THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERSversusM/S MOTI RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER

                         [2019] 12 S.C.R. 589                           589


        THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS                             A
                                 v.
          M/S MOTI RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER
                (Civil Appeal No. 6996 of 2019 etc.)
                      SEPTEMBER 04, 2019                                B

 [ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
      Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
      s. 11A - Applicability of - Failure to declare award u/s. 11
within a period of 2 years from the date of publication of              C
declaration u/s. 6, due to stay order by High Court in respect of
land belonging to other land-owners - Whether would attract s.
11A - Held: If there is stay over the land acquisition proceedings
by the Court, in one or the other matter arising from the self-same
acquisition proceedings in reference to s. 4 followed by s. 6, the      D
authorities would be justified to stay their hands and await decision
of the Court - Period during which there is stay over the
proceedings, has to be excluded, in computing the statutory period
of two years in passing of an award u/s. 11 - In the present case,
the case in which the High Court had stayed the proceedings was         E
in respect of the land of same village under the very notification
and for the very project - The period during which the stay was
operative,is to be excluded - On exclusion of the said period,
acquisition proceedings would not lapse,in view of explanation to
s. 11A - Limitation.
                                                                        F
      Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1. When the scheme of the acquisition is one,
interim stay granted in respect of one pocket of land would
operate even with respect to other pockets of land and in such
a situation the authorities are justified in not proceeding with        G
the acquisition proceedings and therefore the acquisition
proceedings would not lapse. Interim order of stay granted in
respect of one of the land owners would have a complete
restraint for the authorities to proceed further. When the stay
has been granted in one matter and where the scheme was one,
                                                                        H
                                589
590           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     the authorities were justified to stay their hands.   [Para 7.5 (i),
      (ii) and (iii).] [604-D-F]
            2. The extended meaning of the words “stay of the action
      or proceedings under Section 11A of the Act” would mean that
      any interim effective order passed by the court which may come
B     in the way of the authorities to proceed further. Explanation to
      Section 11A of the Act is in the widest possible terms and there
      is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings, referred to
      in the explanation, to actions or proceedings preceding the
      making of the award under Section 11 of the Act and therefore
      the period of injunction obtained by the land holders staying the
C     acquisition and authorities from taking possession of the land
      has to be excluded in computing the period of two years. [Para
      7.5 (iv) and (v)] [604-G-H; 605-A]
            3. Merely because when award was declared, the lands
      with respect to Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 were
D     excluded and therefore, it cannot be said that the period during
      which the stay was operating in the aforesaid Writ Petitions shall
      not be excluded. The words “stay of the action or proceedings
      under Section 11A of the Act” would mean that any order of stay
      in one or the other matter if passed by Court of law, which either
      prohibits or prevents the State authorities from passing of an
E
      award, such a period of stay of action/proceedings deserves to
      be excluded while computing the statutory period of two years
      in passing of an award by the authority under Section 11 of the
      Act. Even otherwise, there was already a stay of possession in
      Writ Petition No. 7867/2012 and therefore the authorities were
F     justified in not proceeding further with the acquisition
      proceedings. [Para 7.6] [605-C-E]
             4. It is true that there is no bar to have more than one
      declaration under Section 6 or the award under Section 11 of the
      Act in reference to the self-same acquisition proceedings
G     initiated under Section 4 followed with Section 6 of the Act but
      if there is a stay of the proceedings by a Court of law in any of
      the matter, that certainly prevents the authorities in taking its
      decision to complete the acquisition proceedings within the
      statutory period as mandated by law in passing of award within
      two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the
H     Act. [Para 7.7] [605-F-G]
   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                        591
            RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER

       5. Thus, if there is any stay over the action or proceeding    A
by a Court of law, in one or the other matter arising from the
self-same acquisition proceedings in reference to Section 4
followed with Section 6 of the Act, the authorities are said to be
justified in the given facts and circumstances to stay their hands
and await the decision of the Court and such a period during          B
which there is a stay over the action or proceeding by a Court
of law in a matter, that has to be excluded for all practical
purposes, in computing the statutory period of two years in
passing of an award under Section 11 of the Act. [Para 7 and 8]
[605-H; 606-A-B]
                                                                      C
       6. In the present case, considering the fact that there was
a stay granted by the High Court in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013
and 3159/2013 (filed by other landlords) against declaring the
final award and the said writ petitions were with respect to the
lands acquired of the very village under the very notification and    D
for the very project and there was stay of possession in writ
petition in the present case during the pendency of the said
petition, the period during which the aforesaid stay/s was/were
operative is to be excluded and if the said period is excluded,
in that case, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse,
                                                                      E
considering explanation to Section 11A of the Act. Under the
circumstances, the High Court has erred in quashing and setting
aside the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the same
have lapsed as the award was not declared within a period of
two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the
Act. The High Court has committed a grave error in not                F
excluding the period of interim stay granted by it in writ petition
nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013. Even grant of interim stay of
possession would also save lapsing of the acquisition. [Para 8]
[606-B-E]
                                                                      G
      G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka
      (1991) 3 SCC 261 : [1991] 2 SCR 563 ; Yusufbhai
      Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4
      SCC 531 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 158 ; Gandhi Grah
      Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v.. State of Rajasthan
      (1993) 2 SCC 662 : [1993] 2 SCR 788; Hansraj H.                 H
592            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           Jain v. State of Maharashtra (1993) 3 SCC 634 :
            [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 216 ; Sangappa Gurulingappa
            Sajjan v. State of Karnataka (1994) 4 SCC 145 ; Abhey
            Ram v.Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3
            SCR 931 ; Om Prakash v. Union of India (2010) 4
            SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447 ; Raj Kumar Gandhi v.
B
            Chandigarh Administration and others (2018) 7 SCC
            763 - relied on.
                             Case Law Reference
      [1991] 2 SCR 563                   relied on            Para 5.4
C     [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 158            relied on            Para 5.4
      [1993] 2 SCR 788                   relied on            Para 5.4
      [1993] 1Suppl. SCR 216             relied on            Para 5.4
      (1994) 4 SCC 145                   relied on            Para 5.4
D
      [1997] 3 SCR 931                   relied on            Para 5.4
      [2010] 2 SCR 447                   relied on            Para 5.4
      (2018) 7 SCC 763                   relied on            Para 5.4
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6996
E     of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 24.03.2017 of the High
      Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition
      No. 7867 of 2012.
            With
F
            Civil Appeal Nos. 6998, 6997 of 2019.
            Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Anoop Kandari, Advs. for
      the Appellants.
             Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Nachiketa Joshi, Subodh S. Patil, Advs.
G     for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J.
            1. Delay condoned in Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.3189/
H     2019. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                                  593
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      2. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of              A
appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
       3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgments and orders dated 24.03.2017 and 27.04.2018 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ
Petition Nos. 7867/2012, 10894/2016 and 9088/2016, by which the High             B
Court has allowed the said writ petitions and has quashed the entire
acquisition proceedings with respect to the acquired lands solely on the
ground that the acquisition has lapsed as the awards under Section 11
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act')
were not declared within a period of two years from the date of
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, the State of Maharashtra            C
and others have preferred the present appeals.
       3.1 For the sake of convenience, the facts in the appeal arising
out of special leave petition No. 23921/2018 arising out of the impugned
judgment and order dated 24.03.2017 passed by the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 7867/2012 are considered as the facts in other two appeals          D
are identical.
       4. That the acquired land in question is situated within the local
limits of village Asarjan, Taluka and District Nanded. That the
notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and published in the
Official Gazette on 01.03.2012. The same was published at Village                E
Chawdi Asarjan by beating of drums on 12.04.2012. That thereafter
notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 07.02.2013
and the notification under Section 6 of the Act was published at Village
Chawdi Asarjan by beating of drums on 13.02.2013.
       4.1 That the original land owners challenged the acquisition and          F
the notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 01.03.2012 by filing
Writ Petition No. 7867 of 2012 on 09.05.2012. That vide order dated
11.10.2013, the High Court directed that the possession of the original
writ petitioners shall not be disturbed. The other land owners, whose
lands were acquired for the very project and under the very Section 4            G
notification dated 01.03.2012, also challenged the acquisition proceedings
and Section 4 notification with respect to their lands by filing Writ Petition
Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013. In those writ petitions also the High
Court granted stay to the acquisition proceedings vide order dated
12.11.2013. It appears that by order dated 20.11.2013, the High Court
in Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 modified the earlier               H
594            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     interim order and directed that till the next date, final award shall not
      be declared. However, the State was permitted to move an application
      seeking leave of the Court to declare the award, if the award is ready.
      That the aforesaid two writ petitions came to be disposed of vide order
      dated 08.01.2014. However, the High Court continued the interim order
      dated 20.11.2013 by 12 weeks. The 12 weeks period got over on
B     02.04.2014. That thereafter the award under Section 11 of the Act was
      passed on 08.05.2015 with respect to the acquired lands in question,
      i.e., in the case of Writ Petition No. 7867/2012. At this stage, it is
      required to be noted that the acquisition was challenged on number of
      grounds. However, at the time of hearing of Writ Petition No. 7867/
C     2012, it was submitted that the entire acquisition has been lapsed as
      the award was not declared within a period of two years from the date
      of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It was
      submitted on behalf of the State that in view of the pending proceedings
      challenging the acquisition as well as in view of the interim stay granted
      by the High Court directing that the possession of the acquired land
D     shall not be disturbed and in view of the specific stay order granted in
      Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 restraining the State from
      declaring final award, the period during which stay was operating is
      required to be excluded and if such period is excluded, in that case,
      the award was declared within a period of two years and therefore
E     there is no question of lapsing the acquisition proceedings. However,
      by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has set aside the
      acquisition proceedings solely on the ground that the acquisition has
      lapsed as the award under Section 11 of the Act has not been declared
      within a period of two years from the date of publication of the
      declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It is required to be noted that
F     so far as challenge to the acquisition on other grounds is concerned,
      the High Court held against the original writ petitioners. However, set
      aside the acquisition solely on the ground that the award under Section
      11 of the Act has not been declared within a period of two years from
      the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
G           4.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order passed by the High Court in quashing and setting aside the
      acquisition, the State has preferred the present appeal. So far as other
      two appeals are concerned, the original writ petitioners subsequently
      challenged the acquisition in the year 2016 after the declaration of the
      award under Section 11 of the Act challenging the acquisition
H     proceedings also on the ground that as the award has not been declared
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                              595
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

within a period of two years from the date of declaration under Section      A
6 of the Act the acquisition proceedings have been lapsed. Accepting
the submission on behalf of the original writ petitioners, by the impugned
common judgment and order, the High Court has quashed and set aside
the acquisition proceedings considering Section 11A of the Act and on
the ground that the acquisition proceedings have been lapsed as the
award under Section 11 of the Act has not been declared within a period      B
of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
Hence, these appeals by grant of special leave petitions.
       5. Shri Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant - State has vehemently submitted
that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has          C
materially erred in quashing and setting aside the acquisition on the
ground that the award under Section 11 of the Act has not been declared
within a period of two years from the date of declaration under Section
6 of the Act.
       5.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Katneshwarkar, learned         D
Advocate appearing for the appellants that the High Court has
materially erred in not properly appreciating the fact that in view of
the challenge to the acquisition proceedings and stay of possession
granted by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 7867/2012 and even
the stay of the acquisition proceedings and against declaring the award
                                                                             E
in Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013, the award under Section
11 of the Act was not declared. It is submitted that excluding the period
during which the stay was granted, more particularly stay granted in
Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013, subsequent declaration of
the award can be said to be within the period prescribed under Section
11 of the Act.                                                               F
       5.2 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants that the High Court has erred in holding that
as respondent no.1 herein - original writ petitioner was not a party to
Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013, the extension of period
during which stay was in operation in the said writ petitions was not        G
applicable to the case of respondent no.1. It is submitted that as such
writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 were with respect to the
lands acquired under the same notification and with respect to the very
village and the project and therefore the authority was justified in not
declaring the award in the present case during the period the stay was
operating in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.                     H
596            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
      behalf of the appellants that even in the present case there was a stay
      against possession and the entire acquisition proceedings were under
      challenge and therefore the authority was justified in not declaring the
      award, which was declared subsequently, more particularly after the
      vacation of the stay granted in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/
B
      2013.
             5.4 In support of his submission that in the facts and
      circumstances of the case the authorities were justified in not proceeding
      with the acquisition proceedings including not declaring the award and
      therefore acquisition proceedings would not lapse, Shri Katneshwarkar,
C     learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has relied upon
      the following decisions of this Court in the cases of G. Narayanaswamy
      Reddy v. State of Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261; Yusufbhai
      Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531;
      Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. V. State of Rajasthan
D     (1993) 2 SCC 662; Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra (1993)
      3 SCC 634; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka
      (1994) 4 SCC 145; Abhey Ram v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC
      421; Om Prakash v. Union of India (2010) 4 SCC 17; and the recent
      decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Gandhi v. Chandigarh
      Administration and others (2018) 7 SCC 763.
E
             5.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
      decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set
      aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court.
            6. Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
F     behalf of the respondents - original writ petitioners.
             6.1 While opposing the present appeals and supporting the
      impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, Shri Navare,
      learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ
      petitioners has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
G     of the case, the High Court has rightly quashed and set aside the
      acquisition proceedings on the ground that the award under Section 11
      of the Act has not been declared within a period of two years from
      the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It is submitted that
      in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly
      observed that Section 11A of the Act would be attracted and therefore
H     due to non-declaration of the award within a period of two years from
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                               597
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the acquisition           A
proceedings have been lapsed.
       6.2 It is further submitted by Shri Navare, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners that in fact
there was no stay by the High Court restraining the authorities from
declaring the award and the only stay was granted with respect to             B
possession and therefore it was always open for the authorities to
declare the award under Section 11 of the Act to avoid lapsing of
proceedings. It is submitted that however the authorities did not declare
the award. It is submitted that therefore as there was no stay either to
the acquisition proceedings and/or against declaring the final award, as
rightly observed by the High Court, there is no question of any exclusion     C
of the period. It is submitted that therefore the award under Section 11
of the Act was beyond the period of two years and therefore
considering Section 11A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings
would lapse.
       6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Navare, learned Senior             D
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners that as
rightly observed by the High Court the stay to the acquisition proceedings
and/or against declaring the final award was in other petitions, i.e., Writ
Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 and not relating to the petitioners
land and therefore the exclusion of period of stay granted in writ petition   E
Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 shall not be available to the State/
authorities with respect to the original writ petitioners land.
       6.4 Now so far as reliance placed upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Raj Kumar Gandhi (supra), relied upon by the learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the State is concerned, Shri Navare,          F
learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ
petitioners has submitted that the said decision shall not be applicable
to the facts of the case on hand as in the instant case the Land
Acquisition Officer has chosen to keep the land, with respect to which
stay was granted, away from the declaration of the award (Writ Petition
Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013) and the award was declared with                 G
respect to rest of the land. It is submitted that therefore the award in
the case of the writ petitioners will have to comply with the mandate
of Section 11A of the Act.
      6.5 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals.                                                              H
598            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A            7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
      at length.
            7.1 (A) The short question posed for the consideration of this
      Court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High
      Court is justified in quashing and setting aside the entire acquisition
B     proceedings on the ground that the same have lapsed under Section
      11A of the Act? (B) The moot question which arises for our
      consideration is whether the stay of action/proceedings by some of the
      land holders prohibiting/preventing the State authorities to make the
      award under Section 11 of the Act, within a statutory period of two
C     years provided under Section 11A of the Act from declaration under
      Section 6 of the Act would be equally extendable to the other alike
      cases of land holders/persons interested/respondents in the instant case?
             7.2 Now so far as the appeal arising out of the impugned
      judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 7867/
D     2012 is concerned, immediately on publication of the notification under
      Section 4 of the Act, the original writ petitioners challenged the
      acquisition proceedings including the notification under Section 4 of the
      Act. The High Court passed the interim order directing that the
      possession of the original writ petitioners shall not be disturbed.
      Simultaneously, the other land owners whose lands were acquired under
E     the very same notification and of the very village Asarjan and acquired
      for the very project also challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing
      Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013. The High Court granted
      stay to the acquisition proceedings on 12.11.2013 which subsequently
      came to be modified and it was directed that the final award shall not
F     be declared. Other two writ petitions being Writ Petition Nos. 10894/
      2016 and 9088/2016 were filed after the award was declared under
      Section 11 of the Act challenging the acquisition proceedings on the
      ground that the same have been lapsed under Section 11A of the Act
      as the award has not been declared within a period of two years. The
      State authorities pleaded for extension of time during which the stay
G
      was operating in writ petition nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013. It has not
      been accepted by the High Court on the ground that the stay of the
      acquisition proceedings was granted not relating to the writ petitioners
      but was with respect to the other land owners. Therefore, the question
      which is required to be considered is, whether the authorities were
H     justified in not declaring the award in the case of other land owners in
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                                599
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

view of granting of the stay to the acquisition proceedings with respect       A
to other lands acquired, which were acquired under the very notification
and for the very project.
      7.3 In the recent decision in the case of Raj Kumar Gandhi
(supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the applicability of
Section 11A of the Act. After considering catena of decisions of this          B
Court on the applicability of Section 11A of the Act, this Court observed
and held that where scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay
granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even in respect
of other pockets of land and therefore the authorities were justified in
not proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and consequently the
                                                                               C
acquisition proceedings would not lapse. In the same decision, this Court
has considered the earlier decisions of this Court in the cases of
G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (supra); Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendoliya (supra); Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti
Ltd.(supra); Hansraj H. Jain (supra); Sangappa Gurulingappa
Sajjan (supra); Abhey Ram (supra); and Om Prakash(supra). In                   D
the case of Raj Kumar Gandhi (supra), in which one of us (Brother
Arun Mishra, J. was a member), this Court has dealt with and
considered the earlier decisions of this Court with respect to applicability
of Section 11A of the Act in paragraphs 11, 12, 15 and 16 as under:
      “11. In Abhey Ram [Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997)                   E
      5 SCC 421] this Court has considered the extended meaning of
      the words “stay of the action or proceedings” and referring to
      various decisions, observed that any type of the orders passed
      by the Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the
      authorities to proceed further. This Court has observed thus:
                                                                               F
      (SCC pp. 428-29, para 9)
            “9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union
            of India [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine
            Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150] are obvious with reference
            to the quashing of the publication of the declaration under
                                                                               G
            Section 6 vis-à-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question
            that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained
            by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents
            from publication of the declaration under Section 6 would
            equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants.
            We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not              H
600   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A      obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but
       since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact,
       prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication
       of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not
       restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support
       of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their
B      hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court
       has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or
       proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai
       Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai
       Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4
C      SCC 531] ; Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra
       [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC
       634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of
       Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of
       Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] ; Gandhi Grah Nirman
       Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [Gandhi Grah
D      Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993)
       2 SCC 662] ; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of
       Karnataka [G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of
       Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261] and Roshanara Begum v.
       Union of India [Roshanara Begum v. Union of India,
E      (1986) 1 Apex Dec 6 (SC)] . The words "stay of the action
       or proceeding" have been widely interpreted by this Court
       and mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court
       would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities
       to proceed further. When the action of conducting an
       enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the
F      declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily
       unless the Court holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was
       properly conducted and the declaration published under
       Section 6 was valid, it would not be open to the officers to
       proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay
       granted in respect of some would be applicable to others
G      also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not
       concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with
       regard to Section 5-A enquiry and consideration of
       objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union.
       We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open
H      to doubt.”
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                               601
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       12. In Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union               A
of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court as to
the effect of interim stay has observed thus: (SCC p. 44, para 72)
      “72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in
      one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint
      on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification      B
      under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification
      during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously
      they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court.
      The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such
      that it had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding
                                                                              C
      further in the matter by issuing declaration/notification under
      Section 6 of the Act.”
       15. The learned counsel has also relied upon Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] in
                                                                              D
which this Court has opined that the Explanation to Section 11-A is in
the widest possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action
or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings
preceding the making of the award under Section 11. Therefore, the
period of an injunction obtained by the landholder from the High Court
restraining the land acquisition authorities from taking possession of the    E
land has to be excluded in computing the period of two years. The
decision is of no help to the submission espoused on behalf of the
appellant. This Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya[Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531]
observed: (SCC p. 535, para 8)
                                                                              F
      “8. The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in
      our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or
      proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or
      proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section
      11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single
                                                                              G
      Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the
      possession can be taken before an award is made and we see
      no reason why the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should
      be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case
      is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it
      appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit         H
602            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under
            Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The
            benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two
            years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings
            would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order
            to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that
B
            the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any
            order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in
            pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so
            that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders
            who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or
C           prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land
            acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in
            taking a similar view in the impugned judgment.”
             16. Reliance has also been placed on Sangappa Gurulingappa
      Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v.
D     State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] , in which this Court has laid
      down that in case there was a stay of dispossession, no useful purpose
      would be served by issuing a declaration under Section 6. Therefore,
      the period during which the order of dispossession granted by the High
      Court operated, should be excluded in the computing period. In
E     Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan
      v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] this Court observed: (SCC
      pp. 147-48, para 2)
            “2. The petitioner contends that the declaration under Section 6
            was not published within three years from the date of the
F           Notification dated 17-5-1984 and, therefore, the Notification under
            Section 4(1) shall stand lapsed. We find no substance in the
            contention. Firstly, the case would be dismissed on a short ground
            that though this plea was available to the petitioner, he did not
            raise the same in the first instance and that, therefore, by
            operation of Section 11 CPC, it operates as constructive res
G           judicata. Under first proviso to Section 6(1), as amended in Land
            Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 through Section 6
            thereof that (i) no declaration in respect of any particular land
            covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) shall
            be published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
H           (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                               603
  RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

 commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984,              A
 after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of
 the notification; or (ii) after the commencement of the Land
 Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the
 expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the
 notification. In other words, under the pre-Amendment Act the
                                                                          B
 declaration under Section 6(1) shall not be published after the
 expiry of three years from the date of Section 4(1) publication
 and after the commencement of the Amendment Act, the State
 has no power to proceed with the matter and publish the
 declaration under Section 6(1) after the expiry of one year from
 the date of the publication of the notification. Explanation 1 thereto   C
 provides the method or mode of computation of the period
 referred to in the first proviso, namely, the period during which
 “any action or proceeding” be taken in pursuance of the
 notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 being
 "stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded". In other words,       D
 the period occupied by the order of stay made by a court shall
 be excluded. Admittedly, pending writ petition on both the
 occasions the High Court granted “stay of dispossession”.
 Admittedly, the validity or tenability of the notification issued and
 published under Section 4(1) is subject of adjudication before the
 High Court. Till the writ petitions are disposed of or the appeals       E
 following its heels, the stay of dispossession was in operation.
 Though there is no specific direction prohibiting the publication
 of the declaration under Section 6, no useful purpose would be
 served by publishing Section 6(1) declaration pending adjudication
 of the legality of Section 4(1) notification. If any action is taken     F
 to pre-empt the proceedings, it would be stigmatised either as
 “undue haste” or action to “overreach the court's judicial
 process”. Therefore, the period during which the order of
 dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be
 excluded in computation of the period of three years covered by
                                                                          G
 clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition Act. When
 it is so computed, the declaration published on the second occasion
 is perfectly valid. Under these circumstances, we do not find any
 justification to quash the notification published under Section 6
 dated 17-5-1984. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed.
 No costs.”                                                               H
604            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           7.4 That thereafter in paragraphs 13 and 17, this Court has
      observed and held as under:
            “13. Thus, it is apparent that when the stay has been granted in
            one matter and when the scheme was one, authorities were
            justified in the facts and circumstances of the instant case to stay
B           their hands. Moreover, a large number of writ petitions have been
            dismissed by the High Court and orders have attained finality and
            this Court has also dismissed the appeals/SLPs. Thus, we are
            not inclined to take a different view in the instant case.
            17. In the instant case, various notifications and declarations
C           under Sections 4 and 6 were issued on the same date with
            respect to the same scheme. Thus, they were part and parcel
            of the same scheme. Thus, the submission raised by the learned
            counsel for the appellant stands rejected.”
            7.5 On considering catena of decisions of this Court, referred to
D     hereinabove, the following propositions of law can be culled out:
              (i) when the scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay
                  granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even
                  with respect to other pockets of land and in such a situation
                  the authorities are justified in not proceeding with the
E                 acquisition proceedings and therefore the acquisition
                  proceedings would not lapse;
             (ii) interim order of stay granted in respect of one of the land
                  owners would have a complete restraint for the authorities
                  to proceed further;
F            (iii) when the stay has been granted in one matter and where
                   the scheme was one, the authorities were justified to stay
                   their hands;
            (iv) the extended meaning of the words "stay of the action or
                 proceedings under Section 11A of the Act" would mean that
G                any interim effective order passed by the court which may
                 come in the way of the authorities to proceed further;
             (v) Explanation to Section 11A of the Act is in the widest
                 possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action
                 or proceedings, referred to in the explanation, to actions or
H                proceedings preceding the making of the award under
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. M/S MOTI                                 605
      RATAN ESTATE AND ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

            Section 11 of the Act and therefore the period of injunction        A
            obtained by the land holders staying the acquisition and
            authorities from taking possession of the land has to be
            excluded in computing the period of two years.
       7.6 Now so far as submission on behalf of the original writ
petitioners that when subsequently the award was declared, the lands            B
with respect to Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 were
excluded and therefore the decision of this Court in the case of Raj
Kumar Gandhi (supra) shall not be applicable has no substance.
Merely because to avoid contempt proceedings and/or in view of the
stay granted in the aforesaid two writ petitions which was continued
subsequently till the representations are considered, the authorities           C
excluded the lands for which writ petitions were filed, it cannot be said
that the period during which the stay was operating in Writ Petition Nos.
3051/2013 and 3159/2013 shall not be excluded. The words “stay of
the action or proceedings under Section 11A of the Act” would mean
that any order of stay in one or the other matter if passed by Court of         D
law, which either prohibits or prevents the State authorities from passing
of an award, such a period of stay of action/proceedings deserves to
be excluded while computing the statutory period of two years in
passing of an award by the authority under Section 11 of the Act. Even
otherwise, as observed hereinabove, there was already a stay of
possession in Writ Petition No. 7867/2012 and therefore even otherwise          E
the authorities were justified in not proceeding further with the acquisition
proceedings.
      7.7 It is true that there is no bar to have more than one declaration
under Section 6 or the award under Section 11 of the Act in reference
to the self-same acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4              F
followed with Section 6 of the Act but if there is a stay of the
proceedings by a Court of law in any of the matter, that certainly
prevents the authorities in taking its decision to complete the acquisition
proceedings within the statutory period as mandated by law in passing
of award within two years from the date of declaration under Section            G
6 of the Act.
      7.8 In meeting out a complex situation, the conclusion which
emerges is that if there is any stay over the action or proceeding by a
Court of law, in one or the other matter arising from the self-same
acquisition proceedings in reference to Section 4 followed with Section         H
606             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     6 of the Act, the authorities are said to be justified in the given facts
      and circumstances to stay their hands and await the decision of the
      Court and such a period during which there is a stay over the action or
      proceeding by a Court of law in a matter, that has to be excluded for
      all practical purposes, in computing the statutory period of two years
      in passing of an award under Section 11 of the Act.
B
             8. Applying the aforesaid principles of law to the facts of the
      case on hand and considering the fact that there was a stay granted
      by the High Court in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013 against
      declaring the final award and the said writ petitions were with respect
      to the lands acquired of the very village under the very notification and
C     for the very project and there was stay of possession in writ petition
      no. 7867/2012 during the pendency of the said petition, the period during
      which the aforesaid stay/s was/were operative is to be excluded and if
      the said period is excluded, in that case, the acquisition proceedings would
      not lapse, considering explanation to Section 11A of the Act. Under the
D     circumstances, the High Court has erred in quashing and setting aside
      the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the same have lapsed
      as the award was not declared within a period of two years from the
      date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The High Court has
      committed a grave error in not excluding the period of interim stay
      granted by it in writ petition nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013. As observed
E     hereinabove, even grant of interim stay of possession would also save
      lapsing of the acquisition.
             9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all these
      appeals succeed. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the
      High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ
F     petitions filed before the High Court stand dismissed. In the facts and
      circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.


      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                          Appeals allowed.

G




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