THE STATE OF TAMIL NADUversusDR. VASANTHI VEERASEKARAN
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 698
- Decided
- 1 July 2019
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A M KHANWILKAR
Holding
When land is acquired for a central railway project and no rehabilitation scheme exists, the State is not required to provide alternate housing, and the High Court’s direction to do so is invalid.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether the State of Tamil Nadu was legally bound to provide alternate housing sites to landowners whose property was acquired for the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) railway project under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The High Court had directed the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to allot such sites, treating the owners as a special category of displaced persons. The Court held that the acquisition was for a central railway project, not a state‑run housing scheme, and no statutory or policy scheme existed for alternate housing; therefore the High Court’s direction was beyond its jurisdiction. It further ruled that compensation under the 1894 Act satisfied the owners’ rights and that Article 21 does not impose a duty to provide alternative accommodation in such cases. Consequently, the High Court judgment was set aside and the writ petitions dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the State is obligated to provide alternate housing sites to persons whose land is acquired for a central railway project under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the absence of a specific rehabilitation scheme.
- Whether the High Court’s direction to the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to allot alternate land is legally valid.
- Whether the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution mandates provision of alternative accommodation after land acquisition.
- Whether compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 suffices when no rehabilitation scheme exists.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2019] 8 S.C.R. 883 883
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU A
v.
DR. VASANTHI VEERASEKARAN
(Civil Appeal No. 8626 of 2009)
JULY 01, 2019 B
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Allotment of alternate housing
site to the displaced persons – Property owned and possessed by
the private respondents were acquired for the purpose of
C
implementing ‘Mass Rapid Transport System’ (MRTS) Railway
project, under the provision of the Act, 1894 – Writ petitions – High
Court while rejecting the challenge to acquisition proceedings
observed that the appropriate authority of the State Government to
consider the representation made by private respondents for
allotment of a housing site by way of rehabilitation – Pursuant D
thereto, representation was made before the State Government,
however, relief claimed was declined – Writ petition against the said
order of the State Government – High Court held that petitioners
were entitled to alternate site under special category of displaced
persons due to the acquisition of their lands for Railways – On
E
appeal, held: The acquisition in the present case was not for the
purpose of development of urban area or for providing a housing
scheme to the residents of the urban area in which the acquired
lands were situated – The acquisition was for a project of MRTS
(Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway, Government of
India and not for the State Government or State Authority – F
Admittedly, no scheme was formulated in relation to the stated railway
project implemented by the Central Government for providing
alternative housing sites to Project affected persons – In the absence
of such a scheme, the direction of High Court to provide alternative
housing sites cannot be countenanced in law – Further, private
G
respondents were duly compensated in conformity with the mandate
of Act, 1894 – Thus, impugned judgment and order of the High
Court set aside.
H
883
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD : 1. The acquisition in the present case is certainly
not for the purpose of development of urban area or for providing
a housing scheme to the residents of the urban area in which the
acquired lands are situated. The acquisition, is for a project of
B MRTS (Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway,
Government of India and not for the State Government or State
Authority. Furthermore, admittedly, no scheme has been
formulated in relation to the stated railway project implemented
by the Central Government for providing alternative housing sites
to project affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, it
C is unfathomable that the High Court could still issue a direction
to the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, in
exercise of writ jurisdiction, to provide alternative land to the
private respondent(s) as a special category of displaced persons.
Such a direction cannot be countenanced in law. This is reinforced
D from the principle underlying the dictum in the case of New
Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer and Ors. In the said decision, the Court noted
that it would be a different matter if the State had come forward
with a proposal to provide an alternative site but that principle
cannot be extended as a condition in all cases of acquisition of
E the land that the owner must be given an alternative site or flat.
The Court unambiguously rejected the contention of the affected
persons that acquisition of their land without providing them an
alternative site would impinge upon their right to life under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. [Para 9] [895-F-H; 896-A-C]
F 2. Again, in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M.
Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr., the Court negatived the claim of the
land owners that the unused acquired land for construction of
national highway should be returned to them. Instead, the Court
held that since the acquisition had been completed and the land
G had vested in the State Government, the unutilised acquired land
could be disposed of only through public auction so that the public
would benefit by getting a higher value. In another case, Tamil
Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran (dead) by Lrs. And
Ors., the Court restated the doctrine of public trust disabling the
State from giving back the property for a consideration less than
H the market value, if it could not be used for any other public
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 885
VEERASEKARAN
purpose by the State in cases where the acquisition process had A
been completed under the 1894 Act. [Para 10] [896-D-F]
3. The private respondents, however, would urge that the
State Government had initiated the acquisition proceedings and
was intently concerned with the stated project within the State
and, for which reason, it could not be extricated from its obligation B
flowing from the existing State policy at the relevant time enabling
the State Government to exercise discretionary quota. The private
respondent(s) have relied on instances where such allotments
have been made, as is evident from the communications annexed
at R4, R5 and R6 to the additional affidavit filed on 15th April,
2019, as per the liberty granted by this Court. [Para 11] [897-C] C
4. On perusal of the said communications. It is evident that,
in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction of
houses under LIG/MIG scheme in respect of which a policy
existed for grant of alternative housing site to the affected
persons. Those schemes were implemented by the State Housing D
Board. These instances will be of no avail to the private
respondents whose lands have been acquired for implementation
of MRTS Project implemented by the Government of India
(Railways). The private respondent(s) have been duly
compensated in conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894. E
Therefore, they cannot expect any further relief much less from
the State Government or, for that matter, the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board. [Para 12] [897-D-F]
New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr. v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 731 : F
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 169 ; State of Kerala and Ors. v.
M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. (1997) 5 SCC 432 : [1997]
1 Suppl. SCR 87 ; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L.
Chandrasekaran (dead) by Lrs. And Ors. (2010) 2 SCC
786 ; V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative
Officer and Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10 G
SCR 603 – relied on.
Bharat Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.
(1988) 4 SCC 534 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 1050 – held
inapplicable.
H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra and ors. (1993)
3 SCC 634 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 216 ; State of U.P. v.
Smt. Pista Devi and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 251 : [1986] 3
SCR 743 ; S.B. Kishore v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC
90 – referred to.
B Case Law Reference
[1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 216 referred to Para 2
[1986] 3 SCR 743 referred to Para 9
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 169 relied on Para 9
C [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 87 relied on Para 10
(2010) 2 SCC 786 relied on Para 10
[2012] 10 SCR 603 relied on Para 10
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 1050 held inapplicable Para 14
D AIR 1991 SC 90 referred to Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No(s). 8626
of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2006 of the High Court
E of Madras in W. P. No. 11907 of 2006.
With
C. A. NO. 8625/2009, C.A. No. 8627/2009 and C.A.
No. 8630/2009
V. Giri, Sr. Adv, C. Paramasivam, Ms. Purbitaa Mitra, Mrs. Svadha
F
and K. V. Vijayakumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
A.Mariarputham, Sr. Adv., Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham,
Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Ms. Getanjali, R. Ayyam Perumal, C.
Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Khanna, M/s. Arputham Aruna and Co. and
V. Ramasubramanian, Advs. for the Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. These appeals emanate from the common judgment and order
of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 28th April, 2006 disposing
H of the concerned writ petitions instituted by the private respondent(s) in
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 887
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
the respective appeals. Although four separate writ petitions were filed, A
one common factum noticed from the factual narration in the impugned
judgment is that the property owned and possessed by the private
respondents in the concerned appeals came to be acquired for the purpose
of implementing the “Mass Rapid Transport System” (for short “MRTS”)
Railway Project, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
B
(for short “1894 Act”). After following due process, the acquisition
proceedings culminated with the passing of the award and taking over
of possession of the concerned property. After possession was taken,
the subject property was made over to the appropriate authority for
implementation of the Railway Project.
2. The private respondent(s) in the respective appeals had, C
however, unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing
writ petitions in the High Court. While rejecting the challenge, the High
Court vide order dated 12th December, 2003 observed that the appropriate
authority of the State Government ought to consider the representation
made by the private respondents in the concerned appeals for allotment D
of a housing site by way of rehabilitation as a special category of
displaced persons, in view of the dictum presumably in Hansraj H.
Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.1 (incorrectly mentioned as
Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab-1993 AIR SCW 2938 which is a decision
in a criminal matter). The operative part of the said order reads thus:
E
“5. The learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC
2025, AIR 1988 SC 2181, AIR 1991 SC 90 and AIR SCW 1993
@ 2923, persuasively contended that there could be direction to
the State Government to allot lands from any one of the Housing
schemes in the city. There is forece and substance in this F
contention.
6. In the circumstances, the present applications taken out by the
petitioners do deserve further consideration and the petitioners
request for housing site deserves to be considered by the State by
way of rehabilitation. G
7. Hence, it is made clear that in the event of the petitioners
applying to the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board
for allotment of house sites in any one of the housing projects
1
(1993) 3 SCC 634
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A promoted by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shall
be considered for allotment of lands, as a special category of
displaced persons by the acquisition of lands for the railways as
has been held by the Supreme Court in Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of
Punjab reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2938.
B 8. With the above observations, the above miscellaneous petitions
are ordered accordingly.”
3. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court, the
private respondent(s) pursued representation before the State
Government. Eventually, the State Government declined to grant any
C relief to the private respondent(s) and communicated its decision to them
vide letter dated 26th May, 2005. It may be apposite to reproduce one
such communication, issued to the private respondent in Civil Appeal
No.8625 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No.8630 of 2009. The same reads
thus:
“GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU
D
Housing and Urban
Development Department
Secretariat, Chennai-9
From
Thiru Lal Rawana Sailo,
E I.A.S.,
Secretary to Government
Letter
No.41629/UD3(2)/2003-13
Dated: 26.05.2005
To
F
Thiru P. Arivudainambi,
MIG No.3, Santhome High
Road,
Foreshre Estate,
TNH Board,
G Chennai-600028.
Tmt. S. Sulochana,
19, Leith Castle Street,
Sea View Apartments,
Santhome,
H Chennai-600028
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 889
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Sir/Madam, A
Sub : Land Acquisition-Mass Rapid Transit System-Lands
acquired for Mass Rapid Transmit Syste, S.No.300/12
measuring 5445 sq.ft. belonging to Tmt. S. Sulochna
S.No.300/13 measuring 5554 sq.ft. belonging to Thiru P.
Arivudainambi- Request for allotment of plots-requested. B
Ref: 1. High Court order dated 01.12.2003 in WPMP No.23077
2003 and W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.
2. High Court of Madras order dated 12.12.2003 in
W.P.M.P. No.28883/2003 in W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.
C
3. Your lawyer Notice dated 10.11.2004.
4. Your petition dated 01.08.2004, 21.02.2005 and
21.04.2005.
5. High Court order dated 04.03.2005 and 18.03.2005 in
W.P. No.7469/2005. D
In the High Court order first cited, the Hon’ble Court has dismissed
your W.P.M.P.23078/2003 and 11290/2003.
2. In the High Court order second cited it has been observed by
the Hon’ble Court that in the event of petitioners applying to the
E
State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board for allotment
of House sites in any one of the Housing projects formulated by
the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shall be considered.
Therefore in pursuance of the orders of the Hon’ble Court your
representation has been examined by the Government in
consultation with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. F
3. I am, accordingly, directed to inform you that during the land
acquisition process you were informed of the procedural formalities
by the Land Acquisition Officer and as per statutory requirements
award No.1/2003 was also passed on 08.01.2003 on land acquisition
proceedings. As ordered in W.P.No.16929/99 the land in question G
for a public purpose. The Hon’ble Court had also on 10.10.2002
on your submission directed in W.P.No.141183/2000 and
W.P.No.15974/2000 alongwith W.P.No.36980/2002 to deposit the
compensation amount in the High Court which was also complied
with. Therefore, the land in question was already taken over by
H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the Metropolitan
Transport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid Transit System
scheme after observing all statutory provisions and Hon’ble Court
orders.
4. You have again submitted a lawyer notice in the reference 3rd
B cited and sent petitions in the reference 4th cited to the Government
for reconsideration of your request. Therefore, your request was
once again examined by the Government in the light of the High
Court orders in the reference 5th cited. The Hon’ble High Court,
in the said order dated 04.03.2005 and modified on 18.03.2005,
has ordered that, instead of the Housing Board, the Government
C would pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Hence
the whole issue was again re-examined by the Government afresh.
5. As already submitted by the Government before the High
Court on more than one occasion, I am directed to inform
you that your request for allotment of land in any one of the
D Tamil Nadu Housing Board/Chennai Metropolitan
Development Authority scheme will not arise as the lands
were not acquired for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Housing
Board of Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority
schemes but they were acquired for Mass Rapid Transit
E System and handed over to the Metropolitan Transport
Project (Railways) which come under Government of India
for their railway scheme. Hence acquisition of your land in
S.No.300/12 measuring 5445 and 5554 sq.ft. respectively was
not arbitrary or illegal in any way as all procedural formalities
were gone thro’ by the Land Acquisition Officer as per the Land
F Acquisition Act. The lands were already vested with the
Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid
Transit System and, therefore, there is no justification for
allotment of land to you in any scheme area when the lands
were not acquired either by Tamil Nadu Housing Board or
G Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority.
6. I am, therefore, directed to inform you that in view of the
foregoing valid reasons your request is not feasible of compliance.
Your faithfully
Sd/-
H For Secretary to Government.
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 891
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Copy to: A
The Member-Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development
Authority, Chennai-8.
The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai-
35.
B
The Collector of Chennai, Singaravelar Maaligai, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai-I.
The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) MRTS, Tiurmailai
Railway Station, Mylapore, Chennai-4.
The Special Tahsildar, (Land Acquisition), Chennai Metropolitan C
Development Authority, Chennai-8 (for guidance and
information).”
(emphasis supplied)
The representation made by the private respondents in the other
D
appeals, however, were not replied to, as a result of which they filed
fresh writ petition(s) which were heard analogously with the writ
petition(s) filed by the private respondent(s) in the aforementioned two
appeals questioning the communication dated 26th May, 2005, rejecting
their representation.
4. All connected writ petitions were accordingly heard and decided E
together by the impugned judgment. The reason which weighed with the
High Court to allow the writ petitions filed by the concerned private
respondent(s) can be discerned from the discussion in paragraph Nos.6
and 7 of the impugned judgment. We deem it apposite to reproduce the
same along with the operative order contained in paragraph Nos.8 and 9 F
of the impugned judgment. The same read thus:
“6. We have already referred to the fact that this order has become
final. Though it is stated that the petitioners/land owners deposited,
the fact remains, even without resorting to acquisition proceeding,
possession of the lands was forcibly taken from the petitioners. It G
is also not in dispute that, in order to implement the project, namely,
M.R.T.S. Scheme, possession of the lands was taken forcibly
and the construction work was started without awaiting for the
completion of the acquisition proceedings. That was that reason
for the learned Judge to pass the directions in the order dated
H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A 12.12.2003. In fact, the learned Judge heavily relied on the Supreme
Court decision reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2923 (cited supra)
while passing the positive direction to the Government. As rightly
observed by the learned Judge in the order dated
12.12.2003, the petitioners are entitled to alternate site
under the Special Category of displaced persons due to the
B
acquisition of their lands for the Railways. Unfortunately, in
W.P. No.39279 of 2005, the second respondent, in spite of the
reasoned positive direction dated 12.12.2003 of the learned Judge
of this Court, rejected the request of the petitioner. Likewise, in
the other two cases, though the order was passed even as early
C as on 12.12.2003 and representations were made on 18.4.2005,
no order has been passed by the Government till this date.
7. In view of the peculiar factual position, viz, that the land of the
petitioners were taken possession forcibly even before initiation
of the acquisition proceedings; and of the stand taken by the
D petitioners that they lost their respective housing plots; and also
taking note of the positive direction of this Court, dated
12.12.2003, to provide equivalent alternate site under the
special category of displaced persons; we are of the view
that the rejection order dated 26.5.2005 passed by the Government
in respect of the petitioner in W.P. No.39279 of 2005 is liable to
E be quashed. As far as the petitioners in W.P. Nos.11907 and 11908
of 2006 are concerned, they are also entitled to similar allotment
as directed in the order dated 12.12.2003.
8. In these circumstances, we issue the following directions:-
F (i) The Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Land
Development Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 is
directed to allot alternate land to the petitioners, approximate
in extent to the acquired land, within the Corporation/City limits,
within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy
of this order.
G
(ii) the petitioners are liable to pay the cost of the land as fixed
by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
9. Writ petitions are allowed with the above directions. No costs.
Connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.”
H (emphasis supplied)
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 893
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
5. By these appeals, the State Government has assailed the A
aforementioned judgment. According to the appellant, the lands in
question were acquired in accordance with law and, after following due
process, possession thereof was taken over and thereafter made over to
the appropriate authority of the MRTS Project (Railways). In other words,
the land was not acquired for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as such. It
B
is urged that the direction issued by the High Court vide the impugned
judgment is on an erroneous assumption that the State Government was
obliged to provide an alternative housing site to the private respondent(s)
in the concerned appeals, in terms of the direction given by the High
Court vide order dated 12th December, 2003. It is then contended that
the direction given by the High Court in the impugned judgment is in the C
nature of granting an extra-legal concession by way of allotment of an
alternative site in lieu of acquired lands sans any such legal obligation on
the State under the 1894 Act or any policy in force pertaining to the
project of MRTS (Railways) to be implemented by the Ministry of
Railway, Government of India. The appellant has relied on the decisions
D
of this Court to buttress the proposition that the private respondent(s)
had no legal right to get an alternative housing site in such a situation.
The appellant has also distinguished the reported judgments referred to
by the High Court in the impugned judgment as being inapplicable to the
facts of the present case.
6. The private respondent(s), on the other hand, have supported E
the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment and
would submit that the direction was in furtherance of the obligation of
the State flowing from the order dated 12th December, 2003. Further, in
light of the reported decisions adverted to by the High Court in the
impugned judgment, it is not open to the appellant-State to deny the F
relief of allotment of an alternative housing site to them as a special
category of displaced persons due to the stated project. In addition, the
private respondent(s), during the pendency of these appeals, had filed
an affidavit to place on record that in the past, the State Government
exercised discretionary power to allot alternative housing site to the
affected persons due to the acquisition of their land for public purposes. G
The private respondent(s) would submit that no interference in the fact
situation of the present case is warranted and the appeals be dismissed.
7. We have heard Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, for the
appellant and Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned Senior Counsel, for the
private respondent(s). H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A 8. The foremost reason which weighed with the High Court is,
the direction issued by the High Court vide order dated 12th December,
2003 had attained finality. Indubitably, that order has not been challenged
by the State or any other State Authority. Nevertheless, the purport of
the order is nothing more than a direction to the State Government and
the Tamil Nadu Housing Board “to consider” the representation(s) made
B
by the private respondent(s) for allotment of an alternative housing site
in any one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board, as a special category of displaced persons. Thus, the direction is
not in the nature of a peremptory direction to allot an alternative housing
site despite absence of any policy with reference to the project under
C consideration or obligation flowing from the provisions of 1894 Act. This
is the first fallacy committed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
9. As regards the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by
the High Court, we must agree with the appellant that the same have no
application to the fact situation of the present case. For, in State of U.P.
D Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors. 2, the direction was issued to the
development authority which had acquired the land for the public purpose
of developing housing schemes with a view to provide housing
accommodation to the residents of Meerut City. Reliance has been placed
upon paragraph Nos.9 and 10, which read thus:
E “9. It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the respondents
that many of the persons from whom lands have been acquired
are also persons without houses or shop sites and if they are to be
thrown out of their land they would be exposed to serious prejudice.
Since the land is being acquired for providing residential
accommodation to the people of Meerut those who are being
F expropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would also
be eligible for some relief at the hands of the Meerut Development
Authority. We may at this stage refer to the provision contained in
Section 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which reads
as follows:
G “21. (2) The powers of the Authority or, as the case may be,
the local authority concerned with respect to the disposal of
land under sub-section 1 shall be so exercised as to secure, so
far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on
2
H (1986) 4 SCC 251
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 895
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to A
obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Authority or
the local authority concerned and are willing to comply with
any requirements of the Authority or the local authority
concerned as to its development and use, have an opportunity
to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable
B
requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at
which any such land has been acquired from them:
Provided that where the Authority or the local authority
concerned proposes to dispose of by sale any land without any
development having been undertaken or carried out thereon, it
shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from C
whom it was acquired, if they desire to purchase it subject to
such requirements as to its development and use as the
Authority or the local authority concerned may think fit to
impose.”
10. Although the said section is not in terms applicable to the D
present acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above
provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome
principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities
throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for
the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and E
trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit
the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable
provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable
terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or
shop buildings in the urban area in question.”
F
The dictum in this judgment concerns the acquisition of large tracts
of land, for the purposes of land development, in urban areas. The
acquisition in the present case is certainly not for the purpose of
development of urban area or for providing a housing scheme to the
residents of the urban area in which the acquired lands are situated. The
acquisition, as aforementioned, is for a project of MRTS (Railways) on G
behalf of the Ministry of Railway, Government of India and not for the
State Government or State Authority. Furthermore, admittedly, no scheme
has been formulated in relation to the stated railway project implemented
by the Central Government for providing alternative housing sites to
project affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, it is H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A unfathomable that the High Court could still issue a direction to the State
Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, to provide alternative land to the private respondent(s) as a
special category of displaced persons. Such a direction cannot be
countenanced in law. This is reinforced from the principle underlying the
dictum in the case of New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr.
B
Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.3 In paragraph 9 of the
said decision, the Court noted that it would be a different matter if the
State had come forward with a proposal to provide an alternative site
but that principle cannot be extended as a condition in all cases of
acquisition of the land that the owner must be given an alternative site or
C flat. The Court unambiguously rejected the contention of the affected
persons that acquisition of their land without providing them an alternative
site would impinge upon their right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
10. Again, in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M.
D Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr.4, the Court negatived the claim of the land
owners that the unused acquired land for construction of national highway
should be returned to them. Instead, the Court held that since the
acquisition had been completed and the land had vested in the State
Government, the unutilised acquired land could be disposed of only through
public auction so that the public would benefit by getting a higher value.
E In another case, Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran
(dead) by Lrs. And Ors.5, the Court restated the doctrine of public trust
disabling the State from giving back the property for a consideration less
than the market value, if it could not be used for any other public purpose
by the State in cases where the acquisition process had been completed
F under the 1894 Act. A similar view has been expressed in V.
Chandrasekaran and Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors.6. In
paragraph 31, the Court observed thus:
“31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean,
that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from
G all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether
the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or
3
(1996) 1 SCC 731
4
(1997) 5 SCC 432
5
(2010) 2 SCC 786
6
H (2012) 12 SCC 133
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. DR. VASANTHI 897
VEERASEKARAN [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the A
land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation
for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged.
The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to
the person interested nor can such person claim any right of
restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory
B
amendment to this effect.”
11. The private respondents, however, would urge that the State
Government had initiated the acquisition proceedings and was intently
concerned with the stated project within the State and, for which reason,
it could not be extricated from its obligation flowing from the existing
State policy at the relevant time enabling the State Government to exercise C
discretionary quota. The private respondent(s) have relied on instances
where such allotments have been made, as is evident from the
communications annexed at R4, R5 and R6 to the additional affidavit
filed on 15th April, 2019, as per the liberty granted by this Court.
12. We have perused the said communications. It is evident that, D
in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction of houses under
LIG/MIG scheme in respect of which a policy existed for grant of
alternative housing site to the affected persons. Those schemes were
implemented by the State Housing Board. These instances will be of no
avail to the private respondents whose lands have been acquired for E
implementation of MRTS Project implemented by the Government of
India (Railways). The private respondent(s) have been duly compensated
in conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894. Therefore, they
cannot expect any further relief much less from the State Government
or, for that matter, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
F
13. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to dilate on
the plea taken by the appellant that the policy regarding grant of alternative
housing site as a discretionary power of the State Government has been
discontinued from the year 2011. For the completion of record, however,
we must note the argument of the private respondent(s) that their claim
must be decided only on the basis of policy as it existed at the relevant G
time and at least at the time of direction issued by the High Court vide
the impugned judgment in the year 2006. As aforementioned, it is not
necessary for us to take this argument any further as we have held that
the schemes applicable to the acquisition for development of houses
have no application to the project for which the lands owned by the H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A private respondent(s) came to be acquired for implementation of a project
by the Government of India (Railways).
14. The other decision which commended to the High Court also
has no application to the present case. For, in Bharat Singh and Ors.
Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.7, the land was acquired for development
B and utilization for industrial purpose. The dictum in paragraph No.18 of
the said decision, in no way, can be construed to mean that even if no
policy for allotment of alternative housing site in connection with the
stated project to be executed by the Railways is in force, yet the project
affected land owners should be provided an alternative housing site that
too by the State. On the other hand, the observation therein is merely to
C direct that the land owners who had become landless by the acquisition
of their land should make an application for allotment of alternative land
and that they may be given priority in the matter of allotment provided
they fulfill the conditions for such allotment and if land is available. In
the case of S.B. Kishore Vs. Union of India8, the acquisition was for
D the purpose of development of the urban area and the relief given to the
land owner was in the peculiar facts of that case. More importantly, the
relief was with reference to the existing policy of allotting alternative
housing sites to the affected land owners. Even in the case of Hansraj
H. Jain (supra), the acquisition was for setting up a new township and
a policy decision of the Government to offer alternative housing site to
E the affected land owner was applicable to such acquisition, as can be
discerned from paragraph 33 of the said judgment.
15. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in setting aside
the impugned judgment and, resultantly, dismissing the writ petitions filed
by the private respondent(s).
F
16. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The impugned common
judgment and order of the High Court dated 28th April, 2006 in writ
petition Nos.39279 of 2005, 11907 of 2006, 11908 of 2006 and 19029 of
2006, respectively, is set aside. Resultantly, the aforementioned writ
petitions are dismissed. All pending interim applications are disposed of.
G No order as to costs.
Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
7
(1988) 4 SCC 534
8
H AIR 1991 SC 90
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.