THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusLAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS

864               SUPREME [2019]
                          COURT2 REPORTS
                                 S.C.R. 864                [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A                   THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                       v.
                     LAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019)
B                              MARCH 05, 2019
        [A. K. SIKRI, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
             s. 482 – Inherent powers of the High Court – Quashing of
C     FIR – On facts, FIR for the offences u/ss. 307 and 34 and for the
      offences punishable u/ss. 323, 294, 308 and 34 respectively –
      Quashed by the High Court on basis of compromise between the
      complainant and the accused – Sustainability of – Held: Not
      sustainable – High Court mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise
      of its powers u/s. 482 CrPC – High Court did not at all consider the
D     fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as
      per s. 320 CrPC, and more particularly the seriousness of the
      offences and its social impact, and the antecedents of the accused
      – High Court erred in quashing the FIR holding that as the
      complainant had compromised with the accused, there was no
E     possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would
      be an exercise in futility – Thus, the order passed by the High Court
      is quashed and set aside.
             ss. 482 and 320 – Power u/s. 482 to quash the criminal
      proceedings for the non-compoundable offences u/s. 320, where
      parties have settled the matter between themselves – Exercise of –
F
      Guiding principles – Elucidated.
             Allowing the appeals, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 The High Court quashed the FIR holding that
      there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused
      persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in
G     futility. The High Court did not at all consider the fact that the
      offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section
      320 Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears
      that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts
      and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness
H     of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment
                                        864
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                    865


and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High            A
Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all
considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong
and a social wrong and the social impact. [Para 9, 9.1][873-B-E]
       1.2 As regards the reliance placed upon the decision of this     B
Court in Shiji’s case, while quashing the FIR by observing that as
the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no
possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would
be an exercise in futility is concerned, the High Court clearly
erred in quashing the FIR on the said ground. It appears that the
High Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to the           C
facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have
appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant
has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not
be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many
a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the      D
prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence
and examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/
material, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial
transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong.
The Shiji’s decision may be applicable in a case which has its
origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have       E
resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society
at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute
is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The said decision may not be
applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious
and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under          F
Section 307 IPC. The High Court has mechanically considered
Shiji’s case without considering the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case. [Paras 11, 11.1][880-B-F; 881-D-E]
       Shiji @ Pappu & others v. Radhika and another (2011)
       10 SCC 705 : [2011] 13 SCR 135 – held inapplicable.
                                                                        G
      2.1 The power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
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866               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
      have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves. Such
      power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved
      heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
      murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature
      and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, such power is not
B
      to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like
      Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
      servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed
      merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
      offender. [Para 13 (iii)][884-E-H]
C            2.2 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
      would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
      therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
      against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
      proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
D     Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
      be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
      on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
      amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest
      its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307
      IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It
E     would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
      incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
      prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
      would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
      purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature
F     of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/
      delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However,
      such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only
      after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge
      sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
      exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
G     investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of the decision
      of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh’s case should be read
      harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances
      stated herein. [Para 13 (iv)][885-A-E]

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 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                 867


     Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 :            A
     [2014] 4 SCR 1012 – relied on.
      2.3 While exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-
compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not
have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a      B
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed
with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
[Para 13 (v)][885-F-G]                                               C
      3. The High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings
for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and
even when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, the
accused managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant
and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The     D
allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in
commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence
and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the
High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the
accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically         E
quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court
also failed to note the antecedents of the accused. The impugned
judgment and order dated 07.10.2013 passed by the High Court
is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/
criminal proceedings be proceeded against the accused.               F
[Para 14, 15][885-G, H; 886-A-C]
      4. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 350/2019 by the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court has quashed the criminal
proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 294,
308 & 34 IPC. Offence under Section 308 IPC is a non-                G
compoundable offence. While committing the offence, the accused
has used the fire arm. They are also absconding, and in the
meantime, they have managed to enter into a compromise with


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868              SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     the complainant. Thus, the impugned judgment and order passed
      by the High Court is quashed and set aside, and the FIR/
      investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the
      accused. [Para 16][886-D-F]
            State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC
B           149 : [2013] 12 SCR 973 ; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab
            (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012] 8 SCR 753 ; State of
            Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 :
            [2013] 12 SCR 973 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
            Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285 ; State of Madhya Pradesh
            v. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307 : [2015] 8 SCR 723 ;
C           J.Ramesh Kamath v. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC
            179 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajveer Singh (2016)
            12 SCC 471 ; Parbatbhai AAhir v. State of Gujarat
            (2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12 ; State of Madhya
            Pradesh v. Kalyan Singh decided on 4.1.2019 in Crl.
D           Appeal No.14/2019 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv
            Gurjar decided on 22.02.2019 in Crl. Appeal @ SLP
            (Criminal) No.9859/2013 ; State of Maharashtra v.
            Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 – referred
            to.

E                         Case Law Reference
      [2013] 12 SCR 973      referred to          Para 1
      [2012] 8 SCR 753       referred to          Para 6.4
      [2013] 12 SCR 973      referred to          Para 6.4
F     (2014) 10 SCC 285      referred to          Para 6.4
      [2015] 8 SCR 723       referred to          Para 6.4
      (2016) 12 SCC 179      referred to          Para 6.4
      (2016) 12 SCC 471      referred to          Para 6.4
G     [2017] 10 SCR 12       referred to          Para 6.4
      (2014) 15 SCC 29       referred to          Para 9.1
      [2011] 13 SCR 135      held inapplicable    Para 11, 11.1
      [2014] 4 SCR 1012      relied on            Para 13
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 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                         869


      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal                      A
No. 349 of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2013 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No. 8000 of 2013.
                               WITH                                          B
Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 2019.
      Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey, Makesh Kumar,
Ms. Indira Bhakar, Ms. Aparna Trivedi, Santanu Singh, Rahul Kaushik,
Bhuvenshwari Pathak, Ms. Shilpi Satyapraiya Satyam, Siddharth
Chakravorty, Arjun Garg, Advs. for the Appellant.
                                                                             C
      Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Adv. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.
      Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019
                                                                             D
       1. A two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,
in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court
in the cases of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466
and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149, has
referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the
matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.                             E
       1.1 Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law is
involved, this Court tagged the connected appeal with the main appeal.
       2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000/2013, by            F
which the High Court has allowed the said application, preferred by the
respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relying
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & others        G
vs. Radhika and another (2011) 10 SCC 705, the State of Madhya
Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.


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870                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A            2.1 Office report dated 18.08.2017 indicates that service of show
      cause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to 3
      are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but during
      the course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.
             3. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodged
B     against the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police Station
      Raun, District Bhind, for the offences punishable under Sections 307
      and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No.36/13. It was
      alleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the complainant – Charan
      Singh, who is an operator of LNT machine is extracting sand of Sindh
      River at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time firing from other side of
C     river started and the counter firing from this side also started then he
      heard that take away your machine from here. It is alleged that some
      people came there from which Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein), Lature
      (respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh (respondent no.3 herein) and two
      unknown persons came near to the complainant and his machine and
D     told him to run away, then somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2
      herein) to fire and then Sanjeev fired on the complainant and then they
      ran away. The complainant fell from the machine. The bullet hit the
      complainant on elbow of right hand. Somehow the complainant managed
      to reach the village and a person called a car and admitted the complainant
      in District Hospital.
E            3.1 That on 04.03.2013, the duty doctor in the District Hospital
      informed the police and on the basis of the statement of the complainant,
      a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under Sections 307
      and 34 of the IPC.
             3.2 That the medical examination of the injured complainant was
F     conducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his body
      and injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and injury
      no.5 was advised for x-ray.
             3.3 That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and prepared
      spot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of
G     the Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and other
      articles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure memos.
             3.4 That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000
      of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya
      Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings against
      the accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of a compromise
H
      arrived at between the accused and the complainant.
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                           871
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       4. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in         A
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the
criminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that the
accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While
quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court
has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of
                                                                               B
Shiji (supra).
       5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment
and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
       6. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya          C
Pradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed a
grave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under Sections
307 and 34 of the IPC.
       6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High Court      D
has quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of the
settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused, without
even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences alleged
against the accused persons.
       6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on         E
behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has not
at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the
society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the
two individuals.
                                                                               F
       6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the decision
of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR. It is
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High Court ought
to have appreciated that in all the cases where the complainant has
compromised/entered into a settlement with the accused, that need not          G
necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording conviction and/
or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility. It is
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-State that in a given case despite the complainant may not
support in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise
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872                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     with the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the
      accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on the
      basis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. It is
      submitted that in the present cases the investigation was in progress and
      even the statement of the witnesses was recorded and the medical
      evidence was also collected. It is submitted that therefore in the facts
B
      and circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred in
      considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of
      Shiji (supra).
             6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellant-State that the accused were hard core criminals
C     and many criminal cases were registered against them and they are a
      serious threat to the society. It is submitted that all these aforesaid
      circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused were required
      to be considered by the High Court while quashing the FIR in exercise
      of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more
D     particularly when the offences alleged were against the society at large,
      namely, attempt to murder, which is a non-compoundable offence. In
      support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant-State has
      placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian Singh
      vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Rajasthan vs.
      Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State of Madhya Pradesh vs.
E     Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish
      (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12
      SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12
      SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641;
      and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan
F     Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019, State
      of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 in
      Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.
             6.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
      decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
      appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and
G     set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
      quashing and setting aside the FIR, in exercise of its inherent powers
      under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
             7. As observed hereinabove, nobody appeared on behalf of the
      respondents – accused.
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 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                               873
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at great             A
length.
       9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals,
the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the
IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and                B
the accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by the
complainant, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji
(supra), the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recording
conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial
would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the FIR.
       9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact              C
that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section
320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears
that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the
offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment and order               D
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically
quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a personal
or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed
by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai
Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising              E
the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings,
should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations
and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the
Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with
care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at              F
hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire
conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal
proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the High
Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of
the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of         G
decisions.
       9.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this
Court has observed and held as under:

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874          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
      summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
      criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
      jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
      criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320
      of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
B
      limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
      engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or
      (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
      power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may
      be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their
C     dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
      case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
      of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature
      and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
      depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
      fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the
D
      offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
      in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
      compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to
      the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption
      Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
E     in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing
      criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
      cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour
      stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
      the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
      partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
F
      matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where
      the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties
      have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the
      High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,
      because of the compromise between the offender and the victim,
G     the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation
      of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
      and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by
      not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement
      and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court
      must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest
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 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                          875
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation     A
      of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process
      of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
      and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
      appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer
      to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
                                                                              B
      be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
      9.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6
SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh
(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
      “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
      the following principles by which the High Court would be guided        C
      in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties
      and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
      accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing
      to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
      proceedings:                                                            D
      29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
      distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
      the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
      Section 482 of the          Code, the High Court has inherent power
      to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are         E
      not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
      between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised
      sparingly and with caution.
      29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
      basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
      guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:                        F
          (i) ends of justice, or
          (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
      While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
      on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
                                                                              G
      29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
      which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
      or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
      private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
      for the offences alleged to have been committed under special
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876          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
      committed by public servants while working in that capacity are
      not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between
      the victim and the offender.
      29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
B     overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
      those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
      matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when
      the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
      29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine
      as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
C     continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
      oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
      to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
      29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
      of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally
D     treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
      alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
      because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
      charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the
      High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
E     307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
      sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the
      charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open
      to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
      such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature
      of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered
F     by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
      this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether
      there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
      conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
      to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings
      whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
G
      Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on
      complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court
      can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
      parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
      improve their future relationship.
H
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                           877
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section         A
      482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
      Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after
      the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
      investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
      settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
                                                                               B
      because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
      and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
      cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start
      or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
      benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
      facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.          C
      On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
      complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
      the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain
      from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
      such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case
                                                                               D
      finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the
      offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
      those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial
      court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High
      Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a
      ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender         E
      who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
      proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
      of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
      a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
       9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court           F
has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the
FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of decisions of this Court
on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions:
        “(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the             G
      High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
      secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
      powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
      the High Court.

                                                                               H
878          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A       (2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash
      a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground
      that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and
      the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
      purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an
      offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
B
      Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is
      attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
        (3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
      complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
      Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
C     justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
        (4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
      ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of
      justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
        (5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first information
D     report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and
      victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts
      and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
      principles can be formulate.
        (6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
E     dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
      Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
      offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity
      or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately
      be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have
      settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private
F     in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
      continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
      element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
        (7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal
      cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a
G     civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise
      of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
        (8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
      commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
      transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
H     situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                          879
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

        (9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal             A
      proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,
      the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a
      criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
        (10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
      Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving the         B
      financial and economic well-being of the State have implications
      which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private
      disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash
      where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or
      economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
      complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh          C
      in the balance.”
       9.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically
observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding
an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of
imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties   D
simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact
on the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused
are facing trial under Sections 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as the
offences are definitely against the society, accused will have to
necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their          E
innocence.
       9.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically
observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable
and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between
the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the
proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar is       F
the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case
of Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).
       10. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder
Singh (supra) is concerned, this Court in paragraph 29.6 admitted that
the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous      G
and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime
against the society and not against the individual alone. However, this
Court further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or
                                                                              H
880                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     other evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only.
      Hence, the decision of this case in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
      shall be of no assistance to the accused in the present case.
              11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this
      Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observing
B     that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no
      possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an
      exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High
      Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid ground. It
      appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the said decision
      to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have
C     appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered
      into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.
      Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine.
      In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the
      guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses and
D     the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not
      a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private
      wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court found that the case had
      its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute was
      resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that, ‘that being so,
      continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to
E     support the allegations…will be a futile exercise that will serve no
      purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed ‘that even
      the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant,
      were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to that this Court
      observed and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing
F     but an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such
      circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse
      of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the
      courts below. Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed
      as under:
            “18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of
G
            the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory
            for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and
            caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands
            that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court
            is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
H           of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                           881
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the       A
      situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may
      be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power
      must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where
      refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the
      process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining
                                                                               B
      interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot
      assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition
      under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the
      above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and
      circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case
      in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”                            C
       11.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case
which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties
have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at
large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/
matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable          D
in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences,
having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC. Therefore,
without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and
circumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred in
mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that in view of the                E
compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the
further trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has
mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in the case
of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant facts and circumstances
of the case.
       12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court      F
in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra)
is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court has
noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences
conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings by the          G
High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in
compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed
by the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided
solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal
                                                                               H
882                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record
      as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power,
      although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
      However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh
      (supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:
B           “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
            the following principles by which the High Court would be guided
            in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties
            and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
            accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing
            to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
C           proceedings:
            29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
            distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
            the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
            Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to
D           quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not
            compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between
            themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and
            with caution.
            29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
            basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
E           guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
                (i) ends of justice, or
                (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
            While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
            on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
F           29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
            which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
            or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
            private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
            for the offences alleged to have been committed under special
            statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
G           committed by public servants while working in that capacity are
            not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between
            the victim and the offender.
            29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
            overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
H           those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                           883
                  [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when         A
   the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
   29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine
   as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
   continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
   oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
                                                                              B
   to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
   29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
   of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally
   treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
   alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
   because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the            C
   charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the
   High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
   307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
   sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the
   charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open
                                                                              D
   to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
   such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature
   of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered
   by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
   this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether
   there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of              E
   conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
   to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings
   whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
   Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on
   complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court
                                                                              F
   can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
   parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
   improve their future relationship.
   29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section
   482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
   Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after           G
   the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
   investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
   settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
   because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
   and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
                                                                              H
884                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A           cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start
            or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
            benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
            facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.
            On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
            complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
B
            the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain
            from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
            such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case
            finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the
            offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
C           those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial
            court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High
            Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a
            ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
            who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
            proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
D
            of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
            a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
            13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
      this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held
      as under:
E
            i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash
            the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under
            Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly
            and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising
            out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
F           relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved
            the entire dispute amongst themselves;
            ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
            involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
            offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
G           private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
            iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
            under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
            offences committed by public servants while working in that
            capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
            between the victim and the offender;
H
 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. LAXMI NARAYAN & ORS.                            885
                   [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would            A
      fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
      are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the
      individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
      offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which
      have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise
                                                                                B
      of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the
      parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.
      However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
      there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
      framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court
      to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is              C
      there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
      evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under
      Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High
      Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury
      is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
                                                                                D
      used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be
      permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation
      and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the
      trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still
      under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in
      paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case        E
      of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to
      be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
      v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to
      quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
      offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious           F
      impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/
      compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court
      is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct
      of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding
      and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the
      complainant to enter into a compromise etc.                               G
      14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has
quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307
and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was under
progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a compromise
with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a           H
886                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 2 S.C.R.


A     settlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm
      also in commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence
      and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Court
      and solely on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the
      complainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in
      exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable
B
      in the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents
      of the accused.
             15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present
      appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 07.10.2013
      passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of
C     2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal
      proceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealt
      with, in accordance with law.
              Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019

D             16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is
      concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
      quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under
      Sections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the
      accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of the
      decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be any
E     possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence under
      Section 308 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While committing the
      offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are also absconding,
      and in the meantime, they have managed to enter into a compromise
      with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this appeal
F     is also allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated 28.05.2018 passed
      by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is
      hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal
      proceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealt
      with, in accordance with law.

G     Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeals allowed.




H