THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICEversusK.S. SWAMINATHAN

               THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE                                A
                                            v.
                                K.S. SWAMINATHAN

                                  OCTOBER 4, 1996

                  [K. RAMASWAMY AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.]                              B

             Service Law :

            Departmental inquiry-Cliarge memo issued to delinquent--On an ap-
..   plication by delinquent, Tribunal setting aside the charge memo on the ground   C
     that the charges were vague-Held, Tnounal was totally unjustified in going
     into the charges at the inquiry stage and quashing the charge-memo-Inquiry
     Officer would conduct and complete the inquiry and the disciplinary authority
     would take action accordingly.

             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13229 of                 D
     1996.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.94 of the Tamil Nadu
     Administrative Tribunal, Madras in 0.A. No. 3590 of 1991.

             V. Krishnamurthy for the Appellant.                                     E
             T. Raja for .the Respondent.

             The following Order of the Court was delivered :

             Delay condoned.
                                                                                     F
             Leave granted.

           While the respondent was working as an Inspector of Police, District
     Special Branch in Coimbatore Rural District a special raid was conducted
     in the farm house of one Eswaramoorthy Gounder located within the limits
     of Avinashi Police Station on August 19,1991. The incriminating material G
     recovered from the farm house would indicate that he was making pay-
     ments to certain persons and one of the names disclosed from the in-
     criminating material was of the respondent. Consequently, a charge memo
     imputing misconduct on his part was issued to him. The respondent filed
     0.A. in the Administrative Tribunal challenging the validity of the charge H
                                         197
    198                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A   memo dated September 28, 1991. The Tribunal in the impugned order
    dated April 15, 1994 set aside the charge memo on the ground that the
    charges were vague. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

         It is settled law by catena of decisions of this Court that if the charge
  memo is totally vague and does not disclose any misconduct for which the
B charges have been framed, the Tribunal or the Court would not be justified
  at that stage to go into whether the charges are true and could be gone
  into, for it would be a matter on production of the evidence for considera-
  tion at the enquiry by the enquiry officer. At the stage of framing of the
  charge, the statement of facts and the charge sheet supplied are required
C to be looked into by the Court or the Tribunal as to the nature of the
  charges, i.e., whether the statement of facts and material in support thereof
  supplied to the delinquent officer would disclose the alleged misconduct.
  The Tribunal, therefore, was totally unjustified in going into the charges at
  that stage. It is not the case that the charge memo and the statement of
  facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer.
D Therefore, the Tribunal was totally wrong in quashing the charge memo.
  In similar circumstances, in respect of other persons involved in the same
  transactions, this Court in appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 19453-63 of
  1995 had on February 9, 1996 allowed the appeals, set aside the order
  passed by the Tribunal and remitted the matter holding that :
E
                "This is not the stage at which the truth or otherwise of the charges
                ought to be looked into. This is the uniform view taken by this
                Court in such matters."

          We respectfully agree with the above conclusion and set aside the
F   impugned order of the Tribunal. The enquiry officer is directed to conduct
    and complete the enquiry within period of eight months from the date of
    the receipt of the order and the disciplinary authority i5 directed to take
    action thereon within three months thereafter.

              The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstance, without
G
     costs.

     R.P.                                                           Appeal allowed.