
strictly to bail proceedings. Instead, the documents enumerated
in Section 94 (such as school certificates or birth certificates)
may be considered as evidence, but their correctness can

7 2024:AHC:62260
8 2023:AHC:32270
784 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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be challenged by the accused at the bail stage. The Court
emphasized that such an assessment of age during bail
proceedings is tentative, meant only for evaluating the prima
facie case and not conclusive for trial purposes.
The High Court had examined and synthesized the leading
authorities of this Court, including Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam
Hossain v. State of West Bengal9; Parag Bhati (Juvenile)
through Legal Guardian–Mother–Rajni Bhati v. State of
U.P.10; Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.11; Rishipal Singh
Solanki v. State of U.P.12; and Mukarrab v. State of U.P.13. The
collective import of these judgments is that the presumption of
correctness attached to age-related documents under Section
94 of JJ Act, is not absolute but rebuttable, and that a Court
may consider other credible materials or order further inquiry,
whenever contradictions or doubts arise about the recorded
age. The Court further observed that accused persons have
the right to question the veracity of age-related documents
relied on by the prosecution. It clarified that bail courts must
independently assess the credibility of such documents and
may consider corroborative materials like medical reports or
other records to resolve doubts regarding the victim’s age. The
Court frowned upon a rigid or formulaic approach to bail under
the POCSO Act, stressing that decisions must be based on the
specific facts and circumstances of each case.
Regarding the presumption of culpable intent under Section 29
of the POCSO Act, the Court held that such presumption does
not apply at the pre-trial bail stage. The presumption becomes
operative only once the trial begins and foundational facts are
established through evidence. The right of the accused to contest
this presumption and present a defence cannot be curtailed
at the bail stage. The Court reaffirmed that constitutional and
evidentiary principles must govern bail decisions, ensuring
fairness and due process.

9 (2012) 10 SCC 489
10 (2016) 12 SCC 744
11 (2019) 12 SCC 370
12 (2022) 8 SCC 602
13 (2017) 2 SCC 210
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 785

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

From a constitutional perspective, the Court reiterated that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal the exception, aligning with
settled principles under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It
noted that while the POCSO Act is a special statute aimed at
protecting minors, it does not exclude the operation of standard
bail principles under Section 439 CrPC. The Court, therefore,
emphasized judicial discretion, proportionality, and individual
case assessment as central to deciding bail. The Court held:
“78. The discussion then proceeded to probe the
effect of Article 21 of the Constitution of India on the
offending provisions for grant of bail. This enquiry
was overlaid with a consideration of authorities “on
the concept of due process in our constitutional
jurisprudence whenever the court has to deal with a
question affecting life and liberty of citizens”.
…
85. In view of the constitutional moorings of the right of
bail, curtailment of the said right cannot be permitted in
absence of an express statutory mandate or contrary
to the constitutional scheme. Nor can restrictions of
on right of bail be readily inferred from a statute if
other interpretations are possible.”
The Court also discussed parameters of bail under the POCSO
Act, holding that the nature and gravity of the offence, likelihood
of conviction, chances of tampering with evidence, or absconding
must be assessed in the light of constitutional protections. No
additional restrictions on bail can be read into the POCSO Act
beyond those under the general law. It was observed:
“88. Bails under POCSO Act offences have to
be considered under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and in
accordance with the settled parameters of grant of
bail which include nature and gravity of the offences,
and the likelihood of an accused having committed the
offence. The possibility of the accused reoffending,
influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence
or being a flight risk are also relevant factors to be
considered while deciding a bail application.
786 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

89. In POCSO Act related offences the age of a victim
is a critical factor which will influence the decision
to grant bail.
90. No provisions circumscribing the right of bail can
be distilled from the scheme of POCSO Act. The
existing norms of bail jurisprudence are sufficient to
effectively implement the POCSO Act and to serve
justice. Of course, the threshold of satisfaction of the
Court while granting bail may vary in the facts and
circumstances of each case.”
In conclusion, the Court found inconsistencies in the age-
related evidence of the victim and the existence of a prima
facie defence by the accused that the victim was a major. The
prosecution’s reliance on unverified documents could not justify
continued detention, particularly when material contradictions
were apparent. Bail was therefore granted on legal and
constitutional grounds.
9.2 Now, let us examine Aman (supra).
The Court noted a recurring problem in POCSO cases: frequent
contradictions in the recorded age of victims and false depiction
of majority as minority, often leading to the weaponisation of the
legislation against young couples in consensual relationships.
Medical determinations of age, drawn per the latest scientific
protocols, were deemed more reliable and essential to prevent
injustice.
Referring to Sections 164-A CrPC and 27 POCSO Act, the
Court held that a medical report determining the victim’s age
is a mandatory component of investigation in every POCSO
case. Such reports assist Courts in making accurate findings,
preventing false implication, and ensuring fair application of law.
Accordingly, the Court issued directions:
“1. The police authorities/investigation officers shall
ensure that in every POCSO Act offence a medical
report determining the victim’s age shall be drawn
up at the outset under Section 164A of the Criminal
Procedure Code read with Section 27 of the Protection
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 787

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The
report may be dispensed with if medical opinion
advises against it in the interests of the victim’s health.
2. The medical report determining the age of the victim
shall be created as per established procedure of law
and in adherence to latest scientific parameters and
medical protocol.
3. The medical report determining the age of the victim
shall be submitted under Section 164-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure to the Court without delay.
4. The Director General (Health), Government of
Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow shall also ensure that the
doctors who comprise the Medical Board are duly
trained and follow the established medical protocol
and scientific parameters for determining the age of
the victims in such cases. Constant research shall
be done in this field to keep the reports in line with
the latest scientific developments. A copy of this
order be communicated by the learned Government
Advocate to the Director General of Police, Lucknow,
Uttar Pradesh for compliance and Director General
(Health), Government of Uttar Pradesh,”
9.3 Although it did not place reliance on Pradeep Kumar Chauhan
(supra) a significant portion of the judgement was devoted to
answering its application, as contended by the advocate for the
State; hence, it is important to refer thereto. The Court undertook
a detailed examination of the applicability of Pradeep Kumar
Chauhan (supra) and ultimately distinguished its ratio. The
Court observed that while Pradeep Kumar Chauhan (supra)
had been invoked in several bail applications to argue that the
age recorded in school certificates is conclusive under Section
94 JJ Act, such reliance was misplaced. The Court relied almost
entirely on an earlier Full Bench decision Chandrapal Singh v.
State of U.P.14 which had already undertaken a comprehensive
analysis of the governing law on age determination under
Section 94 of the JJ Act.

14 2022 SCC OnLine All 934
788 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Relying on the reasoning in Chandrapal Singh (supra) the
learned single Judge reaffirmed that Pradeep Kumar Chauhan
(supra) did not correctly reflect this settled legal position. That
decision had treated documentary proof of age such as school
or matriculation certificates as final and conclusive, thereby
excluding the possibility of further scrutiny. It held that such
a restrictive view was inconsistent with the this Court’s liberal
and contextual interpretation of Section 94 JJ Act. Accordingly,
Pradeep Kumar Chauhan (supra) was distinguished and held
to be inapplicable. The Court concluded that the determination
of age, whether of a victim or an accused - must rest on the
totality of credible evidence, and that the statutory presumptions
under Section 94 JJ Act,though significant, are rebuttable and
subject to judicial verification to ensure fairness and prevent
miscarriage of justice.

The Jurisdictional Question
10. The High Court, while exercising bail jurisdiction issued the directions
reproduced supra. One of the issues raised by the Appellant-State
is that the same was beyond the scope of jurisdiction. The question
of jurisdiction to issue these directions also confronted the learned
Single Judge who answered the same stating that while exercising
statutory jurisdiction, the High Court is not denuded of its constitutional
status and, therefore, it is entirely open, to consider questions of law
as in the present case. Observations in this regard are extracted
hereunder:
“10. While sitting in bail determination, this Court is not
denuded of its constitutional status. The High Court is
a court of record and a constitutional court irrespective
of the nomenclature of the jurisdiction it is exercising.
Needless to add that the High Court always exercises its
jurisdiction as per law. While deciding bail applications the
High Court exercises a composite jurisdiction of statutory
powers and constitutional obligations. At times legal issues
which directly impinge on the fair administration of justice
arise in bail jurisdiction. The High Court cannot neglect
consideration of such issues on the footing that they are
beyond the scope of bail jurisdiction. The High Court always
possesses the necessary powers to decide such issues
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 789

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

for dispensing fair justice and to realize the fundamental
rights of an accused in bail jurisdiction. Refusal to decide
the said issues would amount to abdication of constitutional
obligations of this Court. Issues arising in the instant case
(and those referred in the judgment) directly impact the
right of a prisoner to seek bail. They have to be decided by
this Court with clarity in lawful exercise of bail jurisdiction
and in the interests of equal justice.”
11. Let us now, independently examine this issue.
11.1 Section 439 CrPC reads as under:
“439. Special powers of High Court or Court of
Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court
of Session may direct—
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in
custody be released on bail, and if the offence is
of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section
437, may impose any condition which it considers
necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-
section;
(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when
releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified:
Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session
shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused
of an offence which is triable exclusively by the
Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is
punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice
of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor
unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of
opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice:
1
[Provided further that the High Court or the Court of
Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is
accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3)
of Section 376 or Section 376-AB or Section 376-DA
or Section 376-DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), give notice of the application for bail to the
Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from
the date of receipt of the notice of such application.]
790 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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2
[(1-A) The presence of the informant or any person
authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of
hearing of the application for bail to the person under
sub-section (3) of Section 376 or Section 376-AB
or Section 376-DA or Section 376-DB of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).]
(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that
any person who has been released on bail under
this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.
11.1.1 In State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi15, it was held:
“18. It is well settled that the matters to be
considered in an application for bail are (i)
whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity
of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment
in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the
accused absconding or fleeing, if released on
bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position
and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of
the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice
being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad
Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi [(2001) 4 SCC 280 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 674] and Gurcharan Singh v.
State (Delhi Admn.) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 41 : AIR 1978 SC 179] ]. While a
vague allegation that the accused may tamper
with the evidence or witnesses may not be a
ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such
character that his mere presence at large would
intimidate the witnesses or if there is material
to show that he will use his liberty to subvert
justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail
will be refused…”

15 (2005) 8 SCC 21
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 791

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

11.1.2 Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan16, held thus:
“11. While considering an application for
bail, detailed discussion of the evidence and
elaborate documentation of the merits is to
be avoided. This requirement stems from
the desirability that no party should have
the impression that his case has been pre-
judged. Existence of a prima facie case is
only to be considered. Elaborate analysis or
exhaustive exploration of the merits is not
required. (See Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar
Rajaram Kharote [(1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1980 SC 785] .) Where
the offence is of serious nature the question
of grant of bail has to be decided keeping in
view the nature and seriousness of the offence,
character of the evidence and amongst others
the larger interest of the public. (See State
of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe
[(1990) 1 SCC 397 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 142 :
AIR 1990 SC 625] and State v. Surendranath
Mohanty [(1990) 3 OCR 462] .)”
11.1.3 In State v. M. Murugesan17, a two Judge bench of
this Court analysed various judgements wherein it was
concluded that the Court had overstepped the bounds
of Section 439, viz., State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal
Singh Bhullar18 wherein the concerned High Court
had continued to pass orders with respect to offenders
not connected with the instant case; Sangitaben
Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat19 wherein
the Court, in a bail application had directed the accused
and his family to undergo a narco-analysis test and a
brain mapping test; RBI v. Coop. Bank Deposit A/C HR.

16 (2009) 2 SCC 281
17 (2020) 15 SCC 251
18 (2011) 14 SCC 770
19 (2019) 14 SCC 522
792 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Sha20 once again in a bail application, issued directions
to the concerned bank to begin disbursing the amount
thus far recovered from the accused in the case. Having
referred to these judgements, it was held as under:
“11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M.
Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad
12414] has collated data from the State and
made it part of the order after the decision
[M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original
Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated
18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as
if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to
pass any order under the guise of improving
the criminal justice system in the State. The
jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of
the Code is limited to grant or not to grant
bail pending trial. Even though the object
of the Hon’ble Judge was laudable but the
jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous.
The effort made by the Hon’ble Judge may
be academically proper to be presented at an
appropriate forum but such directions could not
be issued under the colour of office of the court.
(emphasis supplied)

11.1.4 In Union of India v. Man Singh Verma21, this Court
through one of us, (Sanjay Karol J.,) set aside an
order, passed while exercising bail jurisdiction, granting
compensation to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000/- for wrongful
confinement, as being without the authority of law.
11.2 The upshot of the above discussion is that a Court’s jurisdiction,
i.e., either the Court of Sessions or the High Court under
Section 439 CrPC is limited to adjudicating the question of the
person concerned being released into society pending trial or
whether they should continue to be incarcerated.

20 (2010) 15 SCC 85
21 2025 SCC OnLine SC 456
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 793

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

11.3 It is unquestionable that High Court is a constitutional Court.
However, in the instant case the error of jurisdiction by the
High Court was in exercise of a statutory power and not under
the Constitution. The powers arising from the Constitution
and those flowing from a statute are distinct and separate. A
constitutional power is the one which emanates directly from
the text and spirit of the Constitution of India, the supreme
and fundamental charter of governance, and inheres in those
institutions or functionaries whose existence and competence
are defined by it. Such powers are self-sustaining; they are not
contingent upon any act of the Legislature, nor can they be
abridged or extinguished except through a formal amendment
under Article 368. For example, the President’s power to
dissolve the Lok Sabha under Article 85(2)(b); the Governor’s
authority to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President
under Article 200, or the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 are all in exercise of constitutional power. These
powers represent the apex of the legal hierarchy, deriving their
legitimacy not from the will of the people as expressed by
Parliament, but from the sovereignty of the Constitution itself.
In contrast, a statutory power is derivative and conditional,
drawing its vitality from a law duly enacted by the Parliament
or a State Legislature. Such power exists only within the four
corners of the enabling statute and is circumscribed by its
language, purpose, and legislative intent. Illustratively, the
powers conferred upon the Central Government under the
Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986, to frame rules, issue
directions, or regulate industrial operations are purely statutory
in nature, as are the regulatory functions vested in the Securities
and Exchange Board of India under the SEBI Act, 1992, or
those entrusted to the Competition Commission of India under
the Competition Act, 2002. The exercise of these powers must
conform strictly to the parameters laid down by the statute;
any transgression beyond its express or implied authority is
rendered ultra vires and, therefore, void in the eyes of law.
The essential distinction between these two species of power
lies not merely in their origin but also in their constitutional
status and susceptibility to control. Constitutional powers are
sovereign, foundational, and insulated from the vicissitudes of
794 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

ordinary legislation; they can neither be curtailed nor expanded
by parliamentary enactment. Statutory powers, by contrast,
are subordinate and mutable, existing at the pleasure of the
Legislature, which may at any time amend, restrict, or repeal
them through the ordinary legislative process. Judicial review,
while applicable to both, assumes different contours in each
case: in relation to constitutional powers, the Courts examine
whether their exercise conforms to constitutional limitations
including the protection of fundamental rights and the inviolable
tenets of the basic structure whereas, in the case of statutory
powers, the inquiry is confined to whether the authority has
acted within the scope and purpose of the statute from which
its power is drawn.
The constitutional power cannot overshadow the statutory
power, enlarging its scope beyond what has been envisaged
by the statute. In other words, while both powers rest with
the High Court, one power cannot usurp the ambit of another,
unless otherwise permitted by law.
11.4 Let us understand this by way of an example. Suppose a
dispute arises between the Government of State ‘A’ and the
Government of the Union of India, concerning a statutory
scheme. The State files a suit in the Supreme Court under
Article 131 claiming the Union has over-stepped its power.
Because Article 131 deals with original jurisdiction and
involves questions of fact and law between governments, the
Supreme Court may frame issues, permit evidence, summon
and examine witnesses, and make findings of fact as part of
its adjudication.
In the same case, imagine if a private party (or even the
State) tries to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136,
claiming injustice in a judgment of a High Court or Tribunal in
the same matter. While Article 136 gives the Court the power
to grant leave to appeal, the Court cannot treat its jurisdiction
under Article 136 as though it were a suit under Article 131.
If the Court were to proceed under Article 136 but adopt the
full evidentiary/litigation machinery of Article 131 (leading fresh
evidence, summoning witnesses, conducting trial proceedings),
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 795

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

it would step into the turf of Article 131 and thereby blur the
distinction between the two powers. That would amount to an
improper exercise of jurisdiction.
11.5 On the aspect of jurisdiction, consequent to the discussion
above, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court
had erred in undertaking such an exercise of issuing directions
and getting the age of the victim examined in an application
seeking grant of bail .

Whether the impugned directions rest on sound legal grounds?
12. Let us now turn our attention to the provisions of law involved. The
purpose of doing so is to examine whether the directions issued by
the High Court to mandatorily conduct a test for age verification at
the inception of the investigation is sustainable in law, if this question
of law is examined as divorced from the aspect of jurisdiction.
13. At the outset of this analysis, it is important to delve into the scope
and ambit of the POCSO Act. Pardiwala J, writing for the Court
in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish22, examined in
detail, the objects, reasons and scope of the legislation. Relevant
paragraphs of the decision are extracted hereinbelow:
“43. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the
enactment of the POCSO makes it abundantly clear
that since the sexual offences against children were not
adequately addressed by the existing laws and a large
number of such offences were neither specifically provided
for nor were they adequately penalized, the POCSO has
been enacted to protect the children from the offences of
sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and
to provide for establishment of Special Courts for trial of
such offences and for matters connected therewith and
incidental thereto.
44. It further states that the POCSO is a ‘self-contained
comprehensive legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing
the rights of all children to safety, security and protection
from sexual abuse and exploitation countered through

22 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611
796 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence for
sexual offences and pornography and has been enacted
keeping in mind Articles 15 and 39 of the Constitution
respectively and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Children. …
45. The primary legislative intent behind the enactment
of the POCSO was to create a comprehensive legal
framework that would not only punish offenders but
also provide a child-friendly system for the recording of
evidence, investigation, and trial of offenses. The POCSO
was designed to cover all forms of sexual abuse against
children, including sexual harassment, child pornography,
and aggravated sexual assault, among others. It aimed
to ensure the safety and dignity of child victims during
the legal process, with specific provisions that mandate
in-camera trials, the presence of a trusted adult during the
proceedings, and the prohibition of aggressive questioning
of child victims.
(emphasis in original)

Determination of the age of the victim - At what stage and by
whom
13.1 Section 2(d)of the POCSO Act defines a child as any person
below eighteen years. So, for the provisions of this Act to be
applied, the person against whom the offence in question has
been perpetrated must necessarily be below 18 years of age.
This is the sine qua non. The natural question which then arises
is how the age of victim is to be determined. Jarnail Singh v.
State of Haryana23 put this question to rest as follows:
“23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable
only to determine the age of a child in conflict with
law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory
provision should be the basis for determining age,
even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our

23 (2013) 7 SCC 263
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 797

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the
issue of minority is concerned, between a child in
conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime.
Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just
and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules,
to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6.
The manner of determining age conclusively has
been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted
above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a
child is ascertained by adopting the first available
basis out of a number of options postulated in
Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule
12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause,
it has overriding effect over an option expressed
in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option
available would conclusively determine the age of
a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation
(or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is
the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate
is available, no other evidence can be relied upon.
Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule
12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth
entered in the school first attended by the child. In
case such an entry of date of birth is available, the
date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated
as final and conclusive, and no other material is to
be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry,
Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate
issued by a corporation or a municipal authority
or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is
available, then no other material whatsoever is to
be taken into consideration for determining the age
of the child concerned, as the said certificate would
conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only
in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule
12(3) postulates the determination of age of the
child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.”
(emphasis supplied)
798 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 200724 it must be noted, provides the same hierarchy
of documents as has been provided by Section 94 of the JJ
Act. The same is reproduced below for felicity of reference:
“12.Procedure to be followed in determination of
age.—(1) In every case concerning a child or a
juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board
or as the case may be, the Committee referred to in
Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of
such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law
within a period of thirty days from the date of making
of the application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the
Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of
the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the
juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis
of physical appearance or documents, if available,
and send him to the observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in
conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall
be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the
case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence
by obtaining—
(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or

24 Rules 2007
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 799

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered
necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by
considering his/her age on lower side within the margin
of one year,and, while passing orders in such case
shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as
may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case
may be, record a finding in respect of his age and
either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses
(a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b)
shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards
such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in
conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the
date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive
proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board
or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing
pass an order stating the age and declaring the status
of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act
and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be
given to such juvenile or the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or
otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section
7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these Rules, no further
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
after examining and obtaining the certificate or any
other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3)
of this Rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also
apply to those disposed of cases, where the status
of juvenility has not been determined in accordance
with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the
Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the
Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
14. The High Court held that since the presumption of correctness
attached to age-related documents under Section 94 JJ Act is
rebuttable, challenge to the same would be open at the stage of
800 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

bail and the view taken by the Court in such a challenge, would be
“tentative”. Analysis of the judgments referred to by the Court would
be apposite.
14.1 In Abuzar Hossain (supra) a bench of three judges held as
under:
“39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy
the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the
initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be
laid down as to what weight should be given to a
specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient
to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents
referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely
be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court
about the age of the delinquent necessitating further
enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not
by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the
claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability
of the documents like the school leaving certificate or
the voters’ list, etc. obtained after conviction would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they
must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar
Sheikh [(2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431]
and Pawan [(2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri)
522] these documents were not found prima facie
credible while in Jitendra Singh [(2010) 13 SCC 523 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857] the documents viz. school
leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report
were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and
verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents
prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court
may act upon such documents for the purposes of
Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination
of the age of the delinquent.”
14.2 In Parag Bhati (supra) a co-ordinate bench held as under:
“34. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and
unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused
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that he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the
date of the incident and the documentary evidence
at least prima facie proves the same, he would be
entitled to the special protection under the JJ Act.
But when an accused commits a grave and heinous
offence and thereafter attempts to take statutory
shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual
or cavalier approach while recording as to whether
an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted
as the courts are enjoined upon to perform their
duties with the object of protecting the confidence
of common man in the institution entrusted with the
administration of justice.
35. The benefit of the principle of benevolent
legislation attached to the JJ Act would thus apply
to only such cases wherein the accused is held to
be a juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie
evidence regarding his minority as the benefit of
the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of
the alleged accused who is involved in grave and
serious offence which he committed and gave effect
to it in a well-planned manner reflecting his maturity
of mind rather than innocence indicating that his
plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to
dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed
to come to his rescue.
36. It is settled position of law that if the matriculation
or equivalent certificates are available and there is
no other material to prove the correctness of date of
birth, the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation
certificate has to be treated as a conclusive proof of
the date of birth of the accused. However, if there is
any doubt or a contradictory stand is being taken by
the accused which raises a doubt on the correctness
of the date of birth then as laid down by this Court
in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B.,
(2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , an
enquiry for determination of the age of the accused
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is permissible which has been done in the present
case.”
(emphasis supplied)

14.3 In Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra) the question was whether
the accused was entitled to claim the benefit of juvenility for an
offence committed on 18th August 2015. The Juvenile Justice
Board25 at first allowed the plea but then on demand, eventually
decided otherwise and rejected the said having considered
evidence in that regard. The High Court reversed holding
that the matriculation certificate issued by the CBSE would
be given precedence over the opinion of the Medical Board.
The former recorded his date of birth as 17th December 1998
whereas the latter recorded that on 9th November 2016, he
was approximately 19 years of age. This Court set aside the
findings of the High Court and restored the rejection of the plea
of juvenility as returned by the JJB, having considered evidence
on affidavit and arriving at the conclusion that his age would
be determined as per the date of birth - 17th December 1995.
14.4 In Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra) this Court while dealing
with an appeal filed by the father of the deceased noted the
difference between the Rules 2007 and the JJ Act 2015. It
was observed:
“29. The difference in the procedure under the two
enactments could be discerned as under:
29.1. As per the JJ Act, 2015 in the absence of
requisite documents as mentioned in clauses (i)
and (ii) of Section 94(2), there is provision for
determination of the age by an ossification test or
any other medical age related test to be conducted
on the orders of the Committee or the JJ Board as
per Section 94 of the said Act; whereas, under Rule
12 of the JJ Rules, 2007, in the absence of relevant
documents, a medical opinion had to be sought from
a duly constituted Medical Board which would declare
the age of the juvenile or child.

25 JJB
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The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

29.2. With regard to the documents to be provided
as evidence, what was provided under Rule 12 of
the JJ Rules, 2007 has been provided under sub-
section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 as a
substantive provision.
29.3. Under Section 49 of the JJ Act, 2000, where
it appeared to a competent authority that a person
brought before it was a juvenile or a child, then such
authority could, after making an inquiry and taking
such evidence as was necessary, record a finding
as to the juvenility of such person and state the age
of such person as nearly as may be. Sub-section (2)
of Section 49 stated that no order of a competent
authority shall be deemed to have become invalid
merely by any subsequent proof that the person in
respect of whom the order had been made is not
a juvenile and the age recorded by the competent
authority to be the age of person so brought before
it, for the purpose of the Act, be deemed to be the
true age of that person.
30. But, under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, which
also deals with presumption and determination of age,
the Committee or the JJ Board has to record such
observation stating the age of the child as nearly as
may be and proceed with the inquiry without waiting
for further confirmation of the age. It is only when the
Committee or the JJ Board has reasonable grounds
for doubt regarding whether the person brought before
it is a child or not, it can undertake the process of
age determination, by seeking evidence.
31. Sub-section (3) of Section 94 states that the
age recorded by the Committee or the JJ Board to
be the age of the persons so brought before it shall,
for the purpose of the Act, be deemed to be the true
age of that person. Thus, there is a finality attached
to the determination of the age recorded and it is
only in a case where reasonable grounds exist for
doubt as to whether the person brought before the
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Committee or the Board is a child or not, that a
process of age determination by seeking evidence
has to be undertaken.”
Then further, it was held-
“33.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage of
a criminal proceeding, even after a final disposal of the
case. A delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be
a ground for rejection of such claim. It can also be raised
for the first time before this Court.
33.2. An application claiming juvenility could be made
either before the court or the JJ Board.
33.2.1. When the issue of juvenility arises before a court,
it would be under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9
of the JJ Act, 2015 but when a person is brought before
a committee or JJ Board, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015
applies.
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the court claiming
juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 94 of
the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along
with sub-section (2) of Section 9 so as to seek evidence
for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of
the person as nearly as may be.
33.2.3. When an application claiming juvenility is made
under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before the JJ Board
when the matter regarding the alleged commission of
offence is pending before a court, then the procedure
contemplated under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015
would apply. Under the said provision if the JJ Board
has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the
person brought before it is a child or not, the Board shall
undertake the process of age determination by seeking
evidence and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be
the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the
purpose of the JJ Act, 2015, be deemed to be true age of
that person. Hence the degree of proof required in such
a proceeding before the JJ Board, when an application is
filed seeking a claim of juvenility when the trial is before the
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 805

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

criminal court concerned, is higher than when an inquiry
is made by a court before which the case regarding the
commission of the offence is pending (vide Section 9 of
the JJ Act, 2015).
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden
is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the court to
discharge the initial burden. However, the documents
mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the JJ Rules,
2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of
Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima
facie satisfaction of the court. On the basis of the aforesaid
documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof
of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by
contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a court is not the
same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile
sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for
trial before the criminal court concerned. In case of an
inquiry, the court records a prima facie conclusion but
when there is a determination of age as per sub-section
(2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act, a declaration is made
on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ
Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person
brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry
is different from that required in a proceeding where the
determination and declaration of the age of a person
has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and
accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down
an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It
has to be on the basis of the material on record and on
appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each
case.
33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age
determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of
a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical
opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not
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conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor
to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned
in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”
(emphasis supplied)

14.5 Now we proceed to examine the merits of this argument. It
is clear from the above that all of these cases discuss the
determination of age from the point of view of the offender and
not the victim. Although the process to be followed therefor
is the same as that for an offender as held by Jarnail Singh
(supra), the question involved in the instant lis concerns the
forum and the stage at which the determination of age is to
be made. According to the High Court, the bail Court would,
if a challenge is presented by the offender, entertain such
challenge and take a prima facie view. Here, it becomes
important to appreciate the difference between the JJ Act and
the POCSO Act.
14.5.1 The JJ Act is primarily focused on dealing with
children in conflict with law and children in need of
care and protection, rather than victims of offences
who are minors. The Preamble and Section 1(4) of
the Act expressly state that its purpose is to provide
for the care, protection, treatment, development, and
rehabilitation of such children and for the adjudication
of matters relating to children in conflict with law.
The Act establishes the JJB (under Sections 4–9)
to handle cases involving juvenile offenders, and
the Child Welfare Committee 26 (under Sections
27–30) to deal with children who require care and
protection. Neither of these bodies are vested with
jurisdiction over cases concerning child victims of
crime. The definitions provided under the Act, of a
child in conflict with law and a child in need of care
and protection, also clearly underscore this. The Act
draws a fundamental distinction between two principal
categories of children – children in conflict with law
and children in need of care and protection each

26 CWC
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 807

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

grounded in the philosophy of welfare, rehabilitation,
and reintegration. A child in conflict with law refers
to a person who has not completed eighteen years
of age and is alleged or found to have committed
an offence under any existing law. To fall under this
category, the requirements are, first, that the person
must be below eighteen years of age at the time of
the commission of the alleged offence, and second,
that there is an allegation or finding of involvement in
an act constituting an offence. The Act thus rejects the
traditional punitive model of criminal jurisprudence and
adopts a reformative, restorative approach, recognizing
that a child’s deviant conduct often arises from a coming
together in an unfortunate array of circumstances, of
structural neglect, social disadvantage, or exposure
to adversity The focus, therefore, is on correction,
guidance, and social reintegration through child-friendly
processes before the JJB , ensuring that such children
are treated not as offenders but as individuals in need
of direction and support.
14.5.2 Conversely, a child in need of care and protection
denotes a child whose condition of neglect, abuse,
abandonment, or deprivation necessitates intervention
by the State to secure their safety, welfare, and
development. This classification embraces children
who are orphaned or abandoned; those found begging,
working, or living on the streets; those who are victims
of cruelty, exploitation, or trafficking; those who are
physically or mentally challenged and without adequate
family support; and those at imminent risk of early
marriage or neglect within the home ,(which in a given
case, could also be a victim). The essence of this
definition lies in the child’s exposure to vulnerability
and the corresponding necessity of care, protection,
and rehabilitation through the mechanisms of the
CWC. The Act’s protective framework thus ensures that
children who are deprived of a nurturing environment
are restored to stability, dignity, and opportunity through
institutional or family-based care.
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14.5.3 While these two categories emerge from different
factual matrices, one involving alleged delinquency and
the other deprivation, they converge upon a shared
humanitarian foundation. Both are guided by the
principle that every child is entitled to protection, dignity,
and development, and that the justice system must
operate with sensitivity and compassion. This Court
has many-a-time emphasised that the administration
of juvenile justice must rest on care and rehabilitation
rather than punishment, highlighting the State’s duty
to protect all children from circumstances that impede
their growth and well-being.
14.5.4 It is, however, imperative to recognise that neither of
these statutory classifications - the child in conflict
with law or the child in need of care and protection
expressly includes within its ambit the category of
child victims. Although both categories are designed
to shield children from neglect and marginalisation,
the Act does not explicitly address the position of
children who are victims of offences, as those under
POCSO Act. Unless such victims independently
satisfy the definitional parameters of vulnerability or
abandonment, they fall outside the direct purview of
these classifications. This reveals a conceptual gap,
as the legislative scheme, while comprehensive in its
welfare orientation, does not formally integrate the
rehabilitative and procedural rights of child victims
within its framework. Nevertheless, the broader spirit
of the Act, anchored in compassion, protection, and
restorative justice demands that child victims, too, be
accorded equivalent care, support, and rehabilitative
attention, ensuring that every child, irrespective of
circumstance, is empowered to reclaim their dignity
and future.
14.6 Having discussed thus, the two separate fields that these two
legislations govern, we now turn back to the question of age
determination. If the POCSO Act is examined, it can be found
that the Act does not prescribe a manner for determination
of the age of the victim. As we have already noticed, it is an
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The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

established position in law that the procedure under Section 94
of the JJ Act is to be applied.[See: Section 34 of the Act] When
the question of determination of age of a child in conflict with
the law emerges for the first time before a Court, the concerned
legislation provides the procedure as housed in its Section
9 of the Act lays down the procedure to be followed when a
person is brought before a Magistrate who is not empowered
under the Act, and there arises a claim or reasonable doubt
that such person is a child. In such cases, the Magistrate
must conduct an inquiry to determine the person’s age in
accordance with Section 94 of the Act, which prescribes the
method for age determination. If, upon inquiry, the Magistrate
finds that the person was a child at the time of commission of
offence, the case must be immediately forwarded to the JJB
having jurisdiction, which will thereafter deal with the matter
as per the provisions of the JJ Act. Conversely, if the person is
found not to be a child, the Magistrate proceeds with the case
as per the regular criminal procedure. The object of Section
9 is to ensure that no juvenile offender is tried as an adult
merely due to an initial misclassification and to safeguard the
rehabilitative and welfare-oriented spirit of the juvenile justice
system by ensuring that every child in conflict with law is tried
by the appropriate forum, i.e., the JJB
14.7 As held in Rishipal Singh, extracted (supra) the determination
of the age when done by a Court stands differently to that
done by the JJB. There are two possibilities provided for.
There is no determination of age by a JJB - like body when
it comes to the victim. If there is a question about the age,
it has to be dealt with by the Court, as per the procedure of
Section 94, JJ Act. It is when the Court is undertaking the
exercise of determination, that the defense of an accused
can challenge the veracity of these documents, since the
presumption under this section is rebuttable.
14.8 As is obvious and as we have observed, the victim being a
child is sine qua non for the application of the POCSO Act.
If a charge-sheet is filed and it contains charges against a
person under the POCSO Act, it is but obvious that such
an accused would challenge the same at the first available
instance in the Court concerned, or in other words, at the
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inception of trial, so as to ensure that the foundation of the
trial is correctly in place before it proceeds further. The Court
would then undertake the exercise as provided for, and in
accordance with the result obtained therefrom, proceed further,
either under the POCSO Act or under the provisions of the
IPC, as the case may be. Should the accused be dissatisfied
with the manner in which the result has been drawn by the
Trial Court, an appeal from such determination would have
to be filed and only when the question of age is set at rest
can the trial proceed forward on firm footing.
14.9 Unlike an offender who can claim benefit of juvenility at any
point in time, even after completion of proceedings given the
beneficial nature of the JJ Act, a victim of a crime cannot claim
to be a juvenile at any point in time, for the charges against
which an offender is tried, are intrinsically tied to the age of
the victim. If a victim of a sexual offence was allowed to claim
juvenility at any stage of the proceedings, in the same manner
that an offender can under Section 9 of the JJ Act, it would
have serious procedural and substantive consequences. For
instance, an accused may have been charged under Section
376 IPC which applies when the victim is an adult. However, if
the victim is later determined to be below eighteen, the offence
would fall under the POCSO Act, where consent is irrelevant
and the punishments are more stringent. This would mean that
the earlier trial, framing of charges, and recording of evidence
were all conducted under an incorrect legal framework. The
proceedings would therefore be vitiated, and the trial could
be rendered a nullity, necessitating the reframing of charges
and a fresh trial under the correct statute.
14.10 As can be seen from Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra27,
and Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra) the consideration of the
documents enumerated in Section 94, JJ Act is a matter of
consideration of evidence since it may involve the examination
of witnesses to prove the veracity of the documents. That can
only be done by the Trial Court. Contra evidence to challenge
the documents, can also be presented only before the Trial

27 (2013) 14 SCC 637
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 811

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

Court. In our considered view, therefore, the High Court fell in
error in holding that a Court in bail jurisdiction is empowered
to entertain a challenge to the documents as Section 94 would
not apply at the bail stage.

Mini Trial- Impermissible at the stage of Bail
15. There is an additional aspect which, if the proposition as posited by
the impugned judgment is upheld, would fall foul of. Such aspect
would be that a Court, at the stage of bail cannot conduct a mini
trial. This position is trite in law. Reference to the judgments as under
would reiterate the same-
15.1 In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb28, it was held by a bench
of three judges that the High Court could not at the stage
of bail conduct a mini trial and adjudicate, for instance, the
admissibility of certain evidence.
15.2 In Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar29, this Court observed
that when a Court is exercising powers under Section 439
CrPC, such power does not permit the ordering of roving
enquiries, or in the context of that case, the use of involuntary
investigative techniques.
15.3 Let us also understand this by juxtaposition. Section 482 CrPC
empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of
law and secure the ends of justice, including quashing criminal
proceedings or staying investigations. Even under these broad
powers, courts are not permitted to re-examine witnesses or
conclusively decide disputed factual issues. Section 439, by
contrast, is limited to granting bail or anticipatory bail and
requires the Court to consider only prima facie evidence, the
risk of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence, or
other relevant factors. Since Section 439 is narrower in scope,
the Court cannot undertake a mini trial at the bail stage.

Medically Determining the Age of the Victim
16. Apropos the above discussion, it is clearly held that determination of
age of the victim is a matter of trial and not at the stage of bail. If the

28 (2021) 3 SCC 713
29 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1326
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age is under question, the bail Court may examine the documents
produced to establish age, but it will not enter into the question of
those documents being correct or not so. The mandate of Section
94 JJ Act is clear. The documents provided therein are to be utilized
for determination of the age of the victim, and only in the absence
thereof, will medical evidence be resorted to. The decisions in
P. Yuvaprakash v. State30 and Rajni v. State of UP31 make this as
evident as can be.
16.1 Yuvaprakash (supra) was a case involving the alleged
kidnapping of one ‘M’, by the appellant, alleged forced marriage
by tying a ‘thali’ around her neck, and thereafter, repeated
sexual intercourse over a period of time, before abandoning
her when the accused persons came to know that M’s loved
ones had filed a complaint regarding her being kidnapped. On
appeal from a judgment of conviction returned by the Madurai
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, this Court
examined the proper method for determining a victim’s age
under Section 94(2) of the JJ Act The statute established a
clear hierarchy of documents: first, a matriculation or equivalent
school certificate showing the date of birth; second, a birth
certificate issued by a municipal corporation or panchayat;
and third only if these were unavailable could a medical
or ossification test be relied upon. In the present case, the
only document produced was a school Transfer Certificate
indicating the date of birth as 11th July1997. However, this
Certificate was not one of the documents prescribed by the
Section. Moreover, the Transfer Certificate was produced by
a court summoned witness rather than the prosecution, and
the Revenue official confirmed that official birth records for
1997 were missing. Consequently, the Transfer Certificate
could not establish that the victim was under 18 years of age
at the relevant time.
16.1.1 The Court cited precedents, including Rishipal Singh
Solanki (supra) and Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra), to
reaffirm the statutory hierarchy i.e., only in the absence

30 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846
31 2025 INSC 737
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 813

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

of matriculation/school certificates or municipal birth
records could medical agedetermination be used. In the
facts, it was observed, the headmaster (DW2) admitted
that the date of birth in the school record was based on
a horoscope rather than an independent verification,
and no official birth register existed to support it.
16.1.2 Since the documents presented did not fall within the
first two categories under Section 94(2), the Court
held that the prosecution should rely on the medical
ossification test. The doctor (PW9) conducted such a
test, concluding that the victim’s age was “more than 18
years and less than 20 years,” with crossexamination
confirming the possibility of age being 19 years. The
Court below had discounted this medical evidence,
holding that the school record alone could determine
age, but that reasoning was rejected, emphasizing
that the Transfer Certificate did not meet the statutory
standard.
16.1.3 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the only acceptable
evidence on age was the medical ossification report,
which indicated that the victim was above 18 years.
As a result, the prosecution failed to prove that the
victim was a “child” under the POCSO Act, meaning
the statutory age requirement for the offence was not
satisfied. He was, therefore, acquitted.
16.2 In Rajni, the juvenility of her son, Respondent No.2, was the
central question and arose in the context of his being made
an accused in connection with Crime No. 80/2021 registered
before the Medical College Police Station, Meerut under
Sections 302/201/34 of the IPC as well as Crime Case No.
97/ 2021 registered before the same police station under
Sections 3/25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959. Rajni’s application
to have her son dealt with as a minor was rejected by the
JJB, and the case eventually made its way up the judicial
hierarchy, to this Court.
16.2.1 The respondent produced a School Certificate from
DPS Higher Secondary School, Parvesh Vihar, Meerut,
showing his date of birth as 8th September 2003.
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This Certificate, along with the admission date of 4th
April 2016 and the High School passing year 2018,
suggested that the respondent was about 17 years
and 3 months old at the time of the incident. Notably,
an earlier proceeding (Miscellaneous Case No.9/2000)
had already accepted the same date of birth.
16.2.2 However, the JJB was skeptic about these documents,
noting that records from Class 4 to Class 8 had been
destroyed in a fire, and the respondent’s mother could
not recall the school’s name. The school principal
confirmed that original records for those classes were
missing. In addition, the JJB rejected the municipal birth
certificate from the concerned municipal corporation,
which also indicated 8th September 2003, on the
grounds that it had been issued on 8th June 2020 that
is, after the incident. As a result, a medical examination
of the respondent was ordered to determine his age.
16.2.3 The Court held this approach to be incorrect in view of
the clear stipulation under Section 94(2) of the JJ Act.
Here, both the municipal birth certificate and the school
certificate were available, and both corroborated the
earlier JJB decision. By disregarding these documents
and relying on a medical test, the JJB had erred. The
Additional District & Sessions Judge rightly reversed
the JJB’s decision, giving precedence to the school
certificate and declaring the respondent a juvenile.
16.2.4 The Court also emphasized that the JJB could not
challenge its earlier acceptance of the date of birth
simply because the mother or informant was not a
party in the prior proceeding. The JJB does not have
the power to review its earlier decision under the
JJ Act, and the earlier acceptance of 8th September
2003 should be binding. Consequently, the High Court
upheld the Additional District & Sessions Judge’s ruling
and affirmed the date of birth reflected in the school
certificate.
16.2.5 The Court referred to precedents such as Rishipal
Singh Solanki (supra) which clarified that juvenility
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can be claimed at any stage, and that initial burden lies
on the claimant. Documents like school certificates or
municipal birth certificates are prima facie sufficient to
establish juvenility, while medical tests cannot serve as
the sole criterion. When evidence is borderline, Courts
are to lean in favor of juvenility, although misuse must
be guarded against.
16.2.6 The discussion continued by distinguishing prior
cases where medical tests were relied upon when
documentary evidence was unreliable. In contrast,
the present case involved consistent documentary
evidence - the school certificate, municipal certificate,
and earlier JJB decision - all supporting the date of
birth as 8th September 2003. The JJB’s reasoning that
the informant was not a party in the earlier proceeding
was found to be unsound. The Additional District &
Sessions Judge had correctly reversed the JJB’s
approach, and the High Court had rightly affirmed that
the respondent should be treated as a juvenile at the
time of the incident.
17. The necessary sequitur from the above exposition is that a medical
determination of age of a victim cannot be resorted to as a matter
of course, much less mandated. It can only be employed in a given
circumstance when the other stipulations of Section 94 JJ Act are
not/cannot be met. This direction, therefore, has to be set aside.

Summation
18. In fine, our conclusions are that the High Court in bail jurisdiction was
coram non judice for issuing directions mandating the investigating
authorities within the State of Uttar Pradesh to necessarily have
a medical examination of the victim conducted, with the particular
intent to determine the age of the victim as also holding, that a bail
Court would be empowered to entertain challenges to the documents
produced to establish the age of the victim The importance of medical
examination in the harrowing crimes of sexual assault cannot be
overstated, it is not merely a record of injury or a catalogue of
biological traces; it is the voice of the body, speaking when words
falter and memory trembles. In cases where the victim’s courage
816 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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may be tested by stigma, shame, or the weight of societal scrutiny,
medical evidence provides an impartial testament, grounding the
pursuit of justice in the certainty of observable fact. It is, in essence,
the bridge that links the personal suffering of the victim with the
impartial adjudication of the law. But at the same time, its purpose,
which is to gather essential evidence in a scientifically sound manner,
with due regard to the principles of human dignity on one hand and
evidence on the other, cannot be reduced to a common, matter of
course step - especially when a procedure with a legislative imprimatur
has been laid down. The Court could not have passed directions
that go against clearly stated legislative intent under Section 94 of
the JJ Act. The determination of the age of the victim is a matter
for trial, and the presumption which is accorded to the documents
enumerated under the Section, has to be rebutted there, for that is
the appropriate forum to do so, not the bail Court. If the question
of age is raised at the stage of bail, it is only open for the Court to,
from the perusal of the documents, take a prima facie view as to
the age of the victim, not one on the correctness of the documents
since that would amount to a mini trial. It could also not have fused
statutory jurisdiction with a constitutional one, lifting one to the other,
or downgrading the higher to the lower in order to grant itself the
wherewithal, in an otherwise fairly circumscribed jurisdiction, to do
what could not be done.

A Necessitated Post-Script
19. As the conclusions drawn above indicate the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court has to be set aside on grounds of
transgression of the jurisdiction present and thereby lacking the
appropriate directions. It is to be set aside also because it goes
against the statutory prescription under the JJ Act. Be that as it
may, this Court has not lost sight of the well-intentioned purport of
this order. The POCSO Act is one of the most solemn articulations
of justice aimed at protecting the children of today and the leaders
of tomorrow. Yet, when an instrument of such noble and one may
even say basic good intent is misused, misapplied and used as
a tool for exacting revenge, the notion of justice itself teeters on
the edge of inversion. Courts have in many cases sounded alarm
regarding this situation. Misuse of the POCSO Act highlights a grim
societal chasm - on the one end children are silenced by fear and
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 817

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their families are constrained by poverty or stigma, meaning thereby
that justice remains distant and uncertain, and on the other hand,
those equipped with privilege, literacy, social and monetary capital
are able to manipulate the law to their advantage. The impugned
judgment is one amongst many where Courts have spoken out. Not
only are instances rife where the age of the victim is misrepresented
to make the incident fall under the stringent provisions of this law
but also there are numerous instances where this law is used by
families in opposition to relationships between young people. In
Satish alias Chand v. State of U.P.32, the High Court, noted that
on few occasions concern had been expressed by the Court with
respect to application of the Act on consenting adolescence when it
comes to consensual relationships between teenagers, four factors
have been highlighted which, is crucial for the Courts to consider:
“A. Assess the Context: Each case should be evaluated
on its individual facts and circumstances. The nature of
the relationship and the intentions of both parties should
be carefully examined.
B. Consider Victim’s Statement: The statement of the
alleged victim should be given due consideration. If the
relationship is consensual and based on mutual affection,
this should be factored into decisions regarding bail and
prosecution.
C. Avoid Perversity of Justice: Ignoring the consensual
nature of a relationship can lead to unjust outcomes, such
as wrongful imprisonment. The judicial system should aim
to balance the protection of minors with the recognition of
their autonomy in certain contexts. Here the age comes
out to be an important factor.
D. Judicial Discretion: Courts should use their discretion
wisely, ensuring that the application of POCSO does
not inadvertently harm the very individuals it is meant to
protect.”
[See also: Mrigraj Gautam @ Rippu v. State of U.P.]33

32 Crl.Misc.Bail Appl.No.18596 of 2024
33 2023:AHC:204171
818 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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The Delhi High Court in Sahil v. the State NCT of Delhi34 the Court
noted in para 11 of the order that POCSO cases filed at the behest
of a girl’s family objecting to romantic involvement with a young boy
have become common place and consequent thereto these young
boys languish in jails. Therein, reference is also made to an order
of the Gujarat High Court35, where the Court noted that considering
the closeness in age of the prosecutrix and the accused as also
the fact that she had left home of her own accord observed that the
application deserved consideration.
This chasm between access and abuse is also mirrored in the misuse
of Section 498-A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Amongst
numerous examples, we may only refer to Rajesh Chaddha v.
State of U.P36, where this Court lamented the use of these Sections
without specific instances or relevant details, among other cases.
It is also to be stated though that no amount of judicial vigilance
against misuse can alone bridge this ever-widening gap. The first line
of defence lies with the Bar i.e., the body that translates grievance
into action and is the gatekeeper of justice at the point of entry.
When it comes to matters such as these, the responsibility of the
advocate is profound – to examine the allegations with detachment
and necessary discretion and to counsel restraint when grievance
masks vengeance and to refuse participation in litigation when it can
be seen that an ulterior motive is sought to be agitated under the
guise of seeking protection of the law. It is only when the Bar takes
a principled, proactive role, that the legislation intended as a shield
can be stopped from being twisted into a weapon. A lawyer who
tempers aggression with calm, reason and rationality, protects not
only the opposing party from unwarranted harm but also the client
from the long-term consequences of frivolous or malicious litigation,
including adverse orders, and judicial censure. By taking a principled
stand, the Bar acts as a crucial filter, preventing the legal system from
being overwhelmed by abuse masquerading as enforcement. Such
self-regulation strengthens public faith in the profession, ensures
that judicial time is reserved for genuine disputes, and reinforces
the foundational idea that law is a means of justice, not a weapon

34 2024:DHC:6100
35 Jayantibhai Babulbhai Alani v. State of Gujarat 2018 SCC Online Guj. 1223
36 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 819

The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr

of convenience. In this sense, the ethical vigilance of lawyers is not
ancillary to justice, it is indispensable to it. When they do not do
so, the chasm alluded to above widens. Society also must match
institutional reform with moral awakening. The intent and object of
these legislations must be at the forefront when a person wishes
to lodge a complaint thereunder. The misuse of these laws is a
mirror to the opportunistic and self-centered view that pervades the
application of law. It is only through discipline, integrity and courage
that these problems can be remedied and rooted out. Any legislative
amendment or judicial direction will remain lack-luster without this
deeper change.
We have referred to certain instances of the High Courts noting the
misuse/misapplication of the POCSO Act, somewhat in line with the
indices appended to the impugned judgment as also its progenitors.
Considering the fact that repeated judicial notice has been taken of
the misuse of these laws, let a copy of this judgment be circulated to
the Secretary, Law, Government of India, to consider initiation of steps
as may be possible to curb this menace inter alia, the introduction of
a Romeo – Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships
from the stronghold of this law; enacting a mechanism enabling the
prosecution of those persons who, by the use of these laws seeks
to settle scores etc.
20. In that view of the matter, we pass the following order:
(a) The appeal is allowed. The directions issued in the impugned
judgment are set aside.
(b) In view of ‘III)’ as extracted in para 5.6 as also in view of their
intrinsic connection, such effect will extend to Aman (supra)
and Manish (supra)
(c) The bail granted in terms of these judgments and orders, is
left undisturbed in view of the other factors considered by the
learned Single Judge subject to judicial review, if any.
(d) Insofar as the cases listed in the appendices to these judgments
are concerned, this Court refrains from making any comment.
The effect of this judgment will be prospective and shall not
therefore, impact negatively, any of those cases wherein,
following the procedure laid down in the impugned judgment
or its progenitors, bail has been secured.
820 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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(e) The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to dispatch forthwith a copy
of this judgment to the learned Registrar General, High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, for necessary follow-up action, as
also information to the Trial Courts.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan