THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESHversusAMAN MITTAL & ANR.

1180                     [2019]
               SUPREME COURT    11 S.C.R. 1180
                             REPORTS                    [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A                   THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
                                      v.
                          AMAN MITTAL & ANR.
                   (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1328-1329 of 2019)
 B                          SEPTEMBER 04, 2019
           [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
            Legal Metrology Act, 2009:
         ss.3 and 51 - Proceedings u/ss. 265, 267, 420, 34, 120B, 467,
 C 468 and 471 of IPC; u/ss. 3 and 7 of Essential Commodities Act,
   1955; u/ss. 12/30 of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and u/ss.12/
   30 of the Legal Metrology Act - Applicability of the provisions of
   IPC - Held: The Act is a special Act vis-a-vis IPC - Section 3 of
   the Act completely overrides the provisions of Chapter XIII of IPC
   in respect of the offences and penalties imposable for violations
 D of the provisions of the Act, it being a special Act - Therefore, if
   offence is made out under the provisions of the Act, an accused
   cannot be charged for the same offence under Chapter XIII of IPC
   - Section 51 of the Act also makes it clear that the provisions of
   IPC insofar as they relate to offences with regard to weight and
   measure shall not apply to any offence punishable under the Act
 E
   - However, all the offences under IPC are not excluded - The Act
   does not foresee any offence u/s. 415, 467, 468, 471, 34 or 120-
   B of IPC - Since such offences are not punishable under the Act,
   the prosecution for such offences will be maintained - Offences u/
   ss.265 and 267 which fall under Chapter XIII of IPC alone are
 F liable to be quashed - Penal Code, 1860 - Chapter XIII.
         s.51 - Proceedings for the offences under the Legal
   Metrology Act - Applicability of provisions u/s.153 of Cr.P.C. -
   Held: Power of search and seizure in respect of weights and
   measures is vested with the Designated Authorities under the Act,
   hence in view of s.51, entire Cr.P.C. is inapplicable in respect of
 G prosecution under the Act - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
   s.153.
            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
            s.482 - Jurisdiction under - Scope of - Held: Directions of
       High Court against the interest of the accused in the petition u/
 H
                                     1180
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                        1181


s.482 filed by the accused, are beyond the jurisdiction of the High   A
Court - Order by the High Court directing disciplinary action
against erring officials in a petition u/s.482 seeking quashing of
charge-sheet, is also beyond the scope of jurisdiction of High
Court.
      Partly allowing the appeals, the Court                          B
      HELD: 1.1 The Act is a special Act vis-à-vis IPC. Section
51 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 provides that the provisions
of IPC and of Section 153 of Cr.P.C. insofar as such provisions
relate to offences with regard to weight and measures only shall
not apply to any offence which is punishable under the Act.           C
Section 153 of Cr.P.C permits an officer in charge of police
station to enter any place for the purpose of inspecting or
searching any weights or measures or instruments for weighing,
used or kept therein. Section 153 of Cr.P.C has been made
inapplicable under the Act as power of search and seizure is
vested with the designated authorities under the Act. Therefore,      D
the entire Cr.P.C is inapplicable in respect of the prosecution
under the Act that the police cannot enter any place for the
purpose of inspecting or searching for any weights or measures.
Section 3 of the Act completely overrides the provisions of
Chapter XIII of IPC in respect of the offences and penalties
                                                                      E
imposable for violations of the provisions of the Act, it being
special Act. Therefore, if the offence is disclosed to be made
out under the provisions of the Act, an accused cannot be
charged for the same offence under Chapter XIII of IPC.
Therefore, the provisions of IPC which relate to offences with
regard to weight and measure as contained in Chapter XIII of          F
IPC alone will not apply. No person can be charged for an offence
relating to weight or measure falling under Chapter XIII of IPC
in view of the provisions of the Act. The offences under
Sections 265 and 267 IPC are liable to be quashed. [Paras 31,
33, 34 and 36] [1202-E-G; 1201-A; 1203-A-C-G]
                                                                      G
      1.2 The scheme of the Act is for the offences for use of
weights and measures which are non-standard and for tampering
with or altering any standards, secondary standards or working
standards of any weight or measure. The Act does not foresee
any offence relating to cheating as defined in Section 415 of IPC
or the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of IPC.               H
1182           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A     Similarly, an act performed in furtherance of a common intention
       disclosing an offence under Section 34 is not covered by the
       provisions of the Act. An offence disclosing a criminal conspiracy
       to commit an offence which is punishable under Section 120-B
       IPC is also not an offence under the Act. Since such offences
       are not punishable under the provisions of the Act, therefore,
 B     the prosecution for such offences could be maintained since the
       trial of such offences is not inconsistent with any of the
       provisions of the Act. Similar is the provision in respect of the
       offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC as such offences are
       not covered by the provisions of the Act. [Para 35] [1203-D-F]
 C          State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan 2018 (11)
            SCALE 317 ; Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v.
            State of Gujarat & Anr. (2012) 7 SCC 621 : [2012] 3
            SCR 1155 - relied on.
            Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT
 D          of Delhi) (2017) 2 SCC 18 : [2016] 8 SCR 1015 -
            distinguished.
              2. The directions of the High Court in proceedings under
       Section 482 of Cr.P.C. against the interest of the accused in a
       petition filed by the accused are beyond the jurisdiction of the
 E     High Court and, thus, all such observations and directions are
       quashed. The directions issued by the High Court that the erring
       officers/officials named in the supplementary report shall be
       subject to disciplinary action are again beyond the scope of the
       High Court in a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking
       quashing of the charge-sheet and are, thus, quashed. [Para 36]
 F     [1203-H; 1204-A-B]
            3. It is open to the investigating agency to charge the
       accused for such offences or any other offence by way of a
       supplementary report or at a subsequent stage during trial as
       considered appropriate by the investigating agency. [Para 36]
 G     [1204-C]
            M.C. Abraham and Another v. State of Maharashtra
            and Others (2003) 2 SCC 649 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR
            677 ; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. Sri
            Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.
 H          (2019) 4 SCC 376 : [2019] 3 SCR 411 ; Macquarie
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                             1183


      Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Limited                    A
      (2018) 2 SCC 674 : [2017] 13 SCR 751 - referred
      to.
                        Case Law Reference
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 677            referred to            Para 12
[2016] 8 SCR 1015                   distinguished         Para 19          B
[2019] 3 SCR 411                    referred to           Para 24
2018 (11) SCALE 317                 relied on             Para 26
[2012] 3 SCR 1155                   relied on             Para 29
[2017] 13 SCR 751                   referred to           Para 33          C
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1328-1329 Of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 04.10.2017 and 09.11.2017
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) in
Criminal Misc. Application No. 4211 of 2017.                               D
                                 With
      Criminal Appeal Nos. 1330-1331, 1332 of 2019
      Vinod Diwakar, AAG, Mukul Rohatgi, B. N. Dubey, Sayandeep
Pahari, Ms. Garima Prasad, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Mrs. Pragya
Baghel, Sameer Rohatgi, Ms. Devanshi, S. Chakraborty, Ms. Harshita         E
Verma (for M/s. Legal Options), Advs. for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      HEMANT GUPTA, J.
     Crl. Appeal Nos. 1328-1329 of 2019 (@SLP (Criminal)
                                                                           F
Nos.9981-9982 of 2017)
                                 AND
     Crl. Appeal Nos. 1330-1331 of 2019 (@SLP (Criminal)
Nos.1912-1913 of 2017)
      1. Leave granted.                                                    G
      2. The order dated October 4, 2017 passed by the Lucknow
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is the subject matter
of challenge in these appeals.
       3. An FIR No. 130 was lodged on April 28, 2017 with Police
Station Cantt, Lucknow for the offences punishable under Sections 265,     H
1184             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A     267, 420, 34, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 and Sections 3/7
       of the Essential Commodities Act, 19552 in respect of short delivery of
       petrol and diesel by 200-220 ml. on each sale of 5 liters.

              4. On April 27, 2017, the Special Task Force3 of the State Police
       took up the investigation into the commission of offence viz. short
 B     delivery of petroleum products i.e. high-speed diesel and motor spirit
       at various retail outlets operating within the city of Lucknow. The STF
       with the aid of officers of the Department of Weight and Measures
       and the District Administration raided the premises of the retail outlets.
       The team found that 15 nozzles connected to four machines i.e.
 C     dispensing units with seals intact were operative and functional. The
       testing was carried out in the presence of Apar Nagar Magistrate, two
       Inspectors of Weights and Measures Department and the partners of
       the firm M/s. Shiv Narain & Sons and its Manager. As per the inspection
       memo recorded on April 27, 2017, out of 15 nozzles, 10 nozzles were
       used for sale of petrol and the remaining 5 nozzles were used for sale
 D     of diesel. 13 nozzles were involved in malpractice of short delivery. The
       team derived 5 liters of petrol and diesel respectively in the testing work
       standard measurement kept at the outlet but on calibration, it was found
       that the quantity of 200 ml. was short. For such short delivery, the FIR,
       as mentioned above, was lodged.
 E
              5. In the FIR, it is alleged that some electronic chip was fixed
       inside the dispensing unit which was operated through a remote. Three
       remote controls bearing Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were recovered and two remote
       controls were recovered without any numbers. The inspection team also
       verified the storage of stocks available as on date in the underground
 F     tanks by using a dip rod. On verification of actual stock, the comparative
       record maintained by the dealer was found to be inconsistent rather
       the stock available was found to be excessive and was recorded
       accordingly. The dispensing machines were sealed by the inspection
       team and the sale was immediately stopped. The accused were arrested
       on April 28, 2017. Later, on June 1, 2017, the Investigating Officer along
 G
       with seven persons including the City Magistrate visited the retail outlet
       and with the help of technicians hired from General Energy Management
       Systems Pvt. Ltd. opened the dispensing machines. The seals were
       1
         IPC
       2
         Act, 1955
       3
 H       STF
           THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                           1185
                       [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

found intact both at the initial stage of inspection i.e. on April 27, 2017    A
and on June 1, 2017. The electronic chips fixed inside the 24 dispensing
units were taken into custody by the Investigating Officer. Such
electronic chips recovered on June 1, 2017 are now with Forensic
Science Laboratory, Lucknow for its forensic report. The Magistrate
on an application made by the Investigating Officer allowed the judicial
                                                                               B
remand of accused vide order dated June 7, 2017 and also permitted
the investigation under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC and Sections 12/30
of the Legal Metrology Act, 20094.
      6. It is on the basis of investigations carried out, the charge-sheet
dated July 25, 2017 for the offences under Sections 265, 267, 420, 34,
120B IPC and Sections 3 and 7 of the Act, 1955, Sections 467, 468,             C
471 IPC and Sections 12/30 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1976
came to be filed before the competent court. The Magistrate did not
take cognizance of offence under Sections 471 and 120B of IPC for
want of evidence but the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence
under Section 30 of the Act.
                                                                               D
      7. It is thereafter two applications were filed under Sections
167(2) and 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 5 on July
26, 2017 on the ground that the prosecution has no material making
out a case of offences mentioned in the chargesheet, therefore, the
cognizance may not be taken. The learned Magistrate rejected both
the applications on July 27, 2017. It is thereafter the petition was filed     E
under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court, which was
decided by an order impugned in the present appeal. The High Court
has passed a detailed order examining the following questions of law:
           “(i) Whether in view of the promulgation of Legal Metrology Act,
           2009, the offences relating to weights and measures particularly    F
           short delivery of petroleum products sold to the public at large
           through dispensing machines, are open to be registered and
           investigated by the police authorities in terms of the provisions
           of IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure or the provisions of IPC
           and Cr.P.C. for the said purpose would stand ousted/obliterated/
           eclipsed by virtue of Section 51 of Legal Metrology Act, 2009;      G
           (ii) Whether the Legal Metrology Act and the Essential
           Commodities Act and the procedure envisaged thereunder has

4
    Act
5
    Code                                                                       H
1186            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A           an overriding effect over the provisions of Code of Criminal
             Procedure insofar as the investigation/search and seizure in
             respect of the offences relating to weights and measures are
             concerned.
             (iii) Whether the investigation held by the investigating officer
 B           assuming as if the same was permissible, has been held in
             consonance with the relevant law applicable as on the date or
             not and if not, its effect;
             (iv) Whether the court below while taking cognizance of the
             offences has passed the orders in accordance with the well-settled
 C           principles of law and if not, its effect.
             (v) Directions and directives necessary in the case.”
              8. It was held that the Code is applicable so long as a different
       procedure is not prescribed under the special law with respect to the
 D     cognizable or non-cognizable offences but application of the provisions
       of IPC has to be understood within the broader scope of special law in
       the light of exclusionary provision embodied therein. Thus, considering
       Sections 3 and 51 of the Act, the High Court held as under:
             “From a conjoint reading of this provision with the other provisions
 E           of the Act, the logical conclusion to serve the purpose of the Act,
             2009 that can be deduced is that all other offences under the
             Legal Metrology Act, 2009 except the offence under Section 26
             are non-cognizable and compoundable when committed for the
             first time; whereas the offence under Section 26 of the Act is a
 F           non-cognizable offence triable as per the procedure prescribed
             under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the other offences
             when committed second time as well. Thus, the procedure of
             investigation, inquiry and trial under the Cr.P.C. would accordingly
             apply inasmuch as, no procedure in relation thereto is prescribed
 G           under the Special Act.”
               9. It was further held that Section 26 of the Act overrides the
       provisions of Sections 264 to 267 of IPC as Section 51 of the Act clearly
       excludes the application of IPC and Section 153 of the Code insofar
       as it relates with regard to weights and measures punishable under the
 H     special Act. The High Court held as under:
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                              1187
                 [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      “The violation of any provision of the Special Act or Section 26      A
      once noticed against any offender, as is the situation in the
      present case, it would not attract violation of Section 264 to 267
      IPC at all and the prosecution is bound to be guided by the
      relevant provisions under the Special Act. The Special Act has
      replaced the entire Chapter by defining the offences of all
                                                                            B
      descriptions and classified them in the nature of non-cognizable
      compoundable offences, as such, the procedure deserves to be
      applied accordingly as per the classification of offences against
      other laws in the first schedule of Cr.P.C. insofar as criminal
      prosecution is concerned.”
                                                                            C
       10. The High Court ordered that the trial court has not taken
cognizance of offence under Sections 34, 120B, 471 of IPC or 26 of
the Act. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the Court may not
take into account such materials for the purposes of taking cognizance
of the offences, in the light of the orders passed on July 7, 2017 and
August 17, 2017. The High Court held that Sections 467, 468, 471, 120-      D
B and 34 of IPC stand clearly attracted.
       11. In respect of third question, the High Court directed the
District Judge, Lucknow to ascertain the quantitative and qualitative
figures of the residual stock lying in the underground tanks and allow
the stock to be delivered to the oil company for custody after due          E
calibration through the dispensing pumps installed. The High Court issued
the following directions:
      “(i) The Investigating Officer assigned the duty of investigation
      in case crime no. 130/2017 shall stand changed forthwith and
      the Superintendent of Police (City), North, Lucknow at present        F
      is hereby directed to take over the further investigation and
      cooperate with the District Judge, Lucknow to deliver the custody
      of petrol/diesel in the seized underground tanks to the respective
      oil company after due calibration of the same through the
      dispensing units. The District Judge/Investigating officer shall
                                                                            G
      collect the samples for quality and quantity checks both in the
      calibrated containers to be provided by the department of Weights
      and Measures and oil company immediately on demand. The
      samples shall be collected as per the procedure of sample
      collection provided for quality/quantity check specified in the
      statutory Order, 2005;                                                H
1188      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A     (ii) The District Judge, Lucknow jointly with the investigating
       officer authorised hereinabove shall submit the calibration report
       of the residual stock to the court concerned not later than a period
       of 15 days from the date a copy of this order is communicated
       to them by the Senior Registrar of this Court;
 B     (iii) The investigating officer appointed hereinabove, in association
       with the District Judge, Lucknow, shall jointly forward the report
       of calibration of the stock in the respective tanks by duly
       comparing the figures mentioned in the seizure memo/F.I.R. and
       resultant excessive figures be mentioned in clear figures taking
       aid of the totaliser reading in each dispensing unit alongwith their
 C     photographic evidence at the time of start/finish;
       (iv) For the purposes of sample reports, the District Judge/
       investigating officer are jointly authorised to requisition the quality
       check from any of the nearest defence laboratories notified in
       the statutory Order, 2005 and quantity check from any of the
 D     centres mentioned in para-22 of the counter affidavit sworn by
       the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. The reports shall be
       called for expeditiously and may be requested to be supplied not
       later than a period of 6 weeks from the date of submission of
       the samples. The reports so obtained may be filed in the
       respective courts by the investigating officer after endorsement
 E
       by the District Judge;
       (v) The seized dispensing machines be released to the owner as
       soon as the residual stock in the underground tanks is handed
       over to the oil company concerned for which the oil company
       shall provide all the transport and custodial facility besides
 F     operational guidance to the investigating officer and learned
       District Judge, without asking for any remuneration;
       (vi) The investigating officer shall submit the supplementary report
       in terms of the observations made in this judgement not later than
       a period of two months, by taking over all the materials and record
 G     from the previous investigating officer in the form in which
       discovery and seizure were made; and
       (vii) The oil companies henceforth shall make use of collapsible
       pulsers essential in the dispensing machines in order to prevent
       malpractices. Thus, the State Government is directed to implement
 H     the installation of such a device in consultation with the oil
        THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                             1189
                    [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         companies within a planned time framework of not later than four     A
         months.”
       12. The State as well as one of the accused are in appeal before
this Court. At the outset, learned counsel for the parties stated that the
directions issued by the High Court cannot be sustained in law, therefore,
they have no objection if such directions are set aside. Such directions      B
are liable to be set aside in view of the fact that the High Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, cannot interfere
in the manner of investigation, in terms of the Judgment of this Court
in M. C. Abraham and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others6
wherein it was held as under: -
                                                                              C
         “13. This Court held in the case of J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1
         SCC 554: 1980 SCC (Cri) 272] that there is a clear-cut and well-
         demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and
         crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field
         exclusively reserved by the executive through the police
         department, the superintendence over which vests in the State        D
         Government. It is the bounden duty of the executive to
         investigate, if an offence is alleged, and bring the offender to
         book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been
         committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of
         proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating    E
         officer submits report to the court requesting the court to take
         cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code of
         Criminal Procedure, its duty comes to an end. On cognizance of
         the offence being taken by the court, the police function of
         investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained
         in Section 173(8), then commences the adjudicatory function of       F
         the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed
         and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the
         crime. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the High
         Court was set aside by this Court.”
      13. Therefore, the directions issued including in respect of change     G
of Investigating Officer and that the District Judge to be associated
with various action, falling exclusively in the domain of the Investigating
Agency are patently beyond the scope of the petition under Section
482 of the Code and are, therefore, liable to be set aside.
6
    (2003) 2 SCC 649                                                          H
1190             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A           14. Learned counsel for the State vehemently argued that the
       Act does not exclude the offences under IPC. It is contended that the
       Act provides for the offences and penalties but reading of Sections 3
       and 51 of the Act does not exclude the offences under the IPC. The
       Act will override only those offences which are inconsistent with the
       offences under IPC, except to the extent specified in the Act.
 B
              15. Learned counsel for the State relied upon an order passed
       by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan7 wherein,
       while interpreting the provisions of Food and Safety Standards Act,
       2006, it was held that the provisions of the said Act is not the only
       provision that can be resorted to, the prosecution can be lodged for the
 C     offences under IPC as well. Learned counsel for the State also relied
       upon an order passed by this Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai
       Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr.8 wherein, for a dishonour of cheque,
       the prosecution for an offence under Section 420 IPC was found to be
       maintainable even after the prosecution under Section 138 of the
 D     Negotiable Instruments Act, 18819 is lodged. It was held that the mens
       rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of
       cheque is not required to be proved in proceeding of an offence under
       Section 138 of the NI Act, whereas in the case under IPC, the issue
       of mens rea is relevant. It was held that the offences under Section
       420 of IPC and Section 138 of NI Act are different, may on same facts.
 E
              16. On the other hand, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel
       for the accused argued that the Act is a complete Code providing for
       the standards of the weights and measures, the manner in which the
       same are required to be tested and also the offences for which the
       action can be taken. Since the Act is a special statute having overriding
 F     effect, therefore, the accused cannot be charged for the offences under
       IPC. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court in Sharat Babu
       Digumarti v. Government10 (NCT of Delhi) as also the Division Bench
       judgment of Bombay High Court in Gagan Harsh Sharma & Anr. v.
       The State of Maharashtra & Anr. 11 whereby, considering the
       provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 12 , it was held that
 G     the offence under IPC cannot be lodged. It is pointed out that special
       7
          Criminal Appeal No. 1195 of 2018 decided on September 20, 2018
       8
          (2012) 7 SCC 621
       9
          NI Act
       10
           (2017) 2 SCC 18
       11
           Criminal Writ Petition No. 4361 of 2018 decided on October 26, 2018
 H     12
           IT Act
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                             1191
                 [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

leave petitions filed against the said judgment were dismissed by this     A
Court on December 7, 2018.
      17. In this background, the arguments raised by learned counsel
for the parties need to be examined but before we examine the
arguments, certain provisions from the applicable statutes may be
reproduced hereunder:                                                      B
      “THE LEGAL METROLOGY ACT, 2009
      2(g). “Legal Metrology” means that part of metrology which
      treats units of weighment and measurement, methods of
      weighment and measurement and weighing and measuring                 C
      instruments, in relation to the mandatory technical and legal
      requirements which have the object of ensuring public guarantee
      from the point of view of security and accuracy of the
      weighments and measurements;
                 xx                  xx                 xx                 D
      3. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
      anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other
      than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any
      enactment other than this Act.
                                                                           E
                 xx                  xx                 xx
      26. Whoever tampers with, or alters in any way, any reference
      standard, secondary standard or working standard or increases
      or decreases or alters any weight or measure with a view to
      deceiving any person or knowing or having reason to believe that     F
      any person is likely to be deceived thereby, except where such
      alteration is made for the correction of any error noticed therein
      on verification, shall be punished with fine which may extend to
      fifty thousand rupees and for the second and subsequent offence
      with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
                                                                           G
      months but which may extend to one year or with fine or with
      both.
                 xx                  xx                 xx
      30. Penalty for transactions in contravening of standard
      weight or measure. - Whoever-                                        H
1192      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A      (a) in selling any article or thing by weight, measure or number,
            delivers or causes to be delivered to the purchaser any
            quantity or number of that article or thing less than the
            quantity or number contracted for or paid for; or
        (b) in rendering any service by weight, measure or number,
 B          renders that service less than the service contracted for or
            paid for; or
        (c) in buying any article or thing by weight, measure or number,
            fraudulently receives, or causes to be received any quantity
            or number of that article or thing in excess of the quantity
 C
            or number contracted for or paid for; or
       (d) in obtaining any service by weight, measure or number,
           obtains that service in excess of the service contracted for
           or paid for, shall be punished with fine which may extend
 D         to ten thousand rupees, and; for the second or subsequent
           offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend
           to one year, or with fine, or with both.
                  xx                  xx                 xx
       51. The provisions of the Indian Penal Code and section 153 of
 E     the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in so far as such provisions
       relate to offences with regard to weight or measure, shall not
       apply to any offence which is punishable under this Act.”
       “THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
 F     153. Inspection of weights and measures.-(1) Any officer in
       charge of a police station may, without a warrant, enter any place
       within the limits of such station for the purpose of inspecting or
       searching for any weights or measures or instruments for
       weighing, used or kept therein, whenever he has reason to
 G     believe that there are in such place any weights, measures or
       instruments for weighing which are false.
       (2) If he finds in such place any weights, measures or instruments
       for weighing which are false, he may seize the same, and shall
       forthwith give information of such seizure to a Magistrate having
 H     jurisdiction.”
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                               1193
                 [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      “THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860                                           A
      265. Fraudulent use of false weight or measure.-Whoever
      fraudulently uses any false weight or false measure of length or
      capacity, or fraudulently uses any weight or any measure of
      length or capacity as a different weight or measure from what
      it is, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description       B
      for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
      both.
                  xx                  xx                  xx
      267. Making or selling false weight or measure.-Whoever makes,         C
      sells or disposes of any instrument for weighing, or any weight,
      or any measure of length or capacity which he knows to be false,
      in order that the same may be used as true, or knowing that the
      same is likely to be used as true, shall be punished with
      imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend         D
      to one year, or with fine, or with both.”
       18. We do not find any merit in the argument of Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi that the Act is a complete Code which contains the provisions
of offences and penalties under the said Act, therefore, for any violation
of the provisions of the Act, the prosecution can be lodged only under       E
the Act and not for the offences even if disclosed under IPC.
      19. In Sharat Babu Digumarti, an FIR was lodged for the
offences under Sections 292 and 294 of IPC and Section 67 of IT Act.
This Court struck down the offences under Sections 292 and 294 of
IPC in view of the provisions of Section 67 of the IT Act.                   F
       20. The question examined was as to whether an activity
emanating from electronic form which may be obscene would be
punishable under Section 292 IPC or Section 67 of the IT Act or both
or any other provision of the IT Act. This Court held that Section 292
IPC makes offence sale of obscene books, etc. but once the offence           G
has a nexus or connection with the electronic record the protection and
effect of Section 79 cannot be ignored and negated in view of special
provision for a specific purpose. The IT Act has to be given effect to
so as to make the protection effective and true to the legislative intent.
The Court held as under:                                                     H
1194            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A           “31. Having noted the provisions, it has to be recapitulated that
             Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing,
             transmitting obscene materials in electronic form. The said
             provision read with Sections 67-A and 67-B is a complete code
             relating to the offences that are covered under the IT Act. Section
             79, as has been interpreted, is an exemption provision conferring
 B
             protection to the individuals. However, the said protection has
             been expanded in the dictum of Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal
             v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449]
             and we concur with the same.
             32. Section 81 of the IT Act also specifically provides that the
 C           provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
             inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time
             being in force. All provisions will have their play and significance,
             if the alleged offence pertains to offence of electronic record. It
             has to be borne in mind that IT Act is a special enactment. It
 D           has special provisions. Section 292 IPC makes offence sale of
             obscene books, etc. but once the offence has a nexus or
             connection with the electronic record the protection and effect
             of Section 79 cannot be ignored and negated. We are inclined to
             think so as it is a special provision for a specific purpose and
             the Act has to be given effect to so as to make the protection
 E           effective and true to the legislative intent. This is the mandate
             behind Section 81 of the IT Act. The additional protection granted
             by the IT Act would apply.”
              21. The Bombay High Court in Gagan Harsh Sharma has found
       that even a dishonest and fraudulent act falls within the scope of Section
 F     66 of the IT Act and that the IT Act has been given overriding effect
       notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith, therefore, an offender
       gets out of net of IPC. It was held that IPC is a general statute whereas
       IT Act is a special statute and, therefore, special enactment would
       prevail. The Bombay High Court held as under:
 G           “11. Reading of the said judgment, makes is clear that the Hon'ble
             Apex Court had considered the effect of the overriding provisions
             contained in the Information Technology Act and has observed
             that all the provisions in the enactment are of significance
             particularly if the alleged offences pertains to electronic record.
 H           By observing that the Information Technology Act is a special
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                            1195
            [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

enactment and it contain special provision, the Hon'ble Apex         A
Court has also considered the effect of Section 79 contained in
the Information Technology Act which is enacted for a specific
purpose and has observed that the mandate behind Section 81
of the Information Technology Act needs to be understood in its
proper perspective. It referred to the earlier precedents on the
                                                                     B
point where a special statute is pitted against a General
enactment and thereafter has concluded by making reference
Section 79 and 81 that once the special provisions are accorded
overriding effect to cover a criminal Act, the offender gets out
of the net of the Indian Penal Code and in the case in hand of
Section 292.                                                         C
          xxx                 xxx                 xxx
21. Keeping the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements in mind,
if the scheme of the Information Technology Act will have to be
examined and given effect too. The said Act which is a special
                                                                     D
enactment so as to give fillip to the growth of electronic based
transactions, and to provide legal recognition for E-commerce and,
to facilitate E-Governance and to Ensure Security Practice and
Procedures in the context of the use of Information Technology
Worldwide. The said enactment contains a full fledge mechanism
for penalising certain acts which are committed without              E
permission of the owner or any other persons who is in charge
of a computer, computer system, or computer network and those
acts are enumerated in Section 43. The said enactment also makes
certain acts punishable and Chapter-XI of the Information
Technology Act 2000 enumerates such acts. The same acts              F
which are enumerated in Section 43 of the enactment which
would invite penalty and compensation for accessing or securing
any information as contemplated in Section 43, would amount to
an offence under Section 66 if any person, dishonestly,
fraudulently commits such an act. The said Section has an
explanation appended to it to the effect that the word               G
“dishonestly” and “fraudulently” used in the said Section will be
assigned the same meaning as under the Indian Penal Code. In
such circumstances when the Information Technology Act, 2000
specifically provides a mechanism for dealing with an act covered
in Section 43(a) and (j):-                                           H
1196            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A                “Section 43(a) Accesses or secures access to such
                  computer, computer system or computer network (or
                  computer resource);
                  43(j) Steel, conceals, destroys or alters or causes any
                  person to steal, conceal, destroy or alter any computer
 B                source code used for a computer resource with an
                  intention to cause damage."
             and if this is done with a fraudulent or dishonest intention, it
             becomes an offence under Section 66 of the Information
             Technology Act. Since, the Information Technology Act deals with
 C           the use of means of electronic communication and has evolved
             a complete mechanism in itself to deal with the offences in the
             use of electronic transactions, and in the backdrop of the specific
             facts of the case in hand, Section 66 would be attracted and in
             view of the mechanism contained in the said section, the
             invocation of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code is highly
 D
             unwarranted. This view has already been authored by their
             lordships in case of Sharat Babu Digumarti (Supra).”
              22. It may be noticed that Bombay High Court considered the
       judgment of this Court in Sayyed Hassan wherein this Court has held
       that an offence under Section 188 of IPC is wider in scope and did not
 E     cover only breach of law but is attracted in cases where the act
       complained of causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or
       safety as well. The Court held as under:
             “24. The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court is
             therefore clearly distinguishable on facts but even the said
 F           judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterates the settled position
             of law that where an act or an omission constitutes for an
             offence under two enactments the offender may be punished
             under either or both enactment but was not liable to be punished
             twice for the same offence. It is always possible that the same
 G           set of facts can constitute offence under two different laws but
             a person cannot be punished twice for the said act which would
             constitute an offence.”
             23. The special leave petition against the said order was
       dismissed without any reasoned order but with the order “The Special
 H     Leave Petitions are Dismissed”.
        THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                               1197
                    [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       24. Though, the Special Leave Petition against the order of the          A
Bombay High Court was dismissed but in view of three Judge Bench
judgment in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara
Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.13 , the dismissal of special leave
petition does not amount to merger of the order of the High Court with
the order passed in the Special Leave Petition. This Court held as under:
                                                                                B
         “20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where orders
         of different nature were passed and dealt with these judgments
         by classifying them in the following categories:
         (i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition - without
         reasons - no res judicata, no merger. [Proposition based on
         judgments in Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust, (1978) 3 SCC 119;           C
         Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1958
         Mad 398; Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC
         146; Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356; Wilson
         v. Colchester Justices, (1985) 2 All ER 97 (HL); Supreme Court
         Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187;
         Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury v. Union of India, (1996) 7 SCC             D
         1; V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2000) 5 SCC 373;
         Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. Swami Prakasananda,
         (1997) 6 SCC 78 and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhikaji
         Ingle, (1996) 3 SCC 463.
         (ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking or reasoned   E
         order - no merger, but rule of discipline and Article 141 attracted.
         [Penu Balakrishna Iyer v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer, AIR 1965
         SC 195; Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K.
         Santhakumaran, (1998) 7 SCC 386; Shankar Ramchandra
         Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74;
         Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774;                  F
         Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4
         SCC 447; Junior Telecom Officers Forum v. Union of India,
         1993 Supp (4) SCC 693 and Supreme Court Employees'
         Welfare Assn. Case, (1989) 4 SCC 187.
         (iii) Leave granted - dismissal without reasons - merger results.
                                                                                G
         [Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC
         1372].”
         “26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum
         up the legal position as under:
13
     (2019) 4 SCC 376                                                           H
1198            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A           26.1.           xx         xx          xx
             26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as
             under: (Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of
             Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359], SCC p. 384)
             “(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-
 B           speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract
             the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal
             does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge.
             All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise
             its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.”
 C            25. The Bombay High Court in Gagan Harsh Sharma has found
       that even a dishonest and fraudulent act falls within the scope of Section
       66 of IT Act. We are not called upon in the present appeals to examine
       whether an accused can be tried for an offence under IPC in view of
       Section 66 of IT Act. Such question can be raised and decided in an
       appropriate case.
 D
             26. In Sayyed Hassan, the Court held that Section 55 of Food
       and Safety Standards Act, 2006 being a specific provision made in the
       special enactment but still an offence under Section 188 of IPC is made
       out. The Court held as under:

 E           “8. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under
             two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment
             of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an
             omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the
             offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both
             enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the
 F           same offence [T.S. Baliah v. T.S.Rengachari - (1969) 3 SCR
             65]. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute
             offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can
             amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the
             same time, an offence under any other law [State of Bihar v.
             Murad Ali Khan - (1988) 4 SCC 655]. The High Court ought to
 G           have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
             which reads as follows:
                     “Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more
                     enactments - Where an act or omission constitutes an
                     offence under two or more enactments, then the
 H                   offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                              1199
                 [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

           under either or any of those enactments, but shall not           A
           be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”
      27. However, the question as to whether the offences under
Sections 188, 272, 273 and 328 IPC have been made out against the
respondents in the facts of that case, the matter was remitted back to
the High Court to examine the contentions of respective parties.            B
       28. The Sharat Babu Digumarti is a judgment dealing with
obscenity in the electronic form. This Court has held that IT Act is a
special enactment. Since the offence has nexus or connection with the
electronic record the protection and effect of Section 79 cannot be
ignored and negated. Section 292 IPC makes sale of obscene books            C
as an offence which cannot be made out in view of special provision
made in the IT Act. The said judgment is, that an offence pertaining to
electronic record falls within Section 67 of the IT Act, whereas, Section
292 IPC deals with an offence of obscenity in the printed format,
therefore, two offences operate in different field.
                                                                            D
       29. In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel, a subsequent First
Information Report under Sections 406, 420 read with 114 of IPC was
challenged on the ground that the accused has been tried earlier for an
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and that accused cannot be
charged for the offence of criminal breach of trust, cheating and
abetment pertaining to the cheque for which proceedings were initiated      E
under Section 138 of the NI Act. In the said case, the Court held that
there may be overlapping of facts in both the cases but the ingredients
of the offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent case is not
barred by any of the provisions of the NI Act. The Court held as under:
      "37. Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the         F
      offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 of the
      NI Act and the case is sub judice before the High Court. In the
      instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420 read with
      Section 114 IPC. In the prosecution under Section 138 of the
      NI Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
      time of issuance of cheque is not required to be proved. However,     G
      in the case under IPC involved herein, the issue of mens rea may
      be relevant. The offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is a
      serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be imposed.
      38. In the case under the NI Act, there is a legal presumption
      that the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent        H
1200            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A           liability and that presumption can be rebutted only by the person
             who draws the cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the
             offences under IPC. In the case under the NI Act, if a fine is
             imposed, it is to be adjusted to meet the legally enforceable
             liability. There cannot be such a requirement in the offences under
             IPC. The case under the NI Act can only be initiated by filing a
 B           complaint. However, in a case under IPC such a condition is not
             necessary.
             39. There may be some overlapping of facts in both the cases
             but the ingredients of the offences are entirely different. Thus,
             the subsequent case is not barred by any of the aforesaid
 C           statutory provisions.”
             30. This Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel has upheld
       the prosecution for an offence under Section 420 IPC even when the
       prosecution under Section 138 of NI Act was lodged earlier. This Court
       has held that for an offence under Section 420 IPC, mens rea is an
 D     essential ingredient for an offence under Section 138, the factum of
       dishonour of cheque alone discloses an offence. Similarly, in Sayyed
       Hassan, this Court has held that the provision of Food and Safety
       Standards Act, 2006 is not the only provision that can be resorted to
       for lodging a prosecution. The prosecution can be lodged for the
       offences under IPC as well.
 E
              31. Section 51 of the Act provides that the provisions of IPC
       and of Section 153 of the Code insofar as such provisions relate to
       offences with regard to weight and measures only shall not apply to
       any offence which is punishable under the Act. Section 153 of the
       Code permits an officer in charge of police station to enter any place
 F     for the purpose of inspecting or searching any weights or measures or
       instruments for weighing, used or kept therein. Section 153 of the Code
       has been made inapplicable under the Act as power of search and
       seizure is vested with the designated authorities under the Act.
       Therefore, the entire Code is inapplicable in respect of the prosecution
       under the Act that the police cannot enter any place for the purpose of
 G     inspecting or searching for any weights or measures.
              32. The question required to be examined is whether all the
       offences under IPC are excluded in view of Section 3 of the Act or
       only the offences relating to the weights and measures as are contained
       in Chapter XIII IPC alone stand excluded in view of Section 51 of the
 H     Act.
        THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                                1201
                    [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       33. It cannot be disputed that the Act is a special Act vis-à-vis         A
IPC. In Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies
Limited14, this Court adopted a doctrine of harmonious construction to
hold that there was clear disharmony between the two parliamentary
statutes which cannot be resolved by harmonious interpretation. This
Court held as under:
                                                                                 B
         “44. Similarly, in CTO v. Binani Cements Ltd. [CTO v. Binani
         Cements Ltd., (2014) 8 SCC 319] , the rule of construction of
         two parliamentary statutes being harmoniously construed was laid
         down as follows: (SCC pp. 332-33, para 35)
              “35. Generally, the principle has found vast application in
              cases of there being two statutes: general or specific with        C
              the latter treating the common subject-matter more
              specifically or minutely than the former. Corpus Juris
              Secundum, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 482 states that when
              construing a general and a specific statute pertaining to the
              same topic, it is necessary to consider the statutes as
                                                                                 D
              consistent with one another and such statutes therefore
              should be harmonised, if possible, with the objective of giving
              effect to a consistent legislative policy. On the other hand,
              where a general statute and a specific statute relating to
              the same subject-matter cannot be reconciled, the special
              or specific statute ordinarily will control. The provision more    E
              specifically directed to the matter at issue prevails as an
              exception to or qualification of the provision which is more
              general in nature, provided that the specific or special statute
              clearly includes the matter in controversy (Edmond
              v. United States [Edmond v. United States, 1997
              SCC OnLine US SC 45 : 137 L Ed 2d 917 : 520 US                     F
              651 (1997)], Warden v. Marrero [Warden v. Marrero, 1974
              SCC OnLine US SC 136 : 41 L Ed 2d 383 : 417 US 653
              (1974)] ).”
                        xx             xx            xx
         47. Similarly, in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [R.S.            G
         Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992
         SCC (L&S) 286] , the non obstante clause contained in Rule 3(2)
         of the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules,
         1977 was held not to override the Karnataka General Service
14
     (2018) 2 SCC 674                                                            H
1202     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A     (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1976. It was held:
       (SCC p. 348, para 13)
            “13. As already noted, there should be a clear inconsistency
            between the two enactments before giving an overriding
            effect to the non obstante clause but when the scope of the
 B          provisions of an earlier enactment is clear the same cannot
            be cut down by resort to non obstante clause. In the instant
            case, we have noticed that even the General Rules of which
            Rule 3(2) forms a part provide for promotion by selection.
            As a matter of fact Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 also provide
            for the enforceability of the Special Rules. The very Rule
 C          3 of the General Rules which provides for recruitment also
            provides for promotion by selection and further lays down
            that the methods of recruitment shall be as specified in the
            Special Rules, if any. In this background if we examine the
            General Rules it becomes clear that the object of these
            Rules only is to provide broadly for recruitment to services
 D          of all the departments and they are framed generally to
            cover situations that are not covered by the Special Rules
            of any particular department. In such a situation both the
            Rules including Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 of the General
            Rules should be read together. If so read it becomes plain
            that there is no inconsistency and that amendment by
 E          inserting Rule 3(2) is only an amendment to the General
            Rules and it cannot be interpreted as to supersede the
            Special Rules. The amendment also must be read as being
            subject to Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4(2) of the General Rules
            themselves. The amendment cannot be read as abrogating
            all other Special Rules in respect of all departments. In a
 F          given case where there are no Special Rules then naturally
            the General Rules would be applicable. Just because there
            is a non obstante clause, in Rule 3(2) it cannot be interpreted
            that the said amendment to the General Rules though later
            in point of time would abrogate the special rule the scope
            of which is very clear and which co-exists particularly when
 G
            no patent conflict or inconsistency can be spelt out. As
            already noted, Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 of the General
            Rules themselves provide for promotion by selection and for
            enforceability of the Special Rules in that regard. Therefore,
            there is no patent conflict or inconsistency at all between
 H          the General and the Special Rules.”
     THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. AMAN MITTAL                                1203
                 [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       34. In the light of principles laid down, we find that Section 3 of    A
the Act completely overrides the provisions of Chapter XIII of IPC in
respect of the offences and penalties imposable for violations of the
provisions of the Act, it being special Act. Therefore, if the offence is
disclosed to be made out under the provisions of the Act, an accused
cannot be charged for the same offence under Chapter XIII of IPC.
Reading of Section 51 of the Act makes it clear that the provisions of        B
IPC insofar as they relate to offences with regard to weight or measure,
shall not apply to any offence which is punishable under the Act.
Therefore, the provisions of IPC which relate to offences with regard
to weight and measure as contained in Chapter XIII of IPC alone will
not apply. No person can be charged for an offence relating to weight         C
or measure falling under Chapter XIII of IPC in view of the provisions
of the Act.
       35. The scheme of the Act is for the offences for use of weights
and measures which are non-standard and for tampering with or altering
any standards, secondary standards or working standards of any weight
                                                                              D
or measure. The Act does not foresee any offence relating to cheating
as defined in Section 415 of IPC or the offences under Sections 467,
468 and 471 of IPC. Similarly, an act performed in furtherance of a
common intention disclosing an offence under Section 34 is not covered
by the provisions of the Act. An offence disclosing a criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence which is punishable under Section 120-        E
B IPC is also not an offence under the Act. Since such offences are
not punishable under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the prosecution
for such offences could be maintained since the trial of such offences
is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Similar is the
provision in respect of the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC
as such offences are not covered by the provisions of the Act.                F
       36. Thus, we partly allow the present appeals with the following
directions:
        (i) Directions given by the High Court, as mentioned in para
            11 above, are hereby quashed.
                                                                              G
       (ii) We uphold the order of the High Court that the offences
            under Sections 265 and 267 IPC are liable to be quashed.
       (iii) The directions of the High Court in proceedings under
             Section 482 of the Code against the interest of the accused
             in a petition filed by the accused are beyond the jurisdiction   H
1204             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 11 S.C.R.


 A                 of the High Court and, thus, all such observations and
                   directions are quashed.
              (iv) The directions issued by the High Court that the erring
                   officers/officials named in the supplementary report shall be
                   subject to disciplinary action are again beyond the scope of
 B                 the High Court in a petition under Section 482 of the Code
                   seeking quashing of the charge-sheet and are, thus, quashed.
               (v) It is open to the investigating agency to charge the accused
                   for such offences or any other offence by way of a
                   supplementary report or at a subsequent stage during trial
                   as considered appropriate by the investigating agency.
 C
              (vi) In other words, the entire order of the High Court is set
                   aside except the order which relates to the quashing of the
                   charges under Sections 265 and 267 IPC but it shall be open
                   to the investigating agency to take such steps as are
                   required to complete the investigation in accordance with
 D                 law.
       Crl. Appeal No. 1332 of 2019 (@SLP (Criminal) No.3321 of 2018)
              37. Leave granted.
              38. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by
 E     the High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow on November 24, 2017
       whereby, petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of Crime
       No.0313, P.S. Hasanganj dated April 28, 2017 for the offences under
       Sections 265, 267, 420, 467, 468 and 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 7 of
       the Act, 1955 and Section 26/30 of the Act, filed by the appellant who
       is being prosecuted, was dismissed.
 F
             39. The present appeal was posted for final hearing along with
       Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 9981-9982 of 2017
       and 1912-1913 of 2018. In the aforesaid case, it has been held that
       the offence under Chapter XIII of IPC cannot be lodged in view of
       the provisions of the Act whereas the prosecution under other offences
 G     of IPC has been found to be maintainable.
             40. In view of the said fact, the present appeal is partly allowed.
       The offences under Sections 265 and 267 IPC are quashed in view of
       the reasons recorded in the aforesaid appeals.

       Kalpana K. Tripathy                                  Appeals partly allowed.
 H