THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusSURESH

836                       [2019]
               SUPREME COURT     5 S.C.R. 836
                              REPORTS                      [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A                   THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                        v.
                                    SURESH
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 319 of 2019)
B                            FEBRUARY 20, 2019
                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
                       DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
             Sentencing – Principle of Proportionality – Case of the
C     prosecution that the accused-respondent assaulted his father who
      later succumbed to the injury – Trial Court found the respondent
      guilty u/s.304 Part II, IPC and awarded him 3 years’ rigorous
      imprisonment while setting off the period of detention already
      undergone (3 months, 21 days) against the term of imprisonment
      imposed on him – High Court though upheld the conviction of the
D
      respondent but modified the sentence of 3 years’ rigorous
      imprisonment to that of the period already undergone i.e. 3 months
      and 21 days – On appeal, held: When an accused is convicted for
      the offence u/Part II of s.304, he could be sentenced to imprisonment
      for a term which may extend to a period of 10 years, or with fine, or
E     both – In this case, the Trial Court chose to award 3 years’ rigorous
      imprisonment to the respondent – Punishment so awarded by the
      Trial Court was itself leaning towards leniency, essentially in view
      of the fact that the respondent was 26 years of age at the time of the
      incident in question – However, the High Court further reduced the
      punishment to the period already undergone – Further indulgence
F
      by the High Court, over and above the leniency already shown by
      the Trial Court was totally uncalled for – High Court omitted to
      consider the requirement of balancing the mitigating and
      aggravating factors while dealing with the question of awarding
      adequate punishment – Punishment to be awarded in a case has to
G     be commensurate with the gravity of crime as also with the relevant
      facts and attending circumstances – Offending act in question had
      been of respondent assaulting his father and then the attempt to
      cover up the crime by taking his father to hospital and suggesting
      as if the victim sustained injury because of fall from the roof – Acts
      and deeds of the respondent had been of killing his own father and
H
                                       836
       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                           837


then, of furnishing false information – In such a case, there was no   A
further scope for leniency on the question of punishment than what
was already shown by the Trial Court – High Court not justified in
reducing the sentence to an abysmally inadequate period of less
than 4 months – Judgment of the High Court set aside and
that of the Trial Court restored – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.201, 304
                                                                       B
Part II, 302.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 The High Court interfered with and reduced
the sentence awarded by the Trial Court on rather irrelevant
considerations, while ignoring the relevant factors and the            C
governing principles for the award of punishment and hence, the
order impugned cannot be sustained. With the evidence on record,
it was clearly established that the respondent was author of the
fatal injury in question. [Para 10-11][843-B-D]
      1.2 Awarding of just and adequate punishment to the wrong        D
doer in case of proven crime remains a part of duty of the Court.
The punishment to be awarded in a case has to be commensurate
with the gravity of crime as also with the relevant facts and
attending circumstances. The task is of striking a delicate balance
between the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. No strait
jacket formula for sentencing is available but the requirement of      E
taking a holistic view of the matter cannot be forgotten. In the
process of sentencing, any one factor, whether of extenuating
circumstance or aggravating, cannot, by itself, be decisive of the
matter. [Paras 14, 15][847-E-H]
       1.3 When an accused is convicted for the offence under          F
Part II of Section 304, he could be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term which may extend to a period of 10 years, or with fine,
or both. In this case, the Trial Court chose to award the
punishment of 3 years’ rigorous imprisonment to the respondent.
The punishment so awarded by the Trial Court had itself been           G
leaning towards leniency, essentially in view of the fact that the
respondent was 26 years of age at the time of the incident in
question. However, the High Court further proceeded to reduce
the punishment to the period already undergone (i.e., 3 months
and 21 days) on consideration of the factors: (i) that the incident
                                                                       H
838            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     had taken place at spur of the moment; (ii) that the respondent
      was 26 years of age at the time of incident; and (iii) that the
      respondent himself took his father to hospital. On these
      considerations and after finding that the respondent had spent 3
      months and 21 days in custody, the High Court concluded that
      “no useful purpose would be served in sending appellant back to
B
      jail”. Further indulgence by the High Court, over and above the
      leniency already shown by the Trial Court, was totally uncalled
      for. So far the mitigating factors, as taken into consideration by
      the High Court are concerned, the same had already gone into
      consideration when the Trial Court awarded a comparatively lesser
C     punishment of 3 years’ imprisonment for the offence punishable
      with imprisonment for a term that may extend to 10 years, or
      with fine, or with both. In fact, the factor that the incident had
      happened at the ‘spur of moment’ had been the basic reason for
      the respondent having been convicted for the offence of culpable
      homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC
D
      though he was charged for the offence of murder under Section
      302 IPC. This factor could not have resulted in awarding just a
      symbolic punishment. Then, the factor that the respondent was
      26 years of age had been the basic reason for awarding
      comparatively lower punishment of 3 years’ imprisonment. This
E     factor has no further impelling characteristics which would justify
      yet further reduction of the punishment than that awarded by the
      Trial Court. Moreover, the third factor, of the respondent himself
      taking his father to hospital, carries with it the elements of
      pretence as also deception on the part of the respondent,
      particularly when he falsely stated that the victim sustained injury
F
      due to the fall.[Paras 17, 18][848-F-H; 849-A-E]
            1.4 The High Court also appears to have omitted to consider
      the requirement of balancing the mitigating and aggravating
      factors while dealing with the question of awarding just and
      adequate punishment. The facts and the surrounding factors of
G     this case make it clear that, the offending act in question had
      been of respondent assaulting his father with a blunt object which
      resulted in the fracture of skull of the victim at parietal region.
      Then, the respondent attempted to cover up the crime by taking
      his father to hospital and suggesting as if the victim sustained
H
        THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                           839


injury because of fall from the roof. Thus, the acts and deeds of       A
the respondent had been of killing his own father and then, of
furnishing false information. The homicidal act of the respondent
had, in fact, been of patricide; killing of one’s own father. In such
a case, there was no further scope for leniency on the question of
punishment than what had already been shown by the Trial Court;
                                                                        B
and the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence to
an abysmally inadequate period of less than 4 months. The
observations of the High Court that no useful purpose would be
served by detention of the accused cannot be approved in this
case for the reason that the objects of deterrence as also protection
of society are not lost with mere passage of time. [Para 19]            C
[849-F-H; 850-A-B]
      Jinnat Mia v. State of Assam (1998) 9 SCC 319 – held
      inapplicable.
      State of M.P. v. Ganshyam (2003) 8 SCC 13 : [2003]
      3 Suppl. SCR 618 ; Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of            D
      Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : [2012] 1 SCR
      145 – relied on.
      Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1953 SC
      131 : [1953] SCR 546 ; State of Karnataka v.
      Krishnappa (2004) 4 SCC 75 ; Dalbir Singh v. State of             E
      Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 : [2000] 3 SCR 1000 ; State
      of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554 : [2005] 1 Suppl.
      SCR 562 ; Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC
      175:[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195 – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference                               F
[1953] SCR 546                 referred to             Para 6
[2012] 1 SCR 145               relied on               Para 9
(1998) 9 SCC 319               held inapplicable       Para 9
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 618        relied on               Para 12          G

(2004) 4 SCC 75                referred to             Para 13
[2000] 3 SCR 1000              referred to             Para 13
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 562        referred to             Para 13
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840            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195           referred to               Para 13
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 319 of 2019.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2012 of the High Court
      of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur Criminal Appeal No. 260 of 1998.
B
            Varun K. Chopra, AAG, Mrs.Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey,
      Mukesh Kumar, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Ms.Aparna Trivedi, Santanu Singh,
      Gurtej Pal Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
           D. P. Chaturvedi, (A.C.), Ms. Priyank Jain, Advs. for the
C     Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            DINESH MAHESHWARI, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. In this appeal, the appellant-State of Madhya Pradesh has called
      in question the judgment and order dated 27.11.2012 in Criminal Appeal
D
      No. 260 of 1998 whereby, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, even
      while upholding the conviction of accused (respondent herein) for the
      offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code
      (‘IPC’), has modified the sentence of 3 years’ rigours imprisonment as
      awarded by the Trial Court to that of the period already undergone i.e.,
E     3 months and 21 days.
            3. The only question calling for determination in this appeal is: As
      to whether, in the given set of facts and circumstances, the High Court
      was justified in interfering with the punishment awarded by the Trial
      Court by reducing the same to the period of imprisonment already
F     undergone?
             4. The background aspects of the case, so far relevant for the
      question at hand could be noticed as follows: The prosecution case had
      been that on 13.05.1996, at about 4:30 p.m., the respondent assaulted his
      father Tulsiram with a blunt object causing fracture on the parietal region
G     of skull; and the same night, victim succumbed to the injury at Betual
      Hospital. On the basis of the information received from the hospital that
      the deceased Tulsiram was brought to the hospital by the respondent
      Suresh in unconscious condition, Marg Information No. 0/30/96 was
      registered under section 174 Cr.P.C. However, when it was noticed from
      the statements of PW-3 Sawalbai, PW-6 Basanti Bai and PW-10 Sarpach
H
        THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                                  841
                [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Sukhlal that the respondent was seen hitting his father, he was arrested       A
on 20.05.1996 and FIR in Crime No. 120/1996 (Ex. P-19) came to be
registered at police station, Amla. After due investigation, the respondent
was charge-sheeted for the offences under Sections 201 and 302 IPC.
        5. In trial, the prosecution, inter alia, relied on the testimony of
PW-3 Smt. Sawalbai who stated that while working in a field near the           B
place of incident, she had seen the respondent assaulting his father with
a lathi (wooden log). PW-2 Babulal stated that upon hearing the cries of
PW-3, he saw the accused assaulting someone; he reached the spot and
found that the injured person was the father of accused; and he prevented
the accused from further assaulting his father. PW-4 Dinesh alias Mathu
corroborated the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-3. On the other hand, the          C
accused-respondent attempted to suggest that his father sustained injury
when he fell from the roof while putting up khapra.
       6. On appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court rejected the defence
version and found it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent
did cause the fatal injury in question. However, the Trial Court proceeded     D
to hold that the act of the accused-respondent had been of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder and he was guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. The Trial Court was of the
view that while causing injury to the head of the deceased, the accused-
respondent knew that his act was likely to cause death but he had no           E
such criminal intention as defined in Section 300 IPC and hence, he was
not guilty of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. The Trial
Court further found that the accused furnished a wrong information about
accidental injury to the victim so as to save himself from legal punishment
and hence, he was also guilty of the offence under Section 201 IPC.
However, for the reason that the accused stood convicted for the main          F
offence, the Trial Court chose not to convict him for the offence under
Section 201 IPC with reference to the decision of this Court in Kalawati
v. State of Himachal Pradesh: AIR 1953 SC 131.
       7. Having thus convicted the accused-respondent for the offence
under Section 304 Part II IPC, the Trial Court found it just and proper to     G
award him the punishment of 3 years’ rigorous imprisonment while also
observing that the period of detention already undergone (from 20.05.1996
to 09.09.1996) would be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed
on him.
      8. In appeal by the accused, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,           H
842             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     in its impugned judgment and order dated 27.11.2012, found no reason to
      consider interference in the findings recorded by the Trial Court as regards
      conviction for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC but, on the
      question of punishment, proceeded to reduce the sentence of rigorous
      imprisonment from the period of 3 years to that of the period already
      undergone i.e., 3 months and 21 days. The relevant part of the order
B
      passed by the High Court, carrying the reasons for reduction of sentence,
      reads as under:
            “5. The incident had taken place on 13.5.1996. From the
            perusal of the statement of eye-witnesses Babulal (PW-2),
            Sawla Bai (PW-3), Dinesh (PW-4) it seems that the incident
C           had taken place at the spur of the moment. The appellant at
            the time of the incident was a young man aged 26 years. The
            appellant himself took his father namely Tulsiram to the
            hospital. The appellant has remained in jail for a period of
            three months and twenty one days i.e. from 20.05.1996. In
D           the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account
            the period which has elapsed, no useful purpose would be
            served in sending appellant back to jail, I therefore set aside
            the jail sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 304
            Part II of the Indian Penal Code and instead award the
            sentence to the appellant for a period of imprisonment already
E           undergone by him.”
             9. Assailing the order aforesaid, learned counsel for the appellant-
      State has strenuously argued that the High Court has modified and
      reduced the sentence awarded by the Trial Court without any cogent
      reason and without any justification. The learned counsel would submit
F     that the High Court has failed to appreciate the nature and gravity of the
      offence committed by the respondent that resulted in the death of his
      father and has argued for restoration of the order of the Trial Court,
      while relying on the decision in Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of
      Maharashtra: (2012) 2 SCC 648 wherein, this Court has re-
G     emphasised on the principle of proportionality in the determination of
      sentence for an offence. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for
      the respondent-accused has supported the impugned order with the
      submissions that the same meets the ends of justice, particularly when
      the respondent was only 26 years of age at the time of the incident in
      question that occurred at the spur of moment and without any intention
H
        THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                                  843
                [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

on the part of the respondent to cause the death of his father. Learned        A
counsel would submit that the High Court exercising its appellate powers
has reduced the sentence to the period already undergone after due
consideration of all the relevant factors; and while relying on the decision
of this Court in Jinnat Mia v. State of Assam: (1998) 9 SCC 319, has
urged that the present matter does not call for interference by this Court.
                                                                               B
      10. Having heard the respective learned counsel and having
examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearly
of the view that in this case, the High Court has interfered with and
reduced the sentence awarded by the Trial Court on rather irrelevant
considerations, while ignoring the relevant factors and the governing
principles for the award of punishment and hence, the order impugned           C
cannot be sustained.
       11. The respondent was tried for offence under Sections 302 and
201 IPC. With the evidence on record, it was clearly established that the
respondent was author of the fatal injury in question. The Trial Court,
with reference to the nature of the act of respondent and the attending        D
circumstances, convicted him for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 Part II IPC and let him off for the offence
under Section 201 IPC because he had been convicted for the main
offence. This part of the order of the Trial Court having attained finality
and having not been questioned even in this appeal, we would leave the         E
matter as regards conviction at that only. However, the question remains
as to whether all the facts and circumstances of case taken together
justify such indulgence that the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for
a period of 3 years, as awarded by the Trial Court, be reduced to that of
3 months and 21 days? In our view, the answer to this question could
only be in the negative.                                                       F

       12. In the case of State of M.P. v. Ganshyam : (2003) 8 SCC
13, relating to the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC , this
Court found sentencing for a period of 2 years to be to inadequate and
even on the liberal approach, found the custodial sentence of 6 years
serving the ends of justice. This Court underscored the principle of           G
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability; and
while also indicating the societal angle of sentencing, cautioned that undue
sympathy leading to inadequate sentencing would do more harm to the
justice system and undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law.
This Court observed, inter alia, as under:                                     H
844      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     “12. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
      sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
      undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and
      society could not long endure under such serious threats. It
      is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence
      having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
B
      which it was executed or committed etc. This position was
      illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State
      of Tamil Nadu: (1991) 3 SCC 471.
      13. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
      proportionality in prescribing liability according to the
C     culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily
      allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at
      a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that
      reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised
      by the special facts of each case. Judges, in essence, affirm
D     that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
      sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
      Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that
      are offered to justify a sentence, sometimes the desirability of
      keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic
      results of his crime. Inevitably, these considerations cause a
E     departure from just deserts as the basis of punishment and
      create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and
      widespread.
      14. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
      respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains
F     a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The
      practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is
      now unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical
      departure from the principle of proportionality has
      disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for
G     a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed.
      Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious
      crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is
      unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those
      considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is
      out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate
H
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                              845
         [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

punishment has        some    very    undesirable     practical     A
consequences.
15. After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has           B
been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of
really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by
the court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It
has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGautha
v. State of California: 402 US 183: 28 L Ed 2d 711 (1071)
that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would        C
provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and
appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances
that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any
foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable
criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to       D
the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary
judgment in the facts of each case is the only way in which
such judgment may be equitably distinguished.
***                       ***                      ***
17. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on        E
the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it relates
to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences
involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have           F
great impact on social order and public interest cannot be
lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal
attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too
sympathetic a view merely on account of lapse of time in respect
of such offences will be result-wise counterproductive in the
long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared      G
for and strengthened by a string of deterrence inbuilt in the
sentencing system.
***                       ***                      ***

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846             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A            19. Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji v. State of
             Rajasthan: (1996) 2 SCC 175. It has been held in the said
             case that it is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the
             criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate
             punishment in a criminal trial. The court will be failing in its
             duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime
B
             which has been committed not only against the individual victim
             but also against the society to which the criminal and victim
             belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not
             be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with
             the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been
C            perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public
             abhorrence and it should “respond to the society’s cry for
             justice against the criminal”. …...”
                                          (underlining supplied for emphasis)
             13. In the Case of Alister Anthony Pareira (supra), the allegations
D     against the appellant had been that while driving a car in drunken condition,
      he ran over the pavement, killing 7 persons and causing injuries to 8. He
      was charged for the offences under Sections 304 Part II and 338 IPC;
      was ultimately convicted by the High Court under Sections 304 Part II,
      338 and 337 IPC; and was sentenced to 3 years’ rigorous imprisonment
E     with a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC
      and to rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and for 6 months respectively
      for the offences under Section 338 and 337 IPC . Apart from other
      contentions, one of the pleas before this Court was that in view of fine
      and compensation already paid and willingness to make further payment
      as also his age and family circumstances, the appellant may be released
F     on probation or his sentence may be reduced to that already undergone.
      As regards this plea for modification of sentence, this Court traversed
      through the principles of penology, as enunciated in several of the past
      decisions1 and, while observing that the facts and circumstances of the
      case show ‘a despicable aggravated offence warranting punishment
G     proportionate to the crime’, this Court found no justification for extending
      the benefit of probation or for reduction of sentence. On the question of
      sentencing, this Court re-emphasised as follows:-
      1
       This Court referred, amongst others, to the decisions in State of Karnataka v.
      Krishnappa: (2004) 4 SCC 75; Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana: (2000) 5 SCC
      82; State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554; Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996)
H     2 SCC 175; and State of M. P. v. Ghanshyam Singh (supra).
        THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                                 847
                [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

      “84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime.           A
      One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition
      of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence
      commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the
      manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket
      formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The
                                                                              B
      courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of
      the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What
      sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts
      and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in
      mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of
      the offence and all other attendant circumstances.                      C
      85. The principle of proportionality in sentencing a crime-
      doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter
      of law, proportion between crime and punishment bears most
      relevant influence in determination of sentencing the crime-
      doer. The court has to take into consideration all aspects              D
      including social interest and consciousness of the society for
      award of appropriate sentence.
                                  (underlining supplied for emphasis)
      14. Therefore, awarding of just and adequate punishment to the
wrong doer in case of proven crime remains a part of duty of the Court.       E
The punishment to be awarded in a case has to be commensurate with
the gravity of crime as also with the relevant facts and attending
circumstances. Of course, the task is of striking a delicate balance
between the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. At the same time,
the avowed objects of law, of protection of society and responding to the     F
society’s call for justice, need to be kept in mind while taking up the
question of sentencing in any given case. In the ultimate analysis, the
proportion between the crime and punishment has to be maintained while
further balancing the rights of the wrong doer as also of the victim of the
crime and the society at large. No strait jacket formula for sentencing is
available but the requirement of taking a holistic view of the matter         G
cannot be forgotten.
       15. In the process of sentencing, any one factor, whether of
extenuating circumstance or aggravating, cannot, by itself, be decisive
of the matter. In the same sequence, we may observe that mere passage
                                                                              H
848             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     of time, by itself, cannot be a clinching factor though, in an appropriate
      case, it may be of some bearing, along with other relevant factors.
      Moreover, when certain extenuating or mitigating circumstances are
      suggested on behalf of the convict, the other factors relating to the nature
      of crime and its impact on the social order and public interest cannot be
      lost sight of.
B
            16. Keeping in view the principles aforesaid, when the present
      matter is examined, we find that the respondent is convicted of the
      offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304 IPC reads as
      under:-
C           “Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
            murder.—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting
            to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
            imprisonment of either description for a term which may
            extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act
            by which the death is caused is done with the intention of
D           causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
            cause death;
                     or with imprisonment of either description for a term
            which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if
            the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
E           death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause
            such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”
             17. Therefore, when an accused is convicted for the offence under
      Part II of Section 304 ibid., he could be sentenced to imprisonment for
      a term which may extend to a period of 10 years, or with fine, or both. In
F     this case, the Trial Court chose to award the punishment of 3 years’
      rigorous imprisonment to the respondent. The punishment so awarded
      by the Trial Court had itself been leaning towards leniency, essentially in
      view of the fact that the respondent was 26 years of age at the time of
      the incident in question. However, the High Court further proceeded to
G     reduce the punishment to the period already undergone (i.e., 3 months
      and 21 days) on consideration of the factors: (i) that the incident had
      taken place at spur of the moment; (ii) that the respondent was 26 years
      of age at the time of incident; and (iii) that the respondent himself took
      his father to hospital. On these considerations and after finding that the
      respondent had spent 3 months and 21 days in custody, the High Court
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         THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SURESH                                   849
                 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

concluded that “no useful purpose would be served in sending                     A
appellant back to jail”. We are clearly of the view that, further
indulgence by the High Court, over and above the leniency already shown
by the Trial Court, was totally uncalled for.
       18. So far the mitigating factors, as taken into consideration by
the High Court are concerned, noticeable it is that the same had already         B
gone into consideration when the Trial Court awarded a comparatively
lesser punishment of 3 years’ imprisonment for the offence punishable
with imprisonment for a term that may extend to 10 years, or with fine,
or with both. In fact, the factor that the incident had happened at the
‘spur of moment’ had been the basic reason for the respondent having
been convicted for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to             C
murder under Section 304 Part II IPC though he was charged for the
offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. This factor could not have
resulted in awarding just a symbolic punishment. Then, the factor that
the respondent was 26 years of age had been the basic reason for
awarding comparatively lower punishment of 3 years’ imprisonment.                D
This factor has no further impelling characteristics which would justify
yet further reduction of the punishment than that awarded by the Trial
Court. Moreover, the third factor, of the respondent himself taking his
father to hospital, carries with it the elements of pretence as also deception
on the part of the respondent, particularly when he falsely stated that the
victim sustained injury due to the fall. Therefore, all the aforementioned       E
factors could not have resulted in further reduction of the sentence as
awarded by the Trial Court.
       19. The High Court also appears to have omitted to consider the
requirement of balancing the mitigating and aggravating factors while
dealing with the question of awarding just and adequate punishment.              F
The facts and the surrounding factors of this case make it clear that, the
offending act in question had been of respondent assaulting his father
with a blunt object which resulted in the fracture of skull of the victim at
parietal region. Then, the respondent attempted to cover up the crime by
taking his father to hospital and suggesting as if the victim sustained          G
injury because of fall from the roof. Thus, the acts and deeds of the
respondent had been of killing his own father and then, of furnishing
false information. The homicidal act of the respondent had, in fact, been
of patricide; killing of one’s own father. In such a case, there was no
further scope for leniency on the question of punishment than what had
                                                                                 H
850             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 5 S.C.R.


A     already been shown by the Trial Court; and the High Court was not
      justified in reducing the sentence to an abysmally inadequate period of
      less than 4 months. The observations of the High Court that no useful
      purpose would be served by detention of the accused cannot be approved
      in this case for the reason that the objects of deterrence as also protection
      of society are not lost with mere passage of time.
B
             20. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the observations
      in Jinnat Mia (supra) on the powers of the High Court to review the
      entire matter in appeal and to come to its own conclusion or that the
      practice of this Court not to interfere on questions of facts except in
      exceptional cases shall have no application to the present case, particularly
C     when we find that the High Court has erred in law and has not been
      justified in reducing the sentence to a grossly inadequate level while
      ignoring the relevant considerations.
             21. To sum up, after taking into account all the circumstances of
      this case, we are of the considered view that the High Court had been in
D     error in extending undue sympathy and in awarding the punishment of
      the rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone i.e., 3 months
      and 21 days for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. In our view,
      there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to interfere with the
      punishment awarded by the Trial Court, being that of rigorous
E     imprisonment for 3 years.
             22. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this appeal succeeds
      and is allowed; the impugned judgment and order of the High Court
      dated 27.11.2012 is set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 06.01.1998
      is restored. The respondent shall surrender before the Court concerned
F     within a period of 4 weeks from today and shall undergo the remaining
      part of the sentence. In case he fails to surrender within the period
      aforesaid, the Trial Court will take necessary steps to ensure that he
      serves out the remaining part of sentence, of course, after due adjustment
      of the period already undergone.

G
      Divya Pandey                                                   Appeal allowed.




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