Holding

After an award is passed and possession is taken, a writ petition challenging the acquisition cannot be entertained, and the doctrine of delay defeats equity, rendering the petition barred.

Summary

The Municipal Council of Ahmednagar issued a notification under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 on 15 May 1971 and, after a compensation award on 26 April 1976, took possession of land. The respondents, Shah Hyder Beig and others, filed a writ petition in 1992—21 years after the notification and 16 years after the award—challenging the acquisition and seeking restoration of possession and refund of compensation. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition, holding that delay and laches should not bar relief and directing the council to vacate the land. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that once an award is passed and possession taken, a writ petition under Article 226 cannot be entertained, and that the doctrine of "delay defeats equity" bars the relief sought. The Court also noted that the respondents had applied for execution of the award in 1995, indicating acceptance of the award. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the writ petition dismissed. The appeal was allowed, restoring the council’s possession of the land.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be filed to challenge a land acquisition after a substantial delay of 21 years from notification and 16 years from award.
Whether the doctrine of limitation or laches bars the petition despite the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court.
Whether a writ petition can be entertained after the award has been passed and possession taken.
Whether equitable considerations can override the effect of delay in such cases.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4(1), s. 6
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966s. 126(4)

Subjects

Land acquisitionDelayLachesLimitationWrit petitionArticle 226Equitable doctrineRestoration of possessionCompensationCivil procedure

Judgment

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR AND ANR. A
v.
SHAH HYDER BEIG AND ORS.

DECEMBER 8, 1999

[S.B. MAJMUDAR AND UMESH C. BANERJEE, JJ.] B-

Practice & Procedure-Delay & Laches-Land Acquisition-Writ
petition challenging acquisition 21 years after notification and 16 years
after passing of award and handing over of possession-Whether C
maintainable-held, after award is passed no writ petition can be filed
challenging acquisition-Discretionary Relief-Act or conduct should not
indicate giving up of rights-Equity favours vigilant rather than an indolent
litigant-Constitution of India-Article 226.

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966-Section 126(4)-;- D
Land Acquisition-Writ Petition challenging notification and award after
considerable delay-Claim made before relevant authority-Execution of
award filed during pendency of writ petition-Held, facts do not indicate any
challenge to the notice of acquisition and suggests acceptance of award--
Land Acquisition act. 1984-Section 6.
E
Petitioners issued notification dated 15.5.1971 under Section 126(4)
of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 read with Section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 with regard to acquisition of land and
award dated 26.4.1976 was passed thereunder and possession of land was
taken from respondent Nos. 1to3. In the year 1992, respondent Nos. 1to3
filed writ petition challenging the said notification and award which was F
allowed by the High Court on the ground that petition must not necessarily
be refused whenever there was delay and the plea of delay and laches should
not be allowed to be raised during arguments without any pleading; and that
appellants failed to take steps for the purpose for which land was acquired
and modified the purpose which gave cause of action in favour of respondent G
Nos. 1 to 3 and they were entitled to relief on the basis of equitable principle
even if there was delay in filing the writ petition. Against the order of the
High Court, appellants have filed the present appeal.

The appellants contended that the High Court should have taken note of
197 H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A delay of21 years from the date of notification and 16 years from the date of
Award and making over possession, in filing the writ petition.

The respondents contended that the claim being time barred or the
conduct being barred under the laws of limitation could not arise in the case
of continuing wrong; and that the ma/a jides involved should not be restricted
B to be challenged under the garb of limitation.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. While no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal
course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding
C ought to be the guiding factor. The extraordinary jurisdiction has been
conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a
very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay
defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided
D one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours
a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of
law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as
regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does
not and cannot arise. (204-A-C)

E 1.2. While it is true that the plea of limitation ought to be raised at the
first available opportunity but that does not mean and imply that the party
raising it even during the course of hearing would be barred therefrom.
Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The respondents did in fact
agitate the point of limitation during the course of hearing and also had taken
the plea in their affidavit in reply and prior to the commencement of the
F hearing of the matter. The High Court was thus clearly in error in holding
without any further factual detail that the cause of action for the challenge to
the Notification under the Maharashtra Act of 1966 continues even on the
date of filing of the writ petition. [202-A-C)

2.1. There are three owners of the land. Two owners of the land did' in
G fact put forward a claim in regard to the land value and structure before the
concerned authority. The other owner however, did not put forth any claim for
any specific amount but claimed only the market value of the land together
with 15 per cent solatium and the cost of the building standing on the land.
While it is true that the evidence tendered by the respondents during the
H · course of hearing was without prejudice qua the reservation of rights to
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [BANERJEE, J.] 199
challenge the same but the factual backdrop in its entirety however does not A
indicate any challenge to the notice of acquisition. (204-E; 205-C)

2.2. The contextual facts depict that the respondents did in fact apply
for the execution of the award in the year 1995 during the pendency of ~he
writ petition. The factum of presentation of the execution application suggests
that the respondents have in fact accepted the Award and wanted its execution. B
(203-A; DJ

3. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed
challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder.
(205-D] C
C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. ofT.N and Ors., (1997]
2 SCC 627 and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd and Ors., [1996) 11 sec 501, relied
on.

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. Dolly Das, [1999] 4 D
sec 450, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7088 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20/25/27.8.98 of the.Bombay High
Court in W.P. No. 1156 of 1993. E
Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, A.S. Bhasme and Manoj Kumar Mishra
for the Appellants.

Bhimrao Naik, K.K. Venugopal, Kazi, V.B. Joshi, Ms. Shweta Sharma,
Umesh Bhagwat, Janardan and Vinod Mistry for the Respondents Nos. 1-3. F
G.B. Sathe for the Respondent No. 4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. Leave granted. G
The Municipal Corporation, Ahmednagar and another are in appeal
against an order of the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) in Writ
Petition No. 1156 of 1993, wherein the Writ Petition filed by the respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 herein, Shah Hyder Beig and two others was allowed and the
Municipal Corporation was directed to make over vacant possession of the H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A land bearing CTS No. 5761-A situated at Ahmednagar to the petitioners
within a period of three months from the date of the Judgment. The High
Court further directed the writ petitioners to refund the amount of compensation
received by them for the acquired land within a period of four weeks from the
date of handing over the possession of the land to them by the respondent
B Corporation along with certain consequential orders. The facts for the matter
being singularly singular ought to be adverted to at this juncture.

The facts depict that the Writ Petition before the High Court was filed
on 21st October, 1992, for setting aside the Award dated 26th April, 1976 in
regard to CTS No. 5761' of Ahmednagar Town. Subsequent thereto, however,
C the Writ Petition was amended for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari for quashing
and setting a8ide the notification dated 15th May, 1971 issued under Section
126(4) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994.
It is on this petition that the High Court made the rule absolute and directed
making over of the vacant possession of the land under acquisition within
D a period of three months from the date of the Judgement as noticed above.
The appellants on grant of special leave to appeal are before this Court.

While issuing notice on 17th December, 1998, this Court was pleased
to grant an interim stay of operation of the impugned judgement of the High
E Court and also directed filing of counter and rejoinder affidavits. It is in terms
of this direction of the Court that the matter was taken up for hearing on
7.12.1999 and also today.

Upon however, hearing the submissions on behalf of the parties herein,
we do feel it expedient to record that the matter can be dealt with finally on
F a short ground to wit, the time element. While addressing on behalf of the
petitioners herein Mr. Salve learned Solicitor General severely criticised the
judgment of the High Court and contended that the High Court should have
taken note of the element of delay in moving the Court. Mr. Salve pointed out
that whereas the notice for acquisition was issued in 1971 and the Award was
passed and possession was taken in the year 1976, the Writ Petition was filed
G in the year 1992 i.e. to say after expiry of 21 years from the date of notification
and 16 years from the date of making over possession and the Award.

Incidentally this point of delay and laches was also raised before the
High Court and on this score the High Court relying upon the decision in
Abhyankar's case N.l. Abhyankar v. Union of India, [1995] 1 MHLJ 503,
H observed that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever there is delay, the Court
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [BANERJEE, J.] 201
must and necessarily refuse to entertain the petition filed after a period of A
three years or more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a suit.
The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar 's case (supra) stated that the question
is one of discretion to be followed in the fact and circumstances of ea~h case
and further stated :-

"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in B
this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is
whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of
the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where
the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third p~rties
have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless C
there is reasonable explanation for the delay".

In the Judgment Impugned in this appeal the High Court stated :-
"It may be stated that in the instant case the respondent No. 2 not
only failed to take steps even after passing of the Award in 1976 but
attempted to change the public purpose even thereafter in 1980 and D
1993. It can be seen from the discussion of the material placed before
the Court by the petitioners that the respondent No. 2 in fact issued
a public notice inviting objections to the modification in the
development plan in 1993. The petitioners have in fact when realised
the possibility of respondent No. 2 taking steps for changing or E
modifying the development plan to the extent of their land protested
and has in fact lodged their objections on similar grounds which re
urged in the Writ Petition. Therefore, there is a continuity in process
without any break on the part of the respondent No. 2 in changing
the public purpose in not giving effect to the purpose for which
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published by the State F
.government in exercise of its powers and in consequence passing of
the Award based on such notification. In the given set of circumstances,
we feel that there petitioners have had cause of action even passing
of the award in challenging the very initial action on the part of the
respondents in acquiring the land. It may be stated that the respondent G
No. 2 has not raised the contention of delay and laches in the first
affidavit in reply filed on 29.6.1966. It is only in the additional affidavit
in reply on 28.4.98 and that too in reply to amendment made to the
Writ Petition by the petitioners that for the first time a contention is
raised as to the delay and laches in filing the petition. We are afraid
if the respondent No. 2 is entitled to raise this contention during the H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A course of arguments .............................................. "

The observations as above, with due respect the High Court are based
on certain misconception of facts. While it is true that the plea of limitation
ought to be raised at the first available opportunity but that does not mean
and imply that the party raising it even during the course of hearing would
B be barred therefrom. Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Time
barred claim would not even be entertained by a civil court without there
being nay opportunity of filing a pleading by the respondents or the defendants
in a civil suit. The fact remains that the respondents herein did in fact agitate
the point of limitation during the course of hearing and also had taken the
C peal in their affidavit in reply and prior to the commencement of the hearing
of the matter. The High Court was thus clearly in error in holding without any
further factual detail that the cause of action for the challenge to the Notification
under the Maharashtra Act of 1966 continues even on the date of filing of
the writ petition. Mr. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents contended that since this is a continuing wrong, the question
D of the claim being time barred or the conduct being barred under the laws of
limitation does not and cannot arise. Mr. Venugopal further contended that
there are ma/a fide involved and ma/a jides ought not to be restricted to be
challenged under the garb of limitation.

The High Court has in fact proceeded on the basis of the equitable
E principle as it appeared from the observations of the High Court as set out
hereinbelow :-

"In the present case, the respondent No. 2 has in fact did nothing
except by passing resolution for modification of the public purpose
for which the land was acquired rather than actually making use of the
F
land for which it was acquired or possession of which was taken after
passing of the award. On equitable principle the petitioners are entitled
to reliefs even if there is delay in filing the Writ Petition. As a matter
of fact, the petitioners have explained the circumstances in which they
have invoked the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under
G Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Since the petitioners have
been successful in establishing the pleas_e of legal malice as against
the respondent no. 2, we think that the perpetual illegal action of
which has causing substantial injustice to the petitioners is required
to be remedied by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners. It cannot
H
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [BANERJEE, J.) 203

be overlooked that while exercising the extra-ordinary jurisdiction A
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court may be
justified in exercising its powers where justice must appear to have

... been done and must be done."

Incidentally, the contextual facts depict that the respondents did in fact
apply for the execution of the Award in the year 1995. This aspect of the B
matter, unfortunately, does not find place even in the amended Writ Petition.
Significantly, as found from records one I.A. was filed in the present SLP
being I.A. No. 1 of 1999 for dismissal of the Special Leave Petition on the
ground of suppression of fact by the Municipal Council. But what about the
failure to mention the factum of the award in the writ petition? The factum C
of initiation of the execution proceedings was suppressed even in the amended
writ petition. We are at a loss to find as to who ought to be charged with
guilt of suppression of facts.

The records depict that by reason of the failure to obtain necessary
orders from the trail court, a civil revisional application was filed before the D
High Court wherein the High Court has directed deposit of Rs. 3,20, 116 by
the Municipal Council which sum in fact stands deposited till date. While it
is true that the High Court in the said Civil Revision has directed that further
orders as regards the withdrawal of the amount of money can be had only
after the disposal of the Writ Petition, but the factum of presentation of the
execution application goes however to suggest that the respondents have in E
fact accepted the Award and wanted its execution.

The factual analysis in short therefore, depicts that the notification for
acquisition in terms of the Act was issued in 1971, the Award was published
in regard thereto in 1976 and the Writ Petition was filed in 1992. During the F
pendency of the Writ Petition, the respondent-writ petitioners moved an
execution application so far as the Award is concerned and thereafter moved
a further civil revision application before the High Court in 1995 - these factual
details in our view go to negate the observations of the High Court.

It is significant to note that since the year 1952, this particular property G
which is under acquisition was reserved for school and playground. In the
year 1963 the reservation was further continued and as such, there had not
been any development of the plot by any concern since 1952 onwards.
Another redeeming feature ought also to be noticed at this juncture, namely,
the original Writ Petitioner being the father of the present respondents sent
a notice in 1964 to the Municipal Council to purchase the reserved property H
204 SUPREME COURT:REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A or to release the same in favour of the writ petitioner. But there was no
assertion of right thereafter and till the issuance of the notification in 1971
and possession being delivered in terms of the award in 1976.

The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the
same. It is now a ~ell-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on lhis
B score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal
course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding
ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction
is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out
of place to mentiop. that this extraordinary jurisdiction, has been conferred on
C to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound
equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defects
equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article
226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has
not by his act or conduct given· a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a
vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law,
D_ the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards
restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and
cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that
since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of
school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefore,
E the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the
provisions of the Act as stated above.

Apart from the time element as noticed above another redeeming feature
on the factual aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court
at all. There are three owners of the land, namely, Sulat Beig Razak Beig,
F Mohd. Ali Beig Razak Beig and Shah Hyder Beig Razak Beig. The first of the
two owners amongst the three named above of the land did in fact put
forward a claim in regard to the land value and structure before the concerned
authority and two owners claimed as below :-

(i) Market Value of Rs. 20 per Sq. ft
G
(ii) Value of Tin shed: Rs. 15,000

(iii) Build up structure : Rs. 30,000

(iv) Damages and severance of the property : Rs. 35,000

H (v) Salatium : 15% of the amount
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [BANERJEE, J.] 205
of compensation A
(vi) Compensation for loss of : Rs. 13,000
compensation of the strip of land
along towards in North side of the
land under acquisition
(vii) For losmg frontage and benefits : Rs. 50,000 B
acquiring therein
(viii) Cost of the house acquired : Rs. 40,000
for the right

The other owner Shah Hyder Beig, however, did not put forth any claim C
for any specific amount but claimed only the market value of the land together
with 15 per cent solatium and the cost of the building now standing on the
land. Incidentally, the other owner is a resident of England and executed a
power of attorney in favour of Mohd. Ali Beig to act on his behalf in the
proceeding before the authorities and to receive the amount of compensation.
The power of attorney stands recorded in England in February, 1973. While D
it is true that the evidence rendered by the respondents during the course
of hearing was without prejudice qua the reservation of rights to challenge
the same but the factual backdrop in its entirety however in our view does
not indicate any challenge to the notice of acquisition.

In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed E

- challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This
has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent cases
(C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. & Ors., reported in
(1997] 2 SCC 627. This court observed as below :-
"The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published F
under Section 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the
Act") in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17 .10.1962, total extent of 6
areas 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk,
Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII
of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Reichold G
Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had becomq
final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to
the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl.
Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold
Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the
said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in
GOMs No. 816. Industries dated 24.3.1971 in favvur of another
subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent
which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for
two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold
basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement
B in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10.5.I 985. In GOMs 546 Industries
dated 30.3.86, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants
challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17.10.62
contending that since the original purpose for which the land was
acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to
c restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having
already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the
predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge
the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be
dismissed."
D
Similar is the view in. an earlier decision of this Court in the case of
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd and Ors., reported in [1996] 11 SCC 501. Incidentally,
the decision last noted. was also on the land acquisition and requisition under
the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in paragraph 29
E of the report, this Court observed :-

"It is well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the
writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings
have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications.
The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226
F of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4( 1) and
declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all
relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was
passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised
its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken
G into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The
fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly
ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was
not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned
Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the grounds of laches."

H Mr. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [BANERJEE, J.) 207
respondents, placed strong reliance upon a recent decision of this Court in A
the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Dolly Das,
reported in [1999] 4 SCC 450. This Court in paragrpah 8 of the report observed
as below:-
... "Sofar as the contention regarding !aches of the respondent in filing
the writ petition is concerned, delay, by itself, may not defeat the B
claim for relief unless the position of the appellant had been so altered
which cannot be retracted on account of lapse of time or inaction of
the other party. This aspect being dependent upon the examination
of the facts of the case and such a contention not having been raised
before ·the High Court, it would not be appropriate to allow the C
appellants to raise such a contention for the first time before us.
(Emphasis supplied) Besides, we may notice that the period for which
the option of renewal has been exercised has not come to an end.
During the subsistence of such a period certainly the respondent
could make a complaint that such exercise of option was not available
to the appellants and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court D
could be invoked even at a later stage. Further, the appellants are not
put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of this delay in
approaching the High Court for a relief."

The observations however pertain to the Transfer of Property Act and
in particular reference to Section I 05 and the facts therein are clearly E
distinguishable and the sentence emphasised as above depicts the disgust
feature. Hindustan Petroleum's case (supra) is not a case for acquisition at
al~and reliance thereon thus is totally misplaced.

On the wake of the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that the
High Court has dealt with the matter on a totally different perspective and as F
such clearly fell into an error in passing the order as impugned in this appeal.
Not only the length of time but the concept of approbation and reprobation
has totally been ignored at the High Court stage. The appeal therefore,
succeeds. The Writ Petition filed by the respondents in the High Court is
dismissed and as such the I.A. No. 1/99 filed in SLP No. 19507of1998 also G
stands dismissed. In view of he dismissal of the writ petition by the present
judgment, direction contained in the civil revision permitting the respondents
to withdraw the compensation amount will obviously now be complied with.
Each party however should pay and hear its own costs.

A.K.T. Appeal allowed. H