THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.versusN. GANGARAJ

616                       [2020]
               SUPREME COURT     1 S.C.R. 616
                              REPORTS                       [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A                   THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.
                                        v.
                                 N. GANGARAJ
                         (Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2014)
B                             FEBRUARY 14, 2020
            [S. ABDUL NAZEER AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
             Administrative law: Judicial review – Punishment for
      misconduct – Interference by court, permissibility – In the instant
      case, a complaint of illegal gratification was filed against
C
      respondent-Inspector – Disciplinary proceedings conducted against
      him – Inquiry officer returned a finding that the charges levelled
      against him were proved – Termination from service – Aggrieved
      respondent invoked the jurisdiction of Tribunal – Tribunal set aside
      the order of punishment by holding that the criminal court, on the
D     same set of facts, did not place reliance on the deposition of
      witnesses, therefore, it was not proper on the part of the Disciplinary
      Authority to rely upon such evidence to hold that respondent
      demanded illegal gratification – High Court found that similar
      evidence was not accepted in criminal trial and that there were
      discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses which made it
E
      unreliable – On appeal, held: The power of judicial review is
      confined to the decision-making process – The Court/Tribunal in
      its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority
      to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
      findings on the evidence – It was not the case of no evidence or
F     that the findings were perverse – The finding that the respondent
      was guilty of misconduct was interfered with only on the ground
      that there were discrepancies in the evidence of the Department –
      However, the discrepancies in the evidence would not make it a
      case of no evidence – The Inquiry Officer had appreciated the
      evidence and returned a finding that the respondent was guilty of
G
      misconduct – The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of
      the inquiry officer and passed an order of punishment – An appeal
      before the State Government was also dismissed – Once the evidence
      was accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power
      of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere
H
                                       616
    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. v. N. GANGARAJ                         617


with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as       A
if the Courts are the Appellate Authority – Service law – Termination.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: The interference in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.
The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making          B
process. The power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate
authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are
perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct
has been interfered with only on the ground that there are               C
discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The
discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no
evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and
returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.
[Paras 7, 14][621-A; 625-F-G]
                                                                         D
      State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao
      AIR 1963 SC 1723 : [1964] SCR 25; B.C. Chaturvedi
      v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749 : [1995] 4
      Suppl. SCR 644; High Court of Judicature at Bombay
      through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. (2000)
      1 SCC 416 : [ 1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205; State Bank of                E
      Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4
      SCC 584 : [2011] 3 SCR 589; Union of India v. P.
      Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 – relied on.
      Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari (2017) 2
      SCC 308 : [2017] 1 SCR 389 – referred to.                          F
                       Case Law Reference
[1964] SCR 25                   relied on               Para 7
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644         relied on               Para 9
[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205         relied on               Para 10          G

[2011] 3 SCR 589                relied on               Para 11
(2015) 2 SCC 610                relied on               Para 13
[2017] 1 SCR 389                referred to             Para 14
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618                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8071
      of 2014.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2011 of the High Court
      of Karnataka, Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 1985 of 2010 (S-KAT).
                V. N. Raghupathy, Adv. for the Appellants.
B
           Mallikarjun S. Mylar, Ms. E. R. Sumathy, Advs. for the
      Respondent.
                The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                HEMANT GUPTA, J.
C
            1. The State is in appeal aggrieved against an order passed by the
      High Court of Karnataka on 25th August, 2011 whereby the challenge to
      an order passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal1 on 12th March,
      2009 setting aside the punishment of dismissal from the service imposed
      upon the respondent remained unsuccessful.
D
             2. The respondent was working as a Police Inspector at Mysore
      from 31st July, 1997 to 31st October, 1998. On the complaint of one
      Nirmala, the Lokayukta Police had laid a trap. On the basis of a criminal
      complaint lodged, Crime No. 15/1998 was registered against respondent
      in Mysore Lokayukta Police Station under Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with
E     Section 13(2) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998. A charge
      sheet against the respondent was filed in the Court of Special Judge,
      Mysore for the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption
      Act, 1988. The said criminal trial resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.
            3. In addition to the criminal trial, the respondent was also
F     proceeded against for the misconduct in departmental proceedings. The
      respondent was served with a charge sheet.The respondent faced
      departmental proceedings on the following two charges:
                    “1. You, the Accused Police Officer, Sri. N. Gangaraj, while
                    working as Police Inspector in City Crime Record Bureau of
G                   the office of the Commissioner of Police, Mysore City from
                    31/07/97 to 31/10/98, one Miss. Chandrika resident of
                    Nandanavana, Ulsoor, Bangalore City, has lodged a complaint
                    dated 08/08/98 with Sri. Kempaiah, Commissioner of Police,
                    Mysore City, against one Mr. Mahendra of Indiranagar,

H
      1   for short, ‘Tribunal’
    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. v. N. GANGARAJ                              619
                  [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         Bangalore, stating that he promised to marry her and taken           A
         her in car No. KA-05-9795 along with his friends and raped
         her. She has requested therein to take action against Mr.
         Mahendra and his friends. The Commissioner of Police, Mysore
         City has sent the said petition to Police Inspector, City Crime
         Branch, Mysore for enquiry and to send the report. You being
                                                                              B
         a responsible Police Officer, shown utter misconduct in
         managing to obtain a Xerox copy of the said petition through
         illegal means and contacting the wife of the Driver of above
         said vehicle demanded illegal gratification of Rs.40,000/- and
         negotiating the deal for Rs.20,000/- with instructions to the
         party to pay the amount on 27/08/98 at your residence.               C
         2. Even though the petition of Miss. Chandrika, lodged with
         the Commissioner of Police, Mysore City was not at all
         concerned to you, you managed to get it’s copy with ulterior
         motto through illegal means and contacted Mrs. B.J. Nirmala
         wife of Mr. Sampathkumar, Driver of car No. KA-05-9795 by            D
         sending Mr. Puttaraju CHC 141 and Mr. Shivakumar CPC 22
         to Bangalore and also contacted the above parties over
         telephone and demanded Rs.40,000/- as illegal gratification for
         not including the car in the case. When the parties were not
         agreed to pay, you negotiated the amount to Rs.20,000/-. Being
         a responsible Police Officer and knowing fully well that             E
         accepting illegal gratification is against to Rule 7, 13(1)(d) and
         13(2) of P.C. Act, you behaved in a way to bring down the
         prestige of the department, showing dereliction of duty, utter
         misconduct and an at of unbecoming of a Police Officer as
         well as a Government Servant.”                                       F
       4. The respondent denied the charges. The Deputy Superintendent
of Police, West Circle, Mangalore was appointed as the Inquiry Officer
(IO). The IO returned a finding that the charges levelled against the
respondent have been proved. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice
was issued to the respondent. Considering the contentions of the              G
respondent, the Director General and the Inspector General of Police
passed an order of dismissal of the respondent from service on 30th
September, 2005. The period of suspension was ordered to be treated as
the period of suspension only. The respondent filed an appeal before the
Government which came to be dismissed on 8th September, 2006.
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620            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A            5. Aggrieved against the order of punishment, the respondent
      invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the order
      of punishment by holding that the criminal court on the same set of facts
      has not placed reliance on the deposition of the witnesses, therefore, it
      was not proper on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to rely upon
      such evidence to come to the conclusion that the respondent has demanded
B     an amount of Rs.40,000/- and he settled for Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunal
      further did not agree with the findings of the IO or the Disciplinary
      Authority that the charges have been proved as there is no charge on
      record of receipt of Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunal further held that the water
      in which the hands of the respondent were washed, turned pink due to
C     the ink of the pen, as deposed by PW-3 Balaraju in his statement. The
      High Court found that similar evidence has not been accepted in criminal
      trial and that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses
      which make it unreliable. The High Court recorded the following four
      discrepancies in the departmental proceedings:
                “(i) In the complaint Smt. Nirmala says that on 26.08.1998 for
D
                the first time she met the applicant in his house at Mysore but
                in the deposition, she states that she went to the house of the
                applicant on 27.08.1998 for the first time along with panch
                witness Saroja and the money was offered;
                (ii) If the evidence of PW.4 Puttaraju CHC 141 is to be believed,
E               he and PW.5 Shivakumar CPC 22 went to the house of
                complainant Nirmala on 13.08.1998, whereas the evidence of
                PW.5 shows that both of them went to the house of the
                complainant on 14.08.1998. According to the complaint both
                of them had gone to the complainant’s house on 24.08.1998
F               and not earlier;
                (iii) According to the complainant she had given complaint in
                the first instance in English Written by her and later the present
                complaint, marked in the inquiry was got typed; the original
                complaint given in English has been suppressed.
G               (iv) The complaint was registered on 27.08.1998 whereas the
                evidence shows that panch witness had been informed to come
                on 26.08.1998. The complaint does not say anywhere that she
                had gone to the office of the Lokayukta Police on 26.08.1998.”
            6. The Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration the
H     evidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges levelled
      against the respondent stand proved.
       THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. v. N. GANGARAJ                               621
                     [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the         A
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The
power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process.
The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on
the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.
       8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao2, a               B
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether
the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:                        C

         “7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
         Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision
         of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
         servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held
         by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the           D
         procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
         justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
         authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
         and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that
         the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function   E
         of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to
         review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on
         the evidence….”
       9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.3, again, a three
Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not           F
an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the
court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its          G
own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:
         “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
         of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
2   AIR 1963 SC 1723
3   (1995) 6 SCC 749                                                              H
622      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
      and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches
      is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
      conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/
      Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held
      by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
B
      complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
      some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
      inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
      fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
      evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof
C     of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
      proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
      conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority
      is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
      The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
      appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at
D
      its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
      may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against
      the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
      natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode
      of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
E     disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
      finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
      the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
      and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
      each case.
F     13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
      appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive
      power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment.
      In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and
      findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
      or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
G     before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964)
      4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion,
      upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary
      authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
      the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
H     be issued.”
       THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. v. N. GANGARAJ                                   623
                     [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its                          A
Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. 4, this Court held that
interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if
such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural
justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of
such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
                                                                                      B
Constitution. It was held as under:
         “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have
         approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order
         of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.
         Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be
         permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the            C
         Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of
         the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations
         prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the
         authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
         and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority,          D
         on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no
         reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or
         grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that
         the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee
         of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has
         been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there         E
         is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then
         adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
         canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under
         Article 226 of the Constitution.”
       11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand                          F
Nalwaya5, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere
on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based
on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable                 G
nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings
in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:


4   (2000) 1 SCC 416
5   (2011) 4 SCC 584                                                                  H
624   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
      appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
      enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible
      on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
      properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
      question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
B     the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings
      in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere
      with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except
      where such findings are based on no evidence or where they
      are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
C     whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
      conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will
      however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if
      principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been
      violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala
      fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C.
D     Chaturvedi vs. Union of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of
      India vs. G. Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of
      India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762, High
      Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001
      (1) SCC416).
E            xx                xx                xx
      12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the
      respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any
      way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor
      affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential
F     punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal
      proceedings being different from the standard of proof required
      in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may
      lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding
      of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving
      benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so
G     when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the
      incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal
      proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no
      effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee
      who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by
      the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge,
H
       THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. v. N. GANGARAJ                             625
                     [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

             cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground   A
             that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.”
       13. In another judgement reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran6, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the
High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court            B
shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings:
         “13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
         Court shall not:
         (i) re-appreciate the evidence;
                                                                                C
         (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
         has been conducted in accordance with law;
         (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
         (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
         (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings       D
         can be based.
         (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
         (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
         conscience.”
                                                                                E
       14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies
upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari7, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records
a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding
which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the
finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on            F
touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere
with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case
of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the
ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department.
                                                                                G
The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence.
The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding
that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

6   (2015) 2 SCC 610
7   (2017) 2 SCC 308                                                            H
626              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A            15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
      enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before
      the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been
      accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial
      review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings
      of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the Courts are the
B
      Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed
      larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as
      mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the
      High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in
      law. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal
C     and the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is
      restored.


      Devika Gujral                                                 Appeal allowed.

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