Holding

The Collector/LAO is not a court; Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply, and the application for reference is barred by the statutory limitation.

Summary

The Government acquired land under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) made an award under Section 11 on 28‑02‑1989. The respondents, who were present at the award, filed an application for reference under Section 18 on 10‑06‑1989, exceeding the six‑week period prescribed when the applicant is present at the award. The LAO rejected the application as time‑barred; the Gujarat High Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condoned the delay and ordered the LAO to make the reference. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Collector/LAO is a statutory authority, not a court, and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to extend the limitation period in Section 18. Consequently, the application for reference is barred by limitation and the High Court order is set aside.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to applications for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the Collector/LAO can be treated as a court for the purpose of extending the limitation period.
Whether the respondents' application for reference is barred by the six‑week limitation.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 4
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
Limitation Act, 1963s. 29(2), s. 5

Subjects

Land acquisitionReference under Section 18Limitation periodSection 5 Limitation ActCollector as statutory authorityTime‑barred applicationCourt jurisdiction

Judgment

J-

A THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY
(LAND ACQUISITION) AND ANR.
v.
· SHAH MANILAL CHANDULAL ETC.

FEBRUARY 9, 1996
B
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Laws : Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4, 11 and IS-Ac-
quisition of Land-Award-Application to the Collector/LAO for reference to
C the Cowt-Rejection of the application on the ground of limitation-Validity
of

Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Extension of time limit under ce1tain
circumstances-Application of the provision in relation to a Court-Meaning
of the expression "Court"-Status of the Collect01~LAo-Held : Collec-
D tor/LAO, being a statut01y auth01ity and not a Court, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act not applicable-Hence, application for reference is ba1Ted by
Limitation under Section 18(1) of the Act.

The Government acquired land for public purpos~ under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO)
E made his award under Section 11. The respondents were present at the
time of the award. They applied for reference under Section 18. The LAO
rejected the application holding that it was barred by limitation, i.e.,
beyond six weeks from the date of the award. High Court held that Section
5 of the Limitation Act applied to the proceedings. It condoned the delay
F and directed the LAO to make the reference. Hence, this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894,
application for reference has to be made within six weeks from the date of
G the award in cases where the applicant was present either in person or
through counsel at the time of making of the award by the Collector/LAO.
[371-D])
2. It is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid
down in Section 18 including the one relating to limitation, have been
H complied with. Only a valid reference gives jurisdiction to the Court.
366
.OFFICER ON SPL. DUTY (LAND ACQN.) v. SHAH MANILAL CHANDULAL ETC. 367

Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, [1979) 2 SCC 572, relied A
on.

. State of Punjab & Anr. v. Satinder Bir Singh, [1995) 3 SCC 330
referred to. [370-H; 371-A-B]

3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for extension B
of the period of limitation in certain cases on showing sufficient cause
applies only to a Court. The Collector/LAO is not a Court. He acts as a
statutory authority. The Act specifically maintains a distinction between
the Collector and the Court. [369-G; 375-C; A]

Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Cmporation of India & c
Ors., [1969) 2 SCC 199; Smt. Sushi/a Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad & Ors.,
[1976) 1 SCC 361 and Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transpmt Appellate Tribunal,
UP & Ors., AIR (1976) SC 2161, relied on.
' P. V. Gadgil & Ors. v. P. V. Deshpande & Anr., AIR (1983) Born 342; D
Sp!. Dy. Collector Land Acquisition, Anantapur v. Kodandaramacharlu, AIR
(1965) AD 25;Jokkim Femandez v.Amina Kunhi Umma, (1973) Kerala Law
Times 138 and Commissioner of Agricultural, Income Tax v. TR.I., (1981)
KLT 398, referred to.

4.1. Section 18 of the Act may be treated to be special law prescribing E
time limitations. Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for
extension of the period of limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the
Act. [375-A-D]

Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR (1964) SC 260, relied on.
F
4.2. In the instant case, applications for reference are barred by
limitation and stand rejected. [375-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3234 of
1996 Etc.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.92 of the Gujarat High
Court in C.A. No. 2296 of 1990.

Anip Sachthey for the Appellants.

Vimal Dave for the Respondents. H
\
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 2 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

A short but an important question of law arises for decision in these
appeals. By a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
B
1894(1 of 1894) (for short, the "Act") published in the State Gazette on
February 20, 1984, Government acquired the land for public purpose. The
Land Acquisition Officer (for short the "LAO") made his award under
Section 11 on February 28, 1989. The respondents were present at the time
when the award was announced. On June 10, 1989 they applied for refer-
c ence under Section 18. After giving an opportunity· of hearing, by order
dated January 9, 1990, the LAO rejected the application for reference on
the ground that it was barred by limitation, i.e., beyond six weeks from the
date of the award. In writ petitions the High Court of Gujarat in the
impugned order dated March 13, 1992 in Special Civil Application No.·
D 1296/90 and batch held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the
proceedings before the Collector and that, therefore, reasons given to
condone the delay for filing the application were valid. The reasons were
that they had applied for certified copy of the award and after its supply
and in consultation with the counsel, the reference application came to be .
filed. Accordingly, High Court condoned the delay and directed the LAO
E to make the reference. These appeals thus are filed against the said order.

Section 18(1) envisages that any interested person who has not
accepted the awarded may, by application in writing to the Collector,
require him to refer the dispute raised in the application for the determina-
F tion of the court. Under sub-section (2), the grounds on which objection
to the award is taken have to be stated in the application. However, under
the proviso to sub-section (2) every such application shall be made: (a) if
the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at
the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the
G Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the
notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six
months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first
expire. It would thus be clear that if the interested person was present at
the time the Collector made the award, he should make the application
within six weeks from the date of the award of the Collector. In other cases,
H it should be made within six weeks after the receipt of the notice from the
<lfF!CER ON SPL DUTY (LAND ACQN. )v. SHAH MA:-llLAL CHANDULAL ETC. [K. RAMASWAMY. J.j 369

Collector/LAO under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of A
the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. Admittedly, the
application for reference is beyond six weeks under clause (a) of proviso
to sub-section (2) of Section 18.

The question, therefore, is: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act
would apply? The High Court relied upon sub-section (3) of Section 18 B
which was made by way of a local amendment, i.e., Land Acquisition
(Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act XXXVIII of 1964 which
reads thus:

"Any order made by the Collector on an application under this C
section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the
Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the
• meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedur'e, 1908"

It would appear that the High Court of Gujarat has taken consistent
view that, by operation of sub-section (3), as the Collector was designated D
to be a court subordinate to the High Court under Section 115, Civil
Procedure Code (for short, "CPC"), Section 5 of the Limitation Act (26 of
1963) stands attracted. Though sub-section (3) of Section 18, by virtue of
local amendments, treated the Collector as court for a limited purpose of
exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC to correct errors E
of orders passed by the Collector under Section 18, he cannot be con-
sidered to be a court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands attracted only when LAO acts as a
court.

The question is: whether the view of the High Court is correct in F
law? Section 3 of the Limitation Act casts a duty on the Court to apply the
prescribed limitation and irrespective of the fact that deference of limita-
tion was not taken, the court is enjoined to ensure that no suit etc. is laid
beyond the prescribed limitation unless the exceptions for extension of time
are found in Section 4 to 24 (both inclusive) and Section 5 is one of them G
and extends the prescribed time occupied by those sections. Section 5 of
. the Limitati.on Act extends the prescribed period of limitation in certain
cases on showing sufficient cause which would be a question of fact in each
case.

Any appeal or application other than an application under any of the H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 2 S.C.R. •.
A provisions of Order 21 of the CPC may be admitted after the prescribed
period, if the application or appellant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not instituting the suit or preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period. Explanation is not necessary for
the purpose of this case. Hence omitted. If the suit is barred by limitation
prescribed by the Limitation Act, an application for extension of the
B prescribed time may be made to the court and the applicant may satisfy
the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period. The question, therefore, is:
whether the Collector is a court for the purpose of Section 18(1) of the
Act?
c
The right to make application in writing is provided under Section
18(1). The proviso to sub-section (2) prescribes the limitation within which
the said right would be exercised by the claimant or dissatisfied owner. In
Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, [1979] 2 SCC 572, this Court was
D called upon to decide in a reference under Section 18 made by the
Collector to the court beyond the period of limitation, whether the court
can go behind the reference and determine the compensation, though the
application for reference under Section 18 was barred by limitation? This
Court had held that the Collector is required urider Section 18 to make a
reference on the fulfillment of certain conditions, namely, (i) written ap-
E plication hy interested person who has not accepted the award; (ii) nature
of the objections taking for not aceepting the award; and (iii) time within
which the application shall be made. In para 22 after elaborating those
conditions as conditions precedent to be fulfilled, it held that the power to
· make a reference under Section 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid
F down therein and one such condition is a condition regarding limitation to
be found in the proviso. The Collector acts as a statutory authority. If the
application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power
to make reference. In order to determine the limitation on his own power,
the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the
claimant is or is not within time and specify the conditions laid down under
G Section 18. Even if the reference is wrongly made by the Collector, the
court will have to determine the validity of the reference because the very
jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends upon a proper
reference being made under Section 18. If the reference is not proper there
is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It was, therefore, held
H that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down
OFFICER ON SPL DUTY (LAND ACQN.)v. SHAH MANILAL CHANDULALETC. (K. RAMASWAMY. J.] 371

in Section 18 including the one relating to limitation, have been complied A
with and the application is not time-barred. It is not debarred from
satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid
reference. It has to proceed to determine. compensation and if it is time-
barred, it is not called upon to hear the same. It is only a valid reference
which gives jurisdiction to the court. Therefore, the court has to ask itself B
the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference. If the
reference is beyond the prescribed period by the proviso to sub-section (2)
of Section 18 of the Act and if it finds that it was not so made, the court
would decline to answer the reference. Accordingly, it was held that since
the reference was made beyond the limitation, the court was justified in
refusing to answer the reference. C

It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make
a valid reference to the court is that the application under Section 18(1)
shall be in writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award
when the applicant was present either in person or thorough counsel, at D
the time of making of the award by the Collector under clause (a) of
proviso to sub-section (2). The Collector, when he makes the reference,
acts as a statutory authority.

In State of Punjab & Anr v. Satinder Bir Singh, [1995] 3 SCC 330, a
Bench of two Judges (to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a E
member) was to consider whether the application for reference under
Section 18 was barred by limitation and the direction issued by the court
for making reference was valid in law. The Collector made the award on
August 1, 1970. The notice under Section 12(2) was received by the
respondent on September 22, 1970 and he received the compensation F
under protest on September 29, 1970. The application for reference under
Section 18 was made on January 21, 1971. The Collector rejected the
application as being barred by limitation. The High Court in revision under
Section 115, CPC, similar to Gujarat Amendment, allowed the revision
holding that since the noticJ did not contain all the details of the award,
notice under Section 12(2) was not valid. Therefore, there was no limita- G
tion. This Court w 1ersing the view had held in paragraph 7 that the form
of notice was not material since the respondent appeared and received the
notice on September 22, 1970 and received the compensation under protest
on September 29, 1970. The limitation began to run from the date of the
receipt of the notice and by operation of clause (b) of the proviso to H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A sub-section (2} of Section 18 since the application was not made within six
weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice, the application was barred
by limitation prescribed in Section 18(2). It does not depend on the
ministerial act of communication of notice in any particular form which the
Act or Rules have not prescribed. The limitation began to operate from
the moment the notice under Section 12(2) was received as is envisaged by
B Section 18(2). Accordingly the order of the High Court was set aside.

The question emerges: whether the LAO/Collector acts as a court?·
Section 3( d) defines "Couit" to mean the principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction or a principal Judicial officer within any special local limits
C appointed thereunder to perform the functions of the court under the Act. ·
"Collector" has been defined in Clause 3(c) to mean the Collector of district
and includes a Deputy Commissioner etc. appointed by the appropriate
government to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act. He
is variously called the Collector/LAO. It would thus be clear that the Act
D made a distinction between the Collector and the Court. The Collec-
tor/LAO performs the statutory functions under the Act including the one
making the award under Section· 11 and referring a written application
made under Section 18(1) of the Act to the court and complies with
Sections 19 and 20 of the Act. The dichotomy of the Collector and the
E court cannot be lost sight of.

In Nityananda, M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Cmpn. of India &
Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 199, a Bench of three Judges of this Court was to
consider whether the industrial Tribunal is a court within the meaning of
the Industrial Disputes Act when it entertains application under Section
F 33C (1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held that
Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to an application
referable under the CPC and it contemplates an application to the court
as provided in the Third Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 4 of the
Limitation Act also refers to the closure of the court. Section 5 of the
G Limitation Act applies only to a court which is to entertain an application
or an appeal after the prescribed period has expired on its satisfying that
the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making
application. The Labour Court was held not a court within the Limitation
Act when it exercises the power under Section 33C (1) and (2) of the
H Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
OFFICER ON SPL DUTY (LAND ACQN.) v. SHAH MANI LAL CHANDULAL ETC. [K. RAMASWAMY. J.] 373

In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramanadan Prasad & Ors., [1976] 1SCC361, A
the question arose whether the Collector to whom application under
Section 3 of the Kasi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act 30 of
1951 is made, is a Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act? The said
Act by operation of Section 15 of that Act makes certain provisions of the
CPC applicable·when it conducts certain proceedings before it. This Court
B
had held that Collector is not court when he conducts the proceedings
under the Act. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply.
In Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transp01t Appellate T1ibunal, U.P. & Ors., AIR
1976 SC 2161, under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act (4of1939) and
under sub- section (2) proviso and sub-section (3), application for renewal
of the permit would be made and power is given to the R.T.A. to condone c
the delay if the application is made after the expiry but within 15 days of
the period. The question arose: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act
would apply by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation
Act? This Court h~d held that since the limitation of 15 days was
prescribed, if the application is not made within that limitation, the R.T.A. D
is not a court under Section 5 and it has no power to condone the delay.

In Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR (1964) SC 260, the question
arose: whether Section 417(4) of Criminal Procedure Code is a special law
within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and whether
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply? It was held that Section E
417(4) is a special law and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does.not apply
in view of the specific limitation provided under that Act for filing of an
appeal by a private complainant. In Major (Retd.) lnder Singh Rekhi v.
Delhi Development Authority, [1988] 2 SCC 338, Article 137 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an application filed in a civil F
Court. When application under Section 20 of the Arbitration was filed, the
question arose as to when the limitation began to run. This Court had held
that the cause of action arose on February 28, 1983 when the final bill was
not prepared and the application under Section 20 was filed within three
years from that date. It is seen that in that case the application under
Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is to an established civil Court. Therefore, G
the ratio therein has no application to the facts presently before us.

In P. V. Gadgil & Ors. v. P. Y. Deshpande & Anr., AIR 1983 Bombay
342, the question similar to the one presently under consideration had
directly arisen. Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applied for condonation H
/

f
>
'\
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A. of the delay in seeking to make a reference under Section 18. It was
contended that by operation of sub-section (3) as also applicable to States
of Maharashtra and Gujarat, the Collector is a court which is amenable to
revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC and that, therefore, Section
5 of the. Limitation Act would apply. The Division Bench negatived the
B contention and held that the Collector is not a court under CPC attracting
the provisions of the. Limitation Act. The contra view taken by that court
was held to be not a good law and accordingly the same was overruled.
The same question had arisen in Kerala where there is no specific local
provision like Section 18(3), locally amended by Maharashtra and Gujarat.
Contention was raised that by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of
C the Limitation Act, Section 5 stands attracted since there is no express
exclusion of th~ limitation under the Act. Therefore, the delay was con-
donable. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held that the
Collector is not a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Sub-section
(2) of Section 29 did not apply. Same is the view of the AP. High Court
D in Sp!. Dy. Collector Land Acquisition Anantapur v. K Kondandaramachar-
lu, AIR (1965) AP. 25.

In Jokkim Femandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, [1973] Kerala Law
Times 138, a Full Bench of that Court per majority had held that sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 29 and Section 5 of the Limitation Ad do not apply to
E the proceedings under the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act
and that, therefore, the Tribunal is not a court under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. In Commissioner ofA[51icultural Income-tax v. T.R.I., (1981)
K.L.T. 398, the Court was concerned with the question whether the appel-
late Tribunal under the Agricultural Income-tax Act is a court under
F Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in respect of an
application for reference. The Full bench had held that the appellate
authority is not a court under Section 5. The delay therefore, could not be
condoned.

It is to remember that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68
G of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under
Sections 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay
granted by the courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in
proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18, the provisions of the Limitation
Act were not expressly extended. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation
H Act is available, and tlie limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) Section 18
OFFICER ONSPL DUTY (LANDACQN.)v. SHAHMANILALOHANDULALETC. [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 375

may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by A
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), the Act specifically
maintains distinction between the Collector and the court and the Collec-
tor/LAO performs only statutory duties under the Act, including one while
making reference under Section 18. It is difficult to construe that the
Collector/LAO while making reference under Section 18, as statutory B

-- authority still acts as a court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.

Though hard it may be, in· view of the specific limitation provided
under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view
that sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to C
sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a court
when he acts as a statutory authority under Section 18(1). Therefore,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the
period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
18. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the Collector
is a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. D
Accordingly, we hold that the applications are barred by limitation
and Collector has no power to extend time for making an application under
Section 18(1) for reference to the court.

The appeals are accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court E
are set aside. The application under Section 18(1) stands rejected but, in
the circumstances, without cost.

J.N.S. Appeal allowed.