Holding

There is no legal bar to prosecuting road‑traffic offences under both the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860; the statutes operate in distinct spheres and do not conflict.

Summary

The State of Arunachal Pradesh appealed against a Gauhati High Court order that road‑traffic offences must be dealt with solely under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and that prosecution under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was without legal sanction. The Supreme Court examined whether the special Motor Vehicles Act overrides the general provisions of the IPC and the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that there is no conflict between the two statutes; offences under the IPC (e.g., sections 279, 304, 304A, 337, 338) can be prosecuted alongside the Motor Vehicles Act, whose Chapter XIII does not cover offences causing death or grievous hurt. The Court reiterated that Section 26 of the General Clauses Act permits prosecution under either or both enactments, but double punishment is barred. Consequently, the High Court’s directive to prosecute only under the Motor Vehicles Act was set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether road‑traffic offences can be prosecuted exclusively under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, excluding the IPC.
Whether the special law (Motor Vehicles Act) overrides the general law (IPC) under the principle of "generalia specialibus non derogant".
Whether Section 5 of the IPC or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act bars prosecution under both statutes.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 26
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 279, s. 297, s. 304, s. 304A, s. 337, s. 338
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 183, s. 184, s. 185, s. 187, s. 208, s. 209
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994s. 40

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActIndian Penal Coderoad traffic offencesdouble jeopardySection 26 General Clauses Actspecial vs general lawproportionality in sentencingcompoundable offences

Judgment

[2019] 15 S.C.R. 771 771

THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH A
v.
RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 905 of 2010)
OCTOBER 04, 2019 B
[INDU MALHOTRA AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Penal Code, 1860 – Conflict
between – The High Court held that road traffic offences shall be
dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
and the prosecution of cases of road traffic or motor vehicle C
offences under the provisions of the Penal Code is without sanction
of law – Propriety of – Held: Not proper – The position of law is
well-settled – The Supreme Court has consistently held that the M.V.
Act, 1988 is a complete code in itself in so far as motor vehicles
are concerned – However, there is no bar under the M.V. Act or D
otherwise, to try and prosecute offences under the IPC for an
offence relating to motor vehicle accidents – The offences
prescribed under the IPC are independent of the offences
prescribed under the M.V. Act – The legislative intent of the M.V.
Act, and in particular Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, was not to
override or supersede the provisions of the IPC in so far as E
convictions of offenders in motor vehicle accidents are concerned
– There is no provision under the M.V. Act which separately deals
with offences causing death, or grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor
vehicle in cases of motor vehicle accidents – Offences under
Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, cannot abrogate the applicability of F
the provisions u/s. 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC – There
is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the M.V. Act
– Both statutes operate in entirely different spheres – General
Clauses Act, 1897 – s. 26.
Doctrines/Principles – The principle of proportionality G
between the crime and punishment – In relation to road traffic
offences – discussed.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. In view of this Court there is no conflict between
the provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 and the Motor Vehicles H
771
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A Act, 1988. Both the statutes operate in entirely different spheres.
The offences provided under both the statutes are separate and
distinct from each other. The penal consequences provided under
both the statutes are also independent and distinct from each
other. The ingredients of offences under the both statutes, are
different, and an offender can be tried and punished
B
independently under both statutes. The principle that the special
law should prevail over the general law, has no application in
cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the
IPC and M.V. Act. [Para 6] [787-D]
2. It is pertinent to mention that there is no provision
C
under the M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causing
death, or grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of
motor vehicle accidents. Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent
about the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death,
or hurt, or grievous hurt, to persons nor does it prescribe any
D separate punishment for the same; whereas Sections 279, 304
Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have been specifically
framed to deal with such offences. [Para 7] [787-E-F]
3. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides,
“Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or
E more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be
prosecuted and punished under either or any of those
enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the
same offence.” It is well settled that an act or an omission can
constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be
an offence under any other law. The finding of the High Court
F that the prosecution of offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V.
Act and the IPC, is unsustainable and contrary to law, is
therefore, set aside. [Paras 8] [787-G; 788-A]
4. The legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular
Chapter XIII of the MV Act, was not to override or supersede
G the provisions of the IPC in so far as convictions of offenders
in motor vehicle accidents are concerned. Offences under
Chapter XIII of the MV Act, cannot abrogate the applicability
of the provisions under Sections 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338
of the IPC. The offences do not overlap, and therefore, the
H maxim of “generalia specialibus nonderogant” is inapplicable, and
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 773
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR.

could not have been invoked. The offences prescribed under the A
IPC are independent of the offences prescribed under the M.V.
Act. It cannot be said that prosecution of road traffic/motor
vehicle offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the
IPC, as held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for
offences under the M.V. Act is concerned. [Para 9] [790-C-D]
B
5. The principle of proportionality between the crime and
punishment has to be borne in mind. The principle of just
punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal
offence. The maximum imprisonment for a first time offence
under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, is up to only six months;
whereas the maximum imprisonment for a first time offence C
under the IPC in relation to road traffic offences can go upto 10
years under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The sentence
imposed by the courts should be commensurate with the
seriousness of the offence, and should have a deterring effect
on wrong-doers. The punishment of offenders of motor vehicle D
accidents under the IPC is stricter and proportionate to the
offence committed, as compared with the M.V. Act. [Para 12]
[791-A-C]
7. This Court thus holds that a prosecution, if otherwise
maintainable, would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since E
both the statutes operate with full vigour, in their own
independent spheres. Even assuming that some of the
provisions of the MV Act and IPC are overlapping, it cannot be
said that the offences under both the statutes are incompatible.
[Para 13] [791-C-D]
F
T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari [1969] 3 SCR 65 ; State
of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan AIR 2018 SC
5348 ; Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC
82 : [2000] 3 SCR 1000 ; Guru Basavaraj v. State of
Karnataka (2012) 8 SCC 734 : [2012] 8 SCR 189 –
relied on. G
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma and
Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 713 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 677 ;
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 : [2004] SCR
213 ; Vimla Devi and Ors. v. National Insurance H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A Company Limited and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 186 ; M.K.
Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and Ors. (1987)
4 SCC 284 : [1987] 3 SCR 1149 ; Naresh Giri v. State
of M.P. (2008) 1 SCC 791 : [2007] 11 SCR 987;
Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka (2007) 3 SCC
474 ; [2007] 1 SCR 774 ; Alister Anthony Pareira v.
B
State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : [2012] 1
SCR 145 ; N.K.V. Bros (P) Ltd. v. M. Karwnai Ammal
& Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 457 : [1980] 3 SCR 101 ; Gopal
Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 545 :
[2013] 4 SCR 104 ; State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa
C Basanagouda Aregoudar (2002) 3 SCC 738 : [2002]
2 SCR 692 ; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa
Irappa Nesaria, (2008) 3 SCC 464 : [2008] 1 SCR
1061 ; Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2007) 13 SCC 446 :
[2007] 2 SCR 939 – referred to.
D
Case Law Reference
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 677 referred to Para 5
[2004] SCR 213 referred to Para 5
E (2019) 2 SCC 186 referred to Para 5
[1987] 3 SCR 1149 referred to Para 5.1
[2007] 11 SCR 987 referred to Para 5.12
[2007] 1 SCR 774 referred to Para 5.12
F
[2012] 1 SCR 145 referred to Para 5.12
[1980] 3 SCR 101 referred to Para 5.12
[1969] 3 SCR 65 relied on Para 8

G AIR 2018 SC 5348 relied on Para 8
[2013] 4 SCR 104 referred to Para 12
[2002] 2 SCR 692 referred to Para 12
[2008] 1 SCR 1061 referred to Para 15
H [2007] 2 SCR 939 referred to Para 15
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 775
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR.

[2000] 3 SCR 1000 relied on Para 16 A
[2012] 8 SCR 189 relied on Para 16
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 905 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2008 of the Gauhati B
High Court, Agartala Bench in Criminal Revision No. 33 of 2002.
With
Criminal Appeal No. A.No. 906/2010
Kabir Shankar Bose, Mepung Tadar Bage, Anil Shrivastav,
C
Shuvodeep Roy, Ms. Varsha Poddar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Anil Kumar Shrivastav, Rituraj Biswas, Satyendra Kumar
Srivastav, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDU MALHOTRA, J. D
1. The issue which has arisen for consideration in the present
Criminal Appeals is whether the Gauhati High Court was justified in
issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under
the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“M.V. Act”), and in
holding that in cases of road traffic or motor vehicle offences, E
prosecution under the provisions of Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”) is
without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would
be unsustainable in law?
2. The Gauhati High Court, Agartala bench vide the impugned
judgment dated 22.12.2008 held that: F
i. Sections 183 and 184 of the M.V. Act, which relate to
driving of motor vehicles at excessive speeds and
dangerously, and other offences under Chapter XIII of
the M.V. Act are compoundable before the Police, or
in court, and that no further proceeding shall be taken G
against the accused after he has pleaded guilty. On this
premise, it was held “that the provisions of Cr.P.C must
succumb to the statutory provisions to the M.V.Act,
and any investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to
the same, would be illegal and unsustainable in law”.
[Para 14 of the impugned judgment]. H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A ii. The IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“Cr.P.C”) are placed in Entry No. 1 and 2 of the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution of India. The M.V. Act,1988 falls under
Entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List.
B Hence, the status of the M.V. Act is at par with the
IPC and Cr.P.C, and it cannot be presumed that M.V.
Act is either a subordinate legislation, or inferior to the
IPC and Cr.P.C in status. [Para 21 of the impugned
judgment]
C iii. Section 5 of the IPC removes any kind of ambiguity
about the conviction and punishment of offenders under
a special enactment, which covers the field. Section 208
of the M.V. Act has laid down a special procedure for
disposal of road traffic offences. Hence, recourse to the
IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC.
D
Section 5 of the IPC recognizes the supremacy of the
special laws, which cannot be diluted under the garb of
Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 24-
26 of the impugned judgment]

E iv. The prosecution of road traffic offences under the IPC
is not permitted, since it has no sanction of law. The
only exception to this rule would be where the offence
cannot be adequately punished under the M.V. Act.
[Para 24-26 of the impugned judgment]

F v. Since road traffic offences can be regulated and
adequately dealt with under the provisions of MV Act,
resort to the provisions of the IPC, which is a general
law should be avoided. [Para 28 of the impugned
judgment]
vi. Sections 183 to 188 of the MV Act, which relate to
G
punishment for driving at excessive speed or
dangerously or in a drunken condition, etc., are silent
about the outcome of the accidents. These penal
provisions do not prescribe any separate punishment for
causing hurt to people or for damaging any property.
H However, this does not mean that the Legislature was
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 777
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

not aware or totally oblivious to the consequences of A
dangerous driving while enacting the M.V. Act. [Para
30 of the impugned judgment]
vii. If a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any
person while driving a motor vehicle in a rash and
dangerous manner under the MV Act, then the said B
offender cannot also be convicted under the IPC, since
the IPC does not expressly take within its purview road
traffic offences. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment]
viii. To permit the prosecution of offenders under the
provisions of any other penal law other than the M.V. C
Act in cases of motor vehicle offences would amount
to overriding the M.V. Act, which is a special enactment
framed by Parliament for motor vehicle offences. By
invoking provisions of the IPC for motor vehicle
offences, the basic character and structure of the M.V.
Act would get distorted, and would not help in curbing D
the rising rate of motor vehicle accidents. [Para 33 of
the impugned judgment]
ix. Prosecution of offenders in cases of road traffic
accidents must be carried out under the M.V. Act as a
general rule subject to one exception i.e to try offenders E
in cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
under S. 304 IPC, because sentence of imprisonment
of 6 months provided under the M.V. Act appears to
be inadequate, going by the rising rate of violent road
accidents.
F
The prosecution of offenders under the provisions of the
IPC is violative of settled principles of law and contrary
to the legislative intent of the M.V. Act. [Para 37 and
37.1 of the impugned judgment]
x. The High Court directed the States of Assam, Nagaland, G
Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal
Pradesh, and to issue appropriate directions to all
subordinate officers to ordinarily register cases against
offenders of motor vehicle accidents only under the
provisions of the M.V. Act subject to the exception
under S. 304 IPC. H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A 3. The present Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the
States of Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh before this Court, wherein
vide Orders dated 12.05.2009 and 31.07.2009, the operation of the
impugned judgment was stayed.
This Court vide Order dated 26.04.2010 granted special leave
B to appeal, and directed that the stay of the impugned judgment would
continue to operate during the pendency of the appeals.
4. Despite service of notice, none appeared for the Respondents.
Since there is no contest to the adjudication on the merits of the case,
we are not touching upon that part of the judgment.
C
5. The M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation, the primary objective
being to provide a statutory scheme for compensation of victims of motor
vehicle accidents; or, their family members who are rendered helpless
and disadvantaged by the untimely death or injuries caused to a member
of the family, if the claim is found to be genuine.1 The Act provides a
D summary procedure for claiming compensation for the loss sustained
in an accident, which is otherwise applicable to suits and other
proceedings while prosecuting a claim before a civil court.2
5.1 The M.V. Act repealed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The
need was felt to take into account changes in road transport technology,
E pattern of passenger and freight movements, development of the road
network in the country and particularly improved techniques in motor
vehicle management.
In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and Ors.3, this
Court made suggestions for raising the limit of compensation payable
F in motor vehicle accidents wherein death and permanent disablement
had occurred, even in the event of there being no fault on the part of
the person driving the offending vehicle, and also in hit and run
accidents. The said suggestions were taken into consideration by the
Legislature and incorporated in the M.V. Act, 1988.
G
1
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C. Padma and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 713;
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC
385
2
Vimla Devi and Ors. vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2019) 2
SCC 186
3
H (1987) 4 SCC 284: AIR 1987 SC 2158
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 779
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

5.2 Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, 1988 deals with “Offences, A
Penalties and Procedure”. It deals with offences relating to
contraventions of the provisions of the M.V. Act, or any rule, regulation
or notification made thereunder. It primarily deals with offences relating
to licenses, driving of vehicles by unauthorized persons, control of traffic,
maintenance of motor vehicles, using a vehicle in an unsafe condition,
B
or without registration or permit, driving beyond speed limits, driving
dangerously or driving by a drunken person, or by a person under the
influence of drugs, etc.
5.3 The relevant provisions of the M.V. Act,1988 (as they stood
at the time of commission of the offence in question) which are
C
necessary to advert to are extracted herein below:
183. Driving at excessive speed, etc. – (1) Whoever drives
a motor vehicle in contravention of the speed limits referred
to in section 112 shall be punishable with fine which may
extend to four hundred rupees, or, if having been previously
convicted of an offence under this sub-section is again D
convicted of an offence under this sub-section, with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees.
(2) Whoever causes any person who is employed by him or
is subject to his control in driving to drive a motor vehicle
in contravention of the speed limits referred to in section 112 E
shall be punishable with fine which may extend to three
hundred rupees, or, if having been previously convicted of
an offence under this sub-section, is again convicted of an
offence under this subsection, with fine which may extend
to five hundred rupees. F
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence punishable
under subsection (1) solely on the evidence of one witness
to the effect that in the opinion of the witness such person
was driving at a speed which was unlawful, unless that
opinion is shown to be based on an estimate obtained by the G
use of some mechanical device.
(4) The publication of a time table under which, or the giving
of any direction that any journey or part of journey is to be
completed within a specified time shall, if in the opinion of
the Court it is not practicable in the circumstances of the case H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A for that journey or part of a journey to be completed in the
specified time without contravening the speed limits referred
to in section 112 be prima facie evidence that the person
who published the time table or gave the direction has
committed an offence punishable under sub-section (2).
B 184. Driving dangerously — Whoever drives a motor vehicle
at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public,
having regard to all the circumstances of the case including
the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle
is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the
time or which might reasonably be expected to be in the
C place, shall be punishable for the first offence with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and for
any second or subsequent offence if committed within three
years of the commission of a previous similar offence with
D imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with
both.
185. Driving by a drunken person or by a person under
the influence of drugs. - Whoever, while driving, or
E attempting to drive, a motor vehicle,—
(a) has, in his blood, alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100
ml. of blood detected in a test by a breath analyser,
or
(b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent
F as to be incapable of exercising proper control over
the vehicle.
shall be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both; and for a
G second or subsequent offence with imprisonment for term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend
to three thousand rupees, or with both
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the drug or
drugs specified by the Central Government in this behalf,
H by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 781
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

render a person incapable of exercising proper control over A
a motor vehicle.
187. Punishment for offences relating to accident. –
Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of clause (c) of
sub-section (1) of section 132 or of section 133 or section
134 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which B
may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend
to five hundred rupees, or with both or, if having been
previously convicted of an offence under this section, he is
again convicted of an offence under this section, with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or C
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
both.
208. Summary disposal of cases - (1) The Court taking
cognizance of any offence (other than an offence which the
Central Government may by rules specify in this behalf) D
under this Act,—
(i) may, if the offence is an offence punishable with
imprisonment under this Act; and
(ii) shall, in any other case, state upon the summons to
E
be served on the accused person that he—
(a) may appear by pleader or in person; or
(b) may, by a specified date prior to the hearing of
the charge, plead guilty to the charge and remit
to the Court, by money order, such sum (not F
exceeding the maximum fine that may be imposed
for the offence) as the Court may specify, and
the plea of guilt indicated in the money order
coupon itself:
Provided that the Court shall, in the case of any of the G
offences referred to in sub-section (2), state upon the
summons that the accused person, if he pleads guilty, shall
so plead in the manner specified in clause (b) and shall
forward his driving licence to the Court with his letter
containing such plea. H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A (2) Where the offence dealt with in accordance with sub-
section (1)is an offence specified by the Central Government
by rules for the purposes of this sub-section, the Court shall,
if the accused person pleads guilty to the charge and forward
his driving licence to the Court with the letter containing his
plea, make an endorsement of such conviction on his driving
B
licence.
(3) Where an accused person pleads guilty and remits the
sum specified and has complied with the provisions of sub-
section (1), or as the case may be, sub-sections (1) and (2),
no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall be
C
taken against him nor shall he be liable, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be
disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by reason of
his having pleaded guilty.
209. Restriction on conviction. - No person prosecuted for
D
an offence punishable under section 183 or section 184
shall be convicted unless—
(a) he was warned at the time the offence was committed
that the question of prosecuting him would be taken
into consideration, or
E
(b) within fourteen days from the commission of the
offence, a notice specifying the nature of the offence
and the time and place where it is alleged to have
been committed was served on or sent by registered
post to him or the person registered as the owner of
F
the vehicle at the time of the commission of the
offence, or
(c) within twenty-eight days of the commission of the
offence, a summons for the offence was served on
him:
G
Provided that nothing, in this section shall apply where the
Court is satisfied that—
(a) the failure to serve the notice or summons referred
to in this sub-section was due to the fact that neither
H the name and address of the accused nor the name
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 783
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

and address of the registered owner of the vehicle A
could with reasonable diligence have been
ascertained in time, or
(b) such failure was brought about by the conduct of
the accused.”
5.4 Section 183 provides for the offence of driving a vehicle at B
excessive speed in contravention of the speed limits referred in Section
112 of the M.V. Act; while Section 184 M.V. Act deals with the offence
of driving dangerously. In order to constitute an offence under Section
184, the following ingredients are required to be proved:- (a) the accused
should be driving a motor vehicle; (b) the vehicle should be driven at a C
speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public having regard
to all the circumstances of a case, including the nature, condition and
use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the volume of traffic
at the time of the accident or which might reasonably be expected to
be in the place.
D
Section 183 and 184 must be read with Section 209 of M.V. Act,
which provides that a warning, notice or summons, is mandatorily
required to be given for an offence punishable under Section 183 or
184.
5.5 Section 185 of the M.V. Act pertains to the offences of E
driving after consuming alcohol, or driving under the influence of drugs.
Any person who while driving or attempting to drive, (a) has alcohol
exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. present in his blood, detected by a breath
analyser; or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent that
he is incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle, shall be
guilty of an offence under Section 185 of the M.V. Act. F
5.6 Section 187 pertains to offences arising from accidents. The
offence is for breach of duty and failure to comply with the provisions
of Section 132(1)(c) or Section 133 or Section 134 of the M.V. Act.
Clause (c) of Section 132 (1) was omitted by S. 40 of the Motor
G
Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (w.e.f. 14-11-1994); Section 133
relates to the duty of the owner to give information regarding the name
and address of, and the licence held by, the driver or conductor, who is
accused of any offence under this Act on the demand of any police
officer; while Section 134 relates to the duty of the driver in case of
an accident and injury to a person, to take all reasonable steps to secure H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A medical attention for the injured person, by conveying him to the nearest
medical practitioner or hospital, and providing necessary information to
the police and insurer of the vehicle about the accident.
5.7 The offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act provide a
summary procedure for disposal of cases, which are compoundable in
B nature under Section 208 (3) of the M.V. Act. Section 208(3) provides
that if an accused pleads guilty and deposits the fine imposed, then “no
further proceeding in respect of offence shall be taken against him
nor shall he be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining
C a licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty”.
5.8 The IPC, on the other hand, is punitive and deterrent in nature.
The principal aim and object is to punish offenders for offences
committed under the IPC. The relevant provisions of the IPC which
are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below:
D 5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act .- Nothing in
this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing
mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen
in the service of the Government of India or the provisions
of any special or local law.
E 279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.- Whoever
drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner
so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be
likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
F which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to
G murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the
act by which the death is caused is done with the intention
of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely
H to cause death;
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 785
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

or with imprisonment of either description for a term which A
may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act
is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
304A. Causing death by negligence - Whoever causes the B
death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not
amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal C
safety of others. - Whoever causes hurt to any person by
doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human
life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
hundred rupees, or with both. D

338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or
personal safety of others. - Whoever causes grievous hurt
to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as
to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for E
a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
5.9 Section 279 IPC falls under Chapter XIV – “Offences
affecting Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency And
F
Morals”, and provides for offences relating to rash and negligent driving
which endanger human life.
Section 279 IPC makes rash driving, or riding on a public road,
punishable if such rash driving or riding endangers human life, or is likely
to cause hurt or injury to any person. It is the rash or negligent manner G
of driving or riding which endangers human life, or is likely to cause
hurt or injury to any person, which constitutes an offence under Section
279 IPC.
5.10 Sections 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 IPC fall under
Chapter XVI – “Offences Affecting the Human Body” which makes H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A provision for offences relating to culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, causing death by negligence by doing any rash or negligent act,
and causing hurt or grievous hurt, by endangering the life or personal
safety of others.
5.11 Where the rash or negligent driving results in hurt or
B grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under Section
337 or 338 IPC is committed.
5.12 Where the rash or negligent driving, results in the death of
a person, without the knowledge that the said act will cause death,
Section 304A IPC would be applicable. In other words, Section 304A
C
applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death, and no
knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death.
Negligence and rashness are essential elements of Section 304A.4
The three ingredients of Section 304-A, which are required to
D be proved are: (1) the death of a human being; (2) the accused caused
the death; and (3) the death was caused by the doing of a rash or
negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide of either
description.5
The requirement of culpable rashness under S.304A IPC is more
E drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability.6
Criminal or culpable rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton
act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton, and the further
knowledge that it may cause injury, but done without any intention to
cause injury or knowledge that the act would probably cause.7
F 5.13 When a person drives a vehicle so recklessly, rashly or
negligently that it causes the death of a person, and of which he had
knowledge as a reasonable man, that such act was dangerous enough
to cause death, he may be attributed with the knowledge of the
consequence, and may held liable for culpable homicide not amounting
G to murder, which is punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
4
Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. (2008) 1 SCC 791; Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka,
(2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84
5
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953
6
N.K.V Bros (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 457
H 7
Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 787
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

5.14 Sections 279, 304-A, 337 and 338 IPC may be invoked only A
if the act of the accused is a negligent or rash act. It is manifest from
the scheme of Sections 279, 304-A, 336, 337 and 338 IPC that these
offences are punishable because of the inherent danger of the acts
specified therein, irrespective of the knowledge or intention of the
offender.
B
With respect to Section 304 Part II IPC, the prosecution has to
prove that the death of the person was caused by the act of the accused,
and that he had knowledge that such act was likely to cause death. 8
To constitute an offence under this Section, the knowledge of the
offender as required under Section 300 IPC is to be proved and
established. C

6. In our view there is no conflict between the provisions of the
IPC and the MV Act. Both the statutes operate in entirely different
spheres. The offences provided under both the statutes are separate
and distinct from each other. The penal consequences provided under
both the statutes are also independent and distinct from each other. The D
ingredients of offences under the both statutes, as discussed earlier, are
different, and an offender can be tried and punished independently under
both statutes. The principle that the special law should prevail over the
general law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in
road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act. E
7. It is pertinent to mention that there is no provision under the
M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causing death, or
grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of motor vehicle
accidents. Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about the act of rash
and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hurt, to F
persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same;
whereas Sections 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have
been specifically framed to deal with such offences.
8. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, “Where
an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, G
then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under
either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished
twice for the same offence.”
8
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A It is well settled that an act or an omission can constitute an
offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an offence under any
other law. The finding of the High Court that the prosecution of
offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V. Act and the IPC, is
unsustainable and contrary to law, is therefore, set aside.

B A similar issue arose in the case of T.S. Baliah v. T.S.
Rangachari 9, wherein the appellant was prosecuted both under Section
177 of the IPC, and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court
held as follows:
“6. We proceed to consider the next question arising in this
case viz. whether the appellant can be prosecuted both under
C Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 52 of the
1922 Act [Income Tax Act, 1922] at the same time. It was
argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of the
provisions of Section 26 of the General clauses Act (Act 10
of 1897) the appellant can be prosecuted either under
D Section 52 of the 1922 Act or under Section 177 of the
Indian Penal Code and not under both the sections at the
same time. We are unable to accept this argument as correct.
Section 26 of the General clauses Act states:
“26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more
enactments.— Where an act or omission constitutes an
E offence under two or more enactments, then the offender
shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either
or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be
punished twice for the same offence.”
A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to
F the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments
but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice
for the same offence. In other words, the section provides
that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under
two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and
punished under either or both the enactments but shall not
G be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. We
accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this
aspect of the case.”
[emphasis supplied]
9
H (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 : (1969) 72 ITR 787
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 789
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan10, the A
accused was prosecuted under Sections 26 and 30 of the Food and
Safety Standards Act, 2006 as well as Sections 188, 272, 273 and 328
of the IPC for transportation and sale of prohibited gutka/pan masala.
The High Court held that Section 55 of the Food and Safety Standards
Act, 2006 being a specific provision made in a special enactment,
B
Section 188 of the IPC was inapplicable.
The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court, and
held that :
“8. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender
under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the C
punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an
act or an omission constitutes an offence under two
enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished
under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to
be punished twice for the same offence. The same set of facts,
in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two D
different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and
constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time,
an offence under any other law. The High Court ought to
have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 which reads as follows: E
“Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more
enactments -Where an act or omission constitutes an offence
under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be
liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of
those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice F
for the same offence.”
9. In Hat Singh’s case this Court discussed the doctrine of
double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act
to observe that prosecution under two different Acts is
permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied G
on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the
prosecution of the Respondent therein for offences under the
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957
and Indian Penal Code, this Court in State (NCT of Delhi)
10
Criminal Appeal No. 1195-1207 of 2018, Decided on September 20, 2018 H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A v. Sanjay held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons
under the Penal Code where the offences committed by
persons are penal and cognizable offences. A perusal of the
provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that there is
no bar for prosecution under the IPC merely because the
provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties. We, therefore,
B
set aside the finding of the High Court on the first point.”
[emphasis supplied]
9. The legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular Chapter
XIII of the MV Act, was not to override or supersede the provisions
C of the IPC in so far as convictions of offenders in motor vehicle
accidents are concerned. Offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act,
cannot abrogate the applicability of the provisions under Sections 297,
304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The offences do not overlap, and
therefore, the maxim of “generalia specialibus nonderogant” is
inapplicable, and could not have been invoked. The offences prescribed
D under the IPC are independent of the offences prescribed under the
M.V. Act. It cannot be said that prosecution of road traffic/motor
vehicle offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC,
as held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for offences under
the M.V. Act is concerned.

E 10. Considering the matter from a different perspective, offences
under Chapter XIII of the MV Act are compoundable in nature in view
of Section 208(3) of the MV Act, whereas offences under Section 279,
304 Part II and 304A IPC are not.
If the IPC gives way to the MV Act, and the provisions of CrPC
succumb to the provisions of the MV Act as held by the High Court,
F then even cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing
death, or grievous hurt, or simple hurt by rash and negligent driving,
would become compoundable. Such an interpretation would have the
consequence of letting an offender get away with a fine by pleading
guilty, without having to face any prosecution for the offence committed.
G 11. This Court has time and again emphasised on the need to
strictly punish offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle accidents.
With rapidly increasing motorisation, India is facing an increasing burden
of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The financial loss, emotional and
social trauma caused to a family on losing a bread winner, or any other
member of the family, or incapacitation of the victim cannot be
H quantified.
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 791
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

12. The principle of proportionality between the crime and A
punishment has to be borne in mind. The principle of just punishment
is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence.11 The
maximum imprisonment for a first time offence under Chapter XIII of
the M.V. Act, is up to only six months; whereas the maximum
imprisonment for a first time offence under the IPC in relation to road B
traffic offences can go upto 10 years under Section 304 Part II of the
IPC. The sentence imposed by the courts should be commensurate with
the seriousness of the offence, and should have a deterring effect on
wrong-doers.12 The punishment of offenders of motor vehicle accidents
under the IPC is stricter and proportionate to the offence committed,
as compared with the M.V. Act. C

13. We thus hold that a prosecution, if otherwise maintainable,
would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since both the statutes
operate with full vigour, in their own independent spheres. Even
assuming that some of the provisions of the MV Act and IPC are
overlapping, it cannot be said that the offences under both the statutes D
are incompatible.
14. The High Court has given a contradictory finding by holding
on the one hand that the provisions of the Cr.P.C must succumb to the
provisions of the M.V. Act, as executive authorities cannot take away
E
a beneficial provision under a special law enacted by Parliament (para
14 of the impugned judgment), while on the other hand, it has opined
that the M.V. Act is not a complete code in itself, and there is no
complete bar to investigate road traffic offences under the provisions
of Cr.P.C. (para 23 of the impugned judgment).
F
15. In our considered view the position of law is well-settled. This
Court has consistently held that the M.V. Act,1988 is a complete code
in itself in so far as motor vehicles are concerned.13 However, there is
no bar under the M.V. Act or otherwise, to try and prosecute offences
under the IPC for an offence relating to motor vehicle accidents. On
this ground as well, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. G

11
Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608
12
State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar (2002) 3 SCC 738
13
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria, (2008) 3 SCC 464 : (2008)
2 SCC (Cri) 99 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 945; Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 446 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 662 H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A 16. The object behind punishing persons found guilty of causing
motor vehicle accidents has been succinctly stated by this Court in
Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana14 in the following words:
“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made
based on Section 4 of the PO Act for application to a
B convicted person under Section 304-A IPC, that road
accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the
toll is galloping day by day in India, and that no solution is
in sight nor suggested by any quarter to bring them down.
When this Court lamented two decades ago that “more people
C die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the
Indian highways are among the top killers of the country”,
the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it
is today. So V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said
decision [Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719
: 1980 SCC (Cri) 17] thus: (SCC p. 720, para 3)
D
“Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not
absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law
under Section 304-A IPC and under the rubric of
negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency
of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of speeding
E menaces.”
12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna [(1987) 1 SCC 538 :
1987 SCC (Cri) 198] this Court did not allow a sentence of
fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under Section
304-A IPC to remain in force although the High Court too
F
had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was
convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and
causing the death of a human being. In that case this Court
enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six
months besides imposing a fine.
G
13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents
in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims
and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of
the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the

H 14
(2000) 5 SCC 82
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS 793
@ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While A
considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the
offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of
automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be
deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of
the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must B
constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a
single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on
the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should
not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not
necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident
occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any C
human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be
convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is
convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He
must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is
convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being D
due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape
from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can
play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening
the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of
automobiles. “
E
[emphasis supplied]
In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka15, the Court opined
that there is a constant concern of the Court on imposition of adequate
sentence in respect of commission of offences in cases of motor vehicle
accidents. In that case, the appellant was found guilty for the offences F
punishable under Sections 337, 338, 279 and 304-A IPC and sentenced
to undergo simple imprisonment for six months along with fine. The
Court held that:
“32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment
works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not careful G
while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless
attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be
shown indulgence or lives of others are like ‘flies to the
wanton boys’. They totally forget that the lives of many are
15
(2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.

A in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being
is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act.
33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a
proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the
duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed
B regard being had to the commission of the crime and its
impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice
which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly
ignored.”
[emphasis supplied]
C 17. In view of the above discussion, we set aside the directions
issued by the Gauhati High Court to the States of Assam, Nagaland,
Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to issue
appropriate instructions to their subordinate officers to prosecute
offenders in motor vehicle accidents only under the provisions of the
D Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and not the IPC.
18. The Criminals Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
The interim order passed on 26.04.2010 is made absolute. All pending
Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.
Ordered accordingly.
E

Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.

F

G

H