THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.versusBHUPENDRA SINGH

                 [2024] 8 S.C.R. 154 : 2024 INSC 592

                    The State of Rajasthan & Ors.
                                  v.
                         Bhupendra Singh
                  (Civil Appeal Nos. 8546-8549 of 2024)
                               08 August 2024
           [Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court quashing the
       removal order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and issuing
       directions to reconsider the employee’s case for promotion, which
       was upheld by the Division Bench, if justified.

                                  Headnotes†
       Service Law – Suspension/removal from service – Disciplinary
       authority accepting enquiry officer’s findings and imposing
       punishment – Requirement of reasons – On facts, employee
       placed under suspension in contemplation of departmental
       enquiry for having committed various irregularities –
       Departmental Promotion Committee did not find the employee
       fit for promotion as he was under suspension – Charges having
       been proved, the employee removed from service – Employee
       challenged the suspension and removal order – Single Judge
       of the High Court quashed the removal order issuing directions
       to reconsider the employee’s case for promotion – Said order
       upheld by the Division Bench – Sustainability:
       Held: Not sustainable – Single Judge held that the enquiry
       was based on no evidence, and findings rendered therein were
       perverse, and as the Removal Order based on the same was not
       reasoned, quashed the same – Division Bench affirmed the said
       course of action – Despite noticing the position in law relating to
       non-interference by the appellate court to re-assess the evidence
       led in an enquiry or to interfere on the ground that another view
       was possible on the material on record, the Division Bench held
       that the Single Judge had rightly held that the enquiry proceedings
       were vitiated, without giving any reasons of its own as to how the
       Single Judge had arrived at such a conclusion – Single Judge
       and the Division Bench acted as Courts of Appeal and went on to


* Author
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                             155

           The State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh


     re-appreciate the evidence – Evidently, while reappraisal of facts
     and evidence is not impermissible by the High Court, the infirmity
     in the underlying order has to be greater than ordinary – It is not
     the employee’s case that due to omissions by the Department
     in substantive and/or procedural compliances, prejudice ensued
     to him – Employee received an opportunity to submit a written
     representation as also an opportunity of hearing, thus, no violation
     of the principles of natural justice found – Removal Order cannot be
     said to be based on ‘no evidence’ – Removal Order was reasoned
     as on the aspects where the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the
     Enquiry Officer’s report, reasons therefor have been assigned – If
     the Disciplinary Authority accepts findings recorded by the Enquiry
     Officer and proceeds to impose punishment based on the same,
     no elaborate reasons are required – Removal Order makes it
     clear that the Disciplinary Authority has considered the whole
     material before it and was satisfied to impose punishment on the
     employee – Wherever and whenever the Disciplinary Authorities
     concerned impose a major punishment, it would be appropriate for
     their orders to better engage with the representations/submissions
     of the delinquent employees concerned – However, in the instant
     case, in view of the evidentiary material and the process by which
     a fair opportunity was given to the employee to present his version,
     this Court is dissuaded from upholding the impugned judgment
     on account of minor deficiency/ies in the process – Same have
     not caused prejudice to the employee to the extent warranting
     judicial interdiction – Factual position as regards the charges
     pertaining to non-handing over of full charge at the relevant point
     of time; appointing persons without permission from the Collector/
     Registrar; as also, returning the money after one and a half
     years by the employee, could not be controverted – Moreover,
     looking to the respondent’s conduct, no arbitrariness or perversity
     found in the punishment awarded to him – Thus, the impugned
     judgment quashed and set aside, and removal order passed by
     the Disciplinary Authority is restored. [Paras 21, 22, 28-37]

                              Case Law Cited
     State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao [1964] 3 SCR 25 :
     AIR 1963 SC 1723; State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar [2011]
     12 SCR 1036 : (2011) 10 SCC 249; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
     Chitra Venkata Rao [1976] 1 SCR 521 : (1975) 2 SCC 557; State
     Bank of India v. S K Sharma [1996] 3 SCR 972 : (1996) 3 SCC
     364; Union of India v. K G Soni [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 560 : (2006)
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       6 SCC 794; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha
       [2009] 13 SCR 348 : (2009) 8 SCC 310; Bharti Airtel Limited v. A
       S Raghavendra [2024] 4 SCR 100 : (2024) 6 SCC 418; Boloram
       Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank [2021] 1 SCR 858 : (2021) 3
       SCC 806 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
       Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
       Rules, 1958.

                              List of Keywords
       Suspension; Removal from service; Disciplinary authority;
       Departmental enquiry for having committed various irregularities;
       Non-interference by the appellate court to re-assess the evidence
       led in an enquiry; Reasoned order; Enquiry proceedings vitiated;
       Re-appreciate the evidence; Substantive and/or procedural
       compliances; Principles of natural justice.

                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8546-8549 of
       2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2021 of the High Court
       of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCSAW No.1695 of 2008
       and DBCSAW Nos.14, 15 and 65 of 2009.
                          Appearances for Parties
       Vishal Meghwal, Milind Kumar, Jagdish Chandra Solanki, Ms. Yashika
       Bum, Ms. Neha Kapoor, Advs. for the Appellants.
       K.Vijayan, T.R.B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the Respondent.
                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment
       Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
       Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.     Leave granted.
3.     The present appeals are directed against the common Final Judgment
       and Order dated 28.01.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                       157

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     Judgment”) passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
     Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench (hereinafter referred to as
     the “High Court”) by which D.B. Special Appeal Writs No.1695/2008,
     14/2009, 15/2009 and 65/2009 were dismissed.
     BRIEF FACTUAL OVERVIEW:
4.   The sole respondent was appointed as Inspector (Executive) in the
     year 1960 and later appointed as Assistant Registrar on 05.04.1973
     on selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (hereinafter
     referred to as the “RPSC”). On 29.04.1976, the respondent granted
     permission for construction of godown of Sadulshahar Jamidara
     Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. despite the Registrar having
     issued a direction to consult the Public Works Department to obtain
     a technical opinion. The respondent, further, appointed two persons
     on 04.01.1977, despite order to get the permission from the Registrar.
     On 06.05.1977, the respondent was reverted to the post of Inspector
     and also directed to handover charge to Mr. Amar Chand Dhaka but
     he did not comply with the same and allegedly obstructed the other
     person from duty.
5.   On 18.05.1977, the respondent issued an order nominating himself
     as Administrator of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society
     Limited though he was reverted from that post and charge was
     taken over from him by another person. During such period, the
     respondent sold 9 shops without adopting the procedure of auction
     at very low prices compared to the market value of the said shops.
     He is further said to have made irregular payments on 30.05.1977.
     On 21.06.1977, he withdrew an amount of Rs.9,025/- (Rupees Nine
     Thousand Twenty-Five) from the account of the Bharat Bus Transport
     Cooperative Society Limited as expenses incurred for purchase of
     stamps though the same were recovered from the shop-buyers
     and thus, illegally kept by him. On 01.08.1977, the Collector of the
     district asked the respondent to hand over charge of Administrator
     of Hanumangarh Society but he did not hand over the charge and
     cash balance etc. till 19.08.1977.
6.   On 04.10.1979, he was placed under suspension in contemplation of
     departmental enquiry for having committed various irregularities. As
     per the seniority list published on 05.10.1979, the respondent was at
     Sl. No.39 as on 01.07.1978. On 07.02.1980, Appeal No.361/79 was
     filed by the respondent seeking promotion which was dismissed on
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       the ground that there were adverse entries in his Annual Confidential
       Records (hereinafter referred to as “ACRs”) for the years 1975-1976,
       1976-1977 and 1977-1978. However, it was observed that if the said
       adverse entries were expunged, the respondent would have a case
       for reconsideration.
7.     On 03.10.1980, charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil
       Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter
       referred to as the “1958 Rules”) was issued against the respondent
       levelling 16 charges including sub-charges. The preliminary statement
       of the respondent was recorded on 23.05.1983 in connection with
       the said enquiry. Examination of witnesses took place on various
       dates. In the meantime, on 28.11.1983, in Appeal No.237/82, adverse
       entries in the ACR were expunged. On 05.03.1984 and 04.06.1984,
       detailed statement of the respondent was also recorded. Finally,
       the enquiry report was submitted on 19.04.1984. Thereafter, the
       Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the
       “DPC”) in its meeting held on 21.11.1984 did not find the respondent
       fit for promotion as he was under suspension on that day. The
       respondent had moved the High Court in Single Bench Civil Writ
       Petition No.590/1983, wherein suspension order dated 04.10.1979
       against the respondent was prospectively stayed by the learned Single
       Judge. The respondent filed Appeal No.358/85 for consideration
       of his promotion to the posts of Deputy Registrar with effect from
       23.02.1979 and Joint Registrar with effect from 06.04.1985.
8.     After completion of the enquiry and the charges having been proved,
       the respondent was removed from service by order dated 25.09.1985.
       Appeal No.358/85 preferred by the Respondent was partially allowed,
       by order dated 21.08.1991, directing the appellant to convene the
       DPC for the vacancies of the year 1984-1985 and review the case
       of the respondent for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. The
       respondent had also moved against his order of removal before the
       High Court in Single Bench Civil Writ Petition No.793/1986 wherein
       vide order dated 18.12.1991, the order of removal was quashed
       granting liberty to the appellants to conduct enquiry and proceed after
       giving the respondent a copy of the enquiry report and the opinion of
       the RPSC. Compliance of the said order was made on 07.04.1992.
       The respondent submitted written representations on 25.05.1992
       and 10.06.1992 denying all the charges levelled against him. On
       11.09.1992, the DPC found the respondent suitable for 1980-81 but
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     not for 1979-80 for which the recommendation was kept in a sealed
     cover in view of pendency of the departmental enquiry. In the challenge
     to the decision of the DPC by the respondent in Contempt Petition
     No.358/1985, by order dated 08.04.1993, the High Court upheld the
     decision of the DPC. On 28.09.1993, after affording an opportunity
     of hearing to the respondent, an order for his removal was passed.
     Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred a contempt petition in
     the High Court which was dismissed and the D.B. Special Appeal
     No.36/94 filed against the same was also rejected on 04.04.1994.
9.   The respondent then filed four writ petitions being SBCWP
     Nos.6486/1993; 5651/1994; 5752/1994, and; 846/1995 in the High
     Court which were decided by a common judgment dated 22.02.2008,
     wherein SBCWP Nos.6486/1993 and 5651/1994 were allowed,
     while SBCWP Nos.5752/1994 and 846/1995 were partly allowed,
     and directions were issued to reconsider the respondent’s case for
     promotion. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred D.B. Special
     Appeal Writs No.1695/2008, 14/2009, 15/2009 and 65/2009 whereas
     the respondent also filed D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.24/2009. The
     appeal filed by the respondent was related to his claim for costs.
     Vide common Final Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2021, all these
     writ appeals were dismissed, which has given rise to the present
     four appeals at the instance of the appellants.
     SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
10. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the respondent had
    a chequered history and proved himself unfit for being retained in
    service. It was submitted that even during probation, the respondent
    was found unsuitable and was reverted/asked to handover charge to
    Mr. Amar Chand Dhaka by order dated 06.05.1977 but he disobeyed
    and obstructed him from assuming charge of his office. It was
    submitted that even earlier, when the Registrar had issued directions
    to the respondent to consult the PWD for technical opinion with regard
    to permission for construction of godown of Sadulshahar Jamidara
    Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., without doing so, he himself
    had given such permission and had even appointed Mr. Dharam
    Chand and Mr. Birbal on 04.01.1977 on his own, without permission
    from the Registrar. Further, it was submitted that on 18.05.1977, the
    respondent had issued Order No.995-98 nominating himself as the
    Administrator of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society Ltd.
    while he was reverted from that post and charge was taken from
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       him by Mr. Amar Chand Dhaka. It was contended that during the
       said period, the respondent sold 9 shops at a much lower price than
       the market price without following the due prescribed procedure. He
       submitted that on 30.05.1977 also, the respondent made irregular
       payments and on 21.06.1977, he embezzled Rs.9025/- by withdrawing
       the said amount from the account of the society on the head of
       expenses of stamps which were recovered from shopkeepers and
       the amount was illegally kept with him.
11. Further, it was argued by learned counsel for the appellants that on
    05.07.1977, the respondent prepared a bill of Rs.4,600/- against rent
    without obtaining clearance of the Collector and on 06.05.1977, he
    resumed the post from which he was reverted without authority of law.
    Even the said amount of Rs.4,600/- was not paid by the respondent
    to the landlord. He submitted that on 21.07.1977, the respondent
    embezzled Rs.4,000/- by making fake entry of returning deposit of
    the said amount to Smt. Ganga Bai in the Cash Book, but kept the
    amount without any authority. Similarly, it was submitted that on
    25.07.1977, he received Rs.7,766.83/- and kept it with him, which
    he returned only at the time of inspection under compulsion. Further,
    on 30.07.1977, learned counsel submitted that the respondent made
    irregular and doubtful entries relating to payments made by him during
    the period for which he stood demoted to the post of Inspector. It was
    submitted that another glaring example of the respondent committing
    insubordination was that despite the order of the Collector, Sh.
    Ganganagar dated 01.08.1977, directing the respondent to handover
    charge of Administrator, Hanumangarh Society, he did not handover
    the cash balance and other charge till 19.08.1977.
12. Further contention was that the respondent temporarily embezzled
    an amount of Rs.4,764.36/- of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative
    Society Ltd. and the amount was returned only after the respondent
    got transferred to Bhilwara. It was submitted that even the said amount
    which was due on 18.08.1977 itself was sent by the respondent in the
    shape of Demand Drafts of Rs.3,000/- on 07.02.1979, Rs. 764.36/-
    on 09.02.1979 and Rs.1,000/- on 20.02.1979 i.e., after one and a
    half years. He submitted that on 04.10.1978, the respondent took
    advance of Rs.2,000/- to purchase material for godown while working
    as Administrator of Ravla Sale-purchase Co-operative Society Ltd.
    but did not deposit the same and in the meantime, he was transferred
    to Bhilwara and upon repeated reminders and correspondence he
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                      161

           The State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh


     sent the amount under Demand Draft No.738095 on 20.03.1979.
     Another irregularity pointed out was that the respondent did not take
     any steps for new appointment on 28% posts reserved for Scheduled
     Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates on the one hand, while on the
     other hand he appointed one Rajkumar against reserved post on
     07.10.1978 as a junior clerk in violation of the order.
13. Learned counsel submitted that in the background of such conduct,
    the respondent was placed under suspension in contemplation of
    departmental enquiry by order dated 04.10.1979.
14. Learned counsel submitted that on 03.10.1980, a Charge Sheet
    under Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules was issued levelling 16 charges
    against the respondent, inclusive of sub-charges. During the enquiry,
    10 witnesses were examined, who deposed against the respondent,
    whereafter, on 05.03.1984 and 04.06.1984, detailed statement(s) of
    the respondent was also recorded. The enquiry report was finally
    submitted on 19.04.1984. It was contended that, rightly, the DPC in
    its meeting held on 21.11.1984 did not find the respondent suitable,
    on the ground that he was under suspension at that time. It was
    submitted that though on 22.02.1985 the learned Single Judge of
    the High Court in SBCWP No.590/1983 stayed the operation of the
    order of suspension dated 04.10.1979 against the appellant, but the
    same was with prospective effect and Appeal No.358/85 filed by
    the respondent for considering his promotion to the post of Deputy
    Registrar w.e.f. 23.02.1979 and Joint Registrar w.e.f. 06.04.1985,
    was partly allowed with the direction to convene the DPC for the
    vacancies for the year 1984-85 to review the case of the respondent
    for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. In the meantime, during
    the departmental proceeding against the respondent, charges were
    proved and by order dated 25.09.1985, he was removed from service.
15. It was submitted that though the High Court by order dated 18.12.1991
    in Single Bench Civil Writ Petition No.793/1986 quashed the removal
    order against the respondent, liberty was granted to the appellants
    to conduct an enquiry after giving him a copy of the enquiry report
    and the opinion of the RPSC. In compliance of the said order,
    in the departmental proceedings, the respondent submitted his
    written representation denying all charges and was also heard on
    his representation. However, learned counsel submitted that on
    11.09.1992, the DPC found him suitable for 1980-1981 but not for
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       1979-1980, with the recommendation kept under sealed cover in
       view of the pending departmental enquiry. It was submitted that in
       Contempt Petition No.358/1985, preferred by the respondent, by order
       dated 08.04.1993, the decision of the DPC was found to be proper.
16. Learned counsel submitted that after following all due procedure
    under the law and after affording the respondent full opportunity of
    being heard, the removal order was passed on 28.09.1993, holding
    that in light of the serious nature of the charges and partly/fully five
    charges having been found to be proved by the enquiry officer, there
    were sufficient grounds for punishment. The Contempt Petition filed
    by the respondent was dismissed and Special Appeal No.36/94
    before the Division Bench was also rejected.
17. It was submitted that in this background, when the respondent filed
    four writ petitions challenging the removal order dated 28.09.1993,
    the High Court quashed the removal order on the ground of violation
    of principles of natural justice observing that though there was a
    reference to the representation filed by the respondent but there
    was no discussion in the order. Further, as a consequence, the
    suspension order was also quashed holding the respondent entitled
    for the remaining salary from the date of his suspension till the date
    of fresh removal and stating that the entire period will also be counted
    for the purpose of pension. Moreover, the respondent having been
    found fit for promotion in 1980-1981 but denied the same on the
    ground of pendency of departmental enquiry by keeping the result in
    a sealed cover, the suspension as well as the removal order having
    been quashed, the respondent was held entitled for consideration
    for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar in the year 1979-1980
    and 1980-1981 and all consequential benefits, in the event he was
    so promoted.
18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there has been
    gross miscarriage of justice since despite five charges having been
    proved documentarily, still, on hyper-technicality, the High Court
    interfered. Further, it was contended that the view taken by the
    authorities cannot be said to be perverse as it was also a plausible
    view. It was urged that in such matters, the settled law is that where
    two views are possible, the one taken by the authorities ought not to
    be interfered with, only because there can be another view. Learned
    counsel submitted that the act of the respondent stood admitted with
    regard to his conduct of financial irregularity(ies) and insubordination
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     by not obeying orders relating to his transfer, other directions given
     for permission of construction granted to a Cooperative society as
     also acting beyond jurisdiction of assuming power, both in appointing
     persons as well as appointing himself as an Administrator of a Co-
     operative Society. It was submitted that the Division Bench totally
     erred in not appreciating the points, both legal and factual, raised
     by the appellants. It was further submitted that the Division Bench
     erroneously held that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated as they
     were based on no evidence and were perverse, which finding, learned
     counsel contended, was itself perverse, as there were documents
     to prove the charges, which the respondent had not challenged as
     being forged and/or fabricated. Hence, it was prayed that these
     appeals may be allowed.
     SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT:
19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that both
    the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have concurrently
    held that the enquiry was vitiated, and it was a case of no evidence.
    Thus, this Court may also not interfere in the matter. It was submitted
    that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench found that
    the charge relating to temporary embezzlement is illegal as the same
    was not proved but still he has been found guilty. Moreover, it was
    pointed out that though Charge 1-GA is with regard to embezzlement
    of Rs.9,025/- of the sale of shops, the Appellate Authority had
    exonerated the respondent and the Enquiry Officer did not find the
    respondent guilty of the said charge of embezzlement, but found
    sale of those shops irregular which was not even the charge.
20. Similarly, it was pointed out that the learned Single Judge on the issue
    of competence of the respondent to sell the shop at a lower price
    held that despite the finding of the Enquiry Officer that no loss was
    proved, still the charge has been found proved, which is improper
    and there cannot be any dispute on this account. He submitted that
    the order of the learned Single Judge, which has been upheld by
    the Division Bench, does not require interference. He, therefore,
    impressed upon us that the appeals deserved dismissal.
     ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
21. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that the Impugned
    Judgment cannot be sustained. On a prefatory note, we would begin
    by quoting what the Division Bench has noted on page No.7:
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          ‘It is well settled preposition (sic) of law that courts will not
          act as an Appellate Court and re-assess the evidence led in
          domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
          view was possible on the material on record. If the enquiry
          has been fairly and properly held and findings are based on
          evidence, the question of adequacy of evidence or reliable
          nature of the evidence will be no ground for interfering with
          the finding in departmental enquiry. However, when the
          finding of fact recorded in departmental enquiry is based
          on no evidence or where it is clearly perverse then it will
          invite the intervention of the court.’
22. The learned Single Judge held that the findings returned in the
    enquiry were without evidence, contrary to the record, and as the
    Removal Order based on the same was not reasoned, proceeded to
    quash the same. This course of action adopted by the learned Single
    Judge has been affirmed by the Division Bench. Surprisingly, despite
    noticing the aforesaid position in law relating to non-interference by
    the Appellate Court to re-assess the evidence led in an enquiry or
    to interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the
    material on record, the Division Bench went on to record that the
    learned Single Judge had rightly held that the enquiry proceedings
    were vitiated as they were based on no evidence and were perverse,
    without giving any reasons of its own as to how the learned Single
    Judge had arrived at such a conclusion, namely, that the enquiry
    was based on no evidence and the findings rendered therein were
    perverse. Upon detailed assistance from both sides on the factual
    prism, coupled with the materials on record, we are of the considered
    opinion that the judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge
    and the Division Bench are unsustainable.
23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the
    Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’)
    in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State
    of Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a
    3-Judge Bench stated:
          ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
          under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal
          over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
          enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to
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           determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
           competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure
           prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
           justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
           which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
           enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
           support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
           of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
           petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
           and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
           The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
           departmental authorities have held the proceedings
           against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
           rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
           prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
           have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
           by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
           the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
           influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
           conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
           capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
           arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
           departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
           properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some
           legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
           adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
           which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
           Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
           Constitution.’
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank
    of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned
    Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh
    v Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:
           ‘21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental
           inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions
           were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree
           Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723: (1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964)
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       2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in
       considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct
       charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that
       an offence is not established unless proved by evidence
       beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court
       must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic
       tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article
       226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the
       order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
       invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under
       Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a
       departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court
       is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by
       an authority competent in that behalf and according to the
       procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules
       of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there
       is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the
       duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence
       may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
       officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
       High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
       independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
       may interfere where the departmental authorities have
       held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
       inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
       of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
       where the authorities have disabled themselves from
       reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous
       to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
       themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations
       or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
       arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
       ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental
       authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,
       the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence
       on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or
       reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
       permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
       proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
       xxx
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                              167

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           23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article
           226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not
           as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an
           inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of
           evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
           An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record
           can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however
           grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
           recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that
           in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously
           refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
           erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
           influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is
           based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error
           of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding
           of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
           the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
           before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain
           a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on
           a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
           finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
           See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC
           477: (1964) 5 SCR 64].
           24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
           entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High
           Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that
           the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the
           ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the
           evidence in the present case which was considered by the
           Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the
           conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the
           finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the
           journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is
           not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable
           person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High
           Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence
           and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is
           precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to
           issue a writ of certiorari should not do.
           xxx
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        26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High
        Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by
        reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is
        accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
        Parties will pay and bear their own costs.’
                                             (emphasis supplied)
25. In State Bank of India v S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, two
    learned Judges of this Court held:
        ‘28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear,
        viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to
        any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke
        of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back
        in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket.
        Their applicability depends upon the context and the
        facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder
        Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC
        405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair
        hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going
        to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982)
        1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton
        Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed
        out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
        [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the dividing line between quasi-
        judicial function and administrative function (affecting
        the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost
        indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by House of
        Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
        the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR
        1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where the principles of natural
        justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous.
        Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair
        hearing — applying the test of prejudice, as it may be
        called — that any and every complaint of violation of
        the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined.
        Indeed, there may be situations where observance of
        the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the
        very proceeding — which may result in grave prejudice
        to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of
        post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                         169

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           natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g.,
           Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465].
           There may also be cases where the public interest or
           the interests of the security of State or other similar
           considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the
           rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case
           of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of
           the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material
           on which a particular action is being taken. There may
           indeed be any number of varying situations which it is
           not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful
           opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases
           can be stated in the following terms in relation to the
           disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to
           be made between violation of the principle of natural
           justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of
           a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction
           is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate
           hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity”
           and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take
           a case where the person is dismissed from service
           without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin
           [1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935]).
           It would be a case falling under the first category and
           the order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one
           chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980
           AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]).
           But where the person is dismissed from service, say,
           without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer’s
           report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar
           [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25
           ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of
           cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC
           43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case falling in
           the latter category — violation of a facet of the said rule
           of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the
           order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice,
           i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did
           not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct — in
           the light of the above decisions to say that for any and
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         every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule
         incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether
         void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry.
         In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B.
         Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184
         : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the
         complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice,
         no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording
         a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of
         violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing
         the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the
         touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.’
26. In Union of India v K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it was opined:
         ‘14. The common thread running through in all these
         decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
         administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers
         from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
         conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance
         of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated
         in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture
         Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223:
         (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the
         correctness of the choice made by the administrator open
         to him and the court should not substitute its decision to
         that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is
         limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process
         and not the decision.
         15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed
         by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
         shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
         scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it
         may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
         punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
         thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed
         is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to
         direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
         to reconsider the penalty imposed.’
                                                (emphasis supplied)
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                           171

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27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in State of
    Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:
           ‘15. The legal position is well settled that the power of
           judicial review is not directed against the decision but is
           confined to the decision-making process. The court does
           not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not
           open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise
           the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine
           the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court
           of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant
           case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the
           evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of
           the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from
           manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the
           matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in
           accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the
           matter back to the High Court.’
28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find that the learned
    Single Judge and the Division Bench acted as Courts of Appeal and
    went on to re-appreciate the evidence, which the above-enumerated
    authorities caution against. The present coram, in Bharti Airtel
    Limited v A S Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid down:
           ‘29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise
           the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely
           impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
           However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than
           ordinary in a tribunal’s order, which is facing judicial
           scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference.
           We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present
           facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by
           the respondent in support of his contentions, would not
           apply in the facts at hand.’
                                                  (emphasis supplied)
29. Evidently, while reappraisal of facts and evidence is not impermissible
    by the High Court, the infirmity in the underlying order has to be greater
    than ordinary. It is not the respondent’s case that due to omissions by
    the appellants in substantive and/or procedural compliances, prejudice
    has ensued to him. Let us examine the aspect independently too. The
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       facts reveal that an earlier removal order was quashed, and a copy
       of the Enquiry Report alongwith the RPSC’s opinion was supplied to
       the respondent. The respondent, thereafter, received an opportunity
       to submit a written representation, which he availed of. Further, he
       was afforded an opportunity of hearing as well. In this view, we are
       unable to find any violation of the principles of natural justice.
30. Before the Enquiry Officer, 13 witnesses and 75 documents were
    exhibited on behalf of the Authority. 3 witnesses deposed in defence
    of the delinquent employee-respondent. Considering the evidence
    on record, the Enquiry Officer by his report held certain charges
    levelled against the respondent to have been proved in full/part.
    Subsequently, a fresh Removal Order was passed, agreeing with
    the conclusions drawn by the enquiry officer. This Removal Order
    cannot be said to be based on ‘no evidence’. On perusal thereof, we
    find that the Removal Order is reasoned as on the aspects where
    the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Enquiry Officer’s report,
    reasons therefor have been assigned. On the areas of agreement,
    the Removal Order bears discussion on the relevant evidence.
31. It is well-settled that if the Disciplinary Authority accepts findings
    recorded by the Enquiry Officer and proceeds to impose punishment
    basis the same, no elaborate reasons are required, as explained
    by three learned Judges of this Court vide Boloram Bordoloi v
    Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806:
            ‘11. ... Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary
            authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry
            officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are
            required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment.
            The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded
            in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons
            are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. …’
32. The Removal Order makes it clear that the Disciplinary Authority has
    considered the whole material before it and was satisfied to impose
    punishment on the respondent.
33. The observation on page 7 by the Division Bench makes it apparent
    that it was conscious of the proposition of law but still tried to
    make a distinction, which we do not find just and proper. It runs
    contrary to the record. Though arguments have been addressed
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                      173

           The State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh


     by the appellants with regard to each and every charge, we would
     not go individually into the same as we are not re-appreciating the
     evidence. Suffice it would be to say that broadly, the charges were
     proved based on the factual position, which, in turn, was based on
     official documentation, which at no point of time, the respondent
     has controverted or denied. The respondent has not alleged that
     the documents were non-existent/false/fabricated.
34. The learned Single Judge had also reasoned that there was no
    difference between the earlier order of removal and the Removal
    Order passed subsequently. The learned Single Judge was of the
    view that simple reference to the respondent’s representation had
    been made, but without discussion thereon, as such, the Removal
    Order was passed mechanically and without reasons. Even though
    this ground has not been taken by the respondent qua the Impugned
    Judgment, we deem it fit to deal therewith. Upon a comparative
    overview of both the orders of removal, the similarities between the
    two are inescapable.
35. Having said so, we may point out that the respondent-employee’s
    representation has been considered in the fresh Removal Order,
    albeit not in as many words. Going forward, wherever and whenever
    the Disciplinary Authorities concerned impose a major punishment,
    it will be appropriate for their orders to better engage with the
    representations/submissions of the delinquent employees concerned.
    However, in the instant case, in view of the evidentiary material and
    the process by which a fair opportunity was given to the respondent to
    present his version, we are dissuaded from upholding the Impugned
    Judgment on account of minor deficiency/ies in the process. As noted
    hereinbefore, the same have not caused prejudice to the respondent
    to the extent warranting judicial interdiction.
36. At this juncture, it would be relevant to point out that on a specific
    query to the learned counsel for the respondent apropos the charges
    pertaining to non-handing over of full charge at the relevant point
    of time; appointing persons without permission from the Collector/
    Registrar; as also, returning the money after one and a half years
    by the respondent, learned counsel could not controvert the factual
    position and only relied upon the judgment rendered by the learned
    Single Judge and the Impugned Judgment. Moreover, looking to the
    respondent’s conduct, we do not find any arbitrariness or perversity
    in the punishment awarded to him.
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37. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded above, the Impugned Judgment
    is quashed and set aside, and the Removal Order dated 28.09.1993
    passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored. Consequences in law
    to follow. However, by way of extraordinary indulgence, keeping in
    mind the fact that the respondent has retired and is aged, payments,
    if any, already made to him in the interregnum, shall not be recovered
    by the appellants. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
    No order as to costs.

       Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain