THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA BAGALKOTE DISTRICT, BAGALKOTversusCHANDRASHEKAR & ANR.

                  [2026] 1 S.C.R. 191 : 2026 INSC 31

   The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot
                           v.
                  Chandrashekar & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 2026)
                              06 January 2026
     [Ahsanuddin Amanullah and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                          Issue for Consideration
       Whether present is a case where the criminal proceedings can be
       quashed on the exoneration of the respondent-delinquent employee
       in the departmental enquiry or they be permitted to continue.

                                 Headnotes†
       Disciplinary enquiry vis-à-vis criminal prosecution – Criminal
       proceedings when cannot be quashed on the exoneration
       of the delinquent employee in the departmental enquiry –
       Respondent, an Executive Engineer (Electrical) was alleged
       to have demanded a bribe from an electrical contractor –
       Contractor complained to the Anti-Corruption Bureau
       who prepared a trap which was successful – Disciplinary
       proceedings initiated by the department, criminal prosecution
       launched by the appellant-Lokayukta – Since the departmental
       proceedings ended in exoneration, the Respondent approached
       the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings – High
       Court held that if there is an exoneration on merits where the
       allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person
       held innocent, then criminal proceedings on the same set
       of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue –
       Interference with:
       Held: Exoneration is not on merits – Enquiry Report found that
       for reason of the Officer in charge of the trap having not been
       examined, the department was unable to establish the charge,
       which is not at all an exoneration on merits, but more of a
       discharge for lack of diligence – Even without the examination of
       the Inspector who laid the trap there was sufficient proof on the
       standard of preponderance of probabilities to find the delinquent
       guilty of the charge of demand and acceptance of bribe – The
       complainant and the independent witnesses have spoken about
* Author
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       the incident of the successful trap laid – Enquiry Officer fell into
       an error by requiring proof at a higher level than that necessary
       under preponderance of probabilities and so did the Disciplinary
       Authority, in concurring with the same – Present is not a fit case
       where the criminal proceedings can be quashed on the exoneration
       of the delinquent employee in a departmental enquiry – Criminal
       proceedings to continue. [Paras 8, 11, 15, 18]

       Disciplinary enquiry vis-à-vis criminal prosecution – Both are
       independent of each other:
       Held: In a disciplinary enquiry the employer satisfies itself as to
       whether the misconduct alleged is proved and if proved, decides
       on the proportionate punishment that should be imposed; both
       of which are in the exclusive domain of the employer, to be
       determined on the standard of preponderance of probabilities – In
       a criminal prosecution launched what assumes significance is the
       criminality of the act complained of or detected which has to be
       proved beyond reasonable doubt – Both are independent of each
       other not only for reason of the nature of the proceedings and the
       standard of proof, but also for reason of the adjudication being
       carried on by two different entities, regulated by a different set of
       rules and more importantly decided on the basis of the evidence
       led in the independent proceedings – If evidence is not led properly
       in one case, it cannot govern the decision in the other case where
       evidence is led separately and independently. [Para 9]

       Disciplinary enquiry vis-à-vis criminal prosecution – Presence
       of a witness – No consequence in not responding to a
       summons in departmental proceedings, unlike in criminal
       proceedings:
       Held: The exoneration was on the basis of two aspects, one, the
       Inspector of the ACB who carried out the trap having not been
       examined and the other, two independent witnesses accompanying
       the trap team having stated that they were standing outside the office
       room wherein the handing over of the bribe took place – The first
       ground of the Inspector not having been examined based on the
       preponderance of probabilities, is not imperative, especially when
       the two independent witnesses were examined – More so, insofar
       as the department not being at fault since three summons were
       taken out and a further request was made again for summoning the
       witness, which was declined by the Enquiry Officer – There would
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                               193

       The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                       Chandrashekar & Anr.

     be no consequence in not responding to a summons in departmental
     proceedings, while a like failure in criminal proceedings would be
     more drastic – The criminal court has ample powers to ensure the
     presence of a witness in a criminal proceeding, which the Enquiry
     Officer does not possess – The prosecuting agency and the one
     carrying on the departmental enquiry are two different entities – The
     trap was laid by the ACB, and the prosecution was conducted at the
     behest of the Lokayukta, and no laxity on the prosecuting agency
     can be presumed or anticipated of not bringing the Inspector to the
     box, before the criminal court – Moreover, the prosecution cannot
     be put an end on such anticipated laxity. [Para 21]

     Disciplinary enquiry – Enquiry officer vis-à-vis disciplinary
     authority:
     Held: Enquiry report in disciplinary proceedings is not conclusive
     of the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent employee, which finding
     is in the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority – The
     enquiry officer is appointed only as a convenient measure to bring
     on record the allegations against the delinquent employee and
     the proof thereof and to ensure an opportunity to the delinquent
     employee to contest and defend the same by cross-examination of
     the witnesses proffered by the department and even production of
     further evidence, in defense – The enquiry officer merely records
     the evidence and the finding entered on the basis of the evidence
     led at the enquiry does not have any bearing on the final decision
     of the disciplinary authority – The disciplinary authority takes the
     ultimate call as to whether to concur with the findings of the enquiry
     authority or to differ therefrom – On a decision being taken to
     differ from the findings in the enquiry report as to the guilt of the
     delinquent employee, if it is in favour of the delinquent employee
     nothing more needs to be done since the enquiry stands closed
     exonerating the employee of the charges levelled – If the decision
     is to concur with the finding of guilt by the Enquiry Officer, then
     a show-cause is issued with the copy of the Enquiry Report –
     However, while differing from the finding of exoneration in the
     enquiry report, necessarily the disciplinary authority will not only
     have to issue a show-cause against the delinquent employee, with
     a copy of the Enquiry Report, but the show cause notice also has
     to specifically bring to attention of the delinquent, the aspects on
     which the disciplinary authority proposes to differ, based on the facts
     discovered in the enquiry so as to afford the delinquent employee
     an opportunity to proffer his defense to the same. [Para 14]
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       Disciplinary enquiry – Enquiry officer:
       Held: Enquiry Officer often is appointed as an independent person
       who would have no connection with the management to ensure
       against any allegation of bias – A retired judicial officer being
       appointed as an enquiry officer does not confer the enquiry report
       any higher value or greater sanctity than that is normally available
       to such reports. [Para 15]

                                Case Law Cited
       Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. [2011] 4 SCR 889 : (2011)
       3 SCC 581 – distinguished.
       State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi [2012] 8 SCR 208 :
       (2012) 9 SCC 685 – held applicable.
       P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 631 : (1996) 9
       SCC 1; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 259 :
       (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; National Insurance Company Limited v.
       Pranay Sethi [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984.

                               List of Keywords
       Disciplinary enquiry; Criminal prosecution; Criminal proceedings
       cannot be quashed on exoneration of the delinquent employee
       in departmental enquiry; Exoneration not on merits; Not total
       exoneration on merits; Executive Engineer (Electrical); Allegation
       of demand and acceptance of bribe; Successful trap laid; Bribe
       demanded from electrical contractor; Karnataka Electricity
       Transmission Corporation Limited Regulations; Standard of
       preponderance of probabilities; Delinquent guilty of the charge of
       demand and acceptance of bribe; Anti- Corruption Bureau; Enquiry
       officer; Disciplinary authority; Criminal proceedings to continue.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       77 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2025 of the High Court
       of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in WP No. 104828 of 2024
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                         195

       The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                       Chandrashekar & Anr.

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant(s):
     Vikram Hegde, Abhishek Wadiyar, Ashutosh Yadav.
     Advs. for the Respondent(s):
     Mehmood Umar Faruqui, Kartik Ganachari, Md. Zeeshan Ali,
     Mehfuz Basar Mollah.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     K. Vinod Chandran, J.

     Leave granted.
2.   Despite this Court having consistently held that disciplinary
     proceedings and criminal prosecution, even on an identical allegation,
     are parallel proceedings, the relevance of the conclusion in one is
     often contended to be binding on the other. Trite is the principle
     that in a disciplinary proceeding, the proof is of preponderance of
     probabilities while in a criminal proceeding, it has the higher standard
     of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Often it is argued that the acquittal
     in the criminal proceedings should inure to the benefit of the accused/
     delinquent employee in a disciplinary proceeding too. In the present
     case, we have a contrary contention of the disciplinary proceedings
     having exonerated the delinquent employee, who seeks absolution
     from the criminal prosecution. The contention is that when the
     allegations could not be proved in a disciplinary proceeding where
     the requirement is only of preponderance of probabilities, surely it
     cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
3.   The appellant is the Lokayukta of the State of Karnataka, an
     independent body tasked also to conduct enquiries on complaints
     of corruption and initiate and continue prosecution; such powers
     having been statutorily conferred under the Karnataka Lokayukta
     Act, 1984. On facts, suffice it to notice that the respondent, an
     Executive Engineer (Electrical) with the Works and Maintenance
     Division, HESCOM, Bagalkot regulated by the Karnataka Electricity
     Transmission Corporation Limited Regulations, was alleged to have
     demanded a bribe from an electrical contractor to clear five bills, at
     the rate of Rupees two thousand each. The contractor complained
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       to the Anti-Corruption Bureau1 who prepared a trap, with identifiable,
       powdered notes kept in a packet entrusted with the complainant, to be
       handed over to the Executive Engineer. The trap was successful, and
       the notes were recovered from the pocket of the Executive Engineer
       whose hands turned pink on dipping in the prepared solution, which
       proved the taint of corruption.
4.     Disciplinary proceedings were initiated and so was criminal
       prosecution launched, the former by the department itself and the
       latter by the Lokayukta who is the appellant herein. On the claim that
       the departmental proceedings ended in exoneration, the delinquent
       employee approached the High Court, for quashing the criminal
       proceedings. The High Court by the impugned judgment relied on
       Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B.2, a three-Judge Bench
       decision to hold that if there is an exoneration on merits where
       the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person
       held innocent, then criminal proceedings on the same set of facts
       and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue especially based
       on the principle of higher standard of proof in criminal cases. The
       learned Single Judge also refused to follow a later judgment of this
       Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi3; finding the
       later judgment to be per incuriam, having been passed in ignorance
       of the earlier one.
5.     There can be no doubt regarding the principle that if the later Bench
       holds contrary to the earlier Bench decision of coequal strength, on
       the same point, the contrary dictum expressed by the later Bench
       would be per incuriam as held by a Constitution Bench in National
       Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi4. But the question
       arising herein is as to whether there was a conflict with the earlier
       and later judgments.
6.     In Radheshyam Kejriwal2, the raid on the premises of the appellant
       therein, by the Enforcement Directorate gave rise to proceedings
       under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 19735. Initially, a


1    for short, the ACB
2    (2011) 3 SCC 581
3    (2012) 9 SCC 685
4    (2017) 16 SCC 680
5    for short, the FERA
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                          197

          The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                          Chandrashekar & Anr.

       show-cause notice was issued by the Director of the Enforcement
       Directorate proposing adjudication proceedings under Section 51
       of the FERA, which, after explanation received was concluded with
       a decision taken by the Adjudicating Officer that the contravention
       of the provisions alleged cannot be sustained since the transaction
       itself is not proved. The said order became final for reason of
       the Enforcement Directorate having not challenged it. Later, on
       the same set of facts, as enabled under Section 56 of the FERA
       criminal proceedings were initiated, which even as per the enactment
       could be continued without any prejudice to any award of penalty
       by the Adjudicating Officer under Section 51 of the FERA. It is in
       this context that the three-Judge Bench, by a majority, held inter
       alia that though the adjudication and criminal proceedings are
       independent of each other, if in the former the offender is exonerated
       on merits then the criminal prosecution also comes to an inevitable
       end. It was also categorically found that if the exoneration in the
       adjudication proceeding is on a technical ground and not on merits,
       the prosecution could continue.
7.     In Radheshyam Kejriwal2 the adjudication proceedings and the
       criminal proceedings were under the FERA, one for penalty; to
       recoup the economic loss caused by the transaction contravening
       the provisions of the statute and the other, prosecution; to provide
       penal consequences as a deterrent measure. The subject matter of
       the offence alleged in both proceedings was the contravention of
       the provisions of the statute through the transaction detected. When
       the adjudication proceedings found the transaction alleged to have
       not taken place, then it cuts at the root of the prosecution too. Other
       decisions under the FERA, where the two proceedings of adjudication
       and prosecution were found to be independent; the decision in one
       having no bearing on the other, were noticed. So were the decisions
       under the Income Tax Act, 19616 noticed, wherein, when the penalty
       imposed on a presumed violation of the provisions of the I.T. Act
       was set aside by the Tribunal; the last fact-finding authority under
       the scheme of the I.T. Act, for that reason alone the prosecution was
       found redundant and quashed. Radheshyam Kejriwal2 culled out
       the principles in the following manner:



6    For brevity ‘the I.T. Act’
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       38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions
       can broadly be stated as follows:
       (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can
       be launched simultaneously;
       (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary
       before initiating criminal prosecution;
       (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings
       are independent in nature to each other;
       (iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the
       adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding
       for criminal prosecution;
       (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
       Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law
       to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution
       or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
       (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour
       of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend
       upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication
       proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit,
       prosecution may continue; and
       (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the
       allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the
       person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set
       of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue,
       the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof
       in criminal cases.
       39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to
       judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication
       proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution
       is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned
       in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it
       is found on merit that there is no contravention of the
       provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the
       trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the
       process of the court.
                                 [underlining by us for emphasis]
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                        199

       The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                       Chandrashekar & Anr.

8.   In Radheshyam Kejriwal2 the very substratum of the allegation of
     violation of the provisions of FERA was found to be non-existent, an
     adjudication on merits that the transaction alleged had not occurred.
     In the instant case the Enquiry Report found that for reason of the
     Officer in charge of the trap having not been examined, the department
     was unable to establish the charge, not at all an exoneration on
     merits, but more a discharge for lack of diligence. The ratio decidendi
     of that case cannot be extended to every situation where a statute
     provides for a civil liability and a criminal liability, in which event
     Courts would be presuming what logically follows from the finding,
     without any application on the facts.
9.   In a disciplinary enquiry the employer satisfies itself as to whether
     the misconduct alleged is proved and if proved, decides on the
     proportionate punishment that should be imposed; both of which are
     in the exclusive domain of the employer, to be determined on the
     standard of preponderance of probabilities. In a criminal prosecution
     launched what assumes significance is the criminality of the act
     complained of or detected which has to be proved beyond reasonable
     doubt. Both are independent of each other not only for reason of
     the nature of the proceedings and the standard of proof, but also for
     reason of the adjudication being carried on by two different entities,
     regulated by a different set of rules and more importantly decided
     on the basis of the evidence led in the independent proceedings. If
     evidence is not led properly in one case, it cannot govern the decision
     in the other case where evidence is led separately and independently.
10. No doubt, the principles in Radheshyam Kejriwal2 are applicable in
    a disciplinary inquiry, which was the specific question considered in
    Ajay Kumar Tyagi3; interestingly by the very same Hon’ble Judge
    who authored the majority judgment in Radheshyam Kejriwal2. True,
    the earlier decision was not noticed in the latter decision; according
    to us with just cause since there were distinctions on facts.
11. Ajay Kumar Tyagi3 was a case in which a successful trap was laid
    and there was exoneration in the enquiry conducted without a final
    order by the Disciplinary Authority. Therein the Disciplinary Authority
    had not passed an order, in deference to the pending criminal
    prosecution, which action of deferment was unsuccessfully challenged
    in a writ petition by the delinquent. Then a further writ petition was
    filed challenging the continuance of the criminal prosecution on the
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       ground of exoneration in the Enquiry Report, which stood allowed.
       The Disciplinary Authority then passed an order exonerating the
       delinquent, subject to a challenge to the quashing of the criminal
       proceedings. In the SLP filed against the order of quashing there
       was a reference to a larger Bench noting the divergence of opinion
       with regard to the quashing of a prosecution based on exoneration
       in a disciplinary proceeding. Even before answering the reference
       the larger Bench found the quashing to be wrong insofar as the
       Disciplinary Authority having power to differ from the findings in the
       report of enquiry and the High Court, in that case having upheld the
       action of the Disciplinary Authority, keeping in abeyance the final
       order. We pause here to notice that herein the Disciplinary Authority
       passed an order concurring with the findings in the Enquiry Report
       on 08.07.2024, produced as Annexure R-1, with a rider that the order
       is subject to the proceedings in the criminal case, the consequences
       of which would necessarily follow.
12. The reference too was answered in Ajay Kumar Tyagi3. A two-Judge
    Bench decision of this Court in P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar7 was
    referred to wherein the criminal prosecution was quashed when the
    departmental proceedings concluded in exoneration. In P.S. Rajya7,
    the allegation was of possession of assets disproportionate to the
    source of income. The Central Vigilance Commission dealt with
    the charge and in its elaborate report concluded that the valuation
    report on which CBI placed reliance is of doubtful nature. The Court
    on facts found that the value given as a base for the chargesheet
    was not the value given in the reports subsequently given by the
    valuers. The decision in P.S. Rajya7 relying on State of Haryana v.
    Bhajan Lal8; the water shed decision in invocation of the inherent
    powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
    for quashing criminal prosecution, held that the prosecution in that
    case should be quashed for more than one reason as laid down in
    Bhajan Lal8. Ajay Kumar Tyagi3 categorically held that the quashing
    of criminal proceedings in P.S. Rajya7 was not merely on account
    of the exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings. Referring to a
    number of decisions, it was held so in paragraphs 24 & 25 which
    are extracted hereunder:


7   (1996) 9 SCC 1
8   (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                           201

       The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                       Chandrashekar & Anr.

           “24. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court quashed
           the prosecution on total misreading of the judgment in P.S.
           Rajya case (1996) 9 SCC 1. In fact, there are precedents,
           to which we have referred to above, that speak eloquently
           a contrary view i.e. exoneration in departmental proceeding
           ipso facto would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a
           criminal case. On principle also, this view commends us.
           It is well settled that the standard of proof in a department
           proceeding is lower than that of criminal prosecution. It
           is equally well settled that the departmental proceeding
           or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided only
           on the basis of evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness
           of the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only
           after the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal
           case cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence in
           the departmental proceeding or the report of the inquiry
           officer based on those evidence.
           25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the exoneration
           in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result
           in the quashing of the criminal prosecution. We hasten to
           add, however, that if the prosecution against an accused is
           solely based on a finding in a proceeding and that finding
           is set aside by the superior authority in the hierarchy,
           the very foundation goes and the prosecution may be
           quashed. But that principle will not apply in the case of
           the departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the
           departmental proceeding are held by two different entities.
           Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”
13. We are of the opinion that in the present case the distinction as
    brought out in Ajay Kumar Tyagi3 squarely applies and the ratio
    decidendi therein is not regulated by the ratio of the earlier judgment in
    Radheshyam Kejriwal2. In Radheshyam Kejriwal2, the adjudication
    proceedings and the prosecution were both by the very same entity,
    the Enforcement Directorate under the FERA. In Ajay Kumar Tyagi3,
    the allegation was of a demand and acceptance of bribe in which a
    trap was laid, and the prosecution was commenced and continued
    by the ACB while the departmental proceedings were by the Delhi
    Jal Board under which the delinquent employee worked. Identical is
    the fact in this case where the ACB laid the trap, commenced and
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       continued the criminal proceedings, at the behest of the appellant,
       while the department carried on with the enquiry. The findings in
       the enquiry report also do not persuade us to quash the criminal
       proceedings as we would presently notice.
14. At the outset, we cannot but reiterate that the enquiry report in
    disciplinary proceedings is not conclusive of the guilt or otherwise
    of the delinquent employee, which finding is in the exclusive domain
    of the disciplinary authority. The enquiry officer is appointed only
    as a convenient measure to bring on record the allegations against
    the delinquent employee and the proof thereof and to ensure an
    opportunity to the delinquent employee to contest and defend
    the same by cross-examination of the witnesses proffered by the
    department and even production of further evidence, in defense. The
    enquiry officer, strictly speaking, merely records the evidence and
    the finding entered on the basis of the evidence led at the enquiry
    does not have any bearing on the final decision of the disciplinary
    authority. The disciplinary authority takes the ultimate call as to
    whether to concur with the findings of the enquiry authority or to differ
    therefrom. On a decision being taken to differ from the findings in
    the enquiry report as to the guilt of the delinquent employee, if it is
    in favour of the delinquent employee nothing more needs to be done
    since the enquiry stands closed exonerating the employee of the
    charges levelled. If the decision is to concur with the finding of guilt
    by the Enquiry Officer, then a show-cause is issued with the copy
    of the Enquiry Report. However, while differing from the finding of
    exoneration in the enquiry report, necessarily the disciplinary authority
    will not only have to issue a show-cause against the delinquent
    employee, with a copy of the Enquiry Report, but the show-cause
    notice also has to specifically bring to attention of the delinquent, the
    aspects on which the disciplinary authority proposes to differ, based
    on the facts discovered in the enquiry so as to afford the delinquent
    employee an opportunity to proffer his defense to the same.
15. Having thus stated the law regulating the final decision in a
    departmental enquiry, we cannot but notice that in the present case,
    there is a final order produced as passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
    The learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that a
    retired District Judge was the Enquiry Officer, which according to us
    gives the enquiry no higher sanctity than that would be conferred
    on any enquiry report in any disciplinary proceeding carried out by
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       The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                       Chandrashekar & Anr.

     a person not trained in law. The Enquiry Officer often is appointed
     as an independent person who would have no connection with the
     management to ensure against any allegation of bias. A retired
     judicial officer being appointed as an enquiry officer does not confer
     the enquiry report any higher value or greater sanctity than that is
     normally available to such reports. We cannot but observe that in
     this case the Enquiry Officer fell into an error by requiring proof at a
     higher level than that necessary under preponderance of probabilities
     and so did the Disciplinary Authority, in concurring with the same.
16. We also notice the specific findings in the enquiry report. The
    exoneration was on the basis of two aspects, one, the Inspector of
    the ACB who carried out the trap having not been examined and
    the other, two independent witnesses accompanying the trap team
    having stated that they were standing outside the office room wherein
    the handing over of the bribe took place. The first ground of the
    Inspector not having been examined, according to us, based on the
    preponderance of probabilities, is not imperative, especially when the
    two independent witnesses were examined. More so, insofar as the
    department not being at fault since three summons were taken out
    and a further request was made again for summoning the witness,
    which was declined by the Enquiry Officer. We cannot but notice that
    there would be no consequence in not responding to a summons in
    departmental proceedings, while a like failure in criminal proceedings
    would be more drastic. The criminal court has ample powers to
    ensure the presence of a witness in a criminal proceeding, which
    the Enquiry Officer does not possess. In this context, the fact that
    the prosecuting agency and the one carrying on the departmental
    enquiry being two entities assumes significance. Further, here the
    trap was laid by the ACB, and the prosecution was conducted at the
    behest of the Lokayukta, and we cannot presume or anticipate any
    laxity on the prosecuting agency of not bringing the Inspector to the
    box, before the criminal court. More pertinently we cannot, on such
    anticipated laxity put an end to the prosecution.
17. We looked at the evidence laid at the enquiry, not to regulate the
    order in the departmental proceedings which is not challenged
    before us, but to satisfy ourselves and to understand whether there
    is total exoneration on merits, which we find to be absent. In the
    present case, the witnesses proffered by the department where, (i)
    the complainant; the contractor who complained of the demand of
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       bribe and (ii) two independent witnesses, government officers in two
       different departments who accompanied the trap team. PW-1, the
       complainant categorically stated that a bribe was demanded from
       him of Rupees ten thousand to clear five bills at the rate of Rupees
       two thousand each. He complained to the ACB whose Inspector
       marked the notes, powdered them and put them in a packet, after
       noting down the numbers to later identify them. The trap team along
       with the complainant and two witnesses went to the office of the
       delinquent employee. The complainant went inside the office room
       wherein he handed over the packet containing the money to the
       delinquent employee, who counted and put it in his pant’s pocket,
       clearly spoken of by the complainant at the enquiry. The complainant
       gave the signal as agreed upon, a missed call on the mobile, when the
       trap team went in, checked the pockets of the delinquent employee,
       recovered the packet with the money and when the hands of the
       delinquent employee were dipped in the solution earlier prepared,
       the colour changed bringing forth the taint.
18. PW-2 and PW-3 were the independent witnesses who were standing
    outside the office room when the complainant went in. They deposed
    that on the signal being given, the officers went inside the room
    and the witnesses followed. They witnessed the money being taken
    out from the pocket of the delinquent and the delinquent’s hands
    being dipped in a solution which displayed the tainted colour. Even
    without the examination of the Inspector who laid the trap we are
    of the opinion that there was sufficient proof on the standard of
    preponderance of probabilities to find the delinquent guilty of the
    charge of demand and acceptance of bribe. The complainant and
    the independent witnesses have spoken about the incident of the
    successful trap laid.
19. On the principles of law as stated hereinabove and also on the
    peculiar facts coming out from the above case, we are not convinced
    that this is a fit case where the criminal proceedings can be quashed
    on the exoneration of the delinquent employee in a departmental
    enquiry. We find the decision in Ajay Kumar Tyagi3 to be squarely
    applicable. The appeal stands allowed permitting the continuation
    of criminal proceedings. We make it clear that since the disciplinary
    authority has accepted the enquiry report, there cannot be reopening
    of the same based on the findings hereinabove; but a conviction
    in the criminal case would bring in consequences as mandated by
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                        205

          The Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District, Bagalkot v.
                          Chandrashekar & Anr.

     rules regulating the service, specifically reserved in the order of the
     disciplinary authority, Annexure R-1.
20. The Appeal stands allowed.
21. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey