THE STATE OF A.P. & ORS.versusM/S. STAR BONE MILL & FERTILISER CO.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 116
- Decided
- 21 February 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
A sale deed executed by a person who is only a lessee and lacks title is invalid, and the State’s ownership cannot be defeated by the respondent’s possession or revenue records.
Summary
The State of Andhra Pradesh (appellant) challenged a civil suit filed by Mis. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co. (respondent) seeking declaration of title over a 3.525‑acre land. The respondent relied on a registered sale deed dated 11‑Nov‑1959 executed by M/s A. Allauddin & Sons, who were merely lessees of the State since a lease dated 21‑May‑1943. The trial court and High Court had held that the respondent had a better title, ignoring revenue records that showed State ownership since 1920. The Supreme Court held that the sale deed was invalid because the vendor had no title, that Section 90 of the Evidence Act must be applied to the lease deed (not the sale deed) and that presumption of title cannot arise from possession or revenue records alone. Consequently, the lower courts' findings were set aside and the suit dismissed. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The validity of the 11‑Nov‑1959 sale deed executed by a lessee lacking title
- Whether Section 90 of the Evidence Act applies to the lease deed of 1943 or the later sale deed
- The effect of revenue records and possession on presumption of title under Sections 90 and 110 of the Evidence Act
- Whether the State, as absolute owner, can defeat the respondent's claim of title
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 145
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 110, s. 114, s. 90
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 154, s. 158
- Land Encroachment Act (Andhra Pradesh)s. 6, s. 7
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 4 S.C.R. 394
A THE STATE OF A.P. & ORS.
v.
MIS. STAR BONE MILL & FERTILISER CO.
(Civil Appeal No. 6690 of 2004)
FEBRUARY 21, 2013
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]
Property Law - Ownership and title - Suit filed by
C respondent in 1974 on basis of registered sale deed dated
11-11-1959 for declaration of title - Trial court decreed the
suit, holding that appellant-Government was not the owner of
the suit property, and that the respondent had a better title over
it- Order upheld by High Court- On appeal, held: The Courts
o below erred in ignoring the revenue record, particularly, the
documents showing that the Government was the absolute
owner of the suit property since at least 1920 - Unless Mis A
(the vendor of respondent) had valid title, the respondent
could not claim any relief whatsoever from court - There was
E clear admission by respondent in its letter dated 22-5-1970
to the Chief Minister of the State to the effect that it had been
cheated by Mis. A which had no title over the suit property,
and had executed sale deed in favour of respondent by way
of misrepresentation - Documents on record established that
F Mis A was merely a lessee of the appellant-Government -
Sale deed relied upon by the respondent thus invalid and
inoperative - Suit filed by respondent accordingly dismissed
- Maxims - Nemo dat quid non habet and Nemo plus juris
tribuit quam ipse habet.
G Evidence Act, 1872 - s.90 - Purpose of- Held: Is to do
away with strict rules, as regards requirement of proof, which
are enforced in the case of private documents, by giving rise
to a presumption of genuineness, in respect of certain
documents that have reached a certain age - The period is
H 394
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 395
FERTILISER CO.
to be reckoned backward from the date of the offering of the A
document, and not any subsequent date, i.e., the date of
decision of suit or appeal - Deeds and documents - Ancient
documents - Admissibility of.
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 110 - Presunption of title as a
8
result of possession - Held: Can arise only where facts
disclose that no title vests in any party.
On 21.5.1943, a lease deed had been executed by the
appellant-Government in respect of the land in question
in favour of Mis 'A'. The appellant-Government asked Mi C
s 'A' to vacate the land. However, Mis. 'A' remained in
possession. On 11.11.1959, the partners of Mis. 'A'
executed a sale deed in favour of the respondent for
money consideration. The respondent filed a petition
seeking permanent lease of the land in his favour D
whereupon an order was passed by the Ministry for
recovery of arrears of rent The respondent then wrote a
letter to the Chief Minister of the State, stating that he had
been cheated by Mis. A as it had executed a sale deed in
his favour, even though it had no title, and a very high E
rate of rent was fixed by the department, which should
be reduced. The application/petition was rejected. The
respondent filed a Writ Petition. The High Court disposed
of the writ petition, asking the respondent to approach
the appropriate forum, or to make a representation to the F
State Government. The appellants then served notice
upon the respondent under Section 7 of the Land
Encroachment Act. The matter was adjudicated under
Section 6 of the Land Encroachment Act, and the
respondent was directed to vacate the suit land. The G
respondent filed another Writ Petition before the High
Court, however, the same was dismissed, after giving
liberty to the respondent to approach the civil court.
The respondent thereafter filed suit for declaration of
title and for injunction, restraining the appellants from H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 4 S.C.R.
A evicting the respondent from the property in dispute. The
City Civil Court decreed the suit, holding that the
Government was not the owner of the suit land, and that
the respondent/plaintiff had a better title over it.
Aggrieved, the appellants preferred appeal before the
B High Court, which was dismissed.
In the instant appeal, the appellants inter alia
contended that the courts below misdirected themselves
and did not determine the issue as regards, whether the
vendor of the respondent had any title over the suit
C property which was necessary to determine the validity
of the sale deed in favour of the respondent; and that the
courts below erred in applying the provisions of Section
90 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
D Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1. Section 90 of the Evidence Act is based
on the legal maxims : Nemo dat quid non habet (no one
gives what he has not got); and Nemo plus juris tribuit
E quam ipse habet (no one can bestow or grant a greater
right, or a better title than he has himself). Thi~ section
does away with the strict rules, as regards requirement
of proof, which are enforced in the case of private
documents, by giving rise to a presumption of
genuineness, in respect of certain documents that have
F reached a certain age. The period is to be reckoned
backward from the date of the offering of the document,
and not any subsequent date, i.e., the date of decision of
suit or appeal. Thus, the said section deals with the
admissibility of ancient documents, dispensing with proof
G as would be required, in the usual course of events in
usual manner. [Para 7] [405-C-F]
1.2. The High Court erred in holding that the sale deed
dated 11.11.1959, must be considered in light of the
H provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, instead of
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 397
FERTIL:ISER CO.
the period mentioned therein, thereby treating the appeal A
as a continuation of the suit. Therefore, the period of 30
years mentioned therein, has been calculated from 1959,
till the date of the decision of the appeal, i.e. 22.3.2004.
This view itself is impermissible and perverse, and
cannot be accepted. [Para 6] [404-H; 405-A-B] B
2.1. In the instant case, there has been a clear
admission by the respondent/plaintiff in its letter dated
22.5.1970 (Ex.B-39), to the effect that it had been cheated
by Mis. A who had no title over the suit land, and sale
deed dated 11.11.1959, had thus been executed in favour C
of the respondent/plaintiff by way of misrepresentation.
The said application was rejected vide order dated
18.12.1970. While filing the writ petition, the respondent/
plaintiff did not raise the issue of title of the Forest
Department, infact, the dispute was limited only to the D
extent of the amount of rent, and its case remained the
same even in the second writ petition, when it was evicted
under the Encroachment Act. The trial court framed
various issues, and without giving any weightage to the
documents filed by appellant/defendant, decided the case E
in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, with total disregard
to any legal requirements. The courts below have erred
in ignoring the revenue record, particularly, the
documents showing that the Government was the
absolute owner of the suit land since at least 1920. [Para F
8] [405-F-H; 406-A-B]
2.2. No person can claim a title better than he himself
possess. In the instant case, unless it is shown that Mis.
A had valid title, the respondent/plaintiff could not claim G
any relief whatsoever from court. [Para 9] [406-C]
3. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the
Evidence Act, is based on public policy with the object
of preventing persons from committing breach of peace
by taking law into their own hands, however good their H
398 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 4 S.C.R.
A title over the land in question may be. It is for this
purpose, that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of Code of Criminal
Procedure., 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the afore-said
B provisions have the same object. The said presumption
is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and
applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or
very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim
"possession follows title" is applicable in cases where
c proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be
expected, for instance, in the case of waste lands, or
where nothing is known about possession one-way or
another. Presumption of title as a result of possession,
can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in
any party. A person must establish that he has continued
0
possession of the suit property, while the other side
claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/
encroachment etc. Where the apparent title is with the
plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in
order to displace this claim of apparent title and to
E establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by
way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour
his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of
title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to
possession. Presumption of possession and/or
F continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also
be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act. [Para
13] [407-B-E, F-H; 408-A]
Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar & Ors. v. Nagesh Siddappa
G Navalgund & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 901: 2007 (13) SCR 77; Nair
Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander & Ors. & Ors. AIR 1968
SC 1165: 1968 SCR 163 and Chief Conservator of Forests,
Govt. of A.P. v. Collector & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1805: 2003 (
2) SCR 180 - relied on.
H
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 399
FERTILISER CO.
4.1. The courts below have failed to appreciate that A
mere acceptance of municipal tax or agricultural tax by
a person, cannot stop the State from challenging
ownership of the land, as there may not be estoppel
against the statute. Nor can such a presumption arise in
case of grant of loan by a bank upon it hypothecating the s
property. [Para 14] (408-B]
4.2. The trial court has recorded a finding to the effect
that the name of one Raja Ram was shown as Pattadar
in respect of the land in dispute and the respondent/
plaintiff is in possession, and therefore, the burden of C
proof was shifted on the government to establish that the
suit land belonged to it. However, the respondent/plaintiff
could not furnish any explanation as to who was this
Raja Ram, Pattadar and how respondent/plaintiff was
concerned with it. Moreover, in absence of his D
impleadment by the respondent/plaintiff such a finding
could not have been recorded. [Para 15] (408-C-D]
4.3. The courts below erred in holding, that revenue
records confer title, for the reason that they merely show E
possession of a person. The courts below further failed
to appreciate that the sale deed dated 11.11.1959 was
invalid and inoperative, as the documents on record
established that the vendor was merely a lessee of the
Government. The suit filed by·the respondent/plaintiff is F
therefore dismissed. [Paras 16, 17] (408-E-F, G]
Case Law Reference:
2007 (13) SCR 77 relied on Para 10
1968 SCR 163 relied on Para 11 G
2003 (2) SCR 180 relied on Para 12
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6690 of 2004.
H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 4 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 22.03.2004 of the High
Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in City
Civil Court Appeal No. 72 of 1989.
Amrendra Saran, C.K. Sucharita, Rumi Chanda for the
Appellants.
8
D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Asha Gopalan Nair, for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
against the impugned judgment and order dated 22.3.2004,
passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad in City Civil Court Appeal No. 72 of 1989, by way
of which the Civil Suit filed by the respondent against the
D appellants, claiming title over the suit land in dispute, has been
upheld.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal
are:
E
A. One Shri M.A. Samad, Assistant Engineer, City
Improvement Board, Hyderabad, alongwith his associate,
converted the land in dispute measuring 3.525 acres i.e. 17061
sq. yards, in favour of the Forest Department in 1920.
F B. The suit land was given on lease on 21.5.1943 to Mis.
A. Allauddin & Sons for a fixed time period, incorporating the
terms and conditions, that the lessee would not be entitled to
extend the existing building in any way, or to erect any structure
on the land leased. The lessee was also prohibited from
G transferring the suit land by any means.
C. The said M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, a proprietary
concern, sent a letter dated 29.9.1945 in response to the
eviction notice, informing the appellants that it was not possible
H for it to remove the factory established on the suit land, and thus,
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 401
FERTILISER CO-. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the said lessee asked the appellants to put up the said property A
for rent. The said firm. lhen sent a letter dated 1.5.1951, offering
rent of Rs.600/- per annum.
D. The appellants vide letter dated 20.12.1954, informed
Mis. A. Allauddin & Sons to vacate the site within a period of B
one month, or else be evicted in accordance with law, and in
that case it would also be liable to pay damages. In spite of
receiving such a letter, the said lessee/tenant remained in
possession of the suit premises, and continued to pay rent, as
is evident from the letter dated 15.8.1956. The appellants, c
however, vide letter dated 21.2.1958, asked the said lessee/
tenant Mis. A. Allauddin & Sons, yet again, to vacate the suit
land.
E. Instead of vacating the suit land, Mis. A. Allauddin & D
Sons executed a lease deed dated 24.2.1958, and got it
registered on 6.4.1958, in favour of Syed Jehangir Ahmed and
others (Partners of the respondent firm, Mis Star Bone Mill and
Fertiliser Co.), for a period of two years. During the subsistence
of the said sub-lease, the partners of the firm Mis. A. Allauddin
& Sons, executed a sale deed on 11.11.1959 in favour of the E
respondent, for a consideration of Rs.45,0001-. The said sale
deed was also registered, and possession was handed over
to the respondent.
F. The respondent herein filed a petition in 1964 before F
the Minister for Agriculture & Forest, seeking permanent lease
of the suit premises in his favour. On 26.4.1967, an order was
passed by the Ministry of Agriculure & Forest in respect of
recovery of arrears of rent as regards the said land. The
respondent vide letter dated 7.5.1969, offered higher rent to the G
appellants for the suit land.
G. On 22.5.1970, the respondent wrote a letter to the Chief
Minister of Andhra Pradesh (Ex.B-39), stating that he had been
cheated by Mis. A. Allauddin & Sons, as it had executed a sale
deed in his favour, even though it had no title, and a very high H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 4 S.C.R.
A rate of rent was fixed by the department, which should be
reduced and till the matter is finally decided, a rent of Rs.
569/- per month should be accepted. The said application/
petition was rejected by the Assistant Secretary to the
Government, Food & Agriculture Department, vide letter dated
B 18.12.1970.
H. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 187
of 1971 wherein an interim order dated 12.1.1971 was passed,
to the effect that the recovery of rent for the period prior to
26.4.1969 would be made at the rate of Rs.568/- per month
C instead of Rs.1279/- per month. Subsequent to 26.4.1969, rent
would be recovered at the rate of Rs.1279/- per month. In case,
arrears are not paid by the respondent, he would be vacated
from the suit land.
D I. In view of the interim order of the High Court, the
appellants issued a demand notice for a sum of Rs.45,484.62
paise. However, vide order dated 19.10.1971, the High Court
directed the respondent to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000/-, in
eight monthly installments. The said writ petition was disposed
E of vide order dated 18.2.1972, asking the respondent to
approach the appropriate forum to establish his rights over the
suit land, or to make a representation to the State Government
for this purpose.
J. The appellants served notice dated 8.4.1974, upon the
F respondent under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, and
the respondent submitted a reply to the said show cause notice
on 24.6.1974. The matter was adjudicated and decided on
21.8.1974, under Section 6 of the Land Encroachment Act, and
the respondent was directed to vacate the suit land.
G
K. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5222 of 1974
before the High Court, however, the same was dismissed, after
giving liberty to the respondent to approach the civil court. Thus,
the respondent filed Original Suit No. 582 of 1974 for
H declaration of title and for injunction, restraining the appellants
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 403
FERTILISER CO. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
from evicting the said respondent/plaintiff from the property in A
dispute.
The appellants contested the suit by filing a written
statement, and on the basis of the pleadings therein, a large
number of issues were framed, including whether Mis. A.
8
Allauddin & Sons was actually the owner and possessor of the
suit land; and whether it could transfer the suit land to the
respondent/plaintiff, vide registered sale deed dated
11.11 .1959.
L. The City Civil Court, vide judgment and decree dated C ·
25.4.1989 decreed the suit, holding that the Government was
not the owner of the suit land, and that the respondent/plaintiff
had a better title over it. Thus, he was entitled for declaration
of title, and injunction as sought by him.
D
M. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred City Civil Court
Appeal No. 72 of 1989 before the High Court, challenging the
said judgment and decree dated 25.4.1989, which was
dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 22.3.2004,
affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court.
E
Hence, this appeal.
3. Shri Amarendra Sharan, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that the
courts below misdirected themselves and did not determine the F
issue as regards, whether the vendor of the respondent/plaintiff
had any title over the suit property. The same is necessary to
determine the validity of the sale deed in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff. The issue before the trial court was not
whether the Government was the owner of the said land or not. G
No such issue framed either. Moreover, such an issue could
not be framed in view of the admission made by the respondent/
plaintiff itself, as it had been paying rent regularly to the
Government, and the same was admitted by it, by way of filing
an application before the Government stating, that Mis. A. H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 4 S.C.R.
A Allauddin & Sons had cheated it by executing a sale deed in
its favour, without any authority/litle. It thus, requested the
Government to execute a lease deed/rent deed in its favour. It
was not its case, that in its earlier two writ petitions filed by it,
it had acquired title over the land validly, or that Mis. A.
B Allauddin & Sons etc., had any title over the said suit land. The
lease deed executed by the Government in favour of Mis. A.
Allauddin & Sons, dated 21.5.1943 must be considered in light
of the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act'), and not the sale
c deed dated 11.11.1959, as the suit was filed in 1974, just after
a period of 15 years of sale, and not 30 years. The courts below
have erred in applying the provisions of Section 90 of the
Evidence Act. The findings of fact recorded by the courts below
are perverse, being based on no evidence and have been
recorded by a misapplication of the law. Thus, the appeal
0
deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed
the appeal, contending that the findings of fact recorded by the
E courts below, do not warrant interference by this Court. It is
evident from the revenue records that possession is prima
facie evidence of ownership, and that the same is by itself, a
limited title, which is good except to the true owner. The
admission and receipt of tax constitutes admission of
F ownership, and the entries in the revenue record must hence,
be presumed to be correct. In the revenue record, one Raja
Ram has been shown to be the owner of the land, the Forest
Department cannot claim any title or interest therein. The said
appeal lacks merit, and is liable to be dismissed.
G
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
6. Admittedly, the High Court erred in holding that the sale
deed dated 11.11.1959, must be considered in light of the
H provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, instead of the
STATE OF AP. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 405
FERTILISER CO. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J]
period mentioned therein, thereby treating the appeal as a A
continuation of the suit. Therefore, the period of 30 years
mentioned therein, has been calculated from 1959, till the date
of the decision of the appeal, i.e. 22.3.2004. This view itself is
impermissible and perverse, and cannot be accepted. The
courts below have not given any reason, whatsoever, for the B .
said lease deed to be treated as having been executed on
21.5.1943, under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and, thus, for
believing that the land belonging to the Forest Department,
which had in tum, given it to Mis. A. Allauddin & Sons on lease.
7. Section 90 of the Evidence Act is based on the legal C
maxims : Nemo dat quid non habet (no one gives what he has
not got); and Nemo plus juris tribuit quam ipse habet (no one
can bestow or grant a greater right, or a better title than he has
himself).
D
This section does away with the strict rules, as regards
requirement of proof, which are enforced in the case of private
documents, by giving rise to a presumption of genuineness, in
respect of certain documents that have reached a certain age.
The period is to be reckoned backward from the date of the E
offering of the document, and not al')Y subsequent date, i.e., the
date of decision of suit or appeal. Thus, the said section deals
with the admissibility of ancient documents, dispensing with
proof as would be required, in the usual course of events in
usual manner. F
8. There has been a clear admission by the respondent/
plaintiff in its letter dated 22.5.1970 (Ex.B-39), to the effect that
it had been cheated by M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, who had no
title over the suit land, and sale deed dated 11.11.1959, had
thus been executed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by way G
of misrepresentation. The said application was rejected vide
order dated 18.12.1970. While filing the writ petition, the
respondent/plaintiff did not raise the issue of title of the Forest
Department, infact, the dispute was limited only to the extent
of the amount of rent, and its case remained the same even in H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 4 S.C.R.
A the second writ petition, when it was evicted under the
Encroachment Act. The trial court framed various issues, and
without giving any weightage to the documents filed by
appellant/defendant, decided the case in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff, with total disregard to any legal
s requirements. The courts below have erred in ignoring the
revenue record, particularly, the documents showing that the
Government was the absolute owner of the suit land since at
least 1920.
9. No person can claim a title better than he himself
C possess. In the instant case, unless it is shown that Mis. A.
Allauddin & Sons had valid title, the respondent/plaintiff could
not claim any relief whatsoever from court.
10. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar & Ors. v. Nagesh
D Siddappa Navalgund & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 901, this Court held
as under:-
"A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely
raises a presumption in regard to possession.
Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both
E
forward and backward can also be raised under Section
110 of the Evidence Act."
11. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander & Ors.
& Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1165, dealing with the provisions of
F Section 11 O of the Evidence Act, this Court held as under:-
"Possession may prima facie ·raise a presumption of title
no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise
when the facts are known. 11\11Jen the facts disclose no title
in either party, possession 'alone decides."
G
12. In Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v.
Collector & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1805, this Court held that:
"Presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the
H
STATE OF A.P. & ORS. v. STAR BONE MILL & 4{)7
FERTILISER CO. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
possession is prima facie lawful and when the contestiqg A
party has no title."
13. The principle enshrined in Section 11 O of the Evidence
Act, is based on public policy with the object of preventing
persons from comm_ltting breach of peace by taking law into
B
their own hands, however good their title over the lanq in
question may be. I( is for this purpose, that the provisions of
Section 6 of the Sp~cific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of
Indian Penal Cod~. 1860, were enacted. All the afore-said
provisions have the same object. The said presumption is read C
under Section 114-of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a
case where there is either no proof, or very little proof .of
ownership on either side. The maxim "possession follows title"
is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot
reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of waste D
lands, or where nothing is known about possession one-way
or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can
arise' only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party.
Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title
of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that E
because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in
possession of it. It infact means, that if at any time a man with.
title wa_s.in possession of the said property, the law allows the
presumption that such possession was in continuation of the
title vested in him. A person must establish that he has F
continued possession of the suit property, while the other side
claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment
etc. Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent
upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of
apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must G
establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that
favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document
of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.
Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 4 S.C.R.
A forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110
of the Evidence Act.
14. The courts below have failed to appreciate that mere
acceptance of municipal tax or agricultural tax by a person,
cannot stop the State from challenging ownership of the land,
8
as there may not be estoppel against the statute. Nor can such
a presumption arise in case of grant of loan by a bank upon it
hypothecating the property.
15. The trial court has recorded a finding to the effect that
C the name of one Raja Ram was shown as Pattadar in respect
of the land in dispute and the respondent/plaintiff is in
possession. Therefore, the burden of proof was shifted on the
government to establish that the suit land belonged to it.
Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff could not furnish
D any explanation before us as to who was this Raja Ram,
Pattadar and how respondent/plaintiff was concerned with it.
Moreover, in absence of his impleadment by the respondent/
plaintiff such a finding could not have been recorded.
E 16. The courts below erred in holding, that revenue records
confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of
a person. The courts below further failed to appreciate that the
sale deed dated 11.11.1959 was invalid and inoperative, as
the documents on record established that the vendor was
merely a lessee of the Government.
F
17. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
that findings of fact recorded by the courts below are perverse
and liable to be set aside. The appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The judgments of the courts below are hereby set aside. The
G suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is dismissed.
B.B.B. Appeal allowed.
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