THE STATE OF TRIPURA AND ANR.versusROOPCHAND DAS AND ORS.

A                    THE STATE OF TRIPURA AND ANR.
                                           v.
                          ROOPCHAND DAS AND ORS.

                                  DECEMBER 3, 2002

B           [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]


          Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A:

          Land acquisition-Compensation-More than one award-Petition filed
C for redetermination of compensation against subsequent award-Rejected by
    Land Acquisition Collector as time barred counting period of limitation from
    an earlier award in respect of same lands_:_Reversed by High Court-On
    appeal, Held: Since provisions of law allow filing of application by the
    awardee for redetermination of compensation against an award without any
D   restriction as to choice of award when more than one awards passed--
    Application for redetermination of compens(ltion could be filed against
    subsequent award counting period of limitation accordingly.

          The question of law which arose in these appeals was when more than
    one award passed by the Reference Court on different dates in respect of lands
E   covered by the same Notification for the purpose of computing three months
    period for filing of application for redetermination of compensation as
    stipulated in Section .28-A of the Land Acquisition Act whether the date of
    earliest award would only be relevant and not the ~ubsequent or latest date of
    awards.

F         Answering the question in negative, the Court

          HELD: The later part. of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act
    stipulates that the amount of compensation payable to awardee may be re-
    determined on the basis of.the amount of compensation·awarded by the Court
    and leaves the choice to the person making such an application for re-
G   determination, without confining o~ restricting the area of choice of such
    person to any one or the other award though it could be availed of only once
    and not as many number of times as there are so many awards. Under the
    circumstances, the reasoning of the Land Acquisition Officer that for
    purposes of computing the three months period stipulated in Section 28-A of
H   the Act, the date of the earliest award would be relevant and not the subsequent
                              .          448
              STATE v. ROOPCHAND DAS [DORAISWAMY RAJU. J.]                        449

     or latest was rightly rejected by the High Court. [451-C; 450-D-Ej                  A
           Union of India and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumari and Ors., f1995[ 2 SCC 736
     and Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. ·Rodr.iquese and Anr. v. land Acquisition
     Collector and Anr., j1996f 6 SCC 746, relied on.

           Union of India and Anr. v. Hanso/i Devi and Ors., [20021 7 SCC 273,           B
     referred to.

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURl.SDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3515of1997.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.1997 of the High Court of
     Gauhati, in C.R. Nos. 12of1997.                                                     C
           Gopal Singh, Navin Prakash and Rahul Singh, for the Appellants.

           For Respondent Ex-parte .in CA 3516/1997.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                         D
           RAJU, J. These two appeals involve common and identical questions
     of law and are dealt with together. In C.A.No. 3515 of 1997, the challenge is
     to the judgment dated 21.1.97 of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench,
-I   made in Civil Rule No.12 of 1997,.whereunder the High Court, applying the
     earlier decision rendered in Civil Rule IO of 1997, directed, while setting aside   E
     the order dated 18.9.96 of the Land Acquisition Collector, the said Collector
     to consider the petitions filed by the respondent-landowners under Section
     28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act")
     on merits and in accordance with law, holding them to be within the period
     of limitation stipulated therefor. The appeal in C.A. No.351611997 is against       F
     the above noticed earlier decision in Civil Rule I 0 of 1997 dated 21.1.97.

           So far as C.A. No.3515 of 1997 is concerned, relying upon the Reference
     Court's Award dated 19.9.94 in case Nos. Misc. L.A.29/92 and 30/92, the
     respondents sought by a petition filed on 16.12.94 for re-determination of the
     compensation for their lands invoking Section 28-A of the Act. The Land             G
     Acquisition Collector rejected the claim by his order dated 18.9.96 on the
     ground that the same was not filed within the stipulated period of three
     months inasmuch as, according to the Collector, the period of limitation had
     to be calculated from 25.5.94, an earlier Award of the Reference Court in
     respect of the !ands covered by the same Notification under Section 4 ( 1) of
     the Act and not with reference to the latest or subsequent Awards of the            H
     450                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A    Reference Court. So far as the appeal in C.A. 3516 of 1997 is concerned, the
     Land Acquisition Collector, was moved by the land-owners for re-detennination
     of compensation in respect of their lands invoking Section 28~A of the Act,
     with reference to an award of the Reference Court made on 5 .5. 94 in respect
                                                                                           I-
     of cases Misc.LA. 34-36/1992 and on 8.6.94 in Misc. Cases Nos.40, 41, 45 &
B    46/1992. The petition was filed on 1.8.94. But the Land Acquisition Collector
     by his order dated 18.9.96, rejected the same as time-barred on the view that
     in respect of the lands covered. by the very same Notification under Section
     4(1) of the Act, there was an earlier Award passed by the Reference Court
     on 21.12.93 itself in Misc. Case Nos.37, 38, 39, 42, 43 and 44/1992 and that
     the period of limitation has to be calculated from the earliest of the Awards,
C    which in this case, as per Collector, was on 21.12.93.

            The fact that ifthe latest Awards are taken into account, the claim made
     under Section 28-A of the Act is well within time, is not in controversy and
     the Land Acquisition Collector himse:: noticed the said aspect. But in view
     of his opinion that of the Awards by the Reference Court when more than
D    one passed on different dates are available in respect of lands covered by the
     same Notification, for purposes of computing the three months period stipulated
     in Section 28-A of the Act, the date of the earliest one would be relevant and
     not the subsequent or latest, the claims came to be rejected. It was this
     reasoning of the Land Acquisition Collector that did not meet with the
E    approval of the High Court, in our view rightly too, in the light of the decision
     of this Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumari and Ors., [1995]
     2 sec 736.

          Heard, the learned counsel appearing on either side, who reiterated the
   stand taken for the respective parties before the High Court. This Court in
p the decision in Pradeep Kumari and Ors., (supra) categorically held that "the
   right to make the application under Section 28-A of the Act arises from the
   award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application
  ·is seeking re-determination of the compensation. There is nothing in Sub-
  _section (l) of Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respf'.Ct
   of the earliest award that is made by the court after the coming into force of
G Section 28-A." Any construction to the contra introducing such words, not
   found.engrafted in the very provision would amount to curtailing the ~plitude
   of the provision resulting virtually in restricting a benefit conferred, particularly
   of a beneficent provision normally not permissible by judicial interpretation~
   It w~ also held therein that there is nothing iD. the wordings of Section 28-
H A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer any such limited benefit
           STATE v. ROOPCHAND DAS [DORAlSWAMY RAJU . .1.J                    451

thereunder which would have ~he inevitable consequence of denying the                A
benefit of higher a1nount on the basis of the subsequent award. Such an
interpretation as would restrict the benefit of Section 28-A to the first of the
Award in the series and in point of tin1e, was also considered to result 111ore
in· the perpetuation of the inequality in the pay1nent of compensation, which
the legislature specifically intended to remove by enacting the provision and        B
that, therefore, the object underlying Section 28-A would be better served and
achieved by giving the word "an award" in Section 28-A its natural meaning,
as meaning any one of the award(s) made by the court under Part-III, after
the coming into force of Section 28-A. That apart, in our view, even the later
part of Section 28-A which stipulates, "require that the amount of compensation
payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of                   C
compensation awarded by the Court", leaves the choice to the person making
such an application for re-determination, without confining or restricting the
area of choice of such person to any one or the other, "though it could be
availed of only once and not as many number of times as there are so many
awards.
                                                                                     D
      The principles laid down by a bench of three learned Judges of this
Court in Pradeep Kumari and Ors. (supra) was also followed in yet another
decision of a bench of three learned Judges in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R.
Rodriguese and Anr. v. land Acquisition Collector and Anr.. [1996] 6 SCC
746, observing as hereunder:
                                                                                     E
          "'4. We may now refer to the case-law. A two-Judge Bench of this
          Court in Babua Ram v. State of U.P. dealt with this precise question
          and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of
          the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, and
          successive awards cannot save the period of limitation; vi de paragraphs   F
          19 and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated by the same Bench
          in Union of India v. Karnail Singh wherein this Court held that the
          limitation of three months for an application for redetermination of
          compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest award
          made by a civil court, a~d not the judgment rendered by an appellate
          court. This was followed by the decision of a three-Judge Bench in         G
          Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari wherein it was held that the benefit
          under Section 28-A can be had within three months from the date of
1.   119951 2 sec 689
2.   [19951 2 sec 728
3.   [19951 2 sec 736                                                                H
    452                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A            the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof redetermination
             is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram I and
             Karnail Singh 2 were overruled on the limited question that they
             sought to confine the right to seek redetermination to the earliest
             award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act after the
             introduction of Section 28-A into the Act. There is, however, no
B            doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date
             of the Court's award under Section I 8 on the basis whereof
             redetermination is sought. Admittedly, in both the cases at hand, the
             applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A
             were made long after the expiry of three months from the date of the
c            award ·of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking
             redetermination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court
             was right in taking the view that both the applications were time-
             barred."

                                                              (Emphasis supplied)
D
          The correctness of Pradeep Kumari's case (supra) on this aspect when
    sought to be raised before the Constitution Bench in the batch of cases,
    including the appeals before us in Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi
    and Ors. reported in [2002] 7 SCC 273, it was observed, "But since that
    question has neither been referred to us under the order of reference made
E   in the present case nor does it arise in the case in hand, we refrain from
    answering -the same." A Review Petition filed by the appellants herein before
    the Constitution Bench in these appeals, viz., R.P.(C) 1437-38 of2002, has also
    been dismissed. In the light of the above, we see no merit in the challenge
    made to the orders of the High Court. The appeals, consequently, fail and
    shall stand dismissed. No costs.
F
    S.K.S.                                                    Appeals dismissed.