Holding

Acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act are not subject to Section 11‑A of the 1894 Act, and therefore Section 24 of the 2013 Act does not apply; the acquisition has not lapsed and compensation must be fixed under Section 29 of the KIAD Act.

Summary

The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, sought to acquire land under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act) and issued preliminary and final notifications in 2000 and 2005. The respondents challenged the acquisition, arguing that no award under Section 11-A of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act was passed and that, under Section 24 of the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act (New LA Act), the proceedings had lapsed. The High Court Division Bench held the acquisition lapsed, applying the New LA Act, but the Supreme Court reversed this, holding that once proceedings commence under the KIAD Act, Section 11-A of the 1894 Act does not apply, and consequently Section 24 of the 2013 Act is inapplicable. The Court affirmed that the KIAD Act is a self‑contained code, so the acquisition does not lapse and compensation must be fixed under Section 29 of the KIAD Act. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Single Judge’s direction to determine compensation.

Issues considered

Whether Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applies to acquisition proceedings under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.
Whether Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 applies to such proceedings.
Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed due to non‑passage of an award or non‑payment of compensation within the statutory period.
Whether the compensation fixed by the Advisory Committee constitutes a consent award under the KIAD Act.
Whether the KIAD Act is a self‑contained code rendering the old Land Acquisition Act inapplicable.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VI, Rule 17
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966s. 28, s. 29, s. 30
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11-A
Land Acquisition Rules, 1965s. Rule 10(b)
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 24

Subjects

land acquisitionKIAD Actcompensationconsent awardSection 11-ASection 24New Land Acquisition Actself‑contained codeacquisition lapse

Judgment

[2017] 4 S.C.R. 187

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, A
MYSORE & ANR.
v.
ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 353 of2017) B
JANUARY 25, 2017
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.)
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 - ss. 28,
29, 30 - Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
. Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - s.24 -
c
Applicability of - Respondents' land acquired by appellant under
the 1966 Act after issuing preliminary notification u/s. 28 (1) and
final notification u/s. 28(4) - Writ petition by respondents praying
for quashing the notifications claiming that the proceedings had
lapsed as no award was passed u/s.11-A of the 1894 Act which was D
applicable by virtue of s.30 of the 1966 Act - Single Judge of High
Court rejected the plea of respondents and permitted the appellants
to proceed with fixing the market value on the date of final
notification - Writ appeal by respondents - Meanwhile, the 2013
Act came into force repealing the 1894 Act - Respondents in view
E
thereof pleaded that by virtue of s.24 of 2013 Act the acquisi~ion
had lapsed since no award was passed under s.JJA of 1894 Act -
Appeal allowed by Division Bench quashing the acquisition
proceedings - On appeal, held: The effect of non-applicability of
s. JJA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not rightly understood
by High Court - Once proceedings are initiated under the 1966 F
Act, s. JJA of the 1894 Act would not be applicable - On .parity of
reasoning, provision of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act not applicable -
Judgment of Division Bench set aside - Direction passed by Single
Judge directing appellant authorities to fix compensation in
accordance with provisions of s. 29 of 1966 Act, restored - Code of G
Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. VI, r. 17 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - .
s.11-A - Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 - r.JO(b).
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The effect of non-applicability of Section UA
of the Land Acquisition Act; 1894 (the Old LA Act) was not rightly H
187
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017]4 S.C.K ·

. .· .· . . . ·.. ' . . .· . .· .

A understood bythe High Court. 'fhe High Court was not oblivious
of the judgment of this Court in M. }{agabllilsluma's case which
is referred .by it in the impugned judgment itself, This judgment
categorically holds that once the pr-0ccedings are Initiated· under
·. the Karn.ataka Ind~strial Areas Development Act, 1966, Section
HA of the Old LA Act would not be applicabie. [Para 25)
B
[201-C·DJ. .. - . . .

M. Nagabhushand v. State of Karnataka & Others
· . [2011] 2 SCR 435 - relied on~
.. 1.2. Having regard to the aforesaid raiSO/l d'etre for non-
.· c. ..application of the Old LAAct, on th~ parity of reasoning, provision
of Section 24(2) of }l.ight to:Fair Conlpensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisitipn Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
· (the New .:LA Act) not applicable. [Para
; . ·. ·.
26].{204-13]
.. . . . .
-

State of MP. v. M V. Narasimhan [1976)1SCR6 : 1975
.n .(2) sec 377- reiied on.
Case L:lw 'Referen~e
. ..· -. . .

. J2011J2SCR 435 relied on Para25
· . [1976] l SCR 6 ·.relied on · · Para26 ·.
.

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 353 of
2017 ..
From the fodglnent an<l Orderdated 14:01.2015 of the Higli Court
of Karnataka, Bengaluruirt Writ Appeal No. 4/2013 (LA-1.<IADB). · ·
• ··Ms. Ki ran Suri, Sr'. Adv., S. J; Amith, Dr. (Mrs.) ~ipin Gupta,
. Advs ...for .theAppella11ts.
. .
· ·
. . .. . ' . - .

· Manjunath Me'led, Joseph Aristotle S., Ms, Priya · Al'istotle,
Ms. K. Priyadarshini, Anil Kulnar, Ms. Anitha Shenoy;Advs. for the
Respondents. · ·

•. a· . •. The Judg1nentof the C::()urt was delivered by
A. K. SIKRI, J. I. Jhe questionoflaw that has been r~ised in ·
·.· this'appeal by the appellants; for consideration by this Court, is:
. Whether provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation iu)d
Transparency in LandAcquisitionRehabilitation and Resettlement
>H Act, 20l3(forshort, ''NewLAAct';), are applicable in the instant
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 189
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKlU, J.]
'
case when the land is acquired under the provisions of KIAD A
Act?
2. Factual narration that is required to be noted, giving rise to the
aforesaid question oflaw, is stated hereinbelow:
Respondents is the ownerofland bearing Sy. No. 123/1 measuring
4 acres 9 guntas and Sy. No. 123/2 measuring 1 acre situated at ·B
Anganahalli Village, Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk, Madhya
District, Karnataka.
3. The appellants issued a preliminary notification under Section
28( 1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966
(hereinafter referred to as "KIAD Act") as it wanted to acquire certain c
lands, including that of the respondents for the purpose of developing the
said lands as an Industrial Area and the same was published in the
Karnataka Gazette on 15'h September, 2000.
4. After issuing the necessary notices and following the procedure ·
prescribed under the KIAD Act, a final notification under Section 28(4) D
was issued on I S'h June, 2005 in respect of total 153 acres I0 guntas of
'land. ,
5. Section 29 of the KIAD Act deals with compensation. Section
29(2) provides that where the compensation has been determined by
agreement between the State Government and the person to be
E
compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such an agreement. In
case, where no agreement is arrived at, the State Government is to refer
the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount
of compensation to be paid. This scheme of acquisition of land is
contained in Sections 29 and 30 which are reproduced below:
F
"28. Acquisition ofland.- (I) If at any time, in the opinion of the
State Government, any land is required for the purpose of
development by the Board, or for any other purpose in fu11herance
of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by
notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.
(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (I), the State G
Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner
is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such
persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause,
within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the
land should not be acquired. H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 4 S.C.R.

A (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of
the land and by any other person interested therein, and after
giving such owner and person ari opportunity of being heard, the
State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.
(4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the
B State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for
the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section
(I), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be
made to that effect.
(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration
c under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State
Government free from all encumbrances.
(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-
section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order
any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or
D deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person
duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service
of the notice.
(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made
under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer
E authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take
possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as
may be necessary.
(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State
Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer
F
the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been
acquired.
29. Compensation.-(!) Where any land is acquired by the State
Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay
for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions
G
of this Act. ·
(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by
agreement between the State Government and the person to be
compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.
H
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 191
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

(3) Where no suc.h agreement can be reached, the State A
Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for
determination of the amount ofcompensation to be paid for such
acquisition as also the person or persons to. whom such
compensation shall be paid.
(4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3 ), tl1e Deputy B
Commissioner shall serve noti.ce on the owner ot occupier of such
Jarid and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein
to appear before him and state' their respective interests in the
said land." · ·
6. Section 30 of the KIAD Act deals with application of Land c
·Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Old LA Act') and
same is reproduced below:
"Section 30. application of Central Act I of 1894.-The provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) shall
mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by D
the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to court, the apportionment
of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of
lands acquired under this Chapter."
7. In view of the statutory obligations to pay compensation in
accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act, the Deputy E
Commissioner, Madhya came to be constituted as an authority to assess
and fix the market value prevailing as on the date of notification under
Section 28( 1) of the KIAD Act in consultation with land owners. The
Advisory Committee consisting of eight persons was constituted.
8. The appellants issued notice to all land owners for participating
F
in the meeting of the Price Advisory Committee to fix the compensation
with consent. The Advisory ·committee headed by the Deputy
Commissioner held its meetings with the land owners. The proceedings
of the Advisory Committee under the Chairmanship of Deputy
Commissioner was held on 9m September, 2005.
G
9. According to the appellants herein, the outcome of the meeting
with the land owners was that the Advisory Committee could achieve a
consensus and the market rate with consent was fixed at Rs. 6,50,000/-
per acre. It is also the case of the appellants that majority ofland owners
have accepted the said compensation. However, respondents have taken
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A the position that they are not the parties to this agreement. This aspect
shall be adverted to at a later stage with some more details. At this
stage, it is suffice to mention that it has come on record that the
· respondents had sent letter dated 30th October, 2006 to the appellants in
reply to letter dated 16th August, 2006 of the appellants, thereby requesting
the. appellants to provide reasonable and adequate compensation.
B
However, before compensation could be disbursed to the respondents at
the rates purportedly fixed, some disputes among family members of the
respondents arose about the proportionment of the compensation amongst
them. The children of respondent, namely, Parmesh, Lakshamma and
Sunil appeared through their counsel and opposed payment of
c compensation to the respondents. In view of this dispute, the appellants
deposited the entire compensation payable to the respondents, before
the Civil Court, Srirangapatna, as perthe provisions of Section 30 of the
Old LA Act. Precisely a sum of Rs. 30,15,871/- was deposited before
the Civil Court vide cheque dated 8th March, 2007. On that basis LAC
No. 13 of2007 was registered and the court sent notice dated 13th June,
D
2008 to the respondents. At this stage, the writ petition was filed by the
responden~s in the High Court of Karnataka prayi!Jg for quashing of
preliminary notification dated ]5th September, 2000 and final notification
dated ] 5th June, 2005, inter alia, on the following grounds:
. (a) That provisions of Section 11, I IA of the Old LA Act are
E made applicable to the proceedings under KAID Act by vi11ue of Section
30 of the KAID Act and the Deputy Commissioner has not passed any
award as required under ~ection 11 of the Old LA Act;
(b) The entfre proceedings initiated under Section 28 of the KAID
Act have lapsed as no award has been .passed within two years from
F the date of publication of final declaration.
(c) In the absence of consent award under Section 29(2) of the
KIAD Act, the Deputy Commissioner is duty bound to pass regular
award under Section 11 A of the Old LA Act within two years from the
date of publication of final notification.
G
(d) That the respondent herein had not given any consent for the
.so-called consent award as she had not appeared before the Deputy
Commissioner and did not pai1icipate in the said proceeding.
I 0. The appellants contested the said writ petition by filing thtjir
statement of objection. As per tl>e appellants, all the statutory notices
H
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 193
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

had been sent at the correct address of the respondent and necessary A
procedure for fixation of compensation had been followed by them. It
was also submitted that provisions of Section 11 A of the Old LA Act
were not applicable to the acquisition proceedings under KIAD Act.
The Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated 91h
November, 2012 allowed writ petition in part holding that the respondents
B
were not the parties to the Consent Award. However, the Single Judge
permitted the appellants to proceed with the fixing of the market value
as on the date of final notification dated 151h June, 2005 after repelling
the plea of the respondents that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
Aggrieved by this judgment, the respondents preferred writ appeal before
the Division Bench of the High Court wherein following stance was c
taken by them:
(a) That mandatory notice required under Section 28(2) of the
KIAD Act was not served upon the appellai1ts.
(b) That Section 30 of the KIAD Act applies the provision of Old
LA Act in respect of enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner D
and, therefore, Section I IA is applicable and in this case, the award is
not passed under Section 11 A within two years, therefore, the acquisition
has lapsed.
(c) That proceeding of the Advisory Committee conducted on 91h
September, 2005 is only a consultation with some of the land owners and E
cannot be said to be a consent award, which is required to be passed in
writing under Rule I O(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 in form
No. D.
11. During the pendency of the matter, the New LA Act came
into force on I~ January, 2014 whereby Old LA Act stood repealed. F
The respondents filed application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 alleging that since the New LA Act had come
into force, as per Section 24 of the said Act, acquisition of the land had
lapsed since no award has been passed under Section 11 of the Old LA
Act. G
12. The Division Bench of the High Court ofKaranataka by its
judgment and order dated 14'h January, 2015, allowed the writ appeal
and quashed the proceeding initiated by the appellants by way of
preliminary and final notification on the following grounds:
H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A· (~) Wh~n the award was required to be passed unde~ the Old LA
Act, it cannot be said that provisions of the New LA Act would not
apply to acquisition under KIAD Act and, therefore, Section 24 of the
New LA Act will apply..
(b) Even though this Court has held that Section I IA of the Old
B LA Act has no application in respect of the land acquired under.the
provisions of KIAD Act, the New LA Act is appl.icable and that the
acquisition proceedings would be deemed to have lapsed due to non-
payment, compensation and non-passing, of the a'Yard within a period of
two years.
c (c) That the New LA Act does not say whether it is applicable to
the lands acquired under the provisions ofKarnataka Land Acquisition
Act but what Section 24 says is that once the award is not passed under
Section I IA of Old LA Act or the compensation is not paid within five
years, such proceeding would be lapse.

D 13. It cc;rnld be gathered from the above that the Division Ben'ch
has held that the New LA Act would be applicable to the present
proceedings though they were initiated under the provisions of the KIAD
Act read with the Old LA Act.· It has further held tliat since there was
no consent on:fixation of the compensation given by the respondents,
the case would be governed by Section 24(1) of the New LA Act.
E However, since there is no provision for passing the award under the
KIAD Act, which had to be passed only under the Old LA Act, and
since no award had been passed after the final declaration on l 51h June,
2005, acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed. ·
14. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that after issuance
F of the pteliminary notification, requisite notices were issued and
procedure prescribed under the KIAD Act was followed, which
culminated in fixing the compensation at Rs.6,58,000/- per acre with
consent of the land owners. Not only this, thereafter, even the
compensation pertaining to the land of the respondents was deposited
G
bytl1e appellants before. the City Civil Court, Srirangapatna. She stated
that thi's comp~nsation. could nqt be disbursed or withdrawn by the
respondents in v:iew of the dispute that had arisea between tI1e claimants
&bout the apportionment of the said amount and for this reason, reference
wa$ made under Section 30 of the Old LA Act. The Civil :Court had
even issued notice to the parties for adjudication of the dispute. She, ..
H
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 195
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
. .
thus, submitted that once the Advisory Committee had taken a decision A
and fixed the compensation with the consent of the parties, no award
under the provisions of the LA Act was required in the instant case.
Proceeding further in this line of argument, she contended that in such
circumstances, provisions of Section 24(2) of the New LA Act were not
applicable and, ifat all, itis sub-section (1) of Section 24 which would be
B
applicable in the given circumstances. Referring to sub-section (1) of
Section 24, she argued that the situation would be akin to what has been
contemplated under clause (b) thereof and, therefore, there w.as no
question of deemed lapse ofa~quisition proceedings which situation is
· pro:\tided under sub-section (2) of SectiOn 24 and is not attracted in the
instant case. c
15. Learned counsel for the respondents countered the aforesaid
submission by emphasising that the Single Bench as well as the Division
Bench of the High Court rightly arrived at a finding of fact that the
respondents had not given any consent for fixation of compensation at
Rs.6,50,000/- and, therefore, the decision of the Advisory Committee D
dated 9th September, 2005 in this behalf was not binding on the
.respondents. On this basis, it was submitted that as the exercise
contemplated under Section 29 of the KIAD Act .was not fructified, it
was like 'No Consent Award' passed by the Advisory Committee and
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 24 ofNew LA Act shall squarely
apply. E

16. From the narration of events described above as well as the
arguments of both the sides, it becomes clear that the first question
which needs determination is as to whether fixation of compensation at
the rate ofRs.6,50,000/- per acre by the Advisory Committee is "".ith the
consent of the respondents or not. . · . . F
·17. Before adverting to the aforesaid aspect, we may clarify certain
legal aspects. In the State of Karnataka, land can be acquired under the
KIAD Act as well, for the purpose of developing the acquired land as an
industrial area. Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act provides for issuance of
preliminary notification for the aforesaid purpose. Other sub-sections of
Section 28 provide for a particular ,procedure-to be followed by issuing
necessary notices and once that is undertaken; final notification for
acquisition of the land can be issued under sub-section (4) of Section 28
of the KIAD Act. Section 29 of the KIAD Act deals with the payment
H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A of compensation. The provision which is made under this Section calls
for determination of compensation by agreement between the State
Government on the one hand and the land owner, who is to be
compensated for the land acquired, on the other hand. In case, no such
agreement is arrived at, the State Government is supposed to refer the
case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of
B
compensation, who is required to determine the compensation as per
Section 30 of the KIAD Act. Section 30 of the KIAD Act provides that
for fixing the compensation, the Deputy Commissioner is supposed to
follow the same procedure as prescribed under the Old LA Act.
Obviously, in that event, after following the procedure in the Old LA
c Act, the Deputy Commissioner is required to pass an award (which is
contemplated under Section 9 of the Old LA Act). What follows from
the above is that the first attempt is to arrive at a consensus between the
State Government and the person who is the land loser. This task is to
be undertaken by the Advisory Committee. )fit is accomplished then
compensation is payable as per the said agreement. If such an agreement
D
does not fructify, the Deputy Commissioner is to determine the
compensation after following the procedure contained in the Old LA
Act and pass necessary award in this behalf. Obviously, when there is
an agreement no such award is required. Conversely, when there is no
agreement on compensation between the parties, passing of the award
E under Section 30 of the KIAD Act becomes imperative tc bring the
acquisition proceedings to a logical conclusion. In the instant case,
admittedly there is no award passed by the Deputy Commissioner.
According to the appellants, it is because of the reason that, by consent,
market rate of the land in question was fixed at Rs.6,58,000/- by the
Advisory Committee under the Chainnanship ofthe Deputy Commissioner
F
on 9th September, 2005. Respondents contend otherwise submitting
that there is ho such consent and their plea is accepted by the Courts
below. It becomes necessary to answer this question.
18. The undisputed facts which emerge on record, are the
following:
G
On I Sth September; 2000, a preliminary notification under Section
28(1) of the KIAD Act was published. It was followed by final
notification dated 15th June, 2005 under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act.
With the issuance of notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act,
the land stood vested absolutely in the State Government, free from all
H
,
;
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 197
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

encumbrances (See Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act). Next step was to A
take the possession of the land as per the procedure stated in sub-sections
(6) and (7) ofSection 28 of the KIAD Act and to pay the compensation
as provided under Section 29 of the KlAD Act. The State Government
had constituted the Advisory Committee consisting of8 persons which
deliberated with the land owners in order to arrive at consensual figure
B
of the compensation. Notice dated 23rd August, 2005 was issued in this
behalf fixing the date of meeting as 9th September, 2005 with request to
the land owners to attend the said meeting. Appellants have placed on
record proceedings of the said meeting held on 9th September, 2005 as
per which consent agreement was arrived at whereby compensation
was fixed at Rs.6,50,000/- per acre. It appears that thereafter letter c
dated 16th August, 2006 was sent by the Office of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer, KTADB, Mysore though it is not placed Oil record.
However, respondent Anasuya Bai responded to that letter vide her
communication dated 30th October, 2006 stating that she was ready to
take reasonable and adequate compensation as per the. rate prevailing in
D
the market. Thereafter, she wrote letter dated 7th February, 2008
requesting the appellants to furnish copies of preliminary notification
dated 13th May, 2005 and final notification issued under Section 28(4)
dated 15th June, 2005. Another letter dated 26th May, 2008 was written
vide which she asked for the certified copies of the following documents:
(i) Agreement, if any, reached between her and the Government E
as per the provisions of Section 29(2) of KIAD Act.
(ii) Agreement, if any, entered into between her and KIAD Board
as per the provisions of Section 11(2) ofKTAD Act.
(iii) Award, if any, passed as per Section 11 (2) of Old LA Act F
based on principles of valuation of acquired land by adopting known
metl10d of valuation.
19. Aforesaid facts are not in dispute. However, it appears that
tl1ereafter some litigation started in connection with the title of the property
in question resulting into dispute as to who was fo receive the G
compensation and how it had to be apportioned. Respondent Anasuya
Bai had filed soine petition in this behalf before the Principle Civil Judge
(Sr. Division) and JMFC. Summons dated 13th June, 2008 were issued
by the said Principal Civil Judge to the appellants to appear on 3rd May,
2008. Having regard to this dispute, the appellants deposited the
H
198 SUPREME: coµRT REPORTS .' .·. [2017.] 4..S.C.R.

A ·. compensation in the Civil Court at the rate of Rs.6,5~,000/: P,er acre as
per the decision of the Advisory Committee. Wheri the 1Patter rested at
that stage, the respondents filed writ petition in the High Court seeking
.q1,u1shing.of preliminary n.ot.i.fication as well as final declaration . Prayer
was also made to the effect that acquisiti011 oftheir land urider-Section
28(1) of the KIAD Act be declared as lapsed. The aforesaid prayers
B
were made on the ground that n~ award was passed by the Land
Acquisition Collector within the time stipulated under Section 11 A of the
Old LA Act.
20. Appellants herein filed the statement of objections to the said
writ petition contending that by agreement the compensation of
c Rs.6,50,000/- per acre was fixed and, therefore, there was no need to
pass the award. It was also stated· that insofar as appellants are
concerned, it had deposited the amount of compensation in the Civil
Court in view of the dispute between the respondents inter se.
21. From the issuance of notice alone to the respondents under
D Section 29 ofKIAD Act, it cannot be said that respondents had agreed
to the compensation. It may be noted that large chunk of land was
acquired and there were other land owners as well, despite· the
respondents. No doubt, proceedings .dated 9th September, 2005 indicate
that consent agreement is arrive.d at fixing the c.ompensation at
E Rs.6,50,000/- per acre. However, the moot question is as to whether
respondents are also consenting parties. The learned Single Judge of
the High Court returned a categorical finding that respondents never
gave any such consent. For this purpose, reference. was made to Rule
JO(b) of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 which states the
format in which the said mutual agreement is to be arrived at i.e. Form
F D. Rule 1O(b) states the form of agreement to be executed under sub-
section (2) of Section 11 shall be in Form D. No such document is
produced by the appellants. Moreover, the appellants also could not
show that notice dated 23rd August, 2005 was, in fact, served on the
respondents. Therefore, the respondents had not consented to the amount
G of compensation that was determined in the minutes dated 9th Septe!nber,
2005. This finding is upheld by the Division Bench in the impugned
judgment as well. There is no reason to disagree with this finding.
22. Having said so, it also needs to be kept in: mii1d that a large
chunk of land was acquired by the appellants and a miquscule part thereof
··H belonged to the respondents herein. Further, insofar as respondents are
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 199
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

concerned, it even undertook the exercise of fixing the compensation A
for the acquired land, as per the provisions of the KIAD Act. Advisory
Committee was constituted for this purpose. Notices were also sent to
all concerned, including the respondents herein. It further transpired
that the land owners (exceptthe respondents)participated in the meeting
and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 9th September, 2005, consent'
B.
agreement was arrived at whereby compensation at the rate of
Rs.6,50,000/- per acre was fixed. With these minutes, the Advisory
Committee remained under the impression that it had accomp,lished its
task by reaching a consens~s on the qu.antum of ccimpensatioi1. Not.
only this, further steps were taken to· pay the compensation at the
aforesaid rate to the land owners, whose land was acquired. Insofar as c
respondents are concerned, due to the disputes inter se between them,
the compensation as per the minutes dated 9th September, 2005 was
even deposited with the Civil Court. The Civil Court issued notice and
the respondents participated in the proceedings before the Civil Court.
At that stage, respondents chose to file a writ petition for quashing of
D
the acquisition proceedings coming out with the plea that they were not
consenting parties and had not participated in the meeting dated 9th
September, 2005 as even the notice was not received by them. Aforesaid
facts. disclose that the entire move on the part of the appellants wits
bonafide one, though there was an accidental slip on their part that insofar
as respondents are concerned, no consent to the amount of compensation E
fixed was giyen by them. It appears tJiat the appellantscautho~ities. did
not proceed further to determine the .compensation .in respect of
respondents' land as they nurtured a bonatide belief that with the fixation
of compensation as per the Minutes dated 9th September, 2005 all the
land owners, including the respondents, had agreed with the same and,
therefore, no further exercise was required. Had the appell~nts-authorities ·f
been more careful, they would have noticed thaf insofar as respondents
herein are concerned, they are not the consenting parties. In that event,
they could have brought them on board wHh other land owners by taking
their specific consent as well or proceeded further under Section 29(3)
of the KIAD Act. G
23. Taking these factors into consicleration, the learned Single Judge
vide his judgment dated 9th November, 2012 permitted the appellants to
proceed on the basis of the Gazette notification dated 15th J u!le, 2005
·acquiring the la!1d and detenliine the compensation by making an award
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A in this behalf. By this process, appellants were allowed to proceed afresh
to detem1ine the compensation under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act by
reaching an agreement with the respondents, and failing which to refer
the case to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 29(2) for
determination of the amount of compensation. The learned Single Judge,
by adopting this course of action, specifically rejected the content~on of
B
the respondents herein to quash the proceedings.
24. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned
judgment, however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itselfholding
that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of
Section 24 of the New LA Act in the following manner:
c
"13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including
preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the
provisions of the KIA DB Act. But there is no provisions under
the KIADB Act to pass an award and award has to be passed
only under the provisions of the LAAct, 1894. lfthe award has
D to be passed under LA Act, whether the new act can be pressed
into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on
account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years U/s
11. If the award is passed under LA Act, the enquiry has to be
conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before
E passing the award. Section 11 A contemplates ifthe award is not
passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final
declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall
automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true the Hon 'ble
Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of
Karnataka and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 has held that Section
F 11-A of the-Act is no applicatin in respect of the land acquired
under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to
whether Section 24(2) of the New Act is applicable in order to
hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to
G non-payment of compensation and non-passing of the award within
a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect
from non-payment of compensation to the land owners.
14. The New Act does not say whether the Act i£ applicable to
the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land
H
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KlADB, 201
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

Acquisition Act 1894. What Section 24 says that ifthe award is A
not passed U/s 11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid
within 5 years or more prior to new act, ifthe physical posGession
of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid
or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed.
In th instant case, it is not case of the respondent that award is not
B
required to be passed under the provisions of LA Act. When the
award is required to be passed under LA Act, the respondents
cannot contend that the provisions of New Act cannot be made
applicable on account of non payment of compensation within a
·period of five years."
25. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally c
erroneous. In the first instance, matter is not properly appreciated by
ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 24 above. Secondly,
effect ofnon-applicability of Section I IA of the Old LA Act is not rightly
understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this
Court in M. Nagabhuslumu's case which is referred by it in the aforesaid D
discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the
proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 1lA of the Old
LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based
on the following rationale:
"29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid E
provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of
Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the
publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD
Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land jn question vested in the State
free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the
KIAD Act, whereas·the land acquired under the said Act vests F
only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under:
"16.Power to take possessio11.-When the Collector has made
an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the
land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government,
free from all encumbrances." G
30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely,
Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16
of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to
acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with
H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A the Government only when tbe Collector makes an award
under Section 11, and the Government takes possession.
Under Se~tions 28(4) and 28(5)' of the KIAD Act, such
".esting takes place by operation ()f law and it has nothing
to do with the ma~ng of any award. This is where S~ctions
28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from
B
Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.
31. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration before
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap v. State ofRajasthan
[(1996) 3 SCC 1] . In that case the acquisition proceedings
commenc"ed under' Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban
c Improvement Act, 1959 and the same contentions were raised,
namely, that the acquisition notification gets invalidated for not
making an award within a period 'of two years from the .date of
notification. Repelling the said contention, the learned Judges held
that once the land is vested in the Government, the provisions of
D Section 11-A are not attracted and the acquisition proceedings
will not lapse. (Pratap case [(1996) 3 SCC I] , SCC para 12 at
p. 8 of the Report.)
32. In Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
326] this Court held that the provisions of Sections 6 and 11-A of
E the said Act do not apply to the provisions of the Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 (the BOA Act). Jn SCC para
15 at p. 335 of the Report this Court made a distinction between
the purposes of the two enactments and held that all the provisions
.of the said Act do not apply to the BOA Act. Subsequently, the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd.
v. Bangalore Development Authority [(2011) 3 SCC 139 : (2011)
1 SCC (Civ) 662: (2011) I Scale 533], held that Section 11-Aof
the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the BOA Act.
33, The same principle is attracted to the present case also. Here
also on a comparison between the provisions of the said Act and
G the KIAO Act, we find that those two Acts were enacted to
achieve substantially different purposes. Insofar as the KIAD
Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, it
is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following
purposes:
H
THE SPECIAL LANI) ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 203
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

"It is. considereq necessary to make provision for the orderly A
· establishment and development of industries in suitable areas
in the State. TO achieve this object, it is proposed to specify
suitable areas for industrial development and establish aboard
to devefop such areas and make available lands therein for
establishmenfof industries."
B
34. The KIAD Act is of course a self-contained code. The said
Act is .primarily ·a law regulating acquisition of land for public
purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land
under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of
planne9 development of any city. It has to cater to ,different
situations which come within the expanded horizon of public c
purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of this Com1 in Girnar
Traders (3) v. Staie of Maharashtra [(2011) 3 SCC 1: (2011) 1
SCC (Civ) 578: (2.011) 1 Scale 223] held that Section U-A of the
said Act does not apply to acquisition un4er the provisions of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. D
35. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment
v.
of this Court in Mariyappa State of Karnataka [( 1998) 3
SCC 276] . The said decision was cited for the purpose of
contending that Section 11-A is applicable to an acquisition under
the KIAD Act. In Mariyappa [( 1998) 3 SCC 276] before coming E
to hold that provision of Section 11-A o~the Central Act applies to.
the Kamataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act,
1972 (hereinafter "the 1972 Act"), this Court held that the 1972
Act is not a self-contained code. The Court also held that the
1972 Act and the Central Act are supplemental to each other to
the extent that unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka F
Act, the latter cannot function. The Court further held that both
the Acts, namely, the 1972 Act and the Central Act deal with the
same subject. But in the instant case the KIAD Act is a self-
contained code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it.
Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa [(1998) 3 SCC 276] is not G
attracted to the facts of the present case.
36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this
Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the
contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD
H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Act lapsed for alleged non-compliance with the provisions
of Section 11-A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid
all the contentions of the appellant, being without any
substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed."
26. Having regard to the aforesaid raison d'etre for non-application
B of~he Old LAAct, on the parity of reasoning, provision of Section 24(2)
of the New LA Act making Section 11 A of the Old LA Act would,
obviously, be not applicable. We would like to refer to the judgment in
the case of State of M.P. v. M. V. Narasimlum in this behalf where
1

following proposition is laid down:
c "Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous
Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and
independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected
by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle,
however, will not apply in the following cases:
D (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are
supplemental to each other;
(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;
(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, ifnot imported into
the subsequent Act also, would renderthe subsequent Act wholly
E unworkable and ineffectual; and
(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or
by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the
subsequent Act."
27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the
F
learned Single Judge was correct in law which should not have been
interfered with by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. It is
significant to state that insofar as direction of the Single Judge is concerned
that was accepted by the appellants herein, as the appellants did not
challenge the same. It is the respondents which had filed the intra court
G appeal. Thus, appellants by their aforesaid conduct, are satisfied with
the order of the learned Single Judge in directing them to determine the
compensation.
28. We, thus, allow this appeal by setting aside the judgment of
the Division Bench and restore the direction passed by the Single Judge
H 1
( t975l 2 sec 377
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 205
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

with a direction to the appellants authorities to fix the compensation in ,, A
accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the KIAD Act. The
said exercise shall be done as expeditiously as possible.
No order as to cost.

B
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.

·"