Holding

Confiscation proceedings under Section 15 are independent quasi‑judicial actions that may be taken before a criminal conviction, and subsequent purchasers/assignees are ‘persons interested’ under the 2013 Act and thus have standing to seek a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings.

Summary

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kallo Bai, the owner of a tractor and trolley used to transport teak without a permit was seized and a confiscation order was made under Section 15 of the Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969. The lower courts held that confiscation could not occur until the accused’s guilt was proved in the criminal trial. The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings are a separate quasi‑judicial process that may be ordered independently of the criminal prosecution, even before guilt is established. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order was set aside. In Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Manav Dharm Trust, subsequent purchasers and assignees of land sought a declaration that acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The issue was whether such parties have locus standi to file the declaration. The Court held that the 2013 Act’s expanded definition of “person interested” includes these parties, giving them standing to seek a declaration of lapse. The appeals by the State and DDA were dismissed, leaving the High Court’s decision in favour of the petitioners intact.

Issues considered

Whether confiscation under Section 15 of the Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 can be ordered before the accused’s guilt is fully established.
Whether confiscation proceedings are distinct and independent from criminal prosecution.
Whether subsequent purchasers, assignees, successors or power‑of‑attorney holders have locus standi to seek a declaration that land‑acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 55
Delhi Development Act, 1957
Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972s. 3, s. 4, s. 8, s. 9
Indian Forest Act, 1927s. 53, s. 55
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 16, s. 17(2), s. 4(1), s. 48, s. 6
Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969s. 15, s. 15-A, s. 15-B, s. 15-C, s. 15-D
Registration Act, 1908s. 17
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 105, s. 24(2), s. 3(c), s. 3(r), s. 3(x)

Subjects

confiscationquasi‑judicial proceedingsforest produceseparate proceedingsland acquisitionlocus standiright to fair compensation actsubsequent purchaserdeemed lapseproperty seizure

Judgment

[2017] 4 S.C.R. 218

A THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
v.
SMT. KALLO BAI
(Criminal Appeal No. 932 of2017)
B MAY 08, 2017
[N. V. RAMANA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969:
s.15 - Confiscation under - Of Tractor and Trolley and the
c forest produce - Appellate authority upheld the confiscation order
-· Revisional Court held that confiscation was not permissible unless
the guilt of the accused is fully established - High Court affirmed
the order of Revisional Court - On appeal, held: Criminal
prosecution is distinct from confiscation proceedings - The two
proceedings are different and parallel, each having distinct purpose
D ~ The scheme of Adhiniyam prescribes an independent procedure
for confiscation - Therefore, the conclusion by the Revisional Court
and High Court was erroneous.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In order to facilitate development of a good forest
E policy, the State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh
Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969. This legislation was
enacted with an object to regulate the trade of certain forest
prQduce in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Adhiniyam is a
statute enacted for the purpose of preserving certain forest
F produce in the State of Madhya Pradesh.The Scheme of the Act,
as expressed in several provisions, is to empower the authbrized
officers of the Forest Department for proper implementation/
enforcement of the statutory provisions and for enabling them to
take effective steps for preserving these forest produce. For this
purpose certain powers including the power of seizure,
G confiscation and forfeiture have been vested in them. [Para 11]
[222-F-G; 223-A].
2. Confiscation proceedings as contemplated under Section
15 of the Adhiniyam is a quasi-judicial proceedings and not a ·
criminal proceedings. Confiscation proceeds on the basis of the
H
218
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 219

'sati.sfaction' of the Authorized Officer with regard to the A
commission of forest offence; [Para 15] (226-G-H; 227-A]
3. Adhiniyam as originally enacted, did not provide for
separate confiscatory proceedings. Or~ginal enactment only had
penal provisions. The ·newly introduced Sections from Section
15-A to 15-D were brought in line with Indian Forest Act, as B
amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh to provide for a separate
confiscatory mechanism. [Para 12] [223-B-C]
4. The broad scheme of the Adhiniyam is to punish those
who are in contravention of the law at the hand of the criminal
court. The confiscation being incidental and ancillary to the c
conviction, State of Madhya Pradesh, separated the process of
confiscation from the process of prosecution. The purpose of the
enactment seems to be that the power of the criminal court
regarding the disposal of property is made subject to the
jurisdiction of the authorized officer with regard to that aspect;
the jurisdiction of criminal court in regard to the main trial remains D
unaffected. [Para 20] [229-A-B]
Divisional Forest Officer And Anr. v. G V. Sudhakar
And Ors. [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 680 : 1985 (4) SCC
573; State of West.Bengal v. Gopal Sarkar [2001]
5 Suppl. SCR 212 : 2002 (1) SCC 495; State of MP. v. E
S.P. Sales Agencies [2004] 3 SCR 640 : 2004 (4)
sec 448 - relied on.
5. Section 15 gives independent power to the concerned
authority to confiscate the articles, as mentioned there under,
even before the guilt is completely established. This power can F
be exercised by the concerned officer if he is satisfied that the
said objects were utilized during the commission of a forest
offence. A protection is provided for the owners of the vehicles/
articles, if they are able to prove that they took all reasonable
care and precautions as envisaged under Sub-section (5) of Section G
15 of the Adhiniyam and the said offence was committed without
their knowledge or connivance. [Para 24] [230-H; 231-A-B]
6. Criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation
proceedings. The two proceedings are different and parallel, each
H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A having a dis.tinct purpose. The object of confiscation proceeding
is to enable speedy and effective adjudication with regard to
confiscation of the prod nee and the means used for committing
the offen~e while the object of the prosecution is to punish the
offender. The scheme of Adhiniyam prescribes an independent
procedure for confiscation. The intention of prescribing separate
B
proceedings is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop
further misuse of the vehicle. [Para 25] [231-C-D] ·
7. The High Court as well as the Revisional Court erred in
coming to a .conclusion that the confiscation under the law was
not permissible unless the guilt of the accused is completely
c established. [Para 26) (231-D-E)
Case Law Reference
[19,85) 3 Suppl. SCR 680 relied on Para 21

D (2001) 5 Suppl. SCR 212 relied on Para 22
(2004] 3 SCR 640 relied on Para23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppeiifNo.
932 of2017.
E From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2014 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in'M. Cr. C. No. 12750 of2013.
Purushaindra Kumar, Mishra Saurabh, Ankit Kumar Lal,·
Ms. Vanshuja Shukla, Ms. Am1radha Mishra, Ad vs. for the Appellants.
Parmanand Gaur, Sameer Kumar, Ekansh Bansal, Advs. for the
F Respondent.
The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by
N. v. RAMANA, J. I. Leave granted.
~.,_ 2. This appeal is filed assailing the judgment, dated 21.01.2014, in
G -· M.Cr.C No. 12750/2013, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
at Jabalpur, wherein the High Court has dismissed the appeal filed by
the appellant State by upholding the order of the lower court, which
through its order directed to release the confiscated vehicle during the
pendency of the main criminal case.
H
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 221
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

3. Brief facts of the case in nut shell are that the respondent is the A
owner of the tractor bearing number (MP-22 AA-0736) and troiley
bearing number (MP22AA0764). On 03.1.2012 while this vehicle was
beiiig used to transport 1.054 cubic meters of teak wood from Saliwara ·
to Parasia Road, Reserve Forest Compartment No. 117. As the driver
was not carrying the documents required for the transportation of teak
B
wood, the staff of Fore st Development Corporation, at Dhuma District,
Seoni, after completion ·of formalities seized the teakwood and th.e
aforesaid vehicle, being tractor (MP-22 AA-0736) and trolley (MP 22
AA 0764). Thereafter, the Project Range Officer registered the offence
. under Section 5 and Section 15 of Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar
Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 [hereinafter 'Adhiniyam' for brevity] read c
with Section 26 and Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The.said
case was registered as Offence No. 251/2013. In relation to this, a charge
sheet was filed which was numbered as Criminal Case No. 269/2013
before the triaI'court.
4. The Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer ·D
Lakhnadone, Forest Division North (territorial), Seoni simultaneously
initiated the confiscation proceeding under Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam.
The same was registered as Confiscation Case No. 9/2012.
5. In the process, the Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional
Officer Lakhnadone, Forest Division North (territorial), Seoni, ordered E
confiscation of tractor (MP-22 AA-0736) and trolley (MP 22 AA 0764)
and teak wood. The Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer held
that the vehicle operator and his companion had deliberately transported
the teak wood without the requisite permit or any valid document. Further,
he held that the owner was aware of the said illegal transport.
F
6. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent carried the matter
in appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Appellate Authority"cum-
Chief Conservator of Forest, Seoni Circle, Seoni (M.P), who in turn
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the authority below by
order dated 06.12.2012.
G
7. The respondent having been unsatisfied with the order dated 6-
11-2012 preferred rev.ision before the additional sessions judge, Seoni,
under Section 15-B of the Adhiniyam. The additional sessions judge,
Seoni, by judgment dated 18.07.2013, allowed the revision and quashed
the order of confiscation and directed to release the vehicle. Moreover
H
(
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A the court was of the view that unless the guilt of the accused is proved,
there c·annot be any confiscation of the vehicle and the forest produce.
The reasoning of the first revisional court is extracted as under:
14. As such, the order of Authorized Officer and Sub Divisional
Officer dated 09.04.2012 and order of Appellate Authority and
B Designated Conservator of Forests dated 06.12.2012 in Appeal
No. 7/2012 are violation of Section 55 of the Indian Forest Act,
1927 and also Adhiniyam, 1969. The Sub Divisional l!'orest
officer lakhnadon and Appellate Authority without holding
accused guilty in criminal case no. 269/2012 had no right to
confiscate the vehicle and forest produce.
c (emphasis supfllied)
8. The State challenged the aforesaid order of the additional
sessions judge, Seoni, dated 18.07.2013, by filing a petition under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 being M.Cr.C No. 12750/
2013 before the High Comt of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. The High
D Court, by order dated 21.01.2014, dismissed the petition filed by the
appellant/state and affinned the order of the lower court. Aggrieved by
the order of the High Court, the appellant/state has knocked on the doors
of this Court by way of special leave petition.
9. Heard the learned counsel for both parties and perused the
E material available on record.
10. Madhya Pradesh is famous for its abundant biodiversity. The
rich biodiversity generates minor forest produce such as tendu, harra,
sal seed and gum etc 1• These forest prodtice are a good source of revenue
for the state and provides employment opportunities for the people. ·
F
11. In order to facilitate development of a good forest policy, the
State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Adhiniyam in the year 1969.~
This legislation was enacted with an object to regulate the trade of ce1tain
forest produce in the State of Madhya Pradesh. 3 The Adhini)-am is a
· statute enacted for the purpose of preserving certain forest produce in
G the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Scheme of the Act, as expressed in
. several provisions, is to empower the authorized officers of the Forest
Department for proper implementation/enforcement of the statutory
1
Madhya Pradesh Development Report, Planning Commission (2011).
2
Preamble, Adhiniyam.
3
H Ibid.·
•
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI· 223
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

provisions and for enabling them to take effective steps for preserving A
these forest produce. For this purpose certain powers including the power
of seizure, confiscation and forfeiture have been vested in them. This
position is made clear by giving overriding effect to the provisions of the
Act QYer other statutes and laws.
12. At this juncture it is important to have a glance at certain B
changes the Adhiniyam has undergone over the years. Sections 15 and
22 (1) were replaced by Section 15-A to 15-D by the State Act 15 of
1987. Adhiniyam as originally enacted did not provide for separate
confiscatory proceedings. Original enactment only had penal provisions.
The newly introduced Sections from Section I 5-A to 15-0 were brought
in line with Indian Forest Act, as amended by the State of Madhya c
Pradesh to provide for a separate confiscatory mechanisr~l.
13. Before we delve into the issue, a briefreference to the overall
scheme of the Act is necessary. Section 2 of the Adhiniyam is the definition
clause. Under Sub-clause (d) of Section 2 various forest produce have
been elucidated. Section 3 oftheAdhiniyam empowers State Government D
to divide forest area into units for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
Section 4 oftheAdhiniyam states thatthe State Government may appoint
requisite number of agents to trade in specific forest produce. Further,
Section 5 creates bar on individuals other than the State Government or
authorized officers of the State Government or an agent appointed under E
Section 4, to purchase or transport such specified forest produce in such
area with certain exceptions as provided under Sub-section (2) of Section
5. Furthermore, Section 7, 8 and 9 of the Adhiniyam allows the State
Government to fix prices, prescribe procedures for opening depots,
publication of price lists etc. at the depot.
F
14. Section 10 and 11 oftheAdhiniyam prescribes registration of
growers, manufacturers, traders and consumers of specified forest
produce respectively. Section 12 vests discretionary powers upon the
State Government to dispose of specified forest produce. Section 12-A
provides for re-sale of excess specified fru:est produce by manufacturer,
trader or consumer. Section 13 provides for the mode of retail sale of G
specified forest produce. Section 14 empowers State Government.to
delegate powers or functions under the Act.
15. It would be useful for the purpose of this case to reproduce
Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam-
H
.. ,
224. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R..

A 15. Search and seizure of property liable to confiscation
and procedur(l. thereof - (1) A11y Forest Officer as may be ..
notified by the State Government or any Police Officer not below
the rank of an Assistant Sub Inspector or any other person
authorized by the State Govei:nment may, with a view to securing
compliance with the provisions. of thi.s Act or t?e Rules made
B
thereunder or to-satisfying himself that the said provisions have
been complied with,- -
(i) stop and s~arch any person, boat, vehicle or receptacle use ·
or intended to be used for the transport of satisfied forest
produced; -
c
(ii) Enter and search any place)
(2) When. there is reason to believe. that any officer under
this. Act has been committed in respect of any specified forest
produce, 3[Any Forest Officer as may be notified by.the State
D Government or any Police Officer not below the rank of an
Assistant Sub Inspector] oi' any person authorized by the State
Government in this behalf may, seize such specified Fcrest.Produce
along with all tools, boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other·
articles used in committing such offence under the provisions of
this Act.
E
(3) Any Officer or Person seizing any property under this
SectiOn shall place on all such property a mark indicating that the
same has been so seized and shall,, as soon as may be, either
produce the property seized before the officer not below the rank
of an Assistant Conservator or Forest authorised by the State
F Government in this behalf, by notification (hereinafter referred to
as the Authorised Officer] or where it is having regard to quantity
• or bulk or other genuine difficulty, not practicable to produce the
property seized before the Authorised Officer, make a report about
the seizure to the Authorised Officer, or where it is intended to
0 launch criminal proceedings against the offender imrnediately make
report of such seizure to the Magistrate havingjurisdiction to try
the offence account of which seizure has been made:
Provided that, when the specified Forest Produce with respect
to which such offence is believed to have been committed is the
property of Government and the offender is unknown it shall be
H
-
. THE STATE.OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 225
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

· ·. sufficient if the officer make as soon as may be a report of the A
circumstances to his official superior.
(3A) Any forest officer of a rank not inferior to that of .a
Ranger, who or whos~ subordinate, has seized any tools, boats,
vehic~es, ropes, clairps or any other article as liable for confiscation,
may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof, of a B
.I_,_
security·in a form as may th~ prescribed, of an.amount equal to
double the value of such property, as estimated by such officer, of
the production of the property so released, whe~ so required, before
the officer authorized order the confiscation or the Magistrate
having jurisdietion to try the offenc~ on account of which the
seizure has been made. c
(4) Subject to the provisions 0f sub-section(6), where the
authorized officer upon production before him of the specified
forest produce or upon receipt of.report about the seizure, as the
case may be, is satisfied that offence has been committed in
respect thereof, he may, by order in writing and for reasons to be D
recorded confiscate the specified forest produce so seized together
with all tools, vehicles, boats ropes, chains or any other articles .
used in committing such offence. A copy of order of confiscation
shall be forwarded without any undue delay to the ![Officer-in-
(."
charge of Forest Circle] in which the specified forest produce E
has been seized.
'·
' . (S) No order confiscating any property shall be made under
'
sub-section(4)unless t11e authorised officer; - '
' '
'·1
(a) sends an intimation in forms prescribed about intimation
of proceedings for confiscation of property to the F
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on
account of which the seizure has been made;
(b) issues a notice in writing to the person from whom the
property is seized, and to any other person who may
appear to the authorised officer to have some interest in G
such property;
(c) affords an opportunity to the persons referred to in clause
(b) of making a representation within such reasonable
time as may be specified in the notice against the
proposed confiscation; and .H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS pol 7] 4 S.C.R.

A (d) gives to the officer or person effecting the seizure and
the person or persons to whom notice has been issued
under clause (b ), hearing on the date to be fixed for
such purpose.
(5A) When the authorised officer having the jurisdiction over the
B case is himself involved in the seizure of investigation, the next
higher authority may transfer the case to any other officer of the
same rank for conducting proceedings under this section.]
(6) No order of confiscation under sub-section (4) of any tools,
vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or any other articles (other than
c specified forest produce seized) shall be made if any person
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (5) proves to the satisfaction
of authorised officer that any such knowledge or connivance or
as the case may be without the knowledge or connivance of his
servant or agent and that all reasonable and necessary precautions
had been taken against use of objects aforesaid for commission
D of an offence under this Act.
(6A) The seized forest produce or any other property, if ordered
to be released by the authorised officer, shall continue to be under
custody until confirmation of the order of the authorised officer
by the Appellate Authority or until the expiry of the period for
E initiating "suomotu" action by him, whichever is earlier, as specified
under Section 15-A.
(7) The provisions of Sections I02 and I 03 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,. 1973 (No.2 of f9'74) relating to search and seizures
shall so far as may be apply to searches and seizures and seizures
F under this section.
Sub-section (I) of Section 15 empowers concerned forest officers
to conduct search to secure compliance of the provisions of the
Adhiniyam. On a plain reading of Sub-section (2), it is clear that the
concerned officer may seize vehicles, ropes etc, if he has reason to
G believe that the said items were used for the commission of an offence
under the Adhiniyam. Confiscation proceedings as contemplated under
Section I 5 of the Adhiniyam is a quasi-judicial proceedings and not a
criminal proceedings. Confiscation proceeds on the basis of the
'satisfaction' of the Authorized ·Officer with regard to the commission
H
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 227
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

of forest offence. Sub-section (3) of the provision lays down the A
procedure to be followed for confiscation under the Adhi11iyam. Sub-
section (3A) authorizes forest officers of rank not inferior to that of a
Ranger, who or whose subordinate, has seized any tools, boats, vehicles,
ropes, claims or any other article as liable for confiscation, niay release
. the same on execution of a security worth double the ainount of the
B
property so seized. This provision is similar to that of Section 53 of the
Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh. Sub-
section (4) mandates that the concerned officer should pass a written
order recording reasons for confiscation, if he is satisfied that a forest
offence has been committed by using the items marked for confiscation. ·
Sub-section (5) prescribes various procedures for confiscation c
proceedings. Sub-Section (SA) prescribes that whenever an Authorized
Officer havingjurisdiction over the case is himselfinvolved in the seizure,
the next higher authority may transfer the case to any other officer of
the saine rank for conducting confiscatio11 proceedings. Sub-section (6)
provides that with respect to tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains
D
or any other article other than timber or forest-produce seized,
confiscation may be directed unless the person referred in clause (b) of
Sub-section S is able to satisfy that the articles were used without his
knowledge or connivance or, as the case may be, without the knowledge
or connivance of his servant or agent and that all reasonable and
necessary precautions had been taken against the use of such objects E
for commission of forest offence.
16. Section 1SA prov.ides the remedy of appeal against the order
of the authorized officer under Section 1S in confiscation proceedings.
·Section 1S~B of the Adhiniyam provides for revision before the ~ourt of
Sessions against the order of the Appellate Authority in the confiscation F
proceedings.
17. Under Section 15-C oftheAdhiniyam, a jurisdictional Bar on
courts and tribunals have been provided for, if the confiscation
proceedings are initiated under Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam. Moreover
Sub-section (2) of Section 15-C provides that nothing hereinbefore G
contained shall be deemed to prevent any officer authorized in this behalf
by the State Government from directing at any time the immediate release
of any property seized under Section 15. The necessary proposition which
follows such a provision is that, in a case where the Authorized Officer

H
.
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.~.R.

A is empowered to confiscate the seized forest produce on being satisfied
that an offence under the Act has been committed, the general power
vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim custody/release of the
seized materials under the Cr. P.C. gives way. The Magistrate while
dealing with a case of seizure of forest produce under the Act should
first examine whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce
B
is vested in the Authorized Officer under the Act and ifhe finds so, then
he has no power to pass any order dealing with interim custody/release
of the seized matedal. Such ouster of jurisdiction would aid in proper
impl~mentation of the Adhiniyam. If in such cases the power to grant
interim custody/release of seized forest produce is vested in the
c Magistrate, then it will defeat the very scheme of the Act. Such a
consequence is to be avoided.
18. Another relevant provision which needs to be discussed 'is
Section 15-D of the Adhiniyam. It provides that:
15-D. Confiscation of property when the produce is not the
D property of GovernmeI_It.- All specified forest produce which .
in either case is not the property of the Government and in respect
of which a contravention of any' provision of the Act or the rules.
made thereunder has been committed and all tools, boats, vehicles,
ropes, chains.or any other a11icles, in case used in committing
E such contravention shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 15,
15A, 15 B and 15 C be liable to confiscation upon conviction of
the offender for such contravention.
19. The said section makes it clear that section 15-D subjects
itself to confiscation proceedings under Section 15, 15-A, 15-B and 15-
F C ofAct. Further Section 15-D speaks of confiscation of all tools, boats,
vehicles, ropes, chains or any other articles upon conviction ofthe offender
for such forest offence. This Section is equivalent to.Section 55 of the
-Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh. In this
Section the confiscation after the conviction is subjected to separate
confiscation proceedings as contemplated under Section 15, 15-A, 15-
G C. At the cost of repetition it should be noted that if a confiscation
proceeding under Sec.tion 15 has commenced and the confiscation has
already occurred, then there is no question of confiscation under Section
15-D again. If the confiscation has not taken pface under Section 15,
thei1 the Court after finaLconviction can order confiscation under Section
H 15-D of the Adhiriiyam. ·
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 229
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

20. The broad scheme of the Adhiniyam is to punish those who A
are in contravention of the law at the hand of the criminal court. The
confiscation being incidental .and ancillary to the conviction, State of
Madhya Pradesh, separated the process of confiscation from the process
of prosecution. The purpose of the enactment seems to be that the power
of the criminal court regarding the disposal of property is made sub1e.ct
B
to the jurisdiction of the authorized officer with regard to that aspect; the
jurisdiction of criminal court in regard to the main trial remains unaffe~ted.
21. Before we deal with the question concerned in this appeal it
would be apt to have a look at three. cases decided by. this· court. In
l)ivisional Forest Qfficer And Anr. Vs. G V: Sudhakar And Ors. 4,
this Court was concerned with the question as to whether the proceedings c
. for confiscation of illegally felled timber by the respondent therein can
be continued till the disposal of main criminal case pending against him.
This Court after considering the various provisions of the Andhra Pradesh
Forest Act came to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the object
of the legislation was to provide for two separate proceedings before · D
two different forums and that there is no conflict ofjurisdiction as Section
45, as amended by the Amendment Act;. in turn curtails the power
conferred on the Magistrate to direct confiscation of timber or forest
produce on conviction of the accused. This Court proc.eeded to observe-
The conferral ot the power of confiscation of seized timber· pt E
forest produce and the implements, etc. on the Authorized Officer .· ...
under Sub-section (2a) ofSectiori 44 of the Act 'on his being ~
satisfied that a forest offence had been committed)n. respect
thereof, is not dependent upon whether a criminal prosecution for ·
commission of a forest offence has been launched against the
offender or not. It is a separate and distinct proceeding from that F
(

of a trial before the Court for commission of an offence .. Under
Sub-section (2A) of Section 44 of the Act, where a Forest Officer
tnakes report of seizure of any timber before the Authorized
Officer along with a report under Section 44(2), the Authorized
Officer can direct confiscation to .Government of such timber' or G
forest produce and the implements, etc., if he is satisfied that ~
forest offence has been committed, irrespective of the fact whether
the accused is facing a trial before a Magistrate for the commission
of a forest offence under Section 20 or 29 of the Act.
4
(1985)4 SCC.573 H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 22. In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Gopal Sarkar, this
Court again had an opportunity to deal with the confiscatory proceedings
initiated for forest offences. This Court while relying on the judgment in
Divisional Forest Officer vs G V. Sudhakar Rao (Supra) has come to
the following conclusion:
B 10. On a fair reading of the provision it is clear that in a case
where any timber or other forest produce which is the property of
the State Government is produced under sub-section (I) and an
Authorised Officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been
--committed in respect of such property he may pass order of
confiscation of the said property (forest produce) together with
c all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing
the offence. The power of confiscation is independent of any
proceeding of prosecution for the forest offence committed. This
position is manifest from the statute and has also been held by this
Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. G V. Sudhakar Rao [(1985)
D 4 sec 573 : t 986 sec (Cri) 34 : AIR t 986 sc 328] .
23. In the case of State of MP. vs. S.P. Sales Agencies 6, the
brief facts therein were a truck was. intercepted by the police in the
District of Gwalior. It was found that 281 cases ofKuttcha manufactured
by Mis Harsh Food Products, r~spondent 2 therein were found in the
E truck. These wood cases were being transported without requisite transit
' pass under Rule 3 of M.P. Transit Rules thereafter; this matter was
reported to Sub-Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior, who initiated
confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Act. This Com1 had an
opportl,mity to deal with the question as to whether confiscation
proce-edings can be initiated .under section 52 of the Act only after
F launching of the criminal prosecution or is it open to the forest authorities
upon seizure of forest produce to initiate botH or.either. This Com1 relying
on the cases in Divisioi1al Forest Officer vs. G V. Sudhakar Rao and
State of West Bengal vs. Gopal Sarkar, came to the conclusion that
the power of confiscation is independent of any criminal prosecution for
G forest offences committed. ·
24. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is apparent that Section
· 15 gives independent power to the concerned authority to confiscate the
articles, as mentioned there under, even before the guilt is completely
' (2002) 1 sec 495
H '(2004 l 4 sec 448
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 231
[N. V.. RAMANA, J.]

established. This power can be exercised by the concerned officer ifhe A
is satisfied that the said objects were utilized during the commission of a
forest offence. A protection is provided for the owners of the vehicles/
articles, if they are able to prove that they took all reasonable care and
precautions as envisaged under Sub-section (5) of Section I 5 of the
Adhiniyam and the said offence was committed without their knowledge
B
or connivance.
25. Criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation proceedings.
The two proceedings are different and parallel, each having a distinct
purpose. The object of confiscation proceeding is to enable speedy and
effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the produce and the
means used for committing the offence while the object of the prosecution c
is to punish the offender. The scheme Adhiniyam prescribes an
independent procedure for confiscation. The intention of prescribing
separate proceedings is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop
further misuse of the vehicle
26. At the cost of repetition we clarify that confiscatory proceedings D
are independent of the main criminal proceedings. In view of our detailed
discussion in the preceding paragraph we are of opinion that High Court
as well as the revisional court erred in coming to a conclusion that the
confiscation under the law was not permissible unless the guilt of the
accused is completely established. E
'-,_,. 27. Consequently the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the
High Court is set aside.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
.. [2017] 4 S.C.. R. Z32

A· GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
.. v. . •' ..
.·.
MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER
' (CivilA:ppeal'.No. 6112 of2017)
B
.MAY04;i017
. [KURlAN
. . . . JOSEPH AND R. BANUMAJ:HI,
.
JJ.). '•

Right to Fair Compensation ;nd if'ransparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettle1nent Act, 2013 - s.24(2) -
·C Subsequent purchasers/Assignees/Power of attorney holders etc -
Locus standi to file a petition for a declaration of lapse of
acquisition proceedings u/s.24(2) - Held: The subsequent purchaser,
the assignee, the successor in interest, the power of attorney, etc.,
are all persons who are interested in compensation/affected persons
D in terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case
for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virt11e of operation of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act - It is a declaration
/ .
qua the land wherein indisputably.they- have. an interest ahd they
;

. are affected. bY, s~ch acrjuisi'tion _·Land AC<j1:fiSition Act, 1894.
E~ : · ·Dismissing the app eals, the. Co_u~t. · · · · . '
0

.
HELDi i. Unde~'the 2013 Act, all persons claiming interest
in compensatfon to be paid on.account of the acquisition of land
under the 2013 Act, are perso'ns interested. Among others, any
person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be
adversely affected is also a person interested. The definition of
F · affected family also indicates that even a · family residing in the
lands souglit to be acquired; be it an owner or not, is an affected
family, and if a family 'or a person is affected, necessarily, he has a
right to approach the Court' to protect his interests. [Paras 18,
20) [245-C; 246-~)
G 2. The challenge made by the writ petitioners was not to
the acquisition or to·the regularity of the process of acquisition
including the taking of possession. Their only prayer was fqr a
declaration that the proceedings qua the land referred to in the
A~plication have lapsed by virtue of the operation of Section
. . .
H
232
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 233 ·

24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is one thing to say that there is a challenge A
to the legality or propriety or validity of the acquisition
proceedings and yet another thing .h> say that. by virtue of
operation of a subsequent legislatfon, the acquisition proceedings
have lapsed•. (Paras 21, 23) [246-H; 247-A, CJ
3. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on· · B
the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The: only lapse
under the 1894 Act was under Section llA whe~ .wlJat would
lapse is the ... "entire proceedings for the acquisition of land"
whereas under Section 24(2) of th~ :Z013 Act, what gets lapsed is .
the land acquisition proceedings 'initiated under the 1894 Act c
which has culminated in passing of an award under Section 11 but
where either possession was not taken or compensation was no~
paid ~ithin five 'years pri~r to 01.01.2014 • In .other words, the~
land 'acquisition proceedings conteµiplated under Section 24(2)
ofthe 2013 Act would take in botJi,. payment of compensation .and
taking of possession within the five year period prior to D
!)1.01.2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the en)ire land
acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision.
The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive.
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour
of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to E
encumber the land also comes to an end. [Para 25] (247-E-G;
248-A-B]
4. The whole face of land acquisition has changed by the
2013 Act. Section 105 of the 2013 Act has provided that the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to the enactments specified F
in the Fourth Schedule. So far, only 13 Acts have been notified
under the Fourth Schedule. Neither Delhi Development Act, 1957
nor Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 is included
in the Fourth Schedule. There is a clear indication that the Act
proposes to protect the interest of those persons, among others
who are affected by the acquisition. The subsequent purchasers/ G
successors, etc., in the cases before us, are all people affected
by the acquisition, and therefore, also they are entitled to seek a
declaration on lapse under the 2013 Act. [Paras 26, 27]
[248-D, ~; 249-A]
H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 5. The subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor
in interest, the power of attorney, etc., are all persons who are
interested in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms
of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a
declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by
virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a
B
declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an interest
and they are affected by such acquisition. }'or such a declaration,
it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do not have
any locus standi. The appellants are given a period of six nlonths
to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the 2013
c Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh. (Paras
29, 31) (249-F-G; 250-B]
UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through Its Chairman and
another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and
others (1996] 1 SCR 683 : (1996) 3 SCC 124; Sneh
D Prabha (Smt.) and others v. State of UP and another
(1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264 : (1996) 7 SCC 426; Meera
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others (2008]
10 SCR 1012_: (2008) 9 SCC 177; V. Chandrasekaran
and another v. Administrative Officer and others (2012]
E
10 SCR 603 : (2012) 12 SCC 133; Rajastha11 State
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v.
Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur
and others (2013] 4 SCR 978.: (2013) 5 SCC 427 -
held inapplicable.

F Suryaprakash and others v. State of Karnataka and
others.MANUIKA/331912016 (Writ Petition No.
10286-291 of 2014, decided on 05.12.2016) - held
applicable.

Delhi Development Authority v. Sukbhir Singh and
G others (2016) 8 SCALE 655 - relied on.

Case Law Reference

(1996] 1 SCR 683 held inapplicable Para7

H [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264. held inapplicable Para7
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 235

[20081 10 SCR 1012 held inap1>licable Para 7 A

[20121 10 SCR 603 held inapplicable Para7

12013] 4 SCR 978 held inapplicable Para 7

(2016) 8 SCALE 655 relied on Para 25 B

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6112 of
2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2014 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 3411 of2014
c
WITH
C.A. Nos. 6113, 6115, 6118, 6120, 6123, 6128, 6131, 6134, 6136,
6138, 6140, 6142, 6146, 6149, 6152, 6156, 6160, 6163, 6164, 6166, 6170,
6173, 6186, 6190, 6194, 6197, 6203, 6206, 6209, 6213, 6216, 6219, 6224,
6228,6233,6237,6240,6242,6246,6249,6260,6264,6267,6270,6272, D
6274, 6276, 6279, 6281, 6283, 6285, 6287, 6289, 6291, 6292, 6294, 6296,
6298, 6300, 6302, 6125, 6127, 6129, 6130, 6132, 6133, 6135, 6137, 6141, '
6143,6145,6147,6150,6153,6155,6157,6159,6161,6167,6169,6172,
6175,6176,6178,6180,6181,6182,6184,6185,6187,6189,6191,6193,
6195,6198,6200,6202,6205,6207,6210,6212,6214,6217,6218,6221,
E
6222,6225,6227,6230,6231,6234,6236,6239,6241,6243,6245,6248,
6250,6252,6253,6255,6256,6259,6262,6263,6265,6266,6269,6119,
6121,6122,6139,6144,6148,6151,6154,6158,6162,6168,6171,6174,
6177,6179,6183,6188,6192,6196,6199,6201,6204,6208,6211,6215,
6220,6223,6226,6229,6232,6235,6238,6244,6247,6251,6254,6257-
6258,6261,6268,6271,6273,6275,6278,6280,6282,6284,6286,6288, F
6290, 6293, 6295, 6297, 6299 and 6301 of2017.
P. S. Patwalia, ASG, S. S. Shamshery, AAG (Rajasthan), A. K.
Sanghi, K. Radhakrishnan, Amrendra Sharan, A. Sharan, V. Mohana,
"Salman Khurshid, V. Giri, Vivek Kumar Tankha, Rakesh Tiku, R. A.
Jain, Sachin Dutta, Ravinder Sethi, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Indu Malhotra, G
Ashok Chhabra, YashankAdhyaru, Dr. Arun Mohan, P.H. Parekh, Ajit
Kumar Sinha, Dhruv Mehta, A. K. Sanghi, Jayant Sud, Sachin Datta,
Sr. Advs, Mohan Prasad Gupta, R. K. Rathore, R. K. Mohanty,
Ms. Sunita Sharma, Pravesh Thakur, Kiran Bhardwaj, B. K.Prasad,
Shailender Saini, Harish Khinchi, Meenesh Dubey, Ms. Meenakshi
H
236 SUPREME·COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 s.c.R:

A Dubey, ShadmanAli, S. N. Terda:J,Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, Sakesh Kumar,
Ms. Sonam Nagrath Kohli; Karunakar Mahalik, Mukul Singh, Shekhar
Vyas, Meenesh Kumar Dubey, R. K. Rathord, Anil Hooda, Ms. Sushma
Sharma, Raj Bahadur Yadav, M. K. Maroria, Ajay· Kumar Singh, Vikas
Bansal, Ms. Sushma Suri, Neera:j Kr. Sharrrta, D.S. Mahra, Ms. Garirria
Prashad, Ms. Nupur Kumar, L:B. Rai, MohitKumar Sharina, D.eekant
B
Tripathi, Vijay Awana, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin
Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Lt. Col. (R) Arun ..Kumar, Hazi
Salimuddin,Ashis~ Qarg, T. L Garg, Vineet Garg, R: K. Shokeen, Tarjit
Singh, Ms. KaminiJaiswal; Ravi Mishra, Govind Goel,Ankit Goel, Shrey
Dambhare, Ram Naresh Yadav, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya,
c Ms. Binu Tamta, (for Mis Saharya& Co.),Ashwani Kumar, Ja:r Kumar
Bhardwaj, Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Sheetanshu Shekhar,
Ms. Bushra Parveen, Ms. Archana Kumari, Ms. Minali Deswal,.Tushar
Duneja, Vikas Pandey, Rajiv ·Sharma, Girish Chandra, Sanchit Garg,
Ms ..Shweta Jain, Parhlad Singh Sharma,Sandeep Singh, Satya Siddiqui,
Sarfraz Ahmed Siddiqui, S. A. Siddiqui, M. K. Maroria, Go pal Singh,
D
Manish Kumar, Ms. Varsha Po,ddar, Vibhu Shankar Mishra, R.R. Rajesh,
Ajay Sharma, A. K. Kaul, Raj Bahadur, Ms. Garima Prashad, Kaushik
Poddar, Shantanu Sagar, Anmol, A. Deb Kumar, Rabin Majumder, Sameer
Jain, Ms. Anu Suha, Ms. Sanchita, Ms. Azra Rehman, B. S. Mathur,
BharatBhushan, Kaushik, N.S. Dalal, D. P. Singh, Madan Gera,Ashutosh
E Dubey, Ms. Rajshri Dubey, Abhishek Chauhan, V. S. Rawat, Aman
Nandrajog, Ashish Tiwari, Gopal Sankara Narayanan, Zeeshan Diwan,
Sumeer Sodhi, Arjun Nanda, T. Mahipal, R.K. Singh, Ms. Deepa Rai,
Kedar Nath Tripathy, Arunabh Chowdhury, Anjuman Tripathy, Jayant
Mohan, Mohan Prasad Gupta, Shadman Ali, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Rajesh
Singh Chauhan, Mahesh Prasad, Shambhu Prasad, Ms. Ritu Singh Mann,
F
Dheeraj Garg, S. K. Rout, Ms. Amit Kalkal, Jitender Choudhary, Rajesh
Singh, P. K. Jain, Saurabh Jain, P. K. Goswami, S. P. Singh Rathore,
Ashok Kumar Sharma, Uday Prakash Yadav, H. Arjun, Mrs. Anuradha
Soni Venna, .swetank Shantanu, R.R. Kumar, A. Shivani, Navin Chawla,
Ms. Nidhi Mohan Prashar, Gaurav Sarin, Mrs. Charul Sarin,
G Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Ms. Renuka Arora, Ms. S. Janani, Ms. Renuka,
Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Bankey Bihari, Ms. Smita Maan, Naresh Maan,
Sachin Gupta, Ankur Chawla, Ms. Meenakshi Chatterjee, Akshay Sahni,
Vinay Shailendra, Ms. Worthing Kasar, Ms. Deepika V. Marwaha,
Cha.ndra Bhushan Prasad, Saksham Maheshwari, J. S. Chhabra, Mohan
H
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 237

Lal Sharma, Ms. Shikha Sharma, Gov ind Goel, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, A
Ms. Vidyottma, N. S. Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, Pradeep Misra, Daleep
Dhyani, Suraj Singh, Ms. Rashmi Chopra, Ms. Asiya, Ms. Rashmi Arora,
Dr. Monika Gusain, Syed Mehdi Imam, D. K. Sharma, Shamama Anis,
TabrezAhmed, Navras Sohrawarby, Mohd. Noorullah, Javed Muzaffar,
Sumit Bansal, Ms. Richa Oberoi, Ms. Sumi Anand, Vikas Kuniar, Gagan
B
Gupta, Manish Paliwal, P.S. Sharma, Vivek Singh, Chandra Prakash,
Ms. Ashwarya Malik, Ms. Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Vanshaya Shukla,
Ms. Ritika Jhurani, Dinesh Chandra, Amit Sharma, Ankit Raj, Ms. Ruchi
Kohli, Sumit Bansal, Ateev Mathur, Ms. Richa Oberoi, A.P.S. Sehgal,
Vikas Kumar, Gagan Gupta, Arun K. Sinha, Ms. Alka Agrawal, Sumit
Sinha, Mukesh Kr. Maroria, Balendu Shekhar, Ajay Singh, Rajesh Kumar, c
Sibo Sankar Mishra, Ms. Gunwant Dara, Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, B.K.
Prasad, Surender Kumar Gupta, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Manish Kumar,
Madan Lal Sharma, Piyush Rayal, Ms. Smriti Vashisht, Ghan Shyam
Vashisht, Manoj K. Mishra, Sandeep Kr. Dwivedi, Umesh Dubey, S. K.
Pathak, Rajiv Kumar Ghawana, T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas,
D
Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Puneet Sharma, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Jasbir Singh
Malik, Ms. Joymoti Mize, Dhiraj Parveen, Ms. Manjul Dahiya, Pradeep
Jatav, Rajat Bhardwaj, Gov ind Goel, Ankit Goel, Rajendra Prasad Saxena,
N.P. Sahani, Anuj Agarwala, Anubhav Sinha, Aayush Agarwala, Gopal
Sankarnarayanai1, Sumeer Sodhi, Arjun Nanda, Anubhav Bhasin, Pramod
B. Agarwala, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham, Ms. Anuradha E
Arputham, Amit Arora, Vikas Mehta, Devender Prasad, Ms. Anushree
Menon, Ms. Esha Mazumdar, Ms. Priyanjali Singh, Rahul Rathore, Rahul
Jarjal, Vikas Kumar, Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Ms. Renuka Arora, Anup
Kumar, B. Tripathy, Naresh Kaushik, Randhir Pandey, Ms. Ranjeeta
Rohtagi, Ms. Bushra Parveen, Sheetanshu Shekhar, Ms. Minali Deswal,
F
Tushar Duneja, Mohit D. Ram, Monisha Handa, Bharat Beriwal,
Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Dharamveer Khatri, Mansoor Ali, Pradeep Misra,
Ajay Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Ms. Iti Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Rahul
Bhatia, Kartik Bhardwaj, Manu Mridul, Ms. Anwesha Saha, Anil Kumar
Tandale, Amitabh Kumar Verma, Rajesh, Ms. Mukti Chowdhary, Madan
Gera, Garav M. Liberham, Ritesh Khatri, Manoj K. Mishra, Yogendra G
Kumar, Umesh Dubey, Lalit K. Rawat, Nitin Mishra, Tushar Bakshi,
Ms. Richa Kapoor, Ms. Mallika Parmar, Gopal Jha, N. Prabhakar,
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms. Nitya Madhusoodhanan, S.
K. Raut, D. S Kavntae, Megh Pal Singh, Ms. Farha Faiz, Ms. Rita
H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A Gupta, Sanjay Jain, Vinay Arora, Raj Bahadur, Amit Sharma, Ms. Sushma
Verma, D. S. Mahra, R. R. Rajesh, Shadman Ali, Rajesh Ranjan,
Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, Sachin Sharma, Ms. Sushma Sharma, Ms. Sumi
Anand, Ms. Anju Bhattacharya, D. P. Mohanty, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj,
Ajay Sharma, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Nee lam Sharma, Ms. Diksha Kukrety,
Rajesh K. Singh, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Shailendra Saini, Shadman Ali,
B
Karan Sethi, S. A. Siddiqui, Ms. Sushma Verma, Vibhu Shanker Mishra,
Mukul Singh, Rabindra Kumar Mohanty, Yashraj Singh Deore,
Ms. Priyadarshinee Singh, Pankaj Bhatia, Nipun Goel, Dhruv Tamta,
B. L. Shivare, Dhruv Surana, Ashish Choudhury, Ms. Bharti Tyagi,
M.A. Chinnasamy, K. S. Gananasambandam, C. Rubavathi, V. Senthil
c Kumar, P. Raja Ram, R. R. Rajesh, Harsh Gunchind, Azim H. Laskar,
Sachin Das, Ms. Sampa Sengupta Ray, Abhijit Sengupta, Ms. Priya Hingo
Rani, Bhushan Prasad, Mann Mridul, Amitabh Kumar Verma, Krishan
Kumar, Pankaj Vivek, Mrs. Priya Puri, Puneet Sharma, Ranjay Kumar
Dubey, Ms. Vaishali Soni, Ms. Kush Chaturvedi, Rajeev, P. Kausir
Prabhu, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Ms. Ritika Jhurani, Dinesh Shanna, Advs.
D
for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted.

E 2. Whether the subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of
attorney holders, etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a declaration
oflapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of The Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 Act"),
is the only issue arising for consideration in these cases.
F
3. The High Court has taken the view in favour of such people.
Thus, aggrieved the NCT of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority
are in appeals before th is Court.
4. At the outset, we may note that in these cases, the land
G acquisition proceedings have otherwise lapsed by the operation of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act since either compensation was not paid or
possession was not taken within five years prior to 01.01.2014, the date
of coming into force of the 2013 Act. Thus, the dispute is only on the
locus standi.
H
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 239
[KURIAN, J.]

5. Shri Amarendra Saran, learned Senior Counsel leading the A
arguments on behalf of the appellants submits that in all these cases, the
transfer is in violation of The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Delhi Act, 1972"). The transfers
in favour of the writ petitioners are hence void, and accordingly, the
beneficiary of an illegal/void transaction is not entitled to file a case for
B
any relief.
6. Reliance is placed on Sections 3,4,8, and 9 of the 1972 Act,
which read as follows:
"3. Prohibition 011 tra11sfer of lands acquired by Central
Govemme11t - c
No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease
or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Un ion territory
of Delhi which has been acquired by the Central Government
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law
providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose. D

4. Regulatio11 011 tra11sfer of la11ds in rehttio11 to which
acquisitio11 proceedings have been i11itiatetl

No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of
the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, E
mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated
in the Union territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in
ponnection with the Scheme and in relation to which a declaration
to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public
purpose having been made by the Central Government under F
section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Central
Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section
48 of that Act.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Restrictio11s 011 registration of transfers of land - G
Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other Jaw for the time
being in force, where any document required to be registered
under the provisions of clause (a) to clause (e) of sub-section (I)

H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, purports to transfer by
sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof
referred to in section 4, no registering officer appointed under
that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor
produces before such registering officer a permission in writing
of the competent authority for such transfer.
B
9. Penalty -
If any person contravenes the provisions of section 3 or section 4,
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
· extend to three years or with fine or with both."
c
7. Learned Senior Counsel and other learned Counsel further
submitted that the issue is no more res integra in view of the following
decisions of this Com1:
(i) U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through Its Chairman and another
D v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others1,
(ii) Sneh Prabha (Smt.) and others v. State of U.P. and another,
(iii) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others3,
(iv) V. Chandrasekaran and anotherv. Administrative Officer and
E others4,
(v) Rajasthan State. Industrial Development and Investment
Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society,
Jaipur and others5 and
F 8. U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), is a case where this Court
considered the consequences of a transfer of the land after issuance of
notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as "the 1894 Act") in the State of Utter Pradesh.
It was held that any encumbrances created by the owner after Section
4(1) Notification is published, does not bind the Government and such a
G purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. Therefore, such a
1(1996)3SGC124
'( 1996) 7 sec 426
'(2008) 9 sec 1n
'(2012) 12 sec 133
H '(2013)5SCC427
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 241
[KURIAN, J.]

purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity A
of the process of taking possession of the land. To quote paragraph-3:

"3; .. : It is settled law that after the notification under Section
4( 1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance created by the
owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not
acquire any title to the property. In this case, notification under B
Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land
admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was
constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published
later on 8-7~1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was
exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on c
service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since
urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be
constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood
vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances.
It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation
of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all D
encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48( I) is pub! ished
in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A, as
amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the
acquisition does not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1)
and the declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain vaiid. There E
is no other provision under the Ac~ to h.ave the acquired land
divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under Section 48( 1)
was published and the possession is surre12dered pursuant thereto.
That apart, since Mis Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased
the land after the notification under Section 4(1) was published,
its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or F
interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot
challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking
possession of the land before publication of the declaration under
Section 6 was published."
. 9. In Sneh Prabha (supra), this Court reiterated the position that G
any alienation ofland afterthe publication of the notification under Section
4( 1) of the 1894 Act does not bind the Government or the beneficiary
under the acquisition. It has also been held that once the possession of
the land is taken under Section 16 of the Act, the land vests with the
H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Government free from all encumbrances and the absolute title is vested
in the Government. To quote from paragraph-5:

"5•... It is settled law that any person who purchases land after
publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/
her own peril. The object of publication of the notification under
B Section 4( l) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is
likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition
proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the
land acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to
enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any
c alienation of land after the publication of the notification under
Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary
under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights,
titles and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Sec.tion
16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute
title in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser
D acquires land, his/her only right would be subject to the provisions
of the Act and/or to receive compensation for the land. In a recent
judgment, this Court in Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava
considered the controversy and held that a.person who purchases
land ·subsequent to the notification is not entitled to alternative
E site. It is seen that the Land Pol icy expressly conferred that right
only on that person whose land was acquired. In other words, the
person must be the owner of the land on the date on which
notification under Section 4( 1) was published. By necessary
implication, the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the
policy and became disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy."
F
.I 0. In Meera Sahni (supra), this Court dealt with the provisions
under the Delhi Act, 1972. After referring to U.P. Jal Nigam and Sn eh
Prabha .cases (supra), in paragraph-21 of the judgment, it was held that
... "it is by now well settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act,
the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition
G
proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the
compensation".
11. In V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court again addressed
the issue as to whether the subsequent purchaser can challenge the
H
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 243
[KURlAN, J.]

acquisition proceedings. After referring to some of the earlier judgments, A
at paragraph-18, the law has been laid down as follows: .
"18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that a person who purchases land
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect
to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition B
proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the
sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any
title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his
vendor's title."
12. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corporation (supra), this Court held that such transactions c
after initiation of acquisition proceedings would be void and would not
be binding on the Government. To quote paragraph-13:
"13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal
proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a Section
4 notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge the acquisition D
proceedings, and can only claim compensation as the sale
transaction in such a situation is void qua the Government. Any
such encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer of the
land in question, that is made after the issuance of such a
notification, would be deemed to be void and would not be binding E
on the Government. ... "
13. On behalf of the respondents, it has been mainly contended
that the subsequent purchasers are persons interested and they have
every right to file a case to protect their interests. It was also pointed out
that under the Delhi Act, 1972, there is no absolute bar on transfer since
under Section 5, the transfer was possible with the permission of the F
Competent Authority and. that under Section 5, the Competent Authority
cannot refuse to grant the permission except on any of the grounds
under sub-Section (3) of Section 5. To quote Section 5:
"5. Application for gra11t of permission for transfer under
section 4 - G
xx.xx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(3) The competent authority shall not refuse to grant the permission
applied for under this section except on one or more of the
following grounds, namely:-
H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A (i) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed for the effective
implementation of the Scheme;
(ii) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed· for securing
the objects of the Delhi Development Authority referred to in
section 6 of the Development Act;
B
(iii) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed for any
development within the meaning of clause (d) of section 2 of the
Development Act or for such things as public building and other
public works and utilities, roads, housing, recreation, industry,
business, markets, schools and other educational institutions,
c hospitals and public open spaces and other categories of public
uses."
14. It was also contended that the 2013 Act has not exempted the
acquisitions under The Delhi Development Act, 1957, and forthat matter
the Delhi Act, 1972 underthe Fourth Schedule to Section 105.
D
15. Yet another contention was that in all these cases, the challenge
was not to the acquisition proceedings but for a declaration under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act to the effect that by virtue of operation of the said
provision, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed.
E 16. "Person interested", under the 1894 Act, is defined under .
Section 3(b) of the Act, which reads as follows:
"3(b) the expression "person interested" includes all persons
claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account
of the acquisition ofland under this Act; and a person shall
F be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an
easement affecting the land;"
. 17. Under the 2013 Act, "person interested" has been given a
·much wider meaning under Section 3(x). To quote:
o "3(x). "person interested" means-
(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made
on account of the acquisition ofland under this Act;
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers,
who have lost any forest rights recognised under the Scheduled
H
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 245
[KURIAN, J.]

Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition A
of Forest Rights) Act, 2006;
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws
including share-croppers by whatever name they may be B
called; and
(v) any person whose primary source oflivelihood is likely to be
adversely affected;"
18. Thus, under the 2013 Act, all persons claiming interest in
compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition offand under the
c
2013 Act, are persons interested. Among others, any person whose
primary source of livelihood is likely to be adversely affected is also a
person interested.
19. "Land owner" under the 2013 Act is defined under Section D
3(r), which reads as follows:
"3(r)"land owner" includes any person,-
(i) whose name is recorded as the owner of the land or building
or part thereof, in the records of the authority concerned; or
E
(ii) any person who is granted forest rights under the Scheduled
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition
afforest ·Rights) Act, 2006 or under any other law for the
time being in force; or
(iii) who is entitled to be granted Patta rights on the land under F
any law of the State including assigned lands; or
(iv) any person who has been declared as such by an order of the
court or Authority;
Thus, among others, a person whose name is recorded as owner G
of the land or building or part thereof in the records of the Authority
concerned, is a land owner.
20. "Affected family" has been defined in the 2013 Act under
Section 3(c) which reads as follows :-
H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A "3(c)-affected family includes-
(i) a family whose land or other immovable property has been
acquired;
(ii) a family which does not own any land but a member or
members of such family may be agricultural labourers,
B tenants including any form of tenancy or holding ofusufruct
right, share-croppers or artisans or who may be working in
the affected area for three years prior to the acquisition of
the land, whose primary source oflivelihood stand affected
by the acquisition ofland;
c (iii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers
who have lost any of their forest rights recognised under
the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of2007) due to
acquisition ofland;
D (iv) family whose primary source of livelihood for three years
prior to the acquisition of the land is dependent on forests
or water bodies and includes gatherers of forest produce,
hunters, fisher folk and boatmen and such livelihood is
affected due to acquisition of land;
E (v) a member of the family who has been assigned land by the
State Government or the Central Government under any of
its schemes and such land is under acquisition;
(vi) a family residing on any land in the urban areas for preceding
three years or more prior to the acquisition of the land or
F whose primary source oflivelihood for three years prior to
the acquisition of the land is affected by the acquisition of
such land;"
This definition ofaffected family also indicates that even a family
residing in the lands sought to be acquired, be it an owner or not, is an
G affected family, and if a family or a person is affected, necessarily, he
has a right to approach the Court to protect his interests.
21. It is also to be specifically noted that the challenge made by
the writ petitioners in the Miscellaneous Application filed by them is not
to the acquisition or to the regularity of the process of acquisition including
H
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 247
[KURIAN, J.]

the taking of possession. Their only prayer is for a declaration that the A
proceedings qua the land referred to in the Application have lapsed by
virtue of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
22. All the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellants, no doubt, have categorically held that the subsequent
purchasers do not have locus standi to challenge the acquisition B
proceedings. But in the present case, the challenge is not to the acquisition
proceeding; it is only for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings
have lapsed in view of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
and therefore, the ratio in those cases has no application to these cases.
23. It is one thing to say that thereis a challenge to the legality or c
propriety or validity of the acquisition proceedings and yet another thing
to say that by virtue of operation of a subsequent legislation, the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed.
24. In all the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants, which we have referred to above, this Court has protected D
the rights of the subsequent purchaser to claim compensation, being a
person interested in the compensation, despite holding that they have no
locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.
25. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the
acquisition ofland and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the E
1894 Act was under Section 1lA where what would lapse is the ...
"entire proceedings for the acquisition of lam:!' whereas under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in passing of an award
under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or
compensation was not paid within five years prior to 01.01.2014. In F·
other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated ·under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and
taking of possession within the five year period prior to 01.01.2014. If
either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings
would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse G
under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in Delhi
Development Authority v. Sukbhir Singh and others 6 • To quote:
" ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a
putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being
'(2016) 8 SCALE 655 H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative
state of affairs ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression
"deemed to have lapsed" because the Legislature was cognisant
of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid,
and physical possession handed over to the State/vesting has taken
place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to
B
have been ended .... " (Paragraph-27).
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour
of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber
the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the
c transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an
impediment for the transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all
impediments cease to exist.
26. As we have already noted above, the whole face of land
acquisition has changed by the 2013 Act. Section I 05 of the 2013 Act
D has provided that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to the
enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. So far, only 13 Acts have
been notified under the Fourth Schedule. Neither The Delhi Development
Act, 1957 nor The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 is
included in the Fo1J11h Schedule.

E 27. The main purpose of the 2013 Act is clearly stated in the
preamble which reads as follows :-
"An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions oflocal self-
government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution,
a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land
F acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential
infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance
to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide
just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land
has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by
such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected
G persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring
that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be
that affected persons become partners in development leading to
an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
H
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 249
[KURIAN, J.]

There is a clear indication that the Act proposes to protect the A
interest of those persons, among others who are affected by the
acquisition. The subsequent purchasers/successors, etc., in the cases
before us, are all people affected by the acquisition, and therefore, also
they are entitled to seek a declaration on lapse under the 2013 Act.
28. The High Court ofKarnataka at Bengaluru in Suryaprakash B
and others v. State ofKarnataka and others7 has considered a situation
of lapse and locus standi of the subsequent purchaser to file a writ
petition for a declaration on lapse, though not under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act. At paragraph-16, it has been held:
"16 .... the principle that transferee of land after the publication c
of preliminary notification cannot maintain a writ petition
challenging the acquisition, cannot be made applicable to a case
where the acquisition itself has been abandoned and has stood
lapsed due to efflux of time on account of the omission and inaction
on the part of the acquiring authority, particularly because, it is
because of the lapse of time and the abandonment of the acquisition, D
right accrues to the original owner to deal with his property including
by way of the sale and the purchaser will acquire right to protect
his interest. Hence, the judgment in the case of Rajasthan State
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash
Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur and others (2013) 5 E
sec 427, will have no application to the facts of the present case."
We are of the view that this decision, in principle, applies to the
facts of these appeals as well.
29. Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor
in interest, the powerofattorney, etc., are all persons who are interested F
in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act
and such persons are entitled to file a case for a declaration that the land
acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably
they have an interest and they are affected by such acquisition. For
such a declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners G
do not hav~ any locus standi.
30. Thus, we do not find any merit in these appeals and they are
accordingly dismissed. All Interlocutory Applications for Impleadment

'MANU/KA/3319/2016 (Writ Petition No. 10286-291 of2014, decided on 05.12.2016). H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A and Intervention, other than those by Legal Representatives, are also
rejected. Applications for Impleadment of Legal Representatives are
allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
31. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the
appellants are given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted
B under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition
proceedings afresh.
32. We make it clear that we have not gone into the inter se
disputes between the parties in some cases or other claims regarding
the ownership.
c
Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed.