Supreme Court of India
THE STATE OF TELANGANAversusSRI MANAGIPET @ MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1333
- Decided
- 6 December 2019
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- L NAGESWARA RAO
Holding
The authorising officer’s re‑employment and authorization were valid as a de‑facto officer acting in public interest, and the High Court’s quashing of the proceedings was unsustainable.
Summary
The State of Telangana filed a criminal appeal against a Hyderabad High Court order that partially quashed a charge‑sheet under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against former OSD Sri Managipet @ Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy for possessing assets disproportionate to his known income. The High Court had held that there was no valid authorization to register the case, that the informant could not be the investigating officer, and that the lack of a preliminary inquiry, sanction and the delay caused by the accused’s retirement warranted quashing. The Supreme Court held that the authorising officer, K. Sampath Kumar, was validly re‑employed under Article 162 and acted as a de‑facto officer; the High Court lacked jurisdiction to examine his employment. The Court ruled that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory where the FIR discloses a cognizable offence, that sanction may be produced during trial, and that irregularities under Section 17 of the Act do not vitiate proceedings absent prejudice. Consequently, the State’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s appeal dismissed, and the matter remitted to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues considered
- The validity of the authorising officer’s appointment and his power to authorise the investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
- Whether the High Court could entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to examine the nature of the authorising officer’s employment.
- Whether a preliminary inquiry is required before registering an FIR in corruption cases.
- Whether the absence of prior sanction and the retirement of the accused bar prosecution.
- Whether the delay in investigation and alleged irregularities under Section 17 of the Act invalidate the charge‑sheet.
- Whether the informant can also be the investigating officer.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 196, s. 239, s. 482, s. 65B
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2), s. 17
Subjects
CorruptionDisproportionate assetsDe facto officer doctrinePreliminary inquirySection 482 Cr.P.C.Prevention of Corruption ActRe‑employment of civil servantExecutive power of StateSanction for prosecution
Judgment
716 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 14 S.C.R. 716
REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A THE STATE OF TELANGANA
v.
SRI MANAGIPET @ MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY
(Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019)
B DECEMBER 06, 2019
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s.482 – Petition under – For quashing the charge-sheet
C alleging offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – High
Court partly allowed the petition holding that there was no
authorization to register the crime and that the informant could
not be the investigating officer – However, the Court did not accept
the pleas of the accused viz. absence of preliminary inquiry before
registration of crime; absence of sanction before prosecution; and
D
delay in completion of the investigation – Appeal to Supreme Court
by the State as well as the accused – Held: The authorizing Officer
had discharged his duties in exercise of the powers confirmed by
the State Government – The authorization in favour of the
Investigating Officer was issued by the authorizing officer while
E performing his duties in public interest – Therefore such
authorization is valid and binding as if it was an act of an officer
de jure – The High Court had no jurisdiction to decide the nature
of employment of authorising Officer while deciding a petition
u/s.482 – In the facts of the present case preliminary inquiry was
not required and sanction could be produced during the course
F
of trial – Matter remitted to trial court for further proceedings.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
s.17 – Non-compliance – Effect of – Held: If an investigation
is not conducted by a police officer of requisite rank and status
G required u/s. 17, such lapse would be an irregularity – If such
irregularity does not result in causing prejudice, conviction will
not be vitiated on this ground – Investigation.
Constitutionalism:
Executive powers of State – Scope of – Held: Executive
H powers of State is coterminus with the legislative power of the State
716
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 717
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY
Legislature – State Executive has power to make regulations and A
issue Government Orders in respect of a subject on which the State
Legislature has jurisdiction to make law.
Inquiry:
Preliminary inquiry – Requirement of – Before lodging FIR
– Held: Scope and ambit of preliminary inquiry before lodging an B
FIR, would depend upon the facts of each case – Objective of
such inquiry is only to ensure that criminal investigation does not
initiate on frivolous and untenable complaint – In the present case,
since the relevant information was available in respect of prima facie
allegations disclosing a cognizable offence, conducting of C
preliminary inquiry was not required.
Dismissing the appeal of the accused, while allowing that
of the State, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Article 310 of the Constitution of India
contemplates that except as expressly provided, every person D
who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of
the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected
with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office at
the pleasure of the President. In respect of the State Services,
however, he or she holds office at the pleasure of the Governor. E
In the present case, ‘K’ was re-employed for a period of one
year by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred
under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. There is no
prohibition in any of the service rules that there cannot be any
re-employment of a person who was once in a civil service of
either the Center or the State. [Para 10] [727-D-F] F
1.2 Entry 2 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution is the ‘Police’ (including railway and village police)
subject to the provisions of Entry 2A of List I. Therefore,
various facets of Policing in the State fall within the legislative
competence of the State and the re-employment of a retired G
personnel who was a member of Indian Police Service, falls
within the executive power of the State. As a re-employed officer,
he was holding a civil post as his salary was being paid from the
State Exchequer. He was discharging duties and responsibilities
in the Anti-Corruption Bureau. [Para 11] [727-G-H] H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 1.3 The executive power of the State is coterminous with
the legislative power of the State Legislature i.e. if the State
Legislature has jurisdiction to make law with respect to a subject,
the State executive can make regulations and issue Government
orders with respect to it. The executive power of the State
Government cannot be circumscribed if it does not go against
B
the provisions of the Constitution or any law. [Paras 12 and 13]
[728-A-B-E-F]
P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. P. Veldurai (2011) 5 SCC
214 : [2011] 5 SCR 254 ; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra
Mohan & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (1982)
C 1 SCC 39 : [1982] 1 SCR 1137 – relied on.
1.4 ‘K’ was re-employed initially for a period of one year
after his retirement. He was not being recruited for holding a
civil post for the first time which may warrant compliance of
rigour of Article 16 of the Constitution. He had crossed all
D bridges, when he was appointed and discharged duties before
attaining the age of superannuation. Such re-employment by the
State is in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 162
of the Constitution of India. Such executive powers of the State
do not contravene any other statutory provisions; therefore, re-
E employment in this regard is supplementing the statutory rules
and regulations and not supplanting them. Therefore, ‘K’ has
discharged the duties of Joint Director in the Anti-Corruption
Bureau in exercise of the powers conferred by the State
Government. [Para 14] [729-D-E]
F 1.5 Further, ‘K’, whilst discharging the duties of Joint
Director in the Anti-Corruption Bureau were within the scope
of the assumed official authority in public interest and not for
his own benefit. Therefore, acts undertaken in this regard by
the officer will be taken to be valid. The authorisation in favour
of ‘S’ was issued when ‘K’ was performing his duties in public
G interest and not for his own benefit. Therefore, such
authorisation is valid and binding as if it was an act of an officer
de jure. [Paras 15 and 21] [729-F-G; 735-A-B]
Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh
(1981) 3 SCC 132 : [1981] 3 SCR 474 ; Pushpadevi
H M. Jatia v. M. L. Wadhawan, Additional Secretary,
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 719
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY
Government of India and Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 367 : A
[1987] 3 SCR 46 ; VeerendraKumar Gautam & Ors.
v. Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay & Ors. (2016) 14 SCC
18 : [2016] 7 SCR 223 – relied on.
Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor (1911) SCC OnLine
Cal 159 ; P.S. Menonv. State of Kerala AIR 1970 Ker B
165 ; P. Mahamani v. Tamil Nadu Magnesite, Ltd.,
Salem & Ors. (1993) 2 LLN 353 – referred to.
1.6 The High Court, while deciding a petition for quashing
of proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C could not have
commented upon the nature of employment of ‘K’, as such a
C
question does not fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court
whilst deciding the aforementioned petition. [Para 22] [735-B-
C]
1.7 ‘K’ had authorised ‘S’ and the final report had been
filed after the investigation conducted by the latter, in terms of
clause (c) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In D
this regard, it cannot be said that the investigation was not
conducted in a manner contemplated under law. Thus, ‘S’ was
an authorized Officer, competent to investigate and file a report
for the offences under the Act including of an offence under
Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. [Para 23] [735-C-D] E
1.8 The finding recorded by the High Court that the
informant cannot be the investigating officer, ‘S’ being both the
informant and the initiator of the investigations is based on
*Mohan Lal case. In **Varinder Kumar case, *Mohan Lal case
was held to have prospective effect hence, will not be applicable
in the present case. [Para 24] [735-E] F
*Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 :
[2018] 9 SCR 1006 – held inapplicable.
**Varider Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2019)
SCC Online SC 170 – relied on.
G
1.9 Thus, the orders of the High Court to quash the
proceedings against the Accused Officer are not sustainable and
are consequently, set aside. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
State is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the trial court
for further proceedings in accordance with law. [Para 26] [736-
B] H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A Union Public Service Commissioner v. Girish Jayanti
Lal Vaghela & Ors. (2006) 2 SCC 482 : [2006] 1 SCR
1006 – distinguished.
2.1 The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry being
necessary before lodging an FIR, would depend upon the facts
B of each case. There is no set format or manner in which a
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The objective of the same
is only to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not
initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint. [Para 32] [739-
C]
C 2.2 In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the
information collected was in respect of disproportionate assets
of the Accused Officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is
to screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints, in
furtherance of acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant
information was available with the informant in respect of prima
D facie allegations disclosing a cognizable offence. Therefore,
once the officer recording the FIR is satisfied with such
disclosure, he can proceed against the accused even without
conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on the basis of
the credible information received by him. It cannot be said that
the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason that the
E preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can only be
done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. [Para 33] [739-D-F]
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Supp. SCC
335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 – relied on.
F
2.3 Therefore, the preliminary inquiry warranted in *Lalita
Kumari case is not required to be mandatorily conducted in all
corruption cases. The type of preliminary inquiry to be
conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. There are no fixed parameters on which such inquiry can
G be said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal
collection of information disclosing a cognizable offence to the
satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient. [Para
34] [740-A-B]
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
H (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713 – relied on.
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 721
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY
State by Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, A
Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 –
distinguished.
3.1 There is also no merit in the argument that there has
been no sanction before the filing of the report. The sanction
can be produced by the prosecution during the course of trial, B
so the same may not be necessary after retirement of the
Accused Officer. The question as to whether a sanction is
necessary to prosecute the Accused Officer, a retired public
servant, is a question which can be examined during the course
of the trial. [Paras 35 and 36] [740-C-E-F]
C
K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP (2005) 4 SCC 512:
[2005] 3 SCR 1 – relied on.
3.2 If an investigation was not conducted by a police officer
of the requisite rank and status required under Section 17 of
the Act, such lapse would be an irregularity, however unless such D
irregularity results in causing prejudice, conviction will not be
vitiated or be bad in law. Therefore, the lack of sanction was
rightly found not to be a ground for quashing of the proceedings.
[Para 36] [740-F-G]
Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (Government of National E
Capital Territory of Delhi) [2020] 2 SCC 88 – relied
on.
4. It is not correct to contend that amended provisions of
the Prevention of Corruption Act as amended by Act XVI of 2018
would be applicable in the present case, as the Amending Act F
came into force before filing of the charge sheet. In the present
case, the FIR was registered on 9th November, 2011 much before
the Act was amended in the year 2018. Whether any offence
has been committed or not has to be examined in the light of
the provisions of the statute as it existed prior to the amendment G
carried out on 26th July, 2018. [Para 37] [741-B-C]
Case Law Reference
[2006] 1 SCR 1006 distinguished Para 8
[2011] 5 SCR 254 relied on Para 12 H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A [1982] 1 SCR 1137 relied on Para 13
[1981] 3 SCR 474 relied on Para 15
(1911) SCC OnLine Cal 159 referred to Para 16
[1987] 3 SCR 46 relied on Para 17
B AIR 1970 Ker 165 referred to Para 18
(1993) 2 LLN 353 referred to Para 19
[2016] 7 SCR 223 relied on Para 20
[2018] 9 SCR 1006 held inapplicable Para 24
C (2019) SCC Online SC 170 relied on Para 25
[2013] 14 SCR 713 relied on Para 27
(2019) 7 SCC 515 distinguished Para 27
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 relied on Para 33
D [2005] 3 SCR 1 relied on Para 35
[2020] 2 SCC 88 relied on Para 36
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1662 of 2019.
E From the Judgment and Order dated 24.12.2018 of the High
Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
State of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Petition No. 12485 of 2018
With
Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019.
F
Gurukrishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., Sridhar Potaraju, P. Anantha
Nageshwar Rao, Ms. Shweta Parihar, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Ms. G.
Ushasri, T. Vishnu Menon, Ms. Bina Madhavan, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar,
Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Advs. for the appearing parties.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The order dated 24th December, 2018 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Hyderabad is the subject matter of challenge in
the present appeals, one by the State and the other by the Accused
H Officer.
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 723
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
2. The High Court partly allowed the petition filed by the Accused A
Officer under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
qua the proceedings arising out of Crime No. 28/ACB-CIU-HYD/2011
dated 9th November, 2011.
3. Such FIR was registered on the basis of the statement given
by Ch. Sudhakar, Deputy Superintendent of Police 2 at about 10 am. B
The FIR reads as under:
“On receipt of credible information that Sri. Managipet @
Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy S/o. Late Narsimha Reddy, Age
51 years, Occ: OSD, Rang Reddy District, Vikarabad R/o Flat
No. 401, Venkatadri Apartments, Behind HPCL Petrol Pump, C
Gachibowli, Hyderabad is a native of Chilkatonipally (V) Veltoor
(Post), Wanaparthy Tq., Mahaboobnagar District. The S.O.
joined Govt. service on 19-09-1985 as Sub Inspector of Police
and promoted as Inspector of Police on 04-04-1995 and Dy.
Supdt. of Police, in the year 2007. He worked as SI at D
Rayadurgam, Hayathnagar, Malkajigiri, as Circle Inspector at
Huzurnagar of Nalgonda District Narsingi, Uppal, Rajendranagar
of Cyberabad Commissionerate, R.R. District as ACP.,
Rajendranagar for about 4 years and presently working as OSD,
Ranga Reddy District, Vikarabad.
E
During the period of his service he acquired Six Multistoried
Buildings, One Multistoried commercial complex, 27 plots and 26
Acres of land at Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy and Mahboobnagar
Districts and one Scorpio car, one Hyundai Verna car and Maruti
Car, all worth Rs.3,55,61,500/-.
F
The probable income of the A.O. and his family members from
all their known sources of income when calculated roughly would
be Rs.60,00,000/-. The probable expenditure of the accused
officer including household expenditure and expenditure on
children education is tentatively estimated at Rs.23,00,000/-.
G
The likely savings of the accused officer is Rs.37,00,000/- i.e.,
the probable income of Rs. 60,00,000 - minus the probable
expenditure of Rs.23,00,000/-.
1
for short, ‘Code’
2
for short, ‘DSP’ H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A As against the likely savings of Rs.37,00,000/- the
Accused Officer has acquired assets approximately worth
Rs.3,55,61,500/-. Thus, the A.O. is in possession of assets worth
Rs.3,18,61,500/- which are disproportionate to the known sources
of his income for which he cannot satisfactorily account for and
thereby committed the offence punishable U/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e)
B of P.C. Act 1988.
Permission has been obtained from the competent authority to
register a case against the above official U/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Hence, the FIR.”
C
4. A charge sheet was filed on 9th October, 2017 on completion
of the investigations. As per the Report, the Accused Officer was said
to be in possession of assets worth Rs.3,18,61,500/- alleged to be
disproportionate to his known sources of income. The total worth of
the property against his savings of Rs.37 lakhs was found to be
D approximately Rs.3,55,61,500/-. During the investigations, as many as
114 witnesses were examined. Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, CIU, ACB,
Hyderabad and five more investigating officers conducted the
investigations and prepared the final report.
5. The High Court in a petition for quashing of the charge sheet,
E held that there was no authorization to register the crime and that the
informant cannot be the investigating officer and, thus, quashed the
same. The State is aggrieved against the said two findings whereas,
the Accused Officer has challenged the findings of the High Court not
accepting the grounds pressed by him in seeking the quashing of the
charge sheet - that there is no preliminary inquiry before the registration
F of the crime; that there is no sanction and that there is a delay in the
completion of the investigation which has prejudiced the rights of the
Accused Officer.
6. Ms. Bina Madhavan, learned counsel for the State submitted
that the Accused Officer joined as Sub Inspector on 19th September,
G 1985 and was promoted as Inspector on 4th April, 1997. He was further
promoted as DSP in the year 2007. In pursuance of the FIR filed, a
draft final report was prepared on 30th April, 2015 but the same was
submitted on 9th October, 2017 after the Accused Officer retired on
31st May, 2017. Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 3
3
H for short, ‘Act’
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 725
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
pertains to investigation into cases under the Act. A Police officer not A
below the rank of Inspector, authorized by the State Government by
general or special order, may also investigate any such offence. An
offence under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act
cannot be investigated without an order of the Police Officer not below
the rank of Superintendent of Police. Section 17 of the Act reads as
under: B
“17. Persons authorised to investigate.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
no police officer below the rank,—
a) xx xx xx C
b) xx xx xx
c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a
police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate any
offence punishable under this Act without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, D
as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without
a warrant:
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector
of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf
by general or special order, he may also investigate any such E
offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest
therefor without a warrant:
Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-
section (1) of section 13 shall not be investigated without the order F
of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of
Police.”
7. Learned counsel for the State referred to Government Order
No. 3168 dated 24th May, 2008 re-employing Sri K. Sampath Kumar,
Joint Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau as Officer on Special Duty after G
his superannuation on 31st May, 2008 for a period of one year. Such
order of re-employment was renewed on 5th March, 2009; 13th May,
2010 and on 30th May, 2011, each extending the term of re-employment
by one year. It was on 9th November, 2011, the Joint Director, CIU &
SES, Anti-Corruption Bureau authorized Ch. Sudhakar, DSP to register H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A a case against the Accused Officer under Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and inspect any premises, bankers books
of the Accused Officer or of any other person concerned with the
affairs of the Accused Officer and take or cause to be taken certified
copies of the relevant entries therefrom for the purpose of investigation.
It is in pursuance of such authorization that the FIR was lodged,
B
premises were searched and the Accused Officer was arrested.
8. The High Court relied upon the judgment reported as Union
Public Service Commissioner v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Ors.4
to hold that the statutory rules do not permit to extend the age of
superannuation without compliance of Article 16 of the Constitution of
C
India. A person who was appointed for a short period of six months
or till availability of a regular selectee, whichever is earlier is practically
appointed on a contract basis and could not be called a government
servant. The High Court returned the following findings:
“21. It is neither pleaded nor is there any material to show that
D
the appointment of Respondent 1 had been made after issuing
public advertisement or the body authorised under the relevant
rules governing the conditions of service of Drugs Inspectors in
the Union Territory of Daman and Diu had selected him. His
contractual appointment for six months was dehors the rules. The
E appointment was not made in a manner which could even
remotely be said to be compliant with Article 16 of the
Constitution. The appointment being purely contractual, the stage
of acquiring the status of a government servant had not arrived.
While working as a contractual employee Respondent 1 was not
F governed by the relevant service rules applicable to Drugs
Inspector. He did not enjoy the privilege of availing casual or
earned leave. He was not entitled to avail the benefit of general
provident fund nor was he entitled to any pension which are
normal incidents of a government service. Similarly, he could
neither be placed under suspension entitling him to a suspension
G allowance nor could he be transferred. Some of the minor
penalties which can be inflicted on a government servant while
he continues to be in government service could not be imposed
upon him nor was he entitled to any protection under Article 311
4
H (2006) 2 SCC 482
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 727
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
of the Constitution. In view of these features it is not possible to A
hold that Respondent 1 was a government servant.”
9. We find glaring illegality in the line of reasoning and the
findings recorded by the High Court. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela was
a case where Shri Vaghela was appointed on a short term contract
basis, on a fixed salary till a candidate was selected by the Union Public B
Service Commission on a regular basis. The advertisement to fill up
the post on regular basis contemplated relaxation of five years in age
for government servants. He claimed relaxation in age being a
government servant for appointment on regular basis. It was held that
it was a contract which governed his terms of service and not the rules C
framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India in
as much as he was not appointed in accordance with the Rules and,
thus, was not eligible for any relaxation in upper age for appointment
on a regular basis in a post advertised by Union Public Service
Commission. D
10. Article 310 of the Constitution contemplates that except as
expressly provided, every person who is a member of a defence service
or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any
post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds
office at the pleasure of the President. In respect of the State Services, E
however, he or she holds office at the pleasure of the Governor. In
the present case, Sri K. Sampath Kumar was re-employed for a period
of one year by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred
under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. There is no prohibition
in any of the service rules that there cannot be any re-employment of F
a person who was once in a civil service of either the Center or the
State.
11. Entry 2 of List II of the State List is the Police (including
railway and village police) subject to the provisions of Entry 2A of List
I. Therefore, various facets of Policing in the State fall within the G
legislative competence of the State and the re-employment of a retired
personnel who was a member of Indian Police Service, falls within the
executive power of the State. As a re-employed officer, he was holding
a civil post as his salary was being paid from the State Exchequer. He
was discharging duties and responsibilities in the Anti-Corruption Bureau. H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 12. In P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. P. Veldurai5, it has been
held that the executive power of the State is coterminous with the
legislative power of the State Legislature i.e. if the State Legislature
has jurisdiction to make law with respect to a subject, the State executive
can make regulations and issue government orders with respect to it.
B This Court held as under:
“48. The powers of the executive are not limited merely to the
carrying out of the laws. In a welfare State the functions of the
executive are ever widening, which cover within their ambit
various aspects of social and economic activities. Therefore, the
C executive exercises power to fill gaps by issuing various
departmental orders. The executive power of the State is
coterminous with the legislative power of the State Legislature.
In other words, if the State Legislature has jurisdiction to make
law with respect to a subject, the State executive can make
regulations and issue government orders with respect to it,
D subject, however, to the constitutional limitations. Such
administrative rules and/or orders shall be inoperative if the
legislature has enacted a law with respect to the subject. Thus,
the High Court was not justified in brushing aside the Government
Order dated 16-11-1951 on the ground that it contained
E administrative instructions.”
13. In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors. v. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.6, it was held that the executive power of
the State Government cannot be circumscribed if it does not go against
the provisions of the Constitution or any law. The Court held as under:
F “20. …………….. In Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab
[AIR 1955 SC 549 : (1955) 2 SCR 225 : 1955 SCJ 504]
Mukherjea, C.J., dealt with the scope of Articles 73 and 162 of
the Constitution. The learned Chief Justice observed that neither
of the two Articles contains any definition as to what the
G executive function is or gives an exhaustive enumeration of the
activities which would legitimately come within its scope. It was
observed: “Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue
of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial
5
(2011) 5 SCC 214
6
H (1982) 1 SCC 39
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 729
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
functions are taken away.” It is neither necessary nor possible A
to give an exhaustive enumeration of the kinds and categories
of executive functions which may comprise both the formulation
of the policy as well as its execution. In other words, the State
in exercise of its executive power is charged with the duty and
the responsibility of carrying on the general administration of the
B
State. So long as the State Government does not go against the
provisions of the Constitution or any law, the width and amplitude
of its executive power cannot be circumscribed. If there is no
enactment covering a particular aspect, certainly the Government
can carry on the administration by issuing administrative
directions or instructions, until the legislature makes a law in that C
behalf. Otherwise, the administration would come to a standstill.”
14. Sri K. Sampath Kumar was re-employed initially for a period
of one year after his retirement. He was not being recruited for holding
a civil post for the first time which may warrant compliance of rigour
of Article 16 of the Constitution. He had crossed all bridges, when he D
was appointed and discharged duties before attaining the age of
superannuation. Such re-employment by the State is in exercise of the
powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Such
executive powers of the State do not contravene any other statutory
provisions; therefore, re-employment in this regard is supplementing the
E
statutory rules and regulations and not supplanting them. Therefore, Sri
K. Sampath Kumar has discharged the duties of Joint Director in the
Anti-Corruption Bureau in exercise of the powers conferred by the State
Government.
15. We further find that Sri K. Sampath Kumar’s acts whilst
F
discharging the duties of Joint Director in the Anti-Corruption Bureau
were within the scope of the assumed official authority in public interest
and not for his own benefit. Therefore, acts undertaken in this regard
by the officer will be taken to be valid. This Court in a judgment
reported as Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh7 held
as under: G
“17. A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder
or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful
authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be
7
(1981) 3 SCC 132 H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the
office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when
he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit
unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and
acts done by a judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born
of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and
B
endless mischief…
19. In our view, the de facto doctrine furnishes an answer to
the submissions of Shri Phadke based on Section 9 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and Article 21 of the Constitution. The judges
who rejected the appeal in one case and convicted the accused
C in the other case were not mere usurpers or intruders but were
persons who discharged the functions and duties of judges under
colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with the office that
the Judges purported to hold. We are not concerned with the
particular incumbents of the office. So long as the office was
D validly created, it matters not that the incumbent was not validly
appointed. A person appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional
Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising
jurisdiction in the Court of Session and his judgments and orders
would be those of the Court of Session. They would continue to
be valid as the judgments and orders of the Court of Session,
E notwithstanding that his appointment to such Court might be
declared invalid. On that account alone, it can never be said that
the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It would
be a different matter if the constitution of the court itself is under
challenge. We are not concerned with such a situation in the
instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the
F
submissions of the learned Counsel.”
16. The aforesaid judgment relies upon Pulin Behari Das v.
King Emperor8, wherein Justice Mookerjee held the following:-
“The doctrine that the acts of officers de facto performed by
G them within the scope of their assumed ??? authority in the
interest of the public or third persons and not for their own
benefit, are generally as valid and binding as if they were the
acts of officers de jure, dates as far back as the Year-Books,
and it stands confirmed, without any qualification or exception,
8
H 1911 SCC OnLine Cal 159 : (1911-12) 16 CWN 1105
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 731
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
by a long line of adjudications. Viner says “acts done by an A
officer de facto and not de jure are good, for the law favours
one in a refuted authority” (Abridgment, Tit. Officers and Officers
G. 4). In fact the question for determination in cases involving
the application of the de facto doctrine, is not, as a rule, whether
the challenged acts, assuming the officer to be de facto, as such
B
are valid, but whether the person whose title is questioned is or
was really a de facto officer.
xx xx xx
It is not necessary for our present purposes to investigate
exhaustively all the qualifications or limitations subject to which C
the de facto doctrine has to be applied. The substance of the
matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law
as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the
public and the individual where those interests were involved in
the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office D
without being lawful Officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary
to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and
order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body
of individuals were permitted at his or their pleasure to collaterally
challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the
E
Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through
whom it exercised its various powers, on the ground of irregular
existence or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the
worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace
of society their authority must be upheld until in some regular
mode their title is directly investigated and determined, [See the F
observations in Scadding v. Lorant [???] and Norton v. Shelby
County [118 U.S. 425 (1886).] In the matter now before us,
the sanction under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code was
granted by the de facto Local Government and the cognizance
of the case has been taken by the de facto Sessions Judge. In G
my opinion, it is not open to the Appellants to question collaterally
the legality of the conviction upon the allegation that the Local
Government was irregularly constituted and the Sessions Judge
irregularly appointed. The first ground upon which the legality
of the trial is assailed must consequently be overruled.” H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 17. The de facto doctrine as encapsulated above has been
reiterated by this Court, even in the context of an executive appointment,
in the judgment reported as Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M. L. Wadhawan,
Additional Secretary, Government of India and Ors.9. In this case,
the Additional Secretary to the Government of India had detained
B Mohanlal Jatia vide a Government order under sub-section (1) of Section
3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974, on being satisfied that it was necessary to detain
him. Herein, the Additional Secretary relied on statements recorded by
one R.C. Singh whom the appellant contended was not a “gazetted
officer” of enforcement under FERA, and therefore statements recorded
C by the officer could not be relied upon to detain him. It was discussed:
“17. In any event, the learned Counsel further contends that R.C.
Singh was clothed with the insignia of office and he was
purporting to exercise the functions and duties of a gazetted
officer of Enforcement under Section 40(1) of the FERA and
D therefore the de facto doctrine was attracted. He relies upon the
decision of this Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of
Andhra Pradesh [(1981) 3 SCC 132: 1981 SCC (Cri) 652: (1981)
3 SCR 474] enunciating the de facto doctrine, born of necessity
and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless
E mischief. In other words, he contends that where an officer acts
under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the
incumbent is made so far as the validity of his acts are
concerned.
18. We are inclined to the view that in this jurisdiction there is a
F presumption of regularity in the acts of officials and that the
evidential burden is upon him who asserts to the contrary. The
contention that R.C. Singh was not a gazetted officer of
Enforcement within the meaning of Section 40(1) of the FERA
appears to be wholly misconceived besides being an afterthought.
The validity of appointment of R.C. Singh to be an officer of
G
Enforcement under this Act cannot be questioned…….
20. … Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how
the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as validity of
his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the
9
H (1987) 3 SCC 367
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 733
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. The A
official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the
de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent
needless confusion and endless mischief. In Gokaraju
Rangaraju case [(1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 :
(1981) 3 SCR 474] Chinnappa Reddy, J., explained that this
B
doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to
protect the interest of the public.”
18. Further, a Full Bench of Kerala High Court in a judgment
reported as P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala10 held that the de facto
doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect
the interest of the public as well as the individuals involved in the official C
capacity of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually
being one in strict point of law. These officers may not be the officers
de jure but by virtue of particular circumstances, their acts should be
considered valid as a matter of public policy.
19. In another Division Bench judgment reported as P. D
Mahamani v. Tamil Nadu Magnesite, Ltd., Salem & Ors.11 , the
Madras High Court held as under:
“12. An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is
in possession of an office and for the time being performs his
E
duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact.
Whereas an intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties
of an office without authority of law, and without the support of
public acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise or
respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they
are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and F
to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in
security of private rights, the acts of officers de-facto arc not
suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority
except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose. In
all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and G
effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office as though he
were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will
flow from them for the protection of the public and of third
10
AIR 1970 Ker 165
11
(1993) 2 LLN 353 H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A parties. There is an important principle, which finds concise
expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto
cannot be questioned collaterally. A person may be entitled to
his designation although he is not a true and rightful incumbent
of the office, yet he is no more usurper but holds it under colour
B of lawful authority. The de facto doctrine was introduced into
the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest
of the public and the individual where these interests were
involved in the official act of persons exercising the duties of an
office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is
necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and lo preserve
C
peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any
individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their
pleasure, lo collaterally challenge the authority of and lo refuse
obedience lo the Government of the State and the numerous
functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers on
D the ground of irregular existence of defective title insubordination
and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good
order and peace of society, their authority must be up held until
in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and
determined. When one holds office under colour of lawful
E authority, whatever be the defect of his title lo the office, acts
done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions
of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy and acts
done by an officer de jure. The defective appointment of a de
facto officer may be questioned directly in a proceeding lo which
F he may be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in
a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of
no concern or consequence lo the officer concerned. So the writ
petitioner cannot be heard to say that Sri Madhavan Nair, the
second respondent had no authority to preside over the meeting
of the Board of Directors wherein it was resolved lo place him
G
under suspension and initiate disciplinary action.”
20.The de facto doctrine was reiterated yet again in a recent
Supreme Court judgment reported as Veerendra Kumar Gautam &
Ors. v. Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay & Ors.12.
H 12
(2016) 14 SCC 18
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 735
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
21. Therefore, we find that Sri K. Sampath Kumar was A
discharging the duties of Joint Director in Anti-Corruption Bureau under
the authority conferred by the State. The authorisation in favour of Ch.
Sudhakar was issued when he was performing his duties in public
interest and not for his own benefit. Therefore, such authorisation is
valid and binding as if it was an act of an officer de jure.
B
22. We further find that the High Court, while deciding a petition
for quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, could not
have commented upon the nature of employment of Sri K. Sampath
Kumar, as such a question does not fall within the jurisdiction of the
High Court whilst deciding the aforementioned petition.
C
23. Sri K. Sampath Kumar has authorised Ch. Sudhakar and the
final report had been filed after the investigation conducted by the latter,
in terms of clause (c) of Section 17 of the Act. In this regard, it cannot
be said that the investigation was not conducted in a manner
contemplated under law. Thus, Ch. Sudhakar was an authorized Officer,
competent to investigate and file a report for the offences under the D
Act including of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
24. Another finding recorded by the High Court is that the
informant cannot be the investigating officer. Such a finding is based
upon Ch. Sudhakar being both the informant and the initiator of the
investigations. The High Court derives support from the judgment of E
this Court reported as Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab13 to hold that a
fair investigation is the very foundation of fair trial, which necessarily
postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same
person.
25. The said judgment however has been held to be prospective F
in the judgment reported as Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal
Pradesh14 wherein, this Court has succinctly put as under:
“18. The criminal justice delivery system, cannot be allowed to
veer exclusively to the benefit of the offender making it uni-
directional exercise. A proper administration of the criminal justice G
delivery system, therefore requires balancing the rights of the
accused and the prosecution, so that the law laid down in Mohan
Lal (supra) is not allowed to become a spring board for acquittal
13
(2018) 17 SCC 627
14
2019 SCC OnLine SC 170 H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A in prosecutions prior to the same, irrespective of all other
considerations. We therefore hold that all pending criminal
prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the law laid down in
Mohan Lal (supra) shall continue to be governed by the individual
facts of the case.”
B 26. Thus, we find that the orders of the High Court to quash the
proceedings against the Accused Officer are not sustainable and are
consequently, set aside. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State is
allowed and the matter is remitted back to the learned trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with law.
C 27. Coming to the appeal filed by the Accused Officer, Mr. Guru
Krishna Kumar, learned senior counsel vehemently argued that a
preliminary inquiry before the registration of a crime is mandatory.
Reference was made to a judgment reported as Lalita Kumari v.
Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 15 as well as the judgment
reported as State by Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bengaluru
D
v. M.R. Hiremath16.
28. In Lalita Kumari, the Court has laid down the cases in which
a preliminary inquiry is warranted, more so, to avoid an abuse of the
process of law rather than vesting any right in favour of an accused.
E Herein, the argument made was that if a police officer is doubtful about
the veracity of an accusation, he has to conduct a preliminary inquiry
and that in certain appropriate cases, it would be proper for such officer,
on the receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence, to satisfy himself
that prima facie, the allegations levelled against the accused in the
complaint are credible. It was thus held as under:-
F
“73. In terms of the language used in Section 154 of the Code,
the police is duty bound to proceed to conduct investigation into
a cognizable offence even without receiving information (i.e. FIR)
about commission of such an offence, if the officer in charge of
the police station otherwise suspects the commission of such an
G offence. The legislative intent is therefore quite clear, i.e., to
ensure that every cognizable offence is promptly investigated in
accordance with law. This being the legal position, there is no
reason that there should be any discretion or option left with the
15
(2014) 2 SCC 1
16
H (2019) 7 SCC 515
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 737
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
police to register or not to register an FIR when information is A
given about the commission of a cognizable offence. Every
cognizable offence must be investigated promptly in accordance
with law and all information provided under Section 154 of the
Code about the commission of a cognizable offence must be
registered as an FIR so as to initiate an offence. The requirement
B
of Section 154 of the Code is only that the report must disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence and that is sufficient to
set the investigating machinery into action.”
29. The Court concluded that the registration of an FIR is
mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is C
permissible in such a situation. This court held as under:
“111. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of
the Code, if the information discloses commission of a D
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation.
ii) If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only
E
to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed
or not.
iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where
preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a
copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to F
the first informant forthwith and not later than one
week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the
complaint and not proceeding further.
iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering
offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must G
be taken against erring officers who do not register the
FIR if information received by him discloses a
cognizable offence.
v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the
veracity or otherwise of the information received but H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry
is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases
B in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
b) Commercial offences
c) Medical negligence cases
C d) Corruption cases.”
30. It must be pointed that this Court has not held that a
preliminary inquiry is a must in all cases. A preliminary enquiry may be
conducted pertaining to Matrimonial disputes/family disputes,
Commercial offences, Medical negligence cases, Corruption cases etc.
D The judgment of this court in Lalita Kumari does not state that
proceedings cannot be initiated against an accused without conducting
a preliminary inquiry.
31. In M.R. Hiremath, this Court set aside an order on an
application for discharge under Section 239 of the Code, inter alia,
E for the reason that a certificate under Section 65B of Evidence Act
had not been produced while relying upon the evidence of a spy camera.
An argument was raised that the spy camera has been given by the
investigating officer even before investigations were formally started.
On the strength of such fact, an argument was raised by Mr. Guru
Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the Accused Officer, that without
F
conducting a preliminary inquiry the FIR could not have been lodged.
This Court in M.R. Hiremath held that when the investigating officer
had handed over the spy camera to the complainant, the purpose was
to ascertain, in the course of the preliminary inquiry, whether information
furnished by the complainant could form the basis of lodging an FIR.
G It was held to be a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether the
information revealed a cognizable offence. The Court held as under:
“23. In the present case, on 15-11-2016, the complainant is alleged
to have met the respondent. During the course of the meeting, a
conversation was recorded on a spy camera. Prior thereto, the
H investigating officer had handed over the spy camera to the
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 739
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
complainant. This stage does not represent the commencement A
of the investigation. At that stage, the purpose was to ascertain,
in the course of a preliminary inquiry, whether the information
which was furnished by the complainant would form the basis
of lodging a first information report. In other words, the purpose
of the exercise which was carried out on 15-11-2012 was a
B
preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether the information reveals
a cognizable offence.”
32. The said judgment does not help the learned counsel for the
Accused Officer. The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry being
necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon the facts of each
C
case. There is no set format or manner in which a preliminary inquiry
is to be conducted. The objective of the same is only to ensure that a
criminal investigation process is not initiated on a frivolous and untenable
complaint. That is the test laid down in Lalita Kumari.
33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the information
D
collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of the Accused Officer.
The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly frivolous and
motivated complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly and objectively.
Herein, relevant information was available with the informant in respect
of prima facie allegations disclosing a cognizable offence. Therefore,
once the officer recording the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure, he E
can proceed against the accused even without conducting any inquiry
or by any other manner on the basis of the credible information received
by him. It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the
reason that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can
only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is F
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this Court
reported as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal17 wherein, this Court held
inter alia that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused and also where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended G
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with
an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
17
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry warranted in
Lalita Kumari is not required to be mandatorily conducted in all
corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this Court in multiple
instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no fixed
parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be conducted.
B Therefore, any formal and informal collection of information disclosing
a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of the person recording the FIR
is sufficient.
35. We also do not find any merit in the argument that there has
been no sanction before the filing of the report. The sanction can be
C produced by the prosecution during the course of trial, so the same may
not be necessary after retirement of the Accused Officer. This Court
in K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP18 held as under:
“15. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section
197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as
D the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein.
This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The
question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be
determined from stage to stage…”
36. The High Court has rightly held that no ground is made out
E for quashing of the proceedings for the reason that the investigating
agency intentionally waited till the retirement of the Accused Officer.
The question as to whether a sanction is necessary to prosecute the
Accused Officer, a retired public servant, is a question which can be
examined during the course of the trial as held by this Court in K.
Kalimuthu. In fact, in a recent judgment in Vinod Kumar Garg v.
F State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi)19, this
Court has held that if an investigation was not conducted by a police
officer of the requisite rank and status required under Section 17 of
the Act, such lapse would be an irregularity, however unless such
irregularity results in causing prejudice, conviction will not be vitiated
G or be bad in law. Therefore, the lack of sanction was rightly found not
to be a ground for quashing of the proceedings.
37. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar further refers to a Single Bench
judgment of the Madras High Court in M. Soundararajan v. State
18
(2005) 4 SCC 512
H 19
Criminal Appeal No. 1781 of 2009 decided on 27 th November, 2019
STATE OF TELANGANA v. SRI MANAGIPET @ 741
MANGIPET SARVESHWAR REDDY [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
through the Deputy Superintendant of Police, Vigilance and Anti A
Corruption, Ramanathapuram 20 to contend that amended provisions
of the Act as amended by Act XVI of 2018 would be applicable as the
Amending Act came into force before filing of the charge sheet. We
do not find any merit in the said argument. In the aforesaid case, the
learned trial court applied amended provisions in the Act which came
B
into force on 26th July, 2018 and acquitted both the accused from charge
under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act. The High Court
found that the order of the trial court to apply the amended provisions
of the Act was not justified and remanded the matter back observing
that the offences were committed prior to the amendments being carried
out. In the present case, the FIR was registered on 9 th November, 2011 C
much before the Act was amended in the year 2018. Whether any
offence has been committed or not has to be examined in the light of
the provisions of the statute as it existed prior to the amendment carried
out on 26th July, 2018.
38. In view thereof, we do not find any merit in the reasonings D
recorded by the High Court in respect of contentions raised by the
Accused Officer. The arguments raised by the Accused Officer cannot
be accepted in quashing the proceedings under the Act. Accordingly,
Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 filed by the Accused Officer is
dismissed whereas Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019 filed by the State
is allowed. E
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.
F
G
20
Crl. A. (MD) No. 488 of 2018 and Crl. M.P. (MD) No. 8712 of 2018 decided on
30th October, 2018. H
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