THE COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.versusBRIJESH REDDY & ANR.

                   [2013] 1 S.C.R. 853


 THE COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT                      A
                AUTHORITY & ANR.
                        v.
            BRIJESH REDDY & ANR.
         (Civil Appeal No. 1051 of 2013)
                                                              B
                   FEBRUARY 08, 2013

[P. SATHASIVAM AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- s. 9 - Jurisdiction of civil
court - To adjudicate on the dispute contemplated under C
Land Acquisition Act - Land acquired by Development
Authority - Subsequently purchased from the original owner
- Suit by the purchaser for permanent injunction against the
Authority - Trial Court held that suit was not maintainable -
 High Court remanding the matter to trial court to adjudicate D
the suit on merits - On appeal, held: Civil court is devoid of
jurisdiction to give declaration or grant injunction on the
invalidity of the procedure contemplated under Land
Acquisition Act - The acquisition proceedings having been
completed before the land was purchased, the purchaser had E
no right to maintain the suit against the Authority- High Court
erred in remitting the matter, when the suit was not
maintainable - Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

     Certain land including the land in dispute was
acquired by appellant-Development Authority in 1960-70. F
The respondent No. 1 purchased the land in dispute from
its original owner in 1995. He filed civil suit against the
appellant-Authority for permanent injunction. The suit was
dismissed as not maintainable. First appeal was allowed
by High Court and the matter was remitted to the trial G
court with a direction to dispose of the same on merits.
    In appeal to this Court, the questions for
consideration were whether civil court had jurisdiction to
                         853                                  H
    854       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013) 1 S.C.R.


A entertain a suit when the Schedule lands were acquired
  under Land Acquisition proceedings and whether the
  High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the
  trial court without examining the question with regard to
  maintainability of the suit?
B
          Allowing the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1.1. Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of
  a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is
  either expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of
C civil court with regard to a particular matter can be said to
  be excluded if there is an express provision or by
  implication it can be inferred that the jurisdiction is taken
  away. An objection as to the exclusion of civil court's
  jurisdiction for availability of alternative forum should be
D taken before the trial court and at the earliest failing which
  the higher court may refuse to entertain the plea in the
  absence of proof of prejudice. [Para 8] [860-E-G-H; 861-A]

       State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar and Ors. (1995) 4
E SCC 229: 1995 (3) SCR 857; Laxmi Chand and Ors. vs.
  Gram Panchayat, Kararia and Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 218: 1995
  (4) Suppl. SCR 774; Commissioner, Bangalore Development
  Authority vs. K. S. Narayan (2006) 8 SCC 336: · 2006 (7)
   Suppl. SCR 186 - relied on.
F      1.2. The Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code in
  itself and is meant to serve public purpose. By necessary
  implication, the power of civil court to take cognizance
  of the case u/s. 9 CPC stands excluded and a civil court
  has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity
G or legality of the notification u/s. 4, declaration u/s. 6 and
  subsequent proceedings except by tha t-:igh Court in a
  proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus
  clear that the civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give
  declaration or even bare injunction being granted on the
H invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act.
      COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT                     855
            AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY
    The only right available for the aggrieved person is to A
    approach the High Court under Article 226 and this Court
    under Article 136 with self-imposed restrictions on their
    exercise of extraordinary power. [Para 13) [864-D-G]

          1.3. No doubt, in the instant case, the plaintiffs
                                                                8
    approached the civil court with a prayer only for
    permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2,
    i.e., the Development Authority, their agents, servants and
    any one claiming through them from interfering with the
    peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule
    property. It is true that there is no challenge to the C
    acquisition proceedings. However, in view of the
    assertion of the Development Authority, in their written
    statements, about the initiation of acquisition
    proceedings ending with the passing of award, handing
    over possession and subsequent action etc., the said D
    suit is not maintainable. [Para 14) [864-G-H; 865-A-B]
         2.1. The High Court committed an error in remanding
    the matter to the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs
    were not given opportunity to adduce evidence to show             E
    that their vendor was in possession which entitles them
    for grant of permanent injunction from evicting them from
    the scheduled property without due process of law by
    the defendants. In the light of the specific assertion
    coupled with materials in the written statement about the         F
    acquisition of land long ago and subsequent events, suit
    of any nature including bare injunction is not
    maintainable. [Para 14] [865-C-E]
         2.2. Having regard to the fact that the acquisition
    proceedings had been completed way back in 1960-70, G
    the plaintiffs who purchased the suit land in 1995 cannot
    have any right to maintain the suit of this nature
    particularly, against defendant Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the
    Development Authority. The High Court clearly erred in
    remanding the matter when the suit was not maintainable H
I
    856      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 1 S.C.R.


A on the face of it. The High Court failed to take note of the
  fact that even in the plaint itself, the respondents-plaintiffs
  have stated that the suit land was acquired and yet they
  purchased the suit land in 1995 and undoubtedly have
  to face the consequence. The possession vests with the
B Development Authority way back in 1969 and 1978 and
  all the details have been asserted in the written
  statements, hence the remittal order cannot be sustained.
  [Para 15] [865-F-H; 866-A]

                         Case Law Reference:
c
          1995 (3) SCR 857           Relied on         Para 9
          1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 774    Relied on         Para 10
          2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 186 Relied on            Para 11
D
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1051 of 2013.
      From the Judgment & Order dated 27.7.2005 of the High
E Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RF.A. No. 947 of 2003.

        Altaf Ahmed, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ankur S.
    Kulkarni for the Appellants.

     G.V. Chandrashekhar, N.K.                Verma,     Anjana
F Chandrashekar for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.

G     2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and final
  order dated 27.07.2005 passed by the High Court of
  Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 947 of 2003 whereby the
  High Court allowed the first appeal flied by the respondents
  herein and remitted the matter to the trial Court for fresh
H disposal.
  COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 857
AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

    3. Brief facts:                                                  A

     (a) On 28.09.1965, a notification was issued by the State
Government proposing to acquire several lands including the
suit land being Survey No. 23/10 of Ejipura measuring 22
guntas for formation of Koramangala Layout. The original B
khatedars, who were notified were one Papaiah, Thimaiah,
Patel Narayan Reddy, Smt. Rathnamma, Smt. Perumakka
(Defendant No.3 in the suit), Munivenkatappa and ·
Chickaabbaiah, the husband of 3rd defendant. After holding an
enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on c
07.09.1969. Thereafter, 10 guntas of land held by Smt.
Rathnamma was taken possession on 28.11.1969 and the
remaining 12 guntas held by defendant No.3 was taken
possession on 22.07.1978 and then handed over the entire land
to the Engineering Section. The layout was formed, sites were
                                                               0
allotted to the intending purchasers.

     (b) According to the respondents herein, they purchased
12 guntas of land under a registered sale deed dated
15.11.1995 from Perumakka-3rd defendant in the suit.
Originally the said land belonged to Chikkaabbaiah - husband E
of 3rd defendant. Chikkaabbaiah mortgaged the said property
to Patel Narayan Reddy on 26.02.1985. Thereafter, the said
property was re-conveyed in favour of Chikkaabbiah. After the
death of Chikkaabbiah, his wife Perumakka, (3rd defendant in .
the suit) was the absolute owner and in possession of the F
property.

      (c) When the Bangalore Development Authority (in short
"the BOA") tried to interfere with the possession of the suit
property, 3rd defendant in the suit filed O.S. No. 10445of1985       G
for injunction and obtained an order of temporary injunction on
15.06.1985 which was in force till 22.05.1994. Ultimately the
said suit was dismissed on the ground that before filing of the
suit, statutory notice had not been given to the BOA. l;hereafter,
another suit being O.S. No. 2069of1994 was filed by the third        H
    858       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A defendant on the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore and the
  same was dismissed as withdrawn on 14.06.1995 with liberty
  to file a fresh suit.

        (d) In the meantime, the respondents herein purchased the
B suit land from the third defendant under a registered sale deed
  on 15.11.1995. After the purchase of the land, the respondents
  were put in possession. When the BDA tried to interfere with
  the possession of the respondents herein, they filed a petition
  being W.P. No. 41497of1995 before the High Court, ultimately
c the said petition was dismissed as withdrawn by the
  respondents herein with a liberty to file a fresh suit.

       (e) Thereafter, the respondents herein filed a suit being
  O.S. No. 4267 of 1996 on the file of the Court of the XVI Addi.
  City Civil & Sessions Judge at Bangalore for permanent
D injunction. By order dated 18.06.2003, the trial Court dismissed
  the said suit as not maintainable.

        (f) Challenging the said order, the respondents herein filed
  first appeal being R.F.A. No.947 of 2003 before the High Court.
E By impugned order dated 27.07.2005, the High Court allowed
  the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court with a
  direction to dispose of the same after permitting the plaintiffs
  to adduce evidence·on merits.

F        (g) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellarts have
    preferred this appeal by way of special leave

      4. Heard Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel for the
  appellants and Mr. G.V. Chandrashekar, learned counsel for the
G respondents.

    Discussion:

        5. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether
  a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit when the schedule
H lands were acquired under the land acquisition proceedings
 COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 859
AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

and whether the High Court was justified in remanding the          A
matter to the trial Court without examining the question- with
regard to the maintainability of the suit?

     6. It is seen from the plaint averments in O.S. No. 4267 of
1996 that the plaintiffs purchased the suit schedule property      B
from the third defendant under a registered sale deed dated
15.11.1995 and since then they are in exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the same. Since other details are not
necessary for our purpose, there is no need to traverse the
entire plaint allegations.                                         c
       7. The third defendant, who filed a separate written
statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs, had asserted
that she did had the right, interest and title in the schedule
property and she possessed every right to transfer and alienate
                                                                   0
it in favour of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the BOA and its
officers/defendant Nos. 1 and 2, in their written statements, ·
specifically denied all the allegations made by the plaintiff.
According to the BOA, the suit schedule property which forms
part and parcel of Survey No. 23 of 2010 of Ejipura, totally
measuring 22 guntas was notified for acquisition for the E
formation of Koramangala Layout. In their statements, they
specifically pleaded that the notification cameJo be issued on
28.09.1965. The original khatedars who were notified were one
Papaiah, Thimaiah, Patel Narayan Reddy, Smt. Rathnamma,
Smt. Perumakka (0-3), Muni Venkatappa and Chickaabbaiah, F
the husband of 0-3. The Land Acquisition Officer, after
complying with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and
after holding enquiry passed an award. It is further stated that
10 guntas of land held by Smt. Rathnamma was taken
possession on 28.11.1969, remaining 12 guntas held by G
defendant No.3 was taken possession on 22.07.1978 and
thereafter, handed over the entire land to the Engineering
Section. It is also stated that as a follow-up action, the lay out
was formed, sites were allotted to the intending purchasers.
According to defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the entire land vested H
    860      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A with them and the so-called purchase now alleged by the
  plaintiff from Defendant No. 3 on 15.11.1995 is bad and in any
  event, not binding on the defendants. It is also stated that the
  persons who purchased the sites were issued possession
  certificates, khata was changed, khata certificates were issued,
B building licences were issued and there were constructions in
  the said site. Pursuant to the same, they had paid tax to the
  authority concerned. Accordingly, it is asserted that the plaintiff
  was not in possession on the date of filing of the suit. Before
  the trial Court, in order to substantiate the defence, the
C defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have produced copies of the Gazette
  Notification with respect to the acquisition of the said land. The
  award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer has also been
  produced and taken on record. The perusal of the discussion
  by the trial Court shows that the plaintiffs have not disputed the
o contents of those documents, even otherwise it cannot be
  disputed.

        8. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides
  jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting those that are
E expressly or impliedly barred which reads as under:

          "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.· The
          Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained)
          have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting
          suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or
F         impliedly barred.•

   From the above provision, it is clear that Courts have
   jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of
   which their cognizance-is-either expressly or impliedly barred.
G The jurisdiction of Civil Court with regard to a particular matter
   can be said to be excluded if there is an express provision or
 . by implication it can be inferred that the jurisdiction is taken
   away. An objection as to the exclusion of Civil Court's
   jurisdiction for availability of alternative forum should be taken
H before the trial Court and at the earliest failing which the higher
   COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 8"61
 AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
  court may refuse to entertain the plea in the absence of proof A
· of prejudice.

      9. In State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar and Others,
 (1995) 4 sec 229, the core question was whether a civil suit
 is maintainable and ad interim injunction could be issued where          B
 proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was taken
 pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and
 possession delivered to the beneficiary. On going through the
 entire proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, this
 Court held as under:                                                     c
      "3 ... , ... We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently
      advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil
      Court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of
      CPC stands excluded, and a civil Court has no jurisdiction
      to go into the question of validity or legality of the 0
      notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section
      6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article
      226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not
      maintainable ... "
                                                                          E
 After holding so, this Court set aside the finding of the trial Court
 that there is a prima facie triable issue. It also held that the order
 of injunction was without jurisdiction.

      10. In Laxmi Chand and Others vs. Gram Panchayat,                   F
 Kararia and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 218 while considering
 Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 vis-a-vis the Land
 Acquisition Act, 1894, this Court held as under:

      "2 .... It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code,
      1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits, G
      unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civil nature may
      either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure
      contemplated under the Act is a special procedure
      envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily
                                                                         H
    862       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013) 1 S.C.R.

A         acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The
          notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section
          6 of the Act are required to be published in the manner
          contemplated thereunder. The inference gives
          conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the
B         land mentioned therein. The award should be made under
          Section 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied
          claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under
          Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the
          Act. If the Government intends to withdraw from the
c         acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure
          contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to.
          If possession is taken, it stands vested under Section 16
          in the State with absolute title free from all encumbrances
          and the Government has no power to withdraw from
          acquisition.
D
          3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is
          complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil
          Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the
          Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The Civil
E         Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration
          on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the
          Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach
          the constitutional Courts, viz., the High Court and the
          Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles
F         226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restrictions on
          their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there
          is no power to the Civil Court."

       11. In Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
G vs. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 sec 336, which arose under the
  Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, was similar to the
  case on hand, this Court held that a civil suit is not maintainable
  to challenge the acquisition proceedings. In that case one K.S.
  Narayan filed Original Suit No. 5371 of 1989 in the Court of
H the City Civil Judge, Bangalore, praying that a decree for
   COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 863
 AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
  permanent injunction be passed against the defendant - A
  Bangalore Development Authority, their agents and servants
  restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs possession
  and enjoyment of the plaint scheduled property and from
  demolishing any structure situate thereon. The case of the
  plaintiff is that the plaintiff purchased the property in dispute B
  bearing No. 46, situated in Banasawadi village, K.R. Pura
  Hobli, Bangalore, South Taluk from S. Narayana Gowda by
  means of a registered sale deed dated 17 .06.1985. The
  erstwhile owners of the property had obtained conversion
   certificate from the Tahsildar and the property is situated in a c
   layout which is properly approved by obtaining conversion for
   non-agricultural use from the competent authority. The plaintiff
  applied for mutation entries and the same was. granted in his
  favour. The property in dispute was not covered by any
  acquisition proceedings as neither notice of acquisition had D
  been received nor any award regarding the said property had
  been passed. The defendant had no right, title or interest over
  the property but it was trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the
  same on the ground of alleged acquisition. The plaintiff issued
  a notice to the defendant on 11.07.1989 calling upon it not to
  interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the property in E
  dispute. The suit was contested by the defendant - Bangalore
  Development Authority on the ground inter alia that the plaintiff
  was not the owner of the property in dispute. S. Narayana
  Gowda, who is alleged to have executed the sale deed in
  favour of the plaintiff on 17.06.1985, had no right, title or interest F
  over the property in dispute and he could not have conveyed
  any title to the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that the disputed
  land had been acquired by the Bangalore Development
  Authority after issuing preliminary and final notifications in
  accordance with the Bangalore Development Authority Act and G
  the possession had also been taken over and thereafter it was
  handed over to the engineering section on 22.06.1988 after
· completion of all formalities. The award for the land acquired
  had already been made and the compensation amount had
  been deposited in the civil court under Sections 30 and 31(2) H
    864      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A of the Land Acquisition Act. It was specifically pleaded that it
  was the defendant - Bangalore Development Authority which
  was in possession of the plaint scheduled property on the date
  of filing of the suit and, therefore, the suit for injunction filed by
  the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable to be
B dismissed.

       12. ft is relevant to note that in the above decision, the
  acquisition proceedings in question had been taken under the
  Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 and the provisions
C of Sections 17 and 19 are somewhat similar to the provisions
  of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After
  noting out all the details, this Court allowed the appeals and
  set aside the decision rendered by the High Court.

D       13. ft is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete
  Code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. By
  necessary implication, the power of civil Court to take,
  ~ognizani::e of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands
  excluded and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the
E question of the validity or legality of the notification under
  Section 4, declaration under Section 6 and subsequent
  proceedings except by the High court in a proceeding under
  Article 226 of the Constitution. ft is thus clear that the civil Court
  is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration or even bare
F injunction being granted on the invalidity of the procedure
  contemplated under the Act. The only right available for the
  aggrieved person is to approach the High Court under Article
  226 and this Court under Article 136 with self imposed
  restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power.

G        14. No doubt, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs approached
    the civil Court with a prayer only for permanent injunction
    restraining the defendant Nos. 1 and 2,i.e., BDA, their agents,
    servants and any one claiming through them from interfering
    with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule
H
 COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 865
AUTHORITY v. BRIJESH REDDY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
property. It is true that there is no challenge to the acquisition A
proceedings. However, in view of the assertion of the BDA, in
their written statements, about the initiation of acquisition
proceedings ending with the passing of award, handing over
possession and subsequent action etc., the said suit is not
maintainable. This was rightly concluded by the trial Court. For B
proper compensation, the aggrieved parties are free to avail
the statutory provisions and approach the court concerned. All
these aspects have been clearly noted by the trial Court and
ultimately rightly dismissed the suit as not maintainable. On the
other hand, the learned Single Judge of the High Court though c
adverted to the principles laid down by this Court with reference
to acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act and
Section 9 of CPC committed an error in remanding the matter
to the trial Court on the ground that the plaintiffs were not given
opportunity to adduce evidence to show that their vendor was
                                                                    0
in possession which entitles them for grant of permanent
injunction from evicting them from the scheduled property
without due process of law by the defendants. In the light of the
specific assertion coupled with materials in the written statement
about the acquisition of land long ago and subsequent events,
suit of any nature including bare injunction is not maintainable, E
hence, we are of the view that the High Court is not right in
remitting the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal.

     15. Having regard to the fact that the acquisition
proceedings had been completed way back in 1960-70, the F
plaintiffs who purchased the suit land in 1995 cannot have any
right to maintain the suit of this nature particularly, against
defendant Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the BDA. The High Court
clearly erred in remanding the matter when the suit was not
maintainable on the face of it. The High Court failed to take note G
of the fact that evE;!n in the plaint itself, the respondents herein/
plaintiffs have stated that the suit land was acquired and yet
they purchased the suit land in 1995 and undoubtedly have to
face the consequence. The possession vests with the BDA way
back in 1969 and 1978 and all the details have been asserted H
   866       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A in the written statements, hence the remittal order cannot be
  sustained.

       16. In the light of the above discussion, the impugned
  judgment dated 27.07.2005 passed by the High Court in RF.A
8 No. 947 of 2003 remitting the matter to the trial Court is set
  aside and the judgment dated 18.06.2003 of the trial Court in
  O.S. No. 4267 of 1996 is restored.

         17. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

C K.K.T.                                         Appeal allowed.