Holding

Compensation must be "just" and the appropriate award in this case is Rs.4.5 lakhs with interest at 9% per annum, reducing the High Court's award.

Summary

Mahadeva Shetty, a mason, suffered 100% disability after a bus owned by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) plunged into a ravine. He claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Tribunal awarded Rs.2.20 lakhs. The Karnataka High Court enhanced the award to Rs.6.25 lakhs, including various heads such as pain and suffering, loss of future income and future medical expenses, and applied a 9% interest rate. KSRTC appealed, contending the accident was an act of God, that the High Court’s enhancement lacked rational basis, and that the interest rate was excessive. The Supreme Court held that compensation must be "just"—equitable, reasonable and non‑arbitrary—and that the High Court had erred in several components of its award. Accordingly, the Court reduced the compensation to Rs.4.5 lakhs with interest at 9% per annum, directing the balance to be deposited as a fixed deposit. The appeal was allowed in part.

Issues considered

The adequacy and justification of the Karnataka High Court's enhancement of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Whether the accident was caused by rash/negligent driving or was an act of God, affecting liability.
How to determine the quantum of compensation for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, loss of marital life, and future medical expenses.
The appropriate rate of interest to be awarded on the compensation.
The interpretation of the term "just" compensation and the discretion vested in tribunals under Sections 166 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 142
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 166, s. 168

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actcompensationpersonal injuryjust compensationloss of earning capacityact of Godnegligenceinterest rateSupreme Court of IndiaKarnataka High Courttribunal

Judgment

A THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC
v.
MAHADEV A SHETTY AND ANR.

JULY 31, 2003

B [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

..
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Section 166-Motor Accident-Serious injury
causing 100% disability--Compensation-Claim-Rs.2.20 lakhs awarded by
Tribunal-Enhanced by High Court to Rs.6.25 lakhs-On appeal, held: Under
c some heads compensation not justly determined by High Court-Compensation
of Rs.4. 5 lakhs with interest of 9% would be adequate.

Motor Accident-Compensation-Determination of-Held: Compensation
must be 'just'-Expression just' denotes equitabi/ity,fairness, reasonableness
D and non arbitrariness-Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculations-It would depend on particular facts ofeach case- .l

Determination has to be rational, to be done with judicious approach and not
the outcome of whims and wild guesses.

Constitution ofIndia, 1950-Article 142-Precedent-Binding nature of
\.
E -Applicability-Held: Only the principle on which the case was decided is ,..
binding as authority-Statements not part ofratio decendi are not authoritative
and they are only obiter dicta.

Words and Phrases: ~ t
F 'Compensation'; 'damages '-Meaning ofin the context ofMotor Vehicles
Act, 1988.

'Act of God'-Meaning of

Respondent-claimant, a mason by profession, suffered serious injury
G in his spinal cord in an accident by a bus of the appellant-Corporation
while he was travelling in the bus as a passenger. He filed application for
compensation and the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.2.20 lakhs
taking his annual income to be Rs.12,000 per annum. Respondent
approached High Court for enhancement of compensation and the same
\.
H was enhanced to Rs.6.25 lakhs with interest at the rate of 9%. High Court
14
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC 1•. MAHA DEVA SHETTY 15

awarded Rs.I lakh for injuries, mental agony, pains and sufferings, A
Rs.2,55,000 as loss of future income taking the annual income as Rs.15,000,
Rs.1.5 lakh for loss of marital life, Rs.1 lakh for future expenses for
medicine and wheelchair.

In appeal to thrs Court, appellant-Corporation contended that
claimant was not entitled to any compensation as ~he accident was not due B
to rash and negligent driving and the same was due to act of God; that
the High Court enhanced the compensation amount without any rational
basis, and that the rate of interest was on the higher side.

Allowing the app~I, the Court
c
HELD: I. The claimant is entitled to Rs.4.5 lakhs as compensation
along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of application for
compensation till payment. Regarding injuries, mental agony, pains and
sufferings it is noted that the claimant was hospitalized for about seven
weeks. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 fixed by the High Court is D
unreasonable. So far as the loss of earning capacity is concerned, there is
no rational for fixing annual income at Rs. 15,000. Annual income is fixed
at Rs. 12,000. Applying the multiplier of 17 the loss of future income is
fixed at Rs. 2,04,000 instead of Rs. 2,55,000. For the loss of marital life
and the non-possibility of marriage, High Court fixed the compensation
at Rs.1.5 lakhs without any basis being indicated. So far as future expenses E
for medicines and wheelchair etc. are concerned, High Court has fixed it
at Rs.l lakh. Though High Court has not indicated any basis for award
of lump sum, it cannot be denied that the claimant is on the wheelchair
and would need regular medical attention because of the continued
complications. The cost of expenses during hospitalization was small, F
because treatment was at Government Hospital. The situation would not
be different for future treatments. Sum of Rs. 50,000 would be adequate.
The other amounts awarded by the High Court do not call for any
interference. [25-H; 24-E-H; 25-A-C)

R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR [1995) SC 755, G
distinguished.

Nagesha v. M.S. Krishna and Anr., [1997) 8 SCC 349, referred to.

2. The term 'compensation' etymologically suggests the image of
balancing one thing against another; its primary signification is H

,.
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A equivalence, and the secondary and more common meaning is something
given or obtained as an equiv11Ient. Pecuniary damages are to be valued
on the basis of 'full compensation'. 'Compensation' means anything given
to make things recompense, remuneration or pay: it need not, therefore,
necessarily be in terms of money, because law may specify principles on
B which and manner in which compensation is to be determined and given.
Compensation is an act which a court orders to be done, or money which
a Court orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or omissions have caused
loss or injury to another in order that thereby the person damnified may
receive equal value for his loss; or be made whole in respect of his injury;
·-
something given or obtained as equivalent: rendering of equivalent in value
C or amount; an equivalent given for property taken or for an injury done
to another; a recompense in value; a recompense given for a thing
received; recompense for whole injury suffered; remuneration or
satisfaction for injury or damage of every description. The expression
'compensation' is not ordinarily used as an equivalent to 'damages',
although compensation may often have to be measured by the same rule
D as damages in an action for a breach. [20-H; 21-A-E]

Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., [1980] AC 25, referred to.·

3. It is true that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money
cannot renew a physique frame that has been battered and shattered.
E Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind.
Object of providing compensation is to place claimant as far as possible
in the same position financially as he was before accident. Broadly
speaking, in the case of death basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary·
benefits to the dependants of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss,
F expenses, etc. and loss to the estate. Object is to mitigate hardship that
has been caused to the legal representatives due to sudden demise of the
deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate
and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can
be no exact uniform rule for measuring value of human life and measure
of damage cannot be arrived at by precise matbematical calculation; but
G amount recoverable depends oil broad facts and circumstances of each
case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor it
should be a source of profit of the person in whose favour it is awarded.
[21-G-H; 22-A-B]

West v. Shepard, [1964] AC 326 and Charter House Credit v. Jolly,
H
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. MAHA DEVA SHETTY 17
(1963) 2 CB 683, referred to. A
4. The damages for vehicular accidents are in the nature of
compensation in money for loss of any kind caused.to any person. Jn case I

of personal injury the position is different from loss of property. Jn the
latter case, there is possibility of repair or restoration. But in the case of
personal injury, the possibility of repair or restoration is practically non- B
existent. (22-C)

f Parry v. Cleaver, (196~) 1 All E.R. 555 and Fair v. London and North-
Western Railway Co., [1869] 21 LT 326, referred to.

5. Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is C
required to make an award determining the amount of compensation
which to it appears to be 'just'. It has to be borne in mind that
compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden
scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the
claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in D
accordance to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences
like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such
consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for the mental
and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or
she cannot enjoy life which has been curtailed because of physical
handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time E
it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a
wind fall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the
compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of
profit but the same should not be a pittance. What would be "just"
compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable F
to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of
damages cannot be arrived by at precise mathematical calculations. It
) would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending
peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for
assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just"
compen~ation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the G
expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on
the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a
judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and
arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and
reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. (22-H; 23-A-E)
H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 'l. S.C.R.

A Helen C. Rebe/le v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation,
AIR (1998) SC 3191; Ashwani Kumar Mishra v. P. Muniam Babu, [1999)
ACJ 1105 SC and R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd, AIR
[1995) SC 755, referred to.

Fair v. London and North-Western Railway Co., (1869) 21 LT 326 and
B Rushton v. National Coal Board, [1953] 1 All E.R. 314, referred to.

6. While fixing compensation for pain and suffering as also for loss
of amenities of life the features like his age, marital status and unusual
deprivation he has undertaken in his life has to be reckoned. [24-D]

C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5453 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4. I0.200 l of the Kamataka High
Court in M.F.A. No. 3577 of 2000. ·

P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants.
D
G. Ananthamurthy for P.P. Singh, for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was deliyered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
E
Mahadeva Shetty (hereinafter referred to as 'the claimant') suffered
serious injuries on 4.6.1995 as a result of a vehicular accident where a bus
bearing No.KA-01/F 5097 belonging to Kamataka State Road Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') was involved. According to the
claimant, the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving by
F driver of this bus. As a result of the accident the bus plunged into a ravine
resulting in serious injuries to the spinal cord of the claimant and made him
a paraplegic. He filed an application for compensation before the Civil Judge
(Senior Division) & JMFC, Nanjangud, (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Tribunal') claiming compensation of Rs.9.83 lakhs. According to the claim
G petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short
'the Act') the claimant was a Mason by profession. The bus in which he was
a passenger plunged into a pit by rolling down from a great height, and he
sustained injuries and a few persons lost their lives on account of the accident.
He was hospitalized for about 7 weeks i.e. days from 5.6.1995 to 23.7.1995.
There was fracture of Tl 2 vertebra and consequent damage to nerve system
H of the whole body below the hips and the body has bt(en functionless. Limbs
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. MAHADEVA SHETTY [PASA YAT, J.] 19

have become functionless permanently due to failure of nerve system due to A
accident and he has also lost sexual power. He was earning Rs. 3,000 per
month at the time of accident. It was stated that he was of good health at the
time of accident.

Stand of the Corporation in reply to the claim petition was that the
accident was not due to rash and negligent driving, but an act of God and that B
there was no rashness and/or negligence as claimed by the claimant.

r
On consideration of the materials on record and the evidence of witnesses
examined, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.2.20 lakhs. It was
stipulated that the amount be paid with interest @ 6% p.a. from 28.12.1999, C
i.e. the date when claimant tendered evidence in support of the claim.

Matter was carried in appeal by the claimant before the Karnataka High
Court for enhancement of compensation. The Corporation supported the order
dated 24.5.2000 of the Tribunal taking the stand that there was no infirmity
in the order. In appeal the High Court raised the amount of compensation to D
Rs.6.25 lakhs. Under various heads, the amounts of compensation as awarded
by the Tribunal and the High Court are as follows:

Heading Tribunal High Court

(a) Pain & Suffering Rs.25,000 Rs.1,00,000 E
(b) Mental agony Rs.25,000 Both under the head
injury, pain and
suffering

(c) Medical Expenses Rs.15,000 Rs.15,000 F
(d) Transportation Rs.5,000 Rs.5,000

(e) Loss of marital life Rs.75,000 Rs.1,50,000

(f) Loss of future income Rs.75,000 Rs.2,55,000 G
(g) Future expenses ------------ Rs.1,00,000

(h) Interest @ 6% from the @ 9% from the
date of recording date of petition.
Evidence. H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that without any rational
basis the High Court has enhanced the compensation, while the Tribunal
under the Act had indicated cogent reasons for the award made by it. It is
pointed that the claimant was working as a Mason and he did not have
permanent job. His engagement depended on several factors, like availability
B of engagements. When it rains, and· in several other periods, normally a
Mason would not have work. That being the position the High Court was not
justified in taking Rs.15,000 as monthly income. T~e rate of interest justified
by the High Court is on the higher side. In any event the accident was an act
Of God and no compensation is payable.

C In response learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the High
Court has considered all the legal and factual factors and has rightly awarded
the amount, particularly when disability was I 00% and the claimant has
become a cripple. Strong reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in
Nagesha v. MS. Krishna and Anr., [1997) 8 SCC 349 to contend that the
quantum of compensation awarded was meet and the proper.
D
Rival stands need consideration.

The expression "act of God" signifies the operation of natural forces
free from human intervention, such as lightening, storm etc. It may include
such unexpected occurrences of nature as severe gale, snowstorms, hurricanes,
E cyclones, tidal waves and the like. But every unexpected wind and storm
does not operate as an excuse from liability, ifthere is a reasonable possibility
of anticipating their happening. An act of God provides no excuse unless it
is so unexpected that no reasonable human foresight could be presumed to
anticipate the occurrence, having regard to the conditions of time and place
F known to be prevailing at. For instance, where by experience of a number of
years, preventive action can be taken. Lord Westbury defined act of God
(damnum fatale in Scotch Laws) as an occurrence which no human foresight
can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize
the possibility. This appears to be the nearest approach to the true meaning
of act of God. Lord Blancaburgh spoke of it as "an irresistible and unsearchable
G providence nullifying are human effort".

The term 'compensation' as stated in the Oxford Dictionary, signifies
that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered. 'Damages' on the
other hand constitute the sum of money claimed or adjudged to be paid in
compensation for loss or injury sustained, the value estimated in money, of
H something lost or withheld. The term 'compensation' etymologically suggests
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC '" MAHADEVA SHETTY [PASAYA T, J.] 21

the image of balancing one thing against another; its primary signification is A
equivalence, and the secondary and more common meaning is something
given or obtained as an equivalent. Pecuniary damages are to be valued on
the basis of 'full compensation'. That concept was first stated by Lord
Blackborn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1980 AC 25).

The "Rule of Law" requires that the wrongs should not remain B
unredressed. All the individuals or persons committing wrongs should be
liable in an action for damages for breach of civil Jaw or for criminal
punishment. .'Compensation' means anything given to make things equivalent,
a thing given or to make amends for loss, recompense, remuneration or pay:
it need not, therefore, necessarily be in terms of money, because law may C
specify principles on which and manner in which compensation is to be
determined and given. Compensation is an act which a Court orders to be
done, or money which a Court orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or
omissions have caused loss or injury to another in order that thereby the
person damnified may receive equal value for his loss; or be made whole in
respect of his injury; something given or obtained as equivalent; rendering of D
equivalent in value or amount; an equivalent given for property taken or for
an injury done to another; a recompense in value; a recompense given for a
thing received; recompense for whole injury suffered; remuneration or
satisfaction. for injury or damage of every description. The expression
'compensation' is not ordinarily used as an equivalent to 'damages', although E
compensation may often have to be measured by the same rule as damages
in an action for a breach. The term 'compensation' as pointed out in the
Oxford Dictionary signifies that which is given in recompense, an equiva:.ent
rendered; 'damages' on the other hand constitute the sum of money, claimed
or adjudged to be paid in compensation for Joss or injury sustained.
'Compensation' is a return for a loss or damages sustained. Justice requires F
that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind.

It is true that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money cannot
renew a physique frame that has been battered and shattered, as stated by
Lord Merris in West v. Shepard, (1964) AC 326. Justice requires that it
. should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. Object of providing G
compensation is to place claimant as far as possible in the same position
financially as he was before accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death
basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependants of the
deceased which includes pecuniary Joss, expenses, etc. and loss to the estate.
Object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A due to sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded
should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor
deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring value of human
life and measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances
B of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor
it should be a source of profit of the person in whose favour it is awarded.
Upjohn L.J. in Charter House Credit v. Jolly (1963) 2 CB 683 remarked, 'the
assessment of damages has never been an exact science; it is essentially
practical'.

C The damages for vehicular accidents are in the nature of compensation
in money for loss of any kind caused to any person. In case of personal injury
the position is different from loss of property. In the later case there is
possibility of repair or restoration. But in the case of personal injury, the
possibility of repair or restoration is practically non-existent. In Parry v.
Cleaver, (1969) I All.E.R. 555 Lord Morris stated as follows:
D
"To compensate in money for pain ?.nd for physical consequences
is invariably difficult, but... .. no other process can be devised than that
of making monetary assessment."

The main principles of law on compensation for injuries were worked
E out in 19th Century, where railways accidents were becoming common and
all actions were tried by Jury. Though the cases have antiquated air it is still
useful to refer to them. The necessity that damages should be 'full' and
'adequate' was stressed by the Court by Queen's Bench in Fair v. London
and North-Western Railway Co., (1869) 21 LT 326). The word 'compensation'
is derived from Latin word "compensare" meaning "weigh together" or
F "balance". In Rushton v. National Coal Board, (1953) l All.E.R.. 314 it was
observed:

"Every member of this Court is anxious to do all he can do to
ensure that the damages are adequate for the injuries suffered, so far
as they can be compensated for an injury, and to help the parties and
G
others to arrive at a fair and just figure."

It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as
provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount
of compensation which to it appears to be 'just'. It has to be borne in mind
H that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. MAHADEVA SHETTY [PASAYA T, J.] 23

scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant A
to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance to the
injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning
capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A
person becomes entitled to damages for the mental and physical Joss, his or
her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life which
has been curtailed because of physical handicap. n .-~ n-.:.1mal expectation of B
life is impaired. But at the same time it has be to be borne in mind that the
compensation is not expected to be a wind fall for the victim. Statutory
provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be
a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The
Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify C
the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just"
compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to
all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages
cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend
upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special
features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation D
has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the
pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it
to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the detennination has
to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of
whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes E
equitability, fairness and· reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it
cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation, AIR (1998) SC 3191.

This Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR
(1995) SC 755 laying the principles posited: F
"Broadly speaking, while fixing the amount of compensation
payable to a victim of an accident the damages have to be assessed
separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary
damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which
are capable of being calculated in tenns of money; whereas non- G
pecuniary damages are those which are capable of being assessed by
arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary
damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical
attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii)
other material Joss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain
and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii)
damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may
include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant
may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the Joss of
expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of
B the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience,· hardship,
discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life."

Here also because of the accident the appellant had become paraplegic.
The principle has been re-agitated in by the Court in Ashwani Kumar Mishra
C v. P. Muniam Babu, [1999] ACJ 1105 SC.

A person not only suffers injuries on account of accident but also
suffers in mind and body on account of the accident throughout his life and
a feeling is developed that he is no more a normal man and cannot enjoy the
amenities of life as another normal person can. While fixing compensation
D for pain and suffering as also for loss of amenities of life the features like his
age, marital status and unusual deprivation he has un~ertaken in his life bas
to be reckoned.

Coming to the injuries, mental agony, pains and sufferings it is noted
that the claimant was hospitalized for about seven weeks. Therefore, the
E amount of Rs. 1,00,000 fixed by the High Court is unreasonable.

· So far as the loss of earning capacity is concerned, it is noted that thP.
Tribunal had calculated the income at Rs. 12,000 per annum, and the High
Court enhanced it to Rs.15,000. It referred to Schedule (JI) to the Act for
fixing national income and the multiple. Though multiple of 17 as fixed by
F the High Court seems to be in order, there is no rational for fixing annual
ir.come at Rs. 15,000. The Tribunal had taken into account the possibility of
non-engagement and the wages claimed. Same appears to be rational..
Therefore, the annual income is fixed at Rs. 12,000. Applying the multiple
of 17 the loss of future income is fixed at Rs. 2,04,000 instead of Rs.2,55,000
G as fixed by the Tribunal.

Coming to the loss of marital life and the non-possibility of marriage,
the Tribunal had indicated basis for fixing the quantum at Rs. 75,000. Without
any basis being indicated, the High Court fixed at Rs.1.5 lakhs by referring
to the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra). The special features of that case are
H non-existent in the case at hand. The injured in that case was an advocate
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. MAHADEVA SHETTY (PASA YAT, J.] 25

who was married. In the case at hand the claimant is a bachelor. Several other A
factors were considered in the earlier case to fix the quantum. Therefore, the
amount awarded by the Tribunal is restored. So far as future expenses for
medicines and wheelchair etc. are concerned, the Tribunal as noted above
had not awarded any compensation. But the High Court has fixed it at Rs. l
lakh. Though High Court has not indicated any basis of award lump sum, it
cannot be denied that the claimant is on the wheel chair and would need B
regular medical attention because of the continued complications. The cost of
expenses during hospitalization was small, because treatment was at
Government Hospital. The situation would not be different for future
treatments.

Above being the position, sum of Rs.50,000 would be adequate. The
c
other amounts awarded by the High Court, in our considered opinion, do not
call for any interference. Similar is the case for rate of interest awarded. The
total amount comes to Rs. 4,49,000, which is rounded to Rs. 4.50 lakhs.

So far as Nagesha's case (supra) relied upon by the claimant is D
concerned, it is only to be noted that the decision does not indicate the basis
for fixing of the quantum as a lump sum was fixed by the Court. The decision
ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court, while the principle
underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which
comes up for decision subsequently. Therefore, while applying the decision
to a later case, the Court dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the E
principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour
from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and
authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the
needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an authority. upon a
subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements F
which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and
are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty
as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a

,
similar direction must or ought to be made as measure of social justice.
Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual
expression carry no weight at all. Nor every passing expression of a Judge, G
however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the
weight of authority.

The claimant is entitled to Rs. 4.5 lakhs as compensation along with
interest@ 9% p.a. from the date of application for compensation till payment. H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Out of the aforesaid sum a sum of Rs.3.5 lakhs along with entire interest
payable shall be deposited in a fixed deposit for not less than five years in
a nationalized bank. The claimant will be entitled to draw interest on the
deposit, which shall be re-deposited for further terms of five years. In case
of urgent need it shall be open to the claimant to move Tribunal for release
B of any part of the amount in deposit. The Tribunal shall consider the request
for withdrawal and shall direct withdrawal in case of an urgent need and not
otherwise of such sum as would meet the need. It shall be.specifically indicated
to the Bank where the deposit is to be made that no advance or withdrawal
of any kind shall be permitted without the order of the Tribunal. It shall be
open to the claimant to approach the Tribunal for variance of the order
C relating to deposit in fixed deposit, if any other scheme would fetch better
returns and also would provide regular and permanent income. The amount
awarded along with interest shall be deposited within period of four weeks
from today after adjusting any amount already deposited. The deposits shall
be made with the Tribunal.

D The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated. Costs made easy.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.