Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discharging the accused as there was sufficient material to uphold the framing of charges for abetment of suicide.

Summary

The victim, Jyoti Sharma, an employee of Central Bank, alleged repeated harassment by Deepak Bhamawat, including a fraudulent loan taken in her name, termination from her job, and eviction from her residence. She committed suicide by consuming poison and, in her dying declaration, blamed Deepak for her harassment. The Special Judge framed charges under Section 306 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, but the High Court discharged the accused, finding no evidence of provocation or abetment. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court examined the High Court's exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC. Applying established principles, the Court held that the investigation revealed multiple complaints, a dying declaration, and other material sufficient to prima facie establish the offence of abetment of suicide. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeal, upholding the framing of charges.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 of the CrPC in discharging the accused.
Whether the material on record is sufficient to prima facie establish the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC and the SC/ST Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 397, s. 401
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 306
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(2)(v)

Subjects

abetment of suicideSection 306 IPCSC/ST Actrevisional jurisdictionCrPC 397dying declarationharassmentcharge framing

Judgment

[2019] 2 S.C.R. 1055 1055

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A
v.
DEEPAK
(Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2019)
MARCH 13, 2019
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND B
HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s.397 r/w s.401 – Revisional jurisdiction – Exercise of, scope
– Discussed – In the instant case, the prosecution case was that the
victim-deceased and the respondent were employees in the Central C
Bank – The deceased was subjected to harassment by the respondent
which led to her committing suicide by consuming poison – Charges
were framed against the respondent under s.306 IPC and s.3(2)(v)
of SC & ST Act by the Special Judge – High Court discharged the
respondent from charges on the ground that there was no evidence
with regard to provocation, incitement or encouragement which led D
to commission of suicide by the deceased – On State’s appeal, held:
High Court evidently ignored what had emerged during the course
of the investigation – The material indicated that several complaints
were filed by the deceased alleging harassment caused to her by
the respondent – The last of them was filed a few days before she
committed suicide – It was alleged that the respondent had taken a E
loan of Rs 5 lakhs through fraudulent means in the name of the
deceased and an altercation took place between him and the
deceased in that regard – Moreover, the respondent was alleged to
have got the deceased evicted from a rented house as well as
terminated her from employment at Central Bank – There was a
dying declaration also to that effect – Sufficient material was on F
record to uphold the order framing charges by the Special Judge –
Therefore, discharge of the accused was not justified – High Court’s
order set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s.306 – The Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Acts, 1989 –
s.3(2)(v). G
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 :
[2012] 7 SCR 988; State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran
Mehdu (2017) 3 SCC 198 : [2017] 2 SCR 491; Chitresh
Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2009) 16 SCC
605 : [2009] 13 SCR 230; Rajbir Singh v. State of U P
(2006) 4 SCC 51 : [2006] 2 SCR 1134 – relied on. H
1055
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 2 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[2012] 7 SCR 988 relied on Para 11
[2017] 2 SCR 491 relied on Para 12
[2009] 13 SCR 230 relied on Para 14
B [2006] 2 SCR 1134 relied on Para 15
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 485 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2018 of the High Court
of M.P., Bench at Indore in CRR No. 458 of 2018.
C
Vaibhav Srivastava, Praduman K., H. Parashar and Rahul Kaushik,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Shivam Sharma, Ms. Meghna Mittal, R. K. Yadav and Raj Kishor
Choudhary, Advs. for the Respondent.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises from a judgment dated 31 January,
E 2018 of a learned Single Judge of the Indore Bench of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh1 discharging the Respondent from charges framed by
the Special Judge, Neemuch. The Special Judge, Neemuch had by an
order dated 13.10.17 in Special Case No. 51 of 2017 framed charges
against the respondent under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code,
F 18602 and Section 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
3. In pursuance of the notice issued by this Court on 19 November,
2018, the respondent has entered appearance through learned counsel.
We have heard the Deputy Advocate General for the State of Madhya
Pradesh and learned counsel for the respondent.
G
4. On 9 August 2017, Jyoti Sharma committed suicide by consuming
poison at her residence at Neemuch. Immediately after she consumed
poison, she was moved to the District hospital for treatment. The dying
1
In Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2018
2
H ”Penal Code”
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DEEPAK 1057
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

declaration of the victim was recorded on 9 August 2017 in the presence A
of the Naib Tehsildar, Neemuch. The relevant part of the dying
declaration is extracted below:
“Question: What has happened to you?
Answer: I have consumed poison.
B
Question: Why you have consumed poison?
Answer: I am not able to get the job, wherever I go, Deepak
Bhamawat R/o Jeeran, get me sacked out from the job. Earlier
he had molested me, on which, I had instituted a case against him,
since then, he is harassing me. C
Question: Whether you want to say anything else?
Answer: No.”
5. Jyoti Sharma died on 10 August 2017 at a hospital in Udaipur
where she was admitted for treatment. The First Information Report3
D
was registered on 16August 2017. During the course of the investigation,
the respondent was arrested on 6 September 2017. On the completion of
the investigation, the investigating officer submitted a charge-sheet on
22 September 2017 under Section 306 of the Penal Code and Section
3(2)(v) and Section 3(2)(v)(a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act before the Special Judge, Neemuch. E
Cognizance was taken on 13 October 2017. Charges were framed on 10
January 2018. Challenging the order framing charges, a Criminal Revision
was filed before the High Court.
6. The Single Judge, by the order impugned in these proceedings,
set aside the order of the trial judge and directed that the respondent be F
discharged.
7. The Deputy Advocate General has adverted to the charge-
sheet which has been submitted after the investigation was completed.
Learned counsel submitted that there is a dying declaration of the victim
which was recorded on 9 August 2017. It was urged that the investigation G
has disclosed that the respondent and the deceased were employees in
the Central Bank. The respondent had obtained a loan in the name of
the deceased, allegedly after forging her signature. The loan was not
paid, as a result of which on 3 August, 2017, Central Bank issued a
3
”FIR” H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 2 S.C.R.

A notice to the deceased for the repayment of the loan. During the course
of the investigation, the investigating agency found that three complaints
were submitted by the victim: on 1 November 2016 to the Station House
Officer, P.S. Jeeran; in December 2016 at P.S. Jeeran and another on
6 January 2017 to the Collector, Neemuch making specific allegations
that the respondent was harassing her. The respondent is alleged to
B
have caused the deceased to be terminated from employment and also
allegedly caused her landlord to oust her from possession. On this material,
which has emerged in the course of the investigation, it is urged that the
case for discharge was not made out.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
C respondent placed reliance on the fact that in the FIR all that has been
adverted to is that the respondent had got the deceased terminated from
her job in the Central Bank and thereby harassed her and tortured her as
a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste for depositing the installments
of the loan. Learned counsel submitted that on the contents of the FIR,
D the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was
no provocation, inducement or incitement that would fall within the
description of ‘abetment’ to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the
Penal Code.
9. The only circumstance which has weighed with the High Court
E in passing the impugned order is what has been stated in the following
extract:
“11. …. Merely the deceased was failing to get any job and she is
under impression that the petitioner is creating burden and hence
she did not get any new job. He never intended that deceased
F should commit suicide.”
The High Court held thus:
“16 …in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is
no evidence with regard to provocation, incitement or
encouragement for commitment of suicide by the deceased…”
G
10. We shall now examine whether the High Court has correctly
exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 in discharging the respondent of
the charges framed by the Special Judge, Neemuch.
4
H ”Procedure Code”
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DEEPAK 1059
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

11. In Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander5, a two-judge bench A
of this Court elucidated on the revisional power of the Court under Section
397. Justice Swatanter Kumar noted thus:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to
call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any B
proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision
is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate
for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it
bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of C
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked
where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there
is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded
is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not D
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would
have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction
of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised
in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should E
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to
keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should
not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and
in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to
interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case F
substantially falls within the categories afore-stated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the
CrPC.”
The Court also enunciated a set of principles which the High Courts
must keep in mind while exercising their jurisdiction under the provision: G
“27. .. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments
of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be
considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with

5
(2012) 9 SCC 460 H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 2 S.C.R.

A regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case
may be:
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case
B and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the
offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of
a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may
interfere.
C
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or
not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
D 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely
essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for
correcting some grave error that might be committed by
the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court
should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle
the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
E
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have
to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence
and materials on record to determine whether there is
sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end
in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the
F allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute
an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court
leading to injustice.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
G satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The
Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an
opinion formed prima facie.”
H (Emphasis supplied)
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DEEPAK 1061
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

12. In State of Rajasthan v Fatehkaran Mehdu6, a two-judge A
bench of this Court has elucidated on the scope of the interference
permissible under Section 397 with regard to the framing of a charge.
Justice Ashok Bhushan held thus:
“26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 397 CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. B
Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a
stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the
stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not
with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the
material and form an opinion whether there is strong
suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which C
if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge
is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied.
Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court
should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of
committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither D
permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the above decisions of this Court, we shall now
determine whether the High Court has correctly exercised its revisional E
jurisdiction. The High Court had held that the lower court had erred in
framing charges in the present case as there was no evidence with
regard to provocation, incitement or encouragement which would lead
to the commission of suicide by the deceased.
14. It is of relevance to refer to certain judgements of this Court. F
In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi)7, the appellant
and two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with
Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant and
the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a
settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of G
certain land. This led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment
suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide. The Court affirmed the
framing of charges by the trial court. The two-judge Bench of this
Court laid down the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide.
Justice D K Jain held thus:
6
(2017) 3 SCC 198 H
7
(2009) 16 SCC 605
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 2 S.C.R.

A “19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 1088] , where the accused by his acts or by a
continued course of conduct creates such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other option except to
commit suicide, an “instigation” may be inferred. In other
words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of
B
suicide by a person, it has to be established that:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by
words, deeds or willful omission or conduct which may even
be a willful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or
forced the deceased by his deeds, words or willful omission or
C conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in
a forward direction; and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or
encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the
manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is
D the necessary concomitant of instigation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court noted
that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out:
E “22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted
above, statements recorded by the police during the course of
investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions
with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased
was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he
was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the
F conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that
the deceased was left with no other option except to end
his life and therefore, clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was
attracted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
G It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has
to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground
for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence:
“25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a
H view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DEEPAK 1063
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting A
the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court
may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial
stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At
this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view
to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has
B
committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the
conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.”
15. A two-judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of
U P8 noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must
ascertain whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the offence has been C
committed. Justice G P Mathur held thus:
“9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal
Chordia, the Court while examining the scope of Section 227
held as under:
D
“… Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope
of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides
that ‘the judge shall discharge when he considers that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’. The
‘ground’ in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a
ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt E
or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at
the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not
undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the
material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects.
All that the court has to consider is whether the
F
evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted,
would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.”
10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test,
namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused or whether there is ground for
G
presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If
the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot
be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High
Court after merely observing that “as the firing was aimed at the
other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was
8
(2006) 4 SCC 51 H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 2 S.C.R.

A passing through that way and she was hit” and further observing
that “the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was
she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled
Caste” set aside the order by which the charges had been framed
against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the
provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and
B
the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by
the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not
been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous
in law and is liable to be set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied)
C
16. In the present case, there is sufficient material on record to
uphold the order framing charges of the Trial Court. The discharge of
the accused was not justified. The High Court has evidently ignored
what has emerged during the course of the investigation. The material
indicates that several complaints were filed by the deceased. The last of
D them was filed a few days before the suicide. It is alleged that the
respondent had taken a loan of Rs 5 lakhs through fraudulent means in
the name of the deceased and an altercation took place between him
and the deceased in that regard. Moreover, the respondent is alleged to
have got the deceased evicted from a rented house as well as terminated
E from her employment at Central Bank. There is a dying declaration.
17. We, however, clarify that this judgment shall not affect the
merits of the trial.
18. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 31 January 2018.
F
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.

G

H