THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF HYDERABAD AND ANR.versusP. KATA RAO

                           [2008] 6 S.C:R. 983

 -I

           THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                     A
                   HYDERABAD AND ANR.
                                   v:
                             P. KATA RAO
                (Civil Appeal Nos. 2961-2962 of 2008)
..                          APRIL 24, 2008                           B

                  [S.B. SINHA AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

            Service Law - Departmental proceedings -
      Simultaneous criminal proceedings on the same set of           c
      charges - Order of dismissal by Disciplinary Authority -
      Acquittal of all the charges in criminal proceedings - High
      Court directing appropriate authority to re-consider the
      punishment imposed on the delinquent officer- Held: Superior
      courts ordinarily should not interfere with quantum of
      punishment and finding of enquiry officer-Acquittal in criminal D
      proceeding also do not debar departmental proceedings -
      However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
      order of dismissal not correct-Appropriate Authority to impose
      any other suitable penalty on the delinquent Officer.
                                                                      E
            Departmental proceedings were initiated against the
      respondent-employee. 12 charges were alleged. He was
      also proceeded against in a criminal case on the same
      set of charges. In the Departmental proceedings, Enquiry
      Officer found the respondent guilty of all the charges apart F
)
      from three charges. Appointing Authority passed an order
      of dismissal. Appeal against the order of dismissal was
      rejected. In a writ petition against the same, High Court
      quashed the order of punishment and directed the
      disciplinary authority to issue a show cause notice
      indicating modified punishment. In compliance of the G
      order, notice was issued, but again order of dis.missal was
      passed. On dismissal of appeal against the same, writ
      petition was filed. In the meantime, criminal proceedings
      were concluded as High court acquitted the respondent
                                    983                               H
    984      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A of all the charges.
       Respondent filed writ petition challenging the
  second order of dismissal. Single Judge of High Court
  held the second order of dismissal contrary to the
  direction of High Court passed in previous writ petition
8 and directed fresh consideration of the matter. In the writ
  appeal thereagainst, Division Bench of High Court also
  directed the appellants to re-consider respondent's case.
  Hence the present appeal.
c         Dismissing the appeals, the Court
         HELD: 1. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that
    the jurisdiction of superior courts in interfering with a
    finding of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is limited.
    The High Court, it is trite, would also ordinarily not interfere
D   with the quantum of punishment. There cannot,
    furthermore, be any doubt or dispute that only because
    the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal
    charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not
    debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh
E   departmental proceeding and/ or where the departmental
    proceedings had already been initiated or to continue
    therewith. The approach that the court's jurisdiction is
    unlimited although had not found favour with some
    Benches, the applicability of the doctrine of
F   proportionality, however, had not been deviated from. The
    legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the same
    set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a
    departmental proceedings and in a criminal case
    simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The
G   dicta of this Court, however, remains unshaken although
    the applicability thereof had been found to be dependant
    on the fact situation obtaining in each case. [Paras 18, 19
    and 20] [992-C-G]
       Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and
H Anr. 1999 (3) SCC 679 - referred to.
          THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                 985
                  HYDERABAD AND ANR.

              2.1 In view the peculiar facts and circumstances of A
        the case, there is no reason to disagree with the findings
        of High Court. Respondent was a responsible officer. He
      · was holding a position of trust and confidence. He was
        proceeded with both on the charges of criminal
        misconduct as also civil misconduct on the same set of B
...     facts, subject, of course, to the exception that charges
        Nos. 11 and 15 stricto sensu were not the subject matter of
        criminal proceedings, as integrity and diligence, however,
        were not in question. Before this court also it has not been
        contended that he had made any personal gain. ·The High
        Court in its judgment categorically opined that he merely
                                                                      c
        had committed some inadvertent mistakes. He did not
        have any intention to commit any misconduct. The
        purported misconduct on his part was neither willful nor
        there existed any fraudulent intention on his part to falsify
        the account. The High Court opined that the prosecution D
        had failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond
        all reasonable doubts for the offences punishable under
        the provisions of the Penal Code. [Paras 21, 22 and 26]
        [994-G, H; 995-A; 992-G, H; 993-A, B, C]
             2.2 As the respondent has merely been found to be
                                                                      E
       guilty of commission of procedural irregularity, it is not a
       fit case where discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136
       of the Constitution of India is required to be exercised
       particularly in view of the fact that the respondent has
       now reached his age of superannuation, and the                 F
       appropriate authority of the appellant would be entitled
       to impose any suitable penalty upon him. [Para 29]
       [998-F, G]
             GM Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 2006 (5) SCC 446
       - relied on.                                                G

            Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh
       2006 (4) SCC 265; State Bank of India and Ors. v. TJ Paul
       1999 (4) SCC 759; Union of India v. G Ganayutham 1997 (7)
       sec 463 - referred to.                                         H
    986       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
    2961-2962 of 2008.
         From the Judgment and Order dated 4.6.2007 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W.A. No. 627 & 628 of
    2005.
B
          Soli J. Sorabjee, A.V. Rangam and Buddy A. Rangadhan          ·•
    for the Appellants.
          P. Kata Rao-In-Person.
c         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
        2. Appellant is aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a
  judgment and order dated 4.6.2007 passed by a Division Bench
D of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 627/628
  of 2005 whereby and whereunder it refused to interfere with the
  judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of the
  said Court in WP No. 476 of 2001.
       3. Respondent at all rnaterial times was an employee in
E the appellant Bank. He was placed under suspension on or about
  13.8.1998. A departmental proceeding was initiated against
  him.
        12 items of charges were drawn up; charge Nos. 11 and
    15 whereof read as under:
F
          "Charge No. 11: He authorized cash and transfer credits
          to the demand loan accounts against pledge of gold
          ornaments of Smt. P. Lakshmi, his wife, from out of
          proceeds of loan amounts released to two DIR and one
G         cash credit borrowers. Thus he facilitated his wife to get
          undue pecuniary benefit by permitting unauthorized
          adjustments which were done with his prior knowledge.
          Charge No. 15: He sanctioned and released loans to his
          close relatives in contravention of H.O. Cir. No. ADV/98 of
H         1976 dated the 2nd December, 1976."
         THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                      987
           HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

         4. He was also proceeded against in a criminal case. He          A
     was acquitted of the criminal charges.
          5. However, _the departmental proceedings continued
     during pendency of the criminal proceedings as prayer for stay
     thereof was not acceded to. The Enquiry Officer found that all
~-
     the charges apart from charge Nos. 1(a), 2(b), 3 were proved.        B

          6. The Appointing Authority passed an order of dismissal.
     An appeal preferred thereagainst by the respondent was
     dismissed.
           7. By an order dated 29.12.1995, the appellant was             c
     acquitted of the charges framed against him in the criminal
     proceeding under Sections 120B, 420 and 468 of the Indian
     Penal Code. He was also acquitted of the charges for alleged
     commission of offences under Section 5( 1)(d) read with Section
     5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.                            D
          8. Respondent, however, was convicted under Section
     477{A) of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 5(1){d)
     and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He preferred an
     appeal thereagainst before the High Court.
                                                                          E
          A Writ Petition was also filed questioning the said order of
     dismissal.
          9~ By an order dated 12.3.1999, a learned Single Judge
     of the High Court quashed the order of punishment and directed
     the disciplinary authority to issue a show cause notice indicating   F
     the modified punishment and pass an appropriate order.
           10. A show cause notice was issued, pursuant to the.said
     direction.
                                .
           11. Again an order of dismissal was passed on 2.7.1999.
     An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed ..Another writ        G
     petition was filed by the respondent aggrieved by and
I    dissatisfied therewith.
          12. The Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant came up for
     consideration before a learned Single Judge of the High Court
                                                                          H
    988        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A and by a judgment and order dated 3.10.2001, it was held:
          "... In such a case, it is difficult to believe that the appellant
          had any intention to benefit himself or other persons. It has


B
          to be noted that the above reasoning of the trial court is
          most perverse and without any material. In my considered
          view the trial court had jumped to the conclusion without
                                                                               ..
          any basis."
         13. As regards, alleged commission of offence under
    Section 477A of the Indian Penal Code, it was stated:
c         "From the above discussion, I am of the considered
          opinion that the appellant could not have made the alleged
          entries willfully and with dishonest intention to defraud. It is
          certainly not the case of the prosecution that the appellant
          had independently committed the offence under Section
D         477-A l.P.C. and on the contrary the specific allegation of
          the prosecution was that there was conspiracy initially and
          as such a conspiracy has culminated into various offences
          attributable to all the accused and in particular of the
          offence under Section 477-A against the appellant.
E         Therefore, in view of the above observation made by the
          Apex Court and in view of peculiar facts and
          circumstances, in the instant case, it is unsafe to draw any
          adverse inference against the appellant that he committed
          the offence under Section 477-A l.P.C., inasmuch as the
F         essential ingredients viz., 'willfulness' and 'intention' to
          defraud could not successfully be substantiated by the
          prosecution against the appellant. Admittedly the case of
          the appellant as stated in his examination under Section
          313 Cr.P.C., that it was only a mistake committed
G         inadvertently and from the above facts and circumstances
          and the evidence on record, the only inference that can be
          drawn is that the accused, no doubt, might have made
          some wrong entries, but the same cannot be termed as
          acts of willfulness and with fraudulent intention to falsify
H         the accounts. Hence the appellant is entitled for an acquittal
           THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                         989
             HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
 -'.
            for the offence under Section 477-A l.P.C."                        A
             The judgment of conviction and sentence under Sections
       5(1 )(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was also
       set aside by the High Court opining that the prosecution had
       failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable
...    doubts, holding:                                                        B

            " ... In other words when the appellant was acquitted of all
            the charges including the charge under Section 4 77-A,
            l.P.C. by this Court, it cannot be said that he committed
            the offence under the provisions of Prevention of
            Corruption Act."
                                                                               c
              14. The Writ Petition filed by the appellant against the order
       of dismissal passed against him came up for consideration
       before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The High Court,
       while passing its judgment dated 7.02.2005, considered the              D
       totality of the circumstances.
           As regards the correctness of the order of dismissal, it
       was opined:
            " .... The said orders can in no way be considered to be a E
            reason as such for a de novo consideration on the aspect
            of punishment and it is also to be noticed that
            reconsideration is only in respect of punishment and that
            too based on the earlier recommendations made in
            appeal. Therefore, necessarily it follows that the order of
                                                                         F
            dismissal as was imposed earlier on 23.07.1994 could
            not possibly be repeated or restated much less reimposed.
            Necessarily it has to be any other punishment other than
            the order of dismissal or removal. Further, the specific
            direction is only to take a follow up action in terms of the
            directions given in the appeal on the earlier occasion. G
            Thus, on a conspectus reading of the said directions, the
            only scope left for reconsideration is to once again take
            into consideration the earlier directions given in appeal
            and not otherwise, or to impose any other punishment
            much less dismissal order. Having regard to the aforesaid H
    990       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A         circumstances and also even taking into account totality
          of the circumstances vis-a-vis the allegations as made
          against him and also the clear acquittal of the petitioner
          on criminal side though it may not be binding, necessarily
          the respondents had to follow the earlier orders of this
B         Court, since the same are not kept in view and the
          impugned orders are not in terms of the said order. Hence,        ·•
          the matter requires to be reconsidered afresh by the
          authorities. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the
          impugned orders of the respondents in dismissing the
c         petitioner from service are not only contrary to the directions
          given by this Court on 12.03.1999 in W. P. No. 16833 of
          1994, but also do not in any way commensurate to the
          gravity of the allegations as made or found against him."

          It was directed:
D
          "In the circumstances, both the Writ Petitions are allowed
          setting aside both the orders of n::spondents dated
          02.07 .1999 and 02.02.2000 and directing fresh
          consideration and disposal of the matter in accordance
          with law after giving notice and opportunity to the pemioner.
E         The respondents are also directed to pay subsist~nce
          allowance and all such ·other allowances to which the
          petitioner is entitled during the period of his suspension
          from 01.08.1994 to 02.07.1999."No costs."

F         15. An intra-court appeal was preferred thereagainst. The
    Division Bench, in its impugned judgment dated 4.06.2007,
    opined:
          "In the present case, we find that the enquiry officer had
          exonerated the respondent of charges 1(a), 2(b), 3 and 5,
G         which pertain to misappropriation and deriving of pecuniary
          benefits by him. A perusal of the judgment dated
          03.10.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in
          Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1996 makes it clear that the
          respondent was honourably acquitted with an unequivocal
H         finding that there was neither any loss to the bank nor any
            THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                     991
              HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
  .i

             pecuniary benefit was taken by the respondent. Thus, on A
             the crucial issue wheth(jr the respondent is guilty of
             financial misfeasance and malfeasance, there is no
             conflict between the findings of the enquiry officer and
             the Court, which disposed of the criminal appeal. Since
'!t·.
             the learned Single Judge, who decided Writ Petition No. B
             16833 of 1994 and the appointing authority, which
             reconsidered the matter in the light of the direction given
             by this Court, did not have the benefit of considering the
             judgment of acquittal rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 12
             of 1996, the only appropriate course would be to direct C
             the appellants to again consider the respondent's case
             and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
                                              '
                                                    [Emphasis supplied]
             It was directed:-
                                                                            D
             "ln the result, Writ Appeal No. 627 of 2005 is dismissed
             and Writ Appeal No. 628 of 2005 is disposed of with the
             direction that the appointing authority shall reconsider the
             case of the respondent on the issue of quantum of
             punishment to be imposed on him and pass appropriate
             order within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of     E
             this judgment."
             16. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the learned senior counsel
        appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the High
        Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned             F
        judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration:-
                                              .f.
             (i)    That the criminal court merely granted the benefit of
                    doubt in favour of the respondent; and
             (ii)   Even an order of acquittal may not be a bar for G
                    passing an order of dismissal from service
                    particularly keeping in view the fact that a bank
                    employee is required to maintain strict integrity.
            17. Mr. P. Kata Rao, the respondent appearing in person,
        however, would urge that both the departmental proceedings          H
    992       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A and the criminal case were based on the same set of facts. The
  charge of misconduct against him, it was urged, was based on
  violation of some procedural guidelines only and, thus, not grave
  in nature. It was pointed out that the learned Single Judge
  examined the entire records and it had been found that the
B respondent is not guilty of any malpractice and furthermore has
                                                                          ,f
  not derived any pecuniary benefit. Even the charges of
  misappropriation, it was urged, have not been proved against
  him.

         18. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the
C jurisdiction of superior courts in interfering with a finding of fact
  arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is limited. The High Court, it is
  trite, would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of
  punishment. There cannot, furthermore, be any doubt or dispute
  that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing
D a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would
  not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh
  departmental proceeding and/ or where the departmental
  proceedings had already been initiated or to continue therewith.
          19. We are not unmindful of different principles laid down
E   by this court from time to time. The approach that the court's
    jurisdiction is unlimited although had not found favour with some
    Benches, the applicability of the doctrine of proportionality,
    however, had not been deviated from.
F       20. The legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the
  same set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a
  departmental proceedings and in a criminal case
  simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The dicta of
  this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.
G and Another [(1999) 3 sec 679], however, remains unshaken
  although the applicability thereof had been found to be
  dependant on the fact situation obtaining in each case.
       21. The case at hand is an exceptional one. Respondent
  was a responsible officer. He was holding a positior. 0f trust
H and confidence. He was proceeded with both on the" cti3rges of
          THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                        993
            HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA. J.]
 ,,
      criminal misconduct as also civil misconduct on the same set           A
      of facts, subject, of course, to the exception that charges Nos.
      11 and 15 stricto sensu were not the subject matter of criminal
      proceedings, as integrity and diligence, however, were not in
      question. Before us also it has not been contended that he had

...   made any personal gain.

            22. The High Court in its judgment categorically opined
                                                                             B


      that he merely had committed some inadvertent mistakes. He
      did not have any intention to commit any misconduct. The
      purported misconduct on his part was neither willful nor there
      existed any fraudulent intention on his part to falsify the account.   c
      The High Court opined that the prosecution had failed to bring
      home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts for
      the offences punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal
      Code.

            The judgment of the High Court states a definite view. It        D

-..
      opined that the finding of the learned Trial Judge holding him
      guilty under Section 477A of the Indian Penal Code and the
      provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act was perverse.
      The circumstances in favour of the accused, the High Court
      inferred, had wrongly been attributed against him by the Trial         E
      Judge.

            23. A learned Single Judge of the High Court in his judgment
      dated 7 .02.2005 only upon taking into consideration the
      observations made by the High Court in the said criminal appeal
      but also the other circumstances, brought on record, directed          F
      fresh consideration and disposal of the matter in accordance
      with the law upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the
      respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court, in th,e first
      round of litigation, noticed that the entire record had been
      perused by the learned Single Judge. It was found that the             G
      original authority had imposed a punishment of only stoppage
      of one increment with cumulative effect which was modified by
  ;   the appellate authority into one of withholding of increment
      without cumulative effect and held that failure of the disciplinary
      and appellate authorities. to take into consideration modified         H
    994           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A   punishment has caused serious prejudice to the respondent.              ..
          24. It was furthermore noticed that in purported compliance
    of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge, the penalty
    of dismissal from service was re-imposed on the respondent.

B         25. The Division Bench, however, disagreed with the
    conclusion of imposition of stoppage of one increment. Even             ....
    then it observed that in the facts and circumstances of this case
    the issue relating to dismissal of respondent needs
    reconsideration. It was directed:
c         "While doing so, the concerned authority shall keep in
          view the following factors:
          (i)     Both the disciplinary authority and this Court in
                  Criminal Appeal No. 12of1996 found the respondent
                  not guilty of charges of misappropriation, deriving
D
                  the personal benefit for himself and causing loss to
                  the bank.
          (ii)    The effect of the Judgment of this Court in Criminal
                  Appeal No. 12 of 1996 in the light of the decision of
E                 the Supreme Court in M. Paul Anthony's case (supra)
                  and G.M. Tank's case (supra).
          (iii)   Modified punishment of withholding of increment
                  without cumulative effect imposed on the respondent
                  is a minor penalty unlike the punishment of withholding
F                 of increment with cumulative effect, which was held
                  to be a major penalty by the Supreme Court in             ,.
                  Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra).
          (iv)    While considering the proportionality of the
G                 punishment, distinction lies between the procedural
                  irregularities constituting misconduct from the acts
                  of misappropriation of finances, causing loss to the
                  institution, etc."
                                                                            •
          26. We do not see any reason keeping in view the peculiar
H   f~cts and circumstances of the case to disagree with the said
                  THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                       995
                    HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

- -·          findings, although we would like to reiterate the principles of
              law to which we have referred to hereinbefore.
                                                                                    A


                    27. We may, however, notice that Mr. Sorabjee has strongly
              relied upon a decision of this Court in Commissioner of Police,

 ..           New Delhi v. Narender Singh [(2006) 4 SCC 265] to contend
              that therein initiation of a departmental proceeding was upheld
              inter alia on the ground that although a confession made by an
                                                                                    B

              accused jn a criminal proceeding would not be admissible
              having regard to Sections 25 and 27 of the Evidence Act, the
              same would not be a bar to proceed against him departmentally.
                                                                                    c
                   In that case it was held:

                   "13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions
                   of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a
                   criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground
                   not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or         D
      ,
  .....            to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is
                   passed."
                   This court therein considered the nature of the confessions
              made by the delinquent officer and the implication thereof having
                                                                                    E
              regard to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act to hold that
              the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the confessional
              statement was not admissible in the departmental proceeding.

                    In GM. Tank v State of Gujarat and Others [(2006) 5 SCC
              446], noticing a large number of decisions operating in the field,    F
          ~
          r   it was observed:
                   "30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel
                   appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts
                   and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings
                   and the criminal case are based on identical and similar G
                   set of facts and the charge in a departmental ca~e against
      _,           the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are
                   one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the
                   departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is
                   grave. The nature of the case launched against the H
    996       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2008] 6 S.C.R.

                                                                          .
A         appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected
          against him during enquiry and investigation and as
                                                                            -
                                                                                -
                                                                                '


          reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one
          and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses


B
          and circumstances are one and the same. In the present
          case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already
          noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid
                                                                           ..
          conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles
          therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and
          other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses
          examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their
c         statement came to the conclusion that the charges were
          established against the appellant. The same witnesses
          were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court
          on the examination came to the conclusion that the
          prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the
D         appellant beyond any re<lsonable doubt and acquitted the
          appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding        ~-

          that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed
          that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular
          trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it
E         would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow
          the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to
          stand.

          31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the
          departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the
F         same without there being any iota of difference, the            ..'
          appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually
          proved between the departmental and criminal
          proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of
          proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though
G         the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to
          be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable
          acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the            '\-
          proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires
          to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case1
H         will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the
            THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF                      997
              HYDERABAD AND ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
 _,
             appellant deserves to be allowed."                              A

             Each case, therefore, must be determined on its own facts.
              28. However, we may notice that this Court, in State Bank
        of India and Others v. TJ. Paul [(1999) 4 SCC 759], noticed:

;,. .
             "7. The above orders were questioned in a writ petition. B
             The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition
    y        held that the finding of the enquiry officer on Item 23 was
             that no financial loss was proved and if it was a case of
             not taking adequate "security" from the loaners and in not
             obtaining ratification as per Head Office instructions, these   c
             charges were not sufficient - in view of Rules 22(vi)(c)
             and (d) read with sub-rule (vii) - for imposing a penalty
             of dismissal or removal. Only a minor penalty could be
             imposed . As per the enquiry officer's report there was no
             actual loss caused by reason of any act of the employee D
             wilfully done. There was no evidence of financial loss
 -~          adduced before the enquiry officer. The finding that the
             respondent jeopardised the Bank's interest was based
             on no evidence. Penalty must have been only for minor
             misconduct. The SBI Rules were not applicable since the E
             misconduct alleged related to the period of service in Bank
             of Cochin. The learned Judge observed that "punishment
             of removal" could not have been imposed as it was not
             one of the enumerated punishments under Bank of Cochin
             Rules. The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order
             was quashed. It was, however, observed that the Bank F
    !        could impose punishment for minor misconduct as per
             rules of Bank of Cochin."
              TJ. Paul (supra) was a case involving violation of the
        instructions of the Head Office as also gross negligence on the G
        part of the delinquent officer. While holding that the same would
        constitute major misconduct referring to the case of Union of
        India v. G Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463], it was opined:
             "19 ... In our view, this decision is not applicable to the
             facts of the case. Here the Court is not interfering with the   H
    998       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 6 S.C.R.


A         punishment awarded by the employer on the ground that
          in the opinion of the Court the punishment awarded is
          disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. Here,
          the gradation of the punishments has been fixed by the
          rules themselves, namely, the rules of Bank of Cochin and
B         the Court is merely insisting that the authority is confined
          to the limits of its discretion as restricted by the rules.
          Inasmuch as the rules of Bank of Cochin have enumerated
          and listed out the punishments for "major misconduct", we
          are of the view that the punishment of "removal" could not
          have been imposed by the appellate authority and all that
c         was permissible for the Bank was to confine itself to one
          or the other punishment for major misconduct enumerated
          in para 22(v) of the rules, other than dismissal without
          notice. This conclusion of ours also requires the setting
          aside of the punishment of "removal" that was awarded by
D         the appellate authority. Now the other punishments
          enumerated under para 22(v) are "warning or censure or
          adverse remark being entered, or fine, or stoppage of
          increments/reduction of basic pay or to condone the
          misconduct and merely discharge from service". The
E         setting aside of the removal by the High Court and the
          relief of consequential benefits is thus sustained. The
          matter has, therefore, to go back to the appellate authority
          for considering imposition of one or the other punishment
          in para 22(v) other than dismissal without notice."
F        29. As the respondent has merely been found to be guilty
  of commission of procedural irregularity, we are of the opinion        ''
  that it is not a fit case where we should exercise our discretionary
  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
  particularly in view of the fact that the respondent has now
G reached his age of superannuation, and the appropriate authority
  of the appellant would be entitled to impose any suitable penalty
  upon him.
          30. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
H K.K.T.                                        Appeals dismissed.