THE STATE OF TELANGANAversusHABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI & ORS.

                         [2017] l S.C.R. 141



                  THE STATE OF TELANGANA                                  A
                                  v.
              HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANl & ORS.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1144of2016)
                         JANUARY 06, 2017                                 B

           (DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure,· 1973 - s. 482 - Inherent power
of High Court - Interference in investigation - Scope of - High
Court refused to quash the FIR and consequential investigation,           c
but passed an order that if the accused person surrenders before
the trial magistrate he shall be admitted to bail - Held: While
declining to quash FIR and investigation, Court cannot extend the
privilege to.accused person which is in nature of an anticipatory
bail - High Court's direction amou/lfed to an order uls.438 CrPC,
albeit ll'ithout satisfaction of the conditions of.the said provision -   D
This is legally unsustainable - Constitution of India - Art. 226 -
Bail.                                                                 \
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Exercise of
power, scope - Held: The power u/s. 482 CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide powers requires the court to be more cautious -    E
It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court - Courts ·
should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants from invoking the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court for quashing of launching an
FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim order - It is
the obligation of the court t; keep such unprincipled and unethicai
                                                                      F
litigants at bay - Administration of Criminal Justice.
       Precedents: Binding effect of - Held: It is intellectual truancy
to avoid ihe precedents and issue directions which are not in
 consonance with /m1• - It is the duty of a Judge to sustain the judicial ·
 balance and not to think of an order which can cause trauma to the
 process ·of adjudication - Culture of adjudication is stabilized when G
·intellectual discipline is maintained and further when such discipline
 constantly keeps guard on the mind.
       Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: In the instant case, the High Court did not refer to         H
                                  141
142           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] l S.C.R.


A     allegations made in the FIR or what has come out i·n the
      investigation. It correctly noted that the investigation is in
      progress and it is not appropriate to stay the investigation of the
      case. It disposed of the application under Section 482 CrPC,
      however while doing that it directed that the investigating agency
      shall not arrest the accused persons. This direction "amounts"
B
      to an order under Section 438 CrPC, albeit without satisfaction of
      the conditions of the said provision. This is legally unacceptable.
      Such directions would not commend acceptance, for they neither
      come within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution of India
      nor Section 482 CrPC nor Section 438 CrPC. The types of orders
c     like present one, are totally unsustainable. [Paras 15, 24, 25)
      (151-E-F; 157-A-B)
             Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad (1972) 1 SCC
             452 : (1972) 2 SCR 666; Jehan Singh v. Delhi
             Administration AIR 1974 SC 1146 : [1974) 3 SCR
D            794; Amar Nath 1: State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137:
             [1978) 1 SCR 222; Kurukshetra University v. State of
             Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of Bihar v. J.A.C.
             Sa/danha AIR 1980 SC 326 : (1980) 2 SCR 16; State
             of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha AIR 1982 SC
             949 : (1982) 3 SCR 121; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
E            Shivalingappa Konjalgi AIR 1976 SC 1947 : (1976)
             Suppl. SCR 123; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
             Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692·:
           · [1988) 2 SCR 930; State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan
             (1988) 4 SCC 655 ~ [1988) 3 Suppl. SCR 455 ; Rashmi
F            Rekha Thatoi and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors.
             (2012) 5 SCC 690 : (2012] 5 SCR 674; Gurbaksh
             Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 :
             [1980) 3 SCR 383; Ranjit Singh v. State of Madhya
             Pradesh· and Ors. (2013) 16 SCC 797 : (2013) 11
              SCR 273 - relied on.
G
            King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC
          ~-18; Lolita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and
           Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713; State of
           Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. AIR 1992
           SC 604 : (1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Jacob Mathew v.
H
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                  143
                     & ORS.

     State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1 : [2005] 2 Suppl.             A
     SCR 307; P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras (1970) 1
     SCC 595 : [1970] 3 SCR 931; CBI '" Tapan Kumar
     Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; Hema
     Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC
     453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465; Kartar Singh v. State of
                                                                  B
     Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375; Satya
     Pal v. State of UP. 2000 Cri LJ 569 (All); Ajeet Singh
     v. State of UP. 2007 Cri LJ 170 {All); Lalji Yadai; v.
     State of UP. 1998 Cri LJ 2366 {All); Kamlesh Singh v. ·
     State of U.P. 1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All); Natho Mal v.
     State of U.P. 1994 Cri LJ 1919 (All); Amarawati v. State      c
     of U.P. 2005 Cri LJ 755 (All); Lal Kamlendra Pratap
     Singh V. State of U.P. (2009) 4 sec 437 : [2009] 4
      SCR 102 7 - referred to.
                     Case Law Reference
AIR .1945 PC 18                    referred to          Paras      D
'[2013] 14 SCR 713                 referred to          Para6
 [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259           referred to          Para6
 [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 307           referred to          Para8
 [1970] 3 SCR 931                  referred to          Paras
                                                                   E
 [2003] 3 SCR 485                  referred to          Para8
 [1972] 2 SCR 666                  relied on            Para 11
 [1974] 3 SCR 794                  relied on            Para 11
[1978] 1 SCR 222                   relied on            Para 11
 (1977) 4 sec 451                  relied· on           Para 11    F
 [1980] 2 SCR 16                   relied on            Para 11
 [1982] 3 SCR 121                  relied on            Para 11
 [1976] Suppl. SCR 123             relied on            Para 11
 [1988] 2 SCR 930                  relied on            Para 11
                                                                   G
 [1988] 3 -suppl. SCR 455          relied on            Para 11
 t2012] 5 SCR 674                  relied on            Para 16
 [1980] 3 SCR 383                  relied on'           Para 16
  [2013] 11 SCR 273                relied on            Para 17
 [2014] 1 SCR 465                  referred to ·        Para 18    H
144            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [20 I 7] I S.C.R.


A     [1994] 2 SCR .375                      referred to              Para 18
      2000 Cri LJ 569 (All)                  referred to              Para 19
      2007 Cri LJ 170 (All)                  referred to             Para 19
      1998 Cri LJ 2366 (All)                 referred to             Para 19
      1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All)                 referred to             Para 19
B
      1994 Cri LJ 1919 (All)                 referred to             Para 19
      2005 Cri LJ 755 (All)                  referred to             Para 20
      [2009] 4 SCR 1027                      referred to             Para 20
            CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
c     I 144of20I6.                                       .
            From the Order dated 18.10.2014 by the High Court of Judicature
      at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh
      in Criminal Petition No. I 0012of2014.
             Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Baskula Athik,
D     Ad vs. for the Appellant.                     .
            Ms. Nilofar Khan, Adv. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment ofihe Court was delivered by
             DIPAK MISRA, J. The seminal issue that arises for
E     consideration in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the High Court
      while refusing to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to interfere In an application for
      quashment of the investigation, can restrain the investigating agency not
      to arrest the accused persons during the course of investigation.

F            2. The facts lie in a narrow compass. On the basis of a report
      by the informant under Section 154 CrPC, FIR No. 205/2014 dated
      26.07.2014 was registered at Chandrayanagutta Police Station,
      Hyderabad for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 149
      and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Challenging the initiation of
      criminal action, the three, accused persons, namely, accused Nos. I, 2
G     and 5, (respondent Nos. I, 2 and 3 herein) invoked inherent jurisdiction
      of the High Court in Criminal Petition No. I 0012 of2014 forquashingof
      the FIR and consequential investigation. As the impugned order would
      show, the lean_1ed single Judge referred to the FIR and took note of the
      submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners therein that all the
H     allegations that had been raised in the FIR were false and they had been
  THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                                145
                & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]


 falsely implicated and thereafter expressed his disinclination to interfere      A
 on the ground that it was not appropriate to stay the investigation of the
 case. However, as a submission had been raised that the accused persons
 were innocent and there had been allegation of false implication, it would
 be appropriate to direct the police not to arrest the petitioners during the
 pendency of the investigation and, accordingly, it was so directed.
                                                                                   B
         3. It is submitted by Mr. Harin P. Raval, lea111ed senior counsel
  appearing for the State that the informant had sustained grievous injuries
  and was attacked by dangerous weapons and custodial interrogation of
 the accused persons is absolutely essential. According to him, the High
  Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can quash
  an FIR on certain well known parameters but while declining to quash
                                                                                   c
 the same, it cannot extend the privilege to the accused persons which is
  in the nature ofan anticipatory bail. Learned senior counsel would submit
  that the nature of the order passed by the High Court is absolutely
. unknown to the exercise ofinherentjurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
  and, therefore, it deserves to be axed.                                          D
         4. Ms. Nilofar Khan, learned counsel appearing for the
  respondent Nos. I to 3 in support of the order passed by the High Court
  submitted tha(the custodial interrogation is not necessary in the facts of
  the case. She would further submit that the plentitude of power conferred
  on the High Court under Section 482 CrPC empowers it to pass such an             E
  order and there being no infirmity in the order, no interference is warranted
. by this Court.
        5. The controversy compels one to visit the earlier decisions. In
 Kin1: Emperor v. Klmf!ia Nazir Ahmad 1 while deliberating on the
 scope of right conferred on the police under Section 154 CrPC, Privy              F
 Council observed:-
        " ... so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not
        interfere with the police in matters which are within their province
        and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In
        India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the ·pa11 of
                                                                                   G
        the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable
        crime without .requiring any authority from the judicial authorities,
        and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it
        should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by

  'AIR 1945 PC 18
                                                                                   H
146             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A           an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions
            of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping,
            and the combination ofindividual liberty with a due observance of
            law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise
            its own function, always of course subject to the right of the Court
            to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section
B
            491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature
            of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the
            Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and
            not until then."
             Having stated what lies within the domain of the investigating
c     agency, it is essential to refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Lalita
      Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh am/ Ors'. The question that
      arose for consideration before the Constitution Bench was whether "a
      police officer is bound to register a first information report upon receiving
      apy information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under
D     Section 154 CrPC or the police officer has the power to conduct a
      'preliminary inquiry' in order to test the veracity of such information
      before registering the same"? While interpreting Section 154 CrPC, the
      Court addressing itselfto various facets opined that Section 154(1) CrPC
      admits of no other construction but the literal construction. Thereafter it
      referred to the legislative intent of Section 154 which has been elaborated
E     in State of Horyam1 am/ Ors. v. Blwja11 Lal wul Ors.·' and various
      other authorities. Eventually the larger Bench opined that reasonableness
      or credibility of the informatio1i is not a condition precedent for the
      registration of a case. Thereafter there was advertence to the concept
      of preliminary inquiry. In that context, the Court opined thus:-
F            " I OJ. It means that the number of FIRs not registered is
             approximately equivalenttothe numberofFIRs actually registered.
             Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show that about 60 lakh
             cognizable offences were registered in India during the year 2012,
             the burking of crime may itself be in the range of about 60 lakhs
             every year. Thus, it is seen that such a large number of Fl Rs are
G
             not registered every year, which is a clear violation of the rights
             of the victims of such a large number of crimes.
             I 04. Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in the
             short run; and also has a very11egative impact on the rule of law
      2
       (2014) 2 sec 1
H     'AIR 1992 SC 604
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                                 147
              & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      in the long run since people stop having respe~t for the rule of           A
      law. Thus, non-registration of such a large number of Fl Rs leads
      to a definite lawlessness in the society.
      105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form would not
      only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but also to the
      society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court has repeatedly         B
    · held in various decided cases that registration of FIR is mandatory
      if the information given to the police under Section 154 of the
      Code discloses the commission of a cognizable offence."
      7. While dealing with the likelihood of misuse of the provision,
the Court ruled thus:-                                                            c
      ''114. lt is true that a delicate balance has to be maintained between
      the interest of the society and protecting the liberty of an individual.
      As already discussed above, there ·are already sufficient
      safeguards provided in the Code which duly protect the liberty of
      an individual in case of registration of false FIR. At the same             D
      time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in mind the interest of the
      victim and the society. Therefore, we are of the cogent view that
      mandatory registration of FIRs under Section 154 of the Code
      will not be in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution as
      purported by various counsel."
                                                                                  E
       8. The exceptions that were carved out pertain to medical
negligence cases as has been stated in Jacob Matltew v. State of
Punjab'. The Court also referred to the authorities in P. Sirajuddin v.
State of Madras-'·and CBI v. Tap<m Kumar Si11f(lt' and finally held
that what is necessary is only that the information given to the police
must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation,        F
registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence
is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered
immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary
verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether
a cognizable offence has been committed. But, ifthe information given
                                                                                  G
clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no
other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are
not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the
• (2005) 6 sec 1
'\1970) 1sec595
'\2003) 6 sec 11s                                                                 H
148             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A     information is falsely given, whether the infonnation is genuine, whether
      the information is credible, etc. At the stage of registration of FIR, what
      is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses
      the commission of a cognizable offence.
           9. Be it noted, certain directions were issued by the Constitution
B     Bench, which we think, are apt to be extracted:-
            "' 120.5_. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the
            veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to
            ascertain whether the information reveals ar•) vognizable offence.
             120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is
c           to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of
            each case. The category of cases in whicl] preliminary inquiry
            may be made are as under:
            (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
             (b) Commercial offences
D
             (c) Medical negligence cases
             (d) Corruption cases
             (e) Cases where there is abnonnal delay/laches in initiating criminal
             prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the
E
             matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
             The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all
             conditions which may wa1rnnt preliminary inquiry.
             120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused
.F           and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-
             bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of
             such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General
             Diary entry.
             120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the
G            record of all information received in a police station, we direct
             that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether
             resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be
             mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the
             decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected,
             as mentioned above."
H
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                              149
              & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      10. We have copiously referred to the aforesaid decision for the        A
simon pure reason that at the instance of the informant the FIR was
lodged and it was registered which is in accord with the decision of the
Constitution Bench.
        11. Once an FIR is registered, the accused persons can always
 approach the High Court under Section 482 Cr PC or under Article 226         B
 of the Constitution for quashing of the FIR.· In Blwjm1 Lal (supra) the
 two-Judge Bench after referring to Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameslrwar
 Prasatf, Je/um Singlr v. De/Iii Administration', Amar Natlr v. State
 of Haryuna', Kurukslretra University v. State of Haryana", State of
 Biflar v. J.A.C. Sa/dm11ra 11 , State o_f West Benf(al v. Swapan Kumar
 Gulla 11 , Smt. Naf(awwa v. Veert1111w Shivalinf(appa Konjalf(V',            c
 Mad/ravrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Samblwjirao Clumdrojirao Angre",
 State of Bilutr v. Murad Ali Klla11 15 and some other authorities that
 had dealt with the contours of exercise of inherent powers of the High
 Court, thought it appropriate to mention certain category of cases by
 way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 of      D
 the Constitution or inherent power under Section 482 CrPC could be
 exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court orotherwise
 to secure the ends of justice. The Court also observed that it may not be
 possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
 channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
.exhaustive list of myriad cases wherein such power should be exercised.       E
 The illustrations given by the Court need to be recapitulated:-
       "( I) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
       the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
       accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
       or make out a case against the accused.                                 F
       (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
       materials, ifany, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

'(1972) 1sec452
'AIR 1974SC1146                                                                G
9
     ( 1977) 4 sec 137: AIR 1977 SC 2185

 IO ( 1977) 4 sec 451 : AIR 1977 SC 2229
 11
     AIR 1980 SC 326
  "AIR 1982 SC 949
  13
      AIR 1976SC1947
  "(1988) 1SCC692:AIR1988SC709
 "(1988) 4 sec 655 :AIR 1989 SC I                                              H
150             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            (2017] l S.C.R.


A           offence,justifyingan investigation by police officers under Section
            156(1) of the Code except under an order ofa Magistrate within
            the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
            (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
            complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
B           not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
            against the accused.
            (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
            offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
            investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
            Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
c
            (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
            absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
            person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
            ground for proceeding against the accused.
            (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
D           provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
            criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
            of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
            the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
            the grievance of the aggrieved party.
E           (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
            fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
            ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
            a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
            It is worthy to note that the Court has clarified that the said
F     parameters or guidelines are not exhaustive but only illustrative.
      Nevertheless, it throws light on the circumstances and situations where
      court's inherent power can be exercised.
              12. There can be no dispute over the proposition that inherent
      power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly
G     and with caution and when and only when such exercise is justified by
      the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no denial of
      the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it
      needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires
      the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty
      on the Court.
H
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANl                               15 I
              & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]


      13. In this regard, it would be seemly to reproduce a passage             A
from Kurukshetra University (supra) wherein Chandrachud, J. (as
His Lordship then was) opined thus:-
      "2. lt surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that
      in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first information            B
      report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the
      complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding
      at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought
      to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
      jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.
      That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with                  c
      circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases."
       14. We have referred to the said decisions only to stress upon the
issue, how the exercise ofjurisdiction by the High Court in a proceeding
relating to quashment of FIR can be justified. We repeat even at the
cost of repetition that the said power has to be exercised in a very sparing    D
manner and is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is
legitimate. The surprise that was expressed almost four decades ago in
Kurukslzetra University's case compels us to observe that we are also
surprised by the impugned order.
       15. In the instant case\.the High Court has not referred to              E
allegations made in the FIR or what has come out in the investigation. It
has noted and correctly that the investigation is in progress and it is not
appropriate to stay the investigation of the case. It has disposed of the
application under Section 482 CrPC and while doing that it has directed
that the investigating agency shall not arrest the accused persons. Th is
                                                                                F
direction "amounts" to an order under Section 438 CrPC, albeit without
satisfaction of the conditions of the said provision. This is legally
unacceptable.
       I 6. To appreciate the nature of the order passed, it is necessary
to have a survey of the authorities that deal with grant of anticipatory
                                                                                G
bail. In R(ls/imi Rek/w Tlwtoi (Ind Anr. v. State of Orissa <md Ors."
the High Court while rejecting the application for anticipatory bail had
directed that ifthe accused persons surrender, the trial magistrate shall
release them on bail on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit
and proper. Analysing the scope of Section 438 CrPC as expressed by
"(2012) s sec 690                                                               H
152              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017) I S.C.R.


A     the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksli Singh Sibbia v. State ofPunjab"
      and other decisions, the Court held thus:-
             "33. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to highlight
             how the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra)
             had analysed and explained the intrinsic underlying concepts under
B            Section 438 of the Code, the nature of orders to be passed while
             conferring the said privilege, the conditions that are imposable
             and the discretions to be used by the courts. On a reading of the
             said authoritative pronouncement and the principles that have been
             culled out in Savitri Agarwal'" there is remotely no indicat.ion
             that the Court of Session or the High Court can pass an order that
c            on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be
             released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned
             Magistrate may deem fit and proper or the superior court would
             impose conditions for grant of bail on such surrender. When the
             High Court in categorical terms has expressed the view that it is
D            not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner-accused it
             could not have issued such a direction which would tantamount to
             confennent of benefit by which the accused would be in a position
             to avoid arrest. It is in clear violation of the language employed in
             the statutory provision and in flagrant violation of the dictum laid
             dow1Yin Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra) and the principles culled
E            out in Savitri Agamal (mpra). It is clear as crystal the court
             cannot issue a blanket order restraining arrest and it can only
             issue an interim order and the interim order must also conform to
             the requirement of the section and suitable conditions should be ·
             imposed."
F     Elaborating further, the Court held:-
             "36. In the case at hand the direction to admit the accused persons
             to bail on their surrendering has no sanction in .law an<), in fact,
             creates a dent in the sacrosanctity of law. It is contradictory in
             terms and law does not countenance paradoxes. It gains
G            respectability and acceptability when its solemnity is maintained.
             Passing such kind of orders the interest of the collective af large
             and that of the individual victims is jeopardised. That apart, it curtails
             the power of the regular court dealing with the bail applications.

                 sec 565 : Al R 1980 SC 1632
      17 ( 1980) 2

      '"(2009) s sec 325
H
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                             153
              & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      37. In this regard it is to be borne in mind that a court of law has   A
      to act within the statutory command and not deviate from it. It is
      a well-settled proposition of law what cannot be done directly,
      cannot be done indirectly. While exercising a statutory power a
      court is bound to act within the four corners thereof. The statutory
      exercise of power stands on a different footing than exercise of
                                                                             B
      power of judicial review. This has been so stated in Bay Berry
      Apartments (P) Ltd. v. Shobha 1' and UP. State Brassware
      Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey''1."
       17. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 21 the
High Court had directed that considering the nature of the allegation and
the evidence collected in the case-diary, the petitioner shall surrender
                                                                              c
before the competent court and shall apply for regular bail and the same
shall be considered upon furnishingnecessary bail bond. The said order
was challenged before this Court. The two-Judge Bench was constrained
to observe:-
      "lt is the duty of the superior courts to follow the command of the     D
      statutory provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue
      directions which are permissible in law. We are of the convinced
      opinion that the observations made by the learned Single Judge
      while dealing with second application under Section 438 CrPC
      were not at all warranted under any circumstance as it was neither      E
      in consonance with the language employed in Section 438 CrPC
      nor in accord with the established principles of law relating to
      grant of anticipatory bail. We may reiterate that the said order
      has been interpreted by this Comt as an order only issuing a
      direction to the accused to surrender, but as we find, it has really
      created colossal dilemma in the mind of the learned Additional          F
      Sessions Judge. We are pained to say that passing of these kind
      of orders has become quite frequent and the sagacious saying, "a
      stitch in time saves nine" may be an apposite reminder now. We
      painfully part with the case by saying so."
      18. At this juncture, \\le are obliged to refer to the decision in      G
Heilia Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 22 • In the said
"(2006) 13 sec 737
'"(2006) 1 sec 479
21
   (2013) 16 sec 191
22
   (2014) 4 sec 453
                                                                              H
154             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A     judgment, the Court was dealing with the power of the High Court of
      Allahabad pertaining to grant of pre-arrest bail in exercise of extraordinary
      or inherent jurisdiction and it is significant, for in the State ofUttar Pradesh
      Section 438 CrPC has been deleted by the State Legislature. Be it noted
      that constitutional validity of the said deletion was challenged before the
      Constitution Bench in Kartar Singft v. State ofPunjab'-' wherein it has
B
      been held that deletion of the application of Section 438 CrPC in the
      State of Uttar Pradesh is constitutional. The Constitution Bench has
      ruled held that claim for pre-arrest protection is neither a statutory nor a
      right guaranteed under Article 14, Article 19 or Article 21 of the
      Constitution oflndia. The larger Bench has further observed thus:-
c            "368. (17)-Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no
             jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of
             the Constitution and pass orders either way, relating to the cases
             under the 1987 Act, that power should be exercised sparingly,
             that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme
D            circumstances. But the judicial discipline and comity of courts
             require that the High Courts should refrain from exercising the
             extraordinary jurisdiction in such matters."
              19. The Allahabad High Court has taken similar view in several
      judgments, namely, Satya Pal v. State of U.P. 14 , Ajeet Singh v. State of
E     U.P. 15, Lalji Ytulav v. State of U.P. 16, Kamlesh Singh v. State of U.P. 17
      and Natho Mal v. State of U.P.".             .,.
            20. In Hema Misl1ra (supra) the Court referred to the decision in
      Amarawati v. State of U.P. 19 which has been affirmed by this Court in
      Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.·'". In Lal Kamlemlra
F     Pratap Singh (supra) it has been held thus:-
             "6. The learned counsel for the appellant apprehends that the
             appellant will be arrested as there is no provision for anticipatory
             bail in the State of U .P. He placed reliance on a decision of the

      "(1994) 3 sec 569
G     "2000 Cri .LJ 569 (All)
      "2007 ~riLJ 170 (All)
      "' 1998 Cri LJ 2366 (All)
      27 1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All)

      '"1994CriLJ 1919(All)
      "2005 Cri LJ 755 (All)
H     '" r2009) 4 sec 431
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                              155
              & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       Allahabad High Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P. (supra) in          A
       which a seven-Judge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court
       held that the court, if it deems fit in the facts and circumstances
       of the case, may grant interim bail pending final disposal of the
       bail application. The Full Bench also observed that arrest is not a
       must whenever an FIR of a "c'6gnizable offence is lodged. The
                                                                              B
       Full Beµch placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Joginder
       Kumar v. State of U.P. 31 .,
   21. After referring to the same, Radhakrishnan, J. opined thus:-
         "! may, however, point out that there is unanimity in the view that · ·
         in spite of the fact that Section 438 has been specifically omitted c
         and made inapplicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, still a party
         aggrieved can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under
         Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being extraordinary
         jurisdiction and the vastness of the powers naturally impose
         considerable responsibility in its application.All the same, the High
         Co1,1rt has got the power and sometimes c!uty in appropriate cases D
         to grant reliefs, though it is not possible to pinpoint what are the
         appropriate cases, which have to be left to the wisdom of the
         Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
         India."
         22. Sikri,J. in his concurring opinion stated thatthough the High E
 Courts have very wide powers under Article 226, the very vastness of
 the powers imposes on it the responsibility to use them with circumspection
 and in accordance with the judicial consideration and well~established
 principles, so much so that while entertaining writ petitions for granting
 interim protection from arrest, the Court would not go on to the extent of F
 including the provision of anticipatory bail as a blanket provision. It has
 been further observed that such a power has to be exercised very
·cautiously keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions ofArticle
 226 are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The powers
 are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to
 prevent abuse of process oflaw by the authorities indiscriminately making G
 pre-airest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under
 Artie.le 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. On
  the one hand, the .Court is to ensure that such a power under Article 226
  is not to be exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438 CrPC
"(1994) 4 sec 260                                                              H
156             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] I S.C.R.



A     proceedings, keeping in mind that when this provision is specifically omitted
      in the State ofUttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to_ as back door entry
      via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the High Court finds that in
      a given case ifthe protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would
      amount to gross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for
      arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in
B
      the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its power under Article 226
      of the Constitution. Keeping in mind that this power has to be exercised
      sparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified.
             23. We have referred to the authority in Hema Mishra (supra)
      as that specifically deals with the case that came from the State ofUttar
c     Pradesh where Section 438 CrPC has been deleted. It has concurred
      with the view expressed in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Sinf(lt (supra). The
      said decision, needless to say, has to be read in the context of State of
      Uttar Pradesh. We do not intend to elaborate the said principle as that is
      not necessary in this case. What needs to be stated here is that the
D     States where Section 438 CrPC has not been deleted and kept on the
      statute book, the High Court should be well advised that while entertaining
      petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC,
      exercise judicial restraint. We may hasten to clarify that the Court, if it
      thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
      restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation
E     and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law, but
      it is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order of the
      present nature while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is
      not appropriate to stay the investigation. This kind of order is really
      inappropriate and unseemly. It has no sanction in law. The Courts should
F     oust and obstruct unscrupulous .litigants from invokin_g the inherent
      jurisdiction of the Court on the drop of a hat to file an application for
      quashing oflaunching an FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an
      interim order. It is the obligation of the court to keep such unprincipled
      and unethical litigants at bay.

G            24. It has come to the notice of the Court that- in certain cases,
      the High Coutts, while dismissing the application under Section 482 CrPC
      are passing orders that if the accused-petitioner surrenders before the
      trial magistrate, he shall be admitted to bail on such terms and conditions
      as deemed fit and appropriate to be imposed by the concerned Magistrate.
      Sometimes it is noticed that in a case where sessions trial is warranted,
H
 THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI                                 157
               & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

directions are issued that on surrendering before the concerned trial A
judge, the accused shall be enlarged on bail. Such directions would not
commend acceptance in light of the ratio in Rashmi Reklw Tlwtoi
(supra), Gurbakslt Singh Sibbkt"(supra), etc., for they neither come
within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia nor Section·
482 CrPC nor Section 438 CrPC. This Court in Ranjit Singh (supra)
                                                                         B
had observed that the sagacious saying "a stitch in time saves nine" may
be an apposite reminder and this Court also painfully so stated.
        25. Having reminded the same, presently we can only say that
 the types of orders like the present one, are totally unsustainable, for it is
 contrary to the aforesaid settled principles and judicial precedents. It is
 intellectual truancy to avoid the precedents and issue directions which
                                                                                  c
 are not in consonance with law. It is the duty of a Judge to sustain the
 judicial balance and not to think of an order which can cause trauma to
 the process of adjudication. It should be borne in mind that the culture
 ofadjudication is stabilized when intellectual discipline is maintained and
 further when such discipline constantly keeps guard on the mind.                 D
         26. In view of the aforesaid premises, we allow the appeal, set
  aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct that the
  investigation shall proceed in accordance with law. Be it clarified that
  we have not expressed anything on any of the aspects alieged in the
· First Information Report.                                                        E
 Ankit Gyan                                                     Appeal allowed.