THE STATE OF RAJASTHANversusNEMI CHAND MAHELA AND OTHERS

                        [2019] 18 S.C.R. 995                             995


                  THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                 A
                                  v.
            NEMI CHAND MAHELA AND OTHERS
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3873 of 2010)
                          APRIL 30, 2019                                 B
    [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
       Precedents – Law of precedents – “Scarecrow” of a litigation
– Conflicting decisions that fail to respect and follow the precedent
set by Supreme Court cause uncertainty and chaos – On facts,
                                                                         C
conflicting opinions in different decisions of High Court of Rajasthan
contrary to the true and correct interpretation of the principle of
prospective overruling given in decisions of the Supreme Court in
Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and thereafter in
Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Others case has caused
this annoying and festering litigation to prolong since 1999, that in    D
course of time has become so complicated that no man knows what
it means.
      Res judicata – Doctrine of res judicata and law of precedent –
Difference between – Held: Res judicata operates in personam i.e.
the matter in issue between the same parties in the former litigation,   E
while law of precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is
binding on all under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the
Supreme Court – Res judicata binds the parties to the proceedings
for the reason that there should be an end to the litigation and
therefore, subsequent proceeding inter-se parties to the litigation is
                                                                         F
barred – Therefore, law of res judicata concerns the same matter,
while law of precedent concerns application of law in a similar
issue – In res judicata, the correctness of the decision is normally
immaterial and it does not matter whether the previous decision
was right or wrong, unless the erroneous determination relates to
the jurisdictional matter of that body – Precedents – Doctrines /        G
Principles.
      Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 141 – Binding precedent –
Appointment – To post of Primary School teachers in Zila Parishads
of various districts of the State of Rajasthan – Award of bonus
marks on basis of domicile to candidates seeking such appointments       H
                                 995
996            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     – Challenged – Declared unconstitutional by Full Bench of
      Rajasthan High Court by decision dated 18-11-1999 in writ
      proceedings – Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Kailash Chand
      Sharma case, however, by applying the doctrine of prospective
      overruling, it protected appointments made on or before 17-11-1999
      and confined relief only to those writ petitioners who had moved
B
      the High Court before 18-11-1999 – However, in several subsequent
      decisions of Rajasthan High Court, reliefs were granted to writ
      petitioners who had not filed writ petition before the cut-off date of
      18-11-1999 fixed in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case – Some of these
      decisions were made even after the decision of Manmohan Sharma’s
C     case on 01-04-2014 wherein the Supreme Court declined to enlarge
      the scope of directions issued in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case –
      Held: Authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High
      Court must be respected and followed as any departure therefrom
      would cause uncertainty, unnecessary and speculative litigation –
      Directions given by Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case
D
      were a binding precedent u/Art.141 which was affirmed and
      elucidated by Supreme Court in Manmohan Sharma’s case –
      Consequently, candidates who had not filed writ petitions on or
      before 17-11-1999 would not be entitled to appointment upon
      recalculation of marks by exclusion of bonus marks from the marks
E     of the selected candidates – Such direction however would not apply
      to individual cases where decisions of High Court though contrary
      to the ratio in Kailash Chand Sharma case had attained finality and
      thus would operate as res judicata – Service Law – Appointment.
            Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of prospective overruling –
F     Invocation of – Held: Doctrine of prospective overruling can be
      invoked for balancing of competing claims – Supreme Court in
      Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan case while affirming the
      findings of a Full Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court dated
      18-11-1999 held that award of bonus marks on basis of domicile to
      candidates seeking appointment (as primary school teachers in Zila
G     Parishads in the State of Rajasthan) amounted to impermissible
      discrimination – However, keeping in view the factual matrix of the
      case, the Supreme Court felt that there was a need to balance
      competing claims and thus partially applied the doctrine of
      prospective overruling whereby notwithstanding the ratio,
H     appointments made before 18-11-1999 were left untouched and
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. NEMI CHAND MAHELA AND                      997
                     OTHERS

saved – Ratio and direction invoking doctrine of prospective         A
overruling, applied in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case was affirmed
and elucidated by Supreme Court in Manmohan Sharma’s case –
Accordingly, all pending matters before High Court, to be decided
on basis of decisions in Kailash Chandra Sharma’s and Manmohan
Sharma’s cases and the instant cases, subject to condonation of
                                                                     B
delay, when justified and satisfactorily explained – Service Law –
Appointment.
      Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
      (2002) 6 SCC 562 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 317 and
      Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
      (2014) 5 SCC 782 – affirmed.                                   C

      Deepak Kumar Suthar and Another v. State of Rajasthan
      and Ors. (1999) 2 Rajasthan Law Reporter 692 –
      distinguished.
      Naval Kishore case (decided by Rajasthan High Court            D
      on 30-07-2012) - held, impliedly overruled.
      Makhija Construction and Engineering Private Ltd v.
      Indore Development Authority and Others (2005) 6 SCC
      304; Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy
      Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1997) 6 SCC 450 : [1997]           E
      1 Suppl. SCR 184; Bihar State Government Secondary
      School Teachers Association and Ors. v. Bihar
      Education Service Association and Others (2012) 13
      SCC 33 : [2012] 11 SCR 50 – relied on.
                      Case Law Reference                             F
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 317            affirmed          Para 2
(1999) 2 Rajasthan Law             distinguished     Para 3
Reporter 692
(2014) 5 SCC 782                   affirmed          Para 9          G
(2005) 6 SCC 304                   relied on         Para 11
[1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 184            relied on         Para 11
[2012] 11 SCR 50                    relied on        Para 11

                                                                     H
998               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 3873
      of 2010.
              From the Judgment and Order dated 24.05.2007 of the High
      Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Civil Special Appeal
      (Writs) No. 679/2007 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2519/2003.
B              WITH
               Civil Appeal No. 4491/2019
            Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv. (AAG), Ms. Priya Hingorani, Sr.
      Adv., Satyendra Kumar, Ms. Shailja Nanda Mishra, Ms. Ruchi Kohli,
C     K. L. Janjani, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Yunus Malik, Anish Maheshwari,
      Ms. Chitra Chaudhary, Ms. Khushali, Prashant Chaudhary, Mukul Kumar,
      Jayant Bhatt, Ms. Jyoti Sharma and Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Advs. for the
      appearing parties.
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D              SANJIV KHANNA, J.
               1. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4562 of
      2012.
             2. Predicament of candidates consequent to conflicting opinions
      in different decisions of the High Court on true and correct interpretation
E     of principle of prospective overruling as directed in Kailash Chand
      Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.1 is the cause of this agonising
      and festering litigation since 1999. This “scarecrow” of a litigation, to
      use the words of Charles Dickens, “in course of time, [has] become so
      complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”
F            3. Award of bonus marks to candidates seeking appointment to
      the post of Primary School Teachers in Zila Parishad of various districts
      in the State of Rajasthan during the year 1998-99 was struck down and
      declared unconstitutional by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court
      vide judgment dated November 18, 1999 in Kailash Chand Sharma v.
G     State of Rajasthan in W.P.(C) No. 3928 of 1998, for the reason that
      any kind of weightage and advantage in public employment in a State
      service is not permissible on the ground of place of birth, residence or on
      the ground of being a resident of urban or rural area. The Full Bench in
      Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) had followed an earlier Full
      1
H         (2002) 6 SCC 562
      THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. NEMI CHAND MAHELA                               999
                    [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

Bench judgment in Deepak Kumar Suthar and Another v. State of                   A
Rajasthan and Others2 wherein similar stipulations for grant of bonus
marks in selection of Grade II and Grade III teachers in the state cadre
were struck down as unconstitutional. However, in Deepak Kumar
Suthar’s case (supra), no consequential and substantive relief was granted
to the writ petitioners therein as first, they did not have a chance of
                                                                                B
selection on merits even if award of bonus marks to successful candidates
was disregarded and secondly, the candidates so selected had not been
impleaded as parties. Accordingly, the Full Bench in Deepak Kumar
Suthar’s case (supra), in the concluding paragraph, had given the
following directions:
         “44. Instead of sending the matter to the appropriate bench, we        C
         think it proper to dispose of this petition with a direction that no
         relief can be granted to the petitioners as they could not succeed
         to get the place in the merit list even by getting 10 bonus marks
         being residents of urban area, for which they are certainly not
         entitled. More so, the petitioners have not impleaded any person       D
         from the select list, not even the last selected candidate. Thus, no
         relief can be granted to them in spite of the fact that the
         appointments made in conformity of the impugned Circular have
         not been in consonance with law. However, we clarify that any
         appointment made earlier shall not be affected by this judgment
         and it would have prospective application.”                            E

      4. These directions in Deepak Kumar Suthar’s case (supra)
were followed by the Full Bench in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case
(supra) and the batch of writ petitions were disposed of.
       5. After the decision of the Full Bench in Kailash Chand                 F
Sharma’s case (supra), a large number of writ petitions including one
by Naval Kishore were filed before the Rajasthan High Court. Some of
them, notwithstanding the operative directions given by the Full Bench
in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra), were disposed of with a
direction to the authorities to prepare and draw up a fresh merit list of
candidates appointed on or after October 21, 1999 without the bonus             G
marks. For convenience we would refer to these cases as Naval
Kishore’s case. Naval Kishore’s case (supra) was decided on 30th July,
2002.

2
    (1999) 2 Rajasthan Law Reporter 692                                         H
1000            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 18 S.C.R.


 A            6. The decision of the Full Bench in Kailash Chand Sharma’s
       case (supra) and some of the judgments directing preparation of fresh
       merit list without bonus marks (but not in all cases where such directions
       were issued) became subject matter of challenge in Special Leave
       Petitions which were granted and decided vide the judgment reported
       as Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) referred to by us in paragraph
 B
       2 above. Affirming the findings of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High
       Court, this Court concluded that award of bonus marks to residents of
       districts and residents of rural area amounts to impermissible
       discrimination as there was no rational basis for such preferential
       treatment. Thereafter this Court, in paragraph 36 onwards, in Kailash
 C     Chand Sharma’s case (supra) had elaborately and expressly considered
       the question of relief after noticing operative directions in Deepak Kumar
       Suthar’s case (supra). In view of the factual matrix and for several
       reasons recorded, this Court felt that there was a need to balance
       competing claims and accordingly doctrine of prospective overruling was
       partially applied vide paragraphs 45 and 46 of this decision, which read
 D
       as under:
             “45. One more point which needs mention. Some of the learned
             counsel argued that the unsuccessful applicant should not be
             allowed to challenge the selection process to the extent it goes
             against their interest, after having participated in the selection and
 E           waited for the result. It is contended that the discretionary relief
             under Article 226 should not be granted to such persons. Reliance
             has been placed on the decision of this Court in Madan Lal v.
             State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486 and other cases in support of
             this argument. On the other hand, it is contended that in a case of
 F           challenge to unconstitutional discrimination, the doctrine of
             acquiescence, estoppel and the like does not apply and the writ
             petitioners cannot be expected to know the constitutional
             implications of the impugned circular well before the selections.
             We are not inclined to go into this question for the reason that
             such a plea was not raised nor was any argument advanced before
 G           the High Court.
             46. Having due regard to the rival contentions adverted to above
             and keeping in view the factual scenario and the need to balance
             the competing claims in the light of acceptance of prospective
             overruling in principle, we consider it just and proper to confine
 H
   THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. NEMI CHAND MAHELA                                1001
                 [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

      the relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court and to      A
      make appointments made on or after 18-11-1999 in any of the
      districts subject to the claims of the petitioners. Accordingly, we
      direct:
          “1. The claims of the writ petitioners should be considered
          afresh in the light of this judgment vis-à-vis the candidates       B
          appointed on or after 18-11-1999 or those in the select list who
          are yet to be appointed. On such consideration, if those writ
          petitioners are found to have superior merit in case the bonus
          marks of 10% and/or 5% are excluded, they should be offered
          appointments, if necessary, by displacing the candidates
          appointed on or after 18-11-1999.                                   C

          2. The appointments made upto 17-11-1999 need not be
          reopened and re-considered in the light of the law laid down in
          this judgment.
          3. Writ Petition No. 542/2000 filed in this Court under Article     D
          32 is hereby dismissed as it was filed nearly one year after the
          judgment of the High Court and no explanation has been
          tendered for not approaching the High Court under Article 226
          at an earlier point of time.”
       7. Thus, notwithstanding the ratio, appointments made before           E
November 18, 1999 were left untouched and saved. The writ petitioners
who had moved the High Court before November 18, 1999 were entitled
to be considered afresh vis-à-vis candidates appointed on or after
November 18, 1999 or with those in the select list without giving such
appointed/selected candidates benefit of the bonus marks which had
been declared to be unconstitutional. Only such writ petitioners, if found    F
to be higher in the order of merit than those appointed after November
18, 1999 or on select list, were to be offered appointments, if necessary,
by removing such appointed candidates. The date November 18, 1999
selected by the Supreme Court was the date on which the Full Bench of
the Rajasthan High Court had pronounced its judgment in Kailash Chand         G
Sharma’s case (supra). As noticed above, after the Full Bench decision
in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra), a number of writ petitions
had been filed before the High Court in which directions for preparation
of a fresh merit list without bonus marks, appointment in terms of the
new selection list, etc., had been issued. These directions, being contrary
to the ratio and directions given by this Court in Kailash Chand              H
1002                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 18 S.C.R.


 A     Sharma’s (supra), were therefore rendered inconsequential. To this
       extent, decision in Naval Kishore case (supra) and other similar cases
       were overruled/impliedly overruled.
              8. In spite of the aforesaid enunciation and directions in Kailash
       Chand Sharma’s case (supra), it is apparent that in several cases,
 B     directions similar to Naval Kishore’s case (supra) for re-computation
       of marks after excluding bonus marks were issued in favour of candidates
       who had approached and invoked jurisdiction of the High Court after
       November 17, 1999. Even contempt petitions were filed and directions
       were issued notwithstanding the fact that the said writ petitioners/
       petitioners had not filed writ petitions on or before November 17, 1999
 C     i.e. the date on which Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) was
       decided by the Full Bench. In some decisions, it was held that this Court
       in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) had not barred relief to all
       such candidates who may have filed writ petitions at any time after
       November 18, 1999.
 D            9. The controversy was set at rest beyond doubt by this Court in
       its decision in Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Others3
       and other connected matters. After extensively dealing with the factual
       matrix and arguments in Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra), it was
       held as under:
 E               “16. A careful reading of the above leaves no manner of doubt
                 that (a) this Court invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling
                 which implies that the law declared by this Court would apply
                 only to future selections and appointments, (b) that although
                 prospective overruling left the appointments made before 18th
 F               November, 1999 untouched, the writ-petitioners who had moved
                 the High Court had to be considered afresh vis-à-vis candidates
                 appointed on or after 18th November, 1999 or those in the select
                 list without giving to such appointed/selected candidates the benefit
                 of bonus marks under the circular, and (c) that upon such
                 consideration of the writ-petitioners if they are found to be superior
 G               in merit than those appointed after 18th November, 1999 they
                 shall be offered appointments, if necessary, by removing the latter.
                 17. It was strenuously contended by learned counsel for the
                 appellants that the expression “the appellants who moved the High
       3
 H         Civil Appeal No. 4294 of 2014, decided on April 01, 2014
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. NEMI CHAND MAHELA                                1003
              [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

 Court” appearing in para 46 (supra) was wide enough and actually          A
 covered not only such of the writ-petitioners as had approached
 the High Court in the two batch of cases decided by this Court in
 Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) but also all such candidates
 as may have filed writ petitions at any time after 18th November,
 1999 including those who filed such petition after 30th July, 2002
                                                                           B
 when this Court decided the appeals in Kailash Chand Sharma’s
 case (supra) and connected matters.
 18. We find it difficult to accept that contention. There is nothing
 in the judgment of this Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case
 (supra) or the directions that were issued in para 46 thereof to
 suggest that this Court was either conscious of or informed of            C
 pendency of any writ petition filed before the High Court after
 18th November, 1999. There is also nothing to suggest that this
 Court intended the benefit granted in terms of direction (1) under
 para 46 to extend not only to the writ-petitioners who had moved
 the High Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) and in              D
 the writ petition filed by Naval Kishore and others but the same
 has intended to benefit all those who had or may have moved the
 High Court at any point of time. On the contrary there is positive
 indication of the fact that the Court did not intend to extend the
 benefit to any appellant who had challenged the award of bonus
 marks and the selection process on the basis thereof at any stage         E
 after 18th November, 1999. This is evident from the fact that Writ
 Petition No.542 of 2000 filed in this Court under Article 32 of the
 Constitution of India was dismissed by this Court in terms of
 direction (3) under para 46 on the ground that the same had been
 filed nearly one year after the judgment of the High Court. The           F
 expression “as it has been filed after the judgment of the High
 Court” appearing in direction (3) under Para 46 clearly suggest
 that for the grant of relief this Court had only petitions filed before
 the judgment in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) in mind
 and not those filed after 18th November, 1999 when the said
 judgment was pronounced. The observation of this Court that the           G
 writ-petitioners had offered no explanation for not approaching
 the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution at an earlier
 point of time too has two distinct facets, namely, (1) that the writ-
 petitioners in Writ Petition No.542 of 2000 should have ordinarily
 approached the High Court and (2) They should have done so at             H
1004             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 18 S.C.R.


 A           an earlier point of time. The latter of these reasons again
             emphasized the importance this Court attached to the delay in the
             filing of the petitions in the matter of grant of relief for those who
             did not challenge the selection process in good time were not
             granted any relief.”
 B            10. The Bench in Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra) observed
       that there were two categories of cases; Category 1 comprising of writ
       petitions which were filed after November 18, 1999 and before July 30,
       2002 and Category II comprising of writ petitions which were filed after
       July 30, 2002. The date July 30, 2002 being the date of decision of the
       Rajasthan High Court in the case of Naval Kishore’s case (supra).
 C     Rejecting the arguments raised on behalf of the two Categories, the
       Bench observed that in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) this
       Court had recognized the need to balance competing claims by invoking
       doctrine of prospective overruling, thereby, protecting appointments made
       on or before November 17, 1999 and confining relief only to the writ
 D     petitioners who had moved the High Court before November 18, 1999.
       Further, the directions given in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra)
       were a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. With
       regard to the argument for grant of benefit on the principle of parity, i.e.
       similar benefits, as notwithstanding the judgment in Kailash Chand
       Sharma’s case (supra) some of the candidates were appointed on
 E     redrawing the merit list after exclusion of bonus marks, the Bench
       comprehensively and squarely rejected the submission as being contrary
       to the dictum and binding directions of this Court in Kailash Chand
       Sharma’s case (supra). In Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra), the
       Bench observed that there was no need to enlarge the scope of the
 F     directions issued in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) to others
       and that the Court was not hearing a review petition nor could the Court
       modify the order passed by this Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s
       case (supra). The contention of some petitioners in Category II who had
       been appointed on re-computation of the result on merits after November
       18, 1999 was rejected as illegal and impermissible in the light of the
 G     judgment of this Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra). The
       plea and contention of parity and similar treatment was also rejected
       observing that wrong appointments should have been challenged
       expeditiously and not belatedly, and that such appointments would not
       confer any right. That apart, it was recorded in Manmohan Sharma’s
 H     case (supra) that the State had filed an affidavit satisfactorily refuting
       the factual submissions made at the Bar.
    THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. NEMI CHAND MAHELA                               1005
                  [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

       11. The learned counsel for the petitioners had drawn our attention    A
to paragraph 24 of the decision in Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra)
which refers to the case of one Danveer Singh whose writ petition had
been allowed and the order had attained finality as it was not challenged
before the Division Bench or before the Supreme Court. Termination of
services in the case of Danveer Singh, it was accordingly held, was not
                                                                              B
justified and in accordance with law. The reasoning given in paragraphs
24 and 25 in Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra) relating to the case of
Danveer Singh would reflect the difference between the doctrine of res
judicata and law of precedent. Res judicata operates in personam i.e.
the matter in issue between the same parties in the former litigation,
while law of precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is binding   C
on all under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court.
Res judicata binds the parties to the proceedings for the reason that
there should be an end to the litigation and therefore, subsequent
proceeding inter-se parties to the litigation is barred. Therefore, law of
res judicata concerns the same matter, while law of precedent concerns
                                                                              D
application of law in a similar issue. In res judicata, the correctness of
the decision is normally immaterial and it does not matter whether the
previous decision was right or wrong, unless the erroneous determination
relates to the jurisdictional matter of that body. (See Makhija
Construction and Engineering Private Ltd v. Indore Development
Authority and Others4). Learned counsel for the appellants had drawn          E
our attention to several decisions of the Rajasthan High Court in which
reliefs have been granted to the writ petitioners who had not filed a writ
petition before the cut-off date of November 18, 1999 fixed by this Court
in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra). Some of these decisions
were made after the decision of Manmohan Sharma’s case (supra) on
                                                                              F
April 01, 2014. This should have been avoided as authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Court must be respected
and followed as any departure therefrom would cause uncertainty,
unnecessary and speculative litigation as has been held in strong words
in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering
Works (P) Ltd.5 and Bihar State Government Secondary School                   G
Teachers Association and Others v. Bihar Education Service
Association and Others6 Consequently, we find that a number of
4
  (2005) 6 SCC 304
5
  (1997) 6 SCC 450
6
  (2012) 13 SCC 33                                                            H
1006             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 18 S.C.R.


 A     impleadment applications have been filed by aspirants anxiously waiting
       and hoping of favourable outcome in the foreclosed and covered litigation.
       They cannot succeed and these applications are dismissed. We were
       informed that there are a large number of vacant posts and, therefore, it
       has been contended that the benefit should be extended. We do not
       agree and should not accept the said contentions as it would fall foul and
 B
       would be clearly contrary to the ratio of Kailash Chand Sharma’s and
       Manmohan Sharma’s cases (supra).
              12. Our attention was also drawn to the case of Neeraj Saxena in
       whose case the writ appeal filed by the State Government against the
       order of the Single Judge was dismissed on the ground of delay and
 C     inaction. The Special Leave Petition against the decision of the Division
       Bench was also dismissed on the ground of delay. This decision of the
       Division Bench in Neeraj Saxena and the dismissal of the Special Leave
       Petition on the ground of delay does not lay down any ratio in the form
       of precedent. At best, the decision of the Single Judge in the case of
 D     Neeraj Saxena as in the case of Danveer Singh would apply to the
       specific candidates in whose case the decision would operate as res
       judicata. This, however, would not be a ground to negate and nullify the
       ratio and direction invoking doctrine of prospective overruling, applied in
       Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra), which was thereafter affirmed
       and elucidated by this Court in Manmohan Singh’s case (supra).
 E
              13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the candidates
       who had not filed writ petitions on or before November 17, 1999 would
       not be entitled to appointment upon recalculation of marks by exclusion
       of bonus marks from the marks of the selected candidates. The aforesaid
       direction would not apply to individual cases where the principle of res
 F     judicata would apply, i.e. wherein the decision of the Single Judge or
       the Division Bench has become final since it was not challenged before
       the Division Bench or before this Court. All other pending writ petitions
       and appeals, before the High Court, would be disposed of and decided
       on the basis of decisions in Kailash Chandra Sharma’s, Manmohan
 G     Sharma’s cases (supra) and the present matter, subject to condonation
       of delay, when justified and satisfactorily explained.
             14. The appeals and all pending applications are disposed of in the
       aforesaid terms.

 H
       Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                     Appeals disposed of.