Holding

The power of a Cantonment Board to levy tax under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act is subject to the ceiling prescribed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, and any tax exceeding that limit is invalid.

Summary

The respondent, a brick‑kiln owner, challenged a notification by the Mathura Cantonment Board that raised the tax on bricks from 0.19p to 0.75p per thousand, arguing that the Board derived no benefit and that the tax violated Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and the ceiling on taxes fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The High Court held that the constitutional ceiling applied to the Board and declared the notification invalid. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Board’s taxing power, which is linked to municipal taxation provisions, is subject to the same constitutional limit. It held that Section 60 ties the Board’s authority to the tax laws applicable to municipalities in the state, thereby subjecting it to the Article 276(2) ceiling. Consequently, the Board could not levy a tax exceeding the constitutional limit, and the impugned notification was invalid. The Court dismissed the Board’s appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the ceiling on taxes imposed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution applies to a tax levied by a Cantonment Board under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924.

Legislation cited

Cantonments Act, 1924s. 60
Constitution of Indias. 276(1), s. 276(2)
Government of India Act, 1935s. 142-A

Subjects

Cantonment BoardTaxationArticle 276Ceiling limitSection 60Constitutional lawU.P. Municipalities ActBrick kiln

Judgment

Q

THECANTONMENTBOARD,MATHURA A
v.
KRISHNA BRICKS AND LIME FACTORY

SEPTEMBER 12, 1996

[N.P. SINGH AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] B

Cantonments Act, 1924: Section 60.

Imposition of Tax-By cantonment Board-On trades and call-
ings-Rate of tax-Held : must be within the ceiling limit fixed by Art.
276(2)-S. 60 linked Board's power to impose tax with that of any
c
Municipality in the State where Cantonment was situated-Since power of
municipality was subject to ceiling fixed by Art. 276(2), Board's power was
also subject to such ceilin~Hence, Board did not have unlimited taxing
power-U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, S. 128(1)(ii}-Constitution of India,
1950, Art. 276(2). D

The respondent was the owner of a brick kiln and was carrying on
the business of manufacturing and selling of bricks. A suit was filed by the
respondent for restraining the appellant~Board from realising tax at the
rate of 0.75p per thousand bricks by raising it from 0.19p per thousand E
bricks. It was contended by respondent that it neither derived any ad-
vantage from the Board nor any service was provided by the Board to it.
As such, the realisation of the tax at the aforesaid rate was in contraven-
tion and in violation of Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 read with
Section 128(1)(ii) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The suit was dis-
missed and the judgment was affirmed in first appeal. However, in second F
appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that the ceiling and restric-
tion imposed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, as applicable to the
State, any municipal, district board, local board or other local authority
within such State in respect of imposition of taxes on professions, trades
and callings, was applicable even on the Board which had been established G
under the aforesaid Cantonments Act. On that finding the notification
raising the rate of tax was declared to be invalid being hit by Article 276(2)
of the Constitution. Being aggrieved the appellant-Board preferred the
present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court H
135
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP.6S.C.R.

A HELD : 1.1. Article 276 of the Constitution within a prescribed limit,
enables the legislature of the State to make law for imposition of taxes on
income for the benefit of the State or municipality, district board, local
board to other local authority from professions, trades, callings saying that
such law shall not be invalid on the ground_ that it relates to a tax on income.
In view of Article 276, no law of legislature of a State relating to imposition
B of taxes for the benefit of the State or of a municipality, district board, local
board, or other local authority therein in respect of professions', trades,
callings shall be valid, if it provides the total amount payable in respect of
any one person to the State, exceeding the limit fixed by Article 276tl) of
the Constitution. [144-C]
c
1.2. In the instant case the impugned notification imposing enhanced
tax of 0.75p per thousand bricks on brick-kiln owners was issued by the
Cantonment Board under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. As such
the said notification shall not be deemed to have been issued in exercise of
power under a law enacted by the legislature of the State for the objects
D mentioned in Article 276. Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, prescribes two
conditions for imposition of tax by the Board. Firstly, that there must be a
previous sanction of the Central Government and secondly that only such
tax can be imposed within any cantonment which under any enactment for
the time being in force may be imposed in any municipality in the State
E wherein such cantonment is situated. The framers of the Cantonment Act
did not desire to delegate and authorise the Board to impose any tax.
{144-E-G]
1.3. In exer~ise of power under Section 128(1) (ii) of the U.P.
Municipalities Act, 1916, the Municipal Board of any municipality within
F the State could impose a tax on trades and callings carried on within the
municipal limits. Therefore, any Board within the State can also impose
such tax within the cantonment area because of Section 60 of Cantonments
Act. When Section 60 links the power to impose tax with any enactment
for the time being in force in respect of any municipality in the State where
the cantonment is situated, then it shall be deemed that it has also
G prescribed the limit of the ceiling of such tax with reference to the said
enactment in force in respect of any municipality in that State. The Board
cannot have unlimited power without any ceiling to tax on professions,
trades or callings being carried on within the cantonment area. If it is held
otherwise, it will lead to an anomalous position, so far the nature of tax is
H concerned, because of Section 60 the power of the Board is circumscribed
CANI'ONMENTBOARD v.KRISHNABRICKSANDUMEFACTORY(N.P.SJNGH,J.J 137

with reference to any enactment for the time being in force in respect of A
municipality in that State whereas the rate of such tax which is more vital,
has been left to the discretion of the Board. But the Board cannot excercise
unlimited taxing power under Section 60 on the plea that any such tax
including the rate thereof had to be first sanctioned by the Central Govern-
ment. [145-F; H]
B
Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon, AIR
(1966) SC 249 and Mahapalika of the City of Agra v. The Agra Brick Kiln
Owners Association and Anr., [1976) 3 SCC 42, relied on.

Madan Lal v. Cantonment Board, Mathura, (1978) All W 1147; Narain C
and Anr. v. Cantonment Board, Nasirabad, AIR (1963) Raj 190 and Hiralal
& Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., (1977,) Tax L.R. 2051, approved.

Mis. Punjab Lime and Lime-Stone Co., Dehradzm v. Cantonment
Board, Delzaradun & Anr., AIR (1967) All 15, overruled.
D
Poona City Municipal C01poration Case, AIR (1965) SC 555, cited.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 799-802
of 1981.

From the J udginent and Order dated 20.10. 78 of the Allahabad High E
Court in S.A. Nos. 347-350 of 1978.

K.N. Shukla, Ms. Binu Tamta and C.V. Subba for the the Appellant.

M.P. Shorawala for the Respondent.
;
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:

N.P. SINGH, J. These appeals have been filed on behalf of the
cantonment Board, Mathura (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') for
setting aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, declaring notifica- G
tion dated 22.11.1958, by which tax at the rate of 0. 75 p. per thousand bricks
had been fixed by the Board within the cantonment area as invalid.

The respondent is the owner of a brick kiln and was carrying on the
business of manufacturing and selling of bricks. A suit was filed on behalf
of the said respondent for restraining the appellant-Board from realising H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A tax form the said respondent at the rate of 0.75 per thousand of bricks. It
was alleged that previously the Board was realising the tax from the
manufacturers of bricks at the rate of 0.19 per thousand. But by impugned
notification, it raised the rate of the tax at 0.75 per thousand of bricks. It
was alleged and asserted that the respondent as the manufacturer of bricks
was neither &riving any advantage from the Board nor any service was
B being provided by the Board. As such, the realisation of the tax at the
aforesaid rate was in contravention and in violation of Section 60 of the
Cantonments Act, 1924 read with Section 128(1)(ii) of the U.P.
Municipalities Act, 1916. The suit filed on behalf of the respondent was
dismissed by the Trial Court. That judgment was affirmed by the Court of
c Appeal. However, on second appeal being filed on behalf of the said
respondent, the High Court came to the conclusion that the ceiling and
restriction imposed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, as applicable to
the State, any municipal, district board, local board or other local authority
within such state in respect of imposition of taxes on professions, trades
and callings, was applicable even on the Board which had been established
D
under the aforesaid Cantonments Act. On that finding the notification was
declared to be invalid being hit by Article 276(2) of the Constitution.

Section 3 of the Cantonments Act provides that the Central Govern-
ment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any place or
E places in which any part of the Forces is quartered or which, being in the
vicinity of any such place or places, is or are required for the service of
such forces to be a cantonment for the purposes of the said Act and may
by a like notification, declare that any cantonment shall cease to be a
cantonment. In view of sub-section (4) of Section 3 Central Government
F may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any place declared
a cantonment under sub-section (1) the provisions of any enactment relat-
ing to local self-Government other than this Act shall have effect only to
such extent or subject to such modifications, or that any authority con-
stituted under any such enactment shall exercise authority only to such
extent, as may be specified in the notification. Section 6 provides that when
G by a notification under Section 3, any cantonment ceases to be a canton-
ment, the local area comprised therein shall immediately be placed under
the control of a local authority, the balance of the cantonment fund and
other property vesting in the Board shall also vest in such local authority,
and the liabilities of the Board shall be transferred to such local authority.
H Similarly, Section 7 and 8 make provisions in respect of cantonment fund
CANTONMENT BOARD v. KRISHNA BRICKS AND LlME FACTORY [N.P. SINGH, J.) 139

and its property which is placed under the control of some other local A
authority, in view of the notification under Section 4, because of which any
local area forming part of cantonment ceases to be under the control of a
particular Board. Section 60 of the Cantonments Act provides :

General Power of taxation -
B
(1) The Boardkay, with the previous sanction of the Central
Government, impose in any cantonment any tax which under any
enactment for the time being in force, may be impose in any
municipality in the State wherein such cantonment is situated :

(2) Any taximposed under this section shall take effect from the C
date of its notification in the Official Gazette or where any later
date is specified in this behalf in the notification, from such later
date.

Because of aforesaid Section 60 the Board may with previous sanction of D
the Central Government impose in any cantonment, any tax 'which under
any enactment for the time being in force, may be imposed in any
municipality in the State where such cantonment is situated'. For imposing
any tax in exercise of the power under Section 60, two conditions have to
be fulfilled and complied with (1) there must be a previous sanction of the
Central Government to impose such tax and (ii) the tax to be imposed must E
be such which under any enactment for the time being in force may be
imposed in any municipality in the State wherein such cantonment is
situated.
\ So far the municipality within any State is concerned, its power to
F
impose a tax in respect of professions, trades or callings is governed and
controlled by Article 276 of the Constitution, which says :

"Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments -

(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 246, no law of the Legisla- G
ture of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or of a
municipality, district board, local board or other local authority
therein in respect of professions, trades, callings or employments
shall be invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.

(2) The total amount payable in respect of any one person to the H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or
other local authority in the State by way of taxes on professions,
trades, callings and employments shalt not exceed two thousand
and five hundred rupees per annum.

(3) The power of the Legislature of a State to make laws as
B aforesaid with respect to taxes on p;ofessiens, trades, callings and
employritents shall not be construed as limiting in any way the
power of Parliament to make laws with respect to taxes on income
accruing from or arising out of professions, trades, callings and
employments."
c
There is a non-obstante clause in Article 276(1) of the Constitution saying
that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 246 no Jaw made by the
legislature of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or of a
municipality, district board, local board, or other local authority therein in
D respect of professions, tradings, callings or employments shall be invalid
on the ground that it relates to a tax on income. Having said so a ceiling
on the amount of tax has been imposed by Article 276(2), which was Rs.
250 earlier and has been raised to Rs. 2,500 by the Constitution (Sixtieth
Amendment) Act, 1988 with effect from 20.12.1988. In the case of Bharat
Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon, AIR 1966 SC I
E 249 = [1965) 3 SCR 499 a Constitution Bench in its majority judgment I

said:
a
"Before we deal with these cases it is necessary to point out the
rational upon which S. 142-A of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 was
F enacted and on which Art. 276 of the Constitution now rests. It is
that the legislative spheres of the Provinces and the Centre came
to be clearly demarcated in regard to items falling within Lists I
and II of Schedule VII of the Govt. of India Act and now to those
falling within the same lists of Schedule VII of the Constitution.
Taxes on professions, trades callings and employments are taxes on
G income and are thus outside the provincial and now State - lists and
belong exclusively to Parliament and before that to the Central
Legislature. Yet under a large number of laws enacted before the
Govt. of India Act, 1935 came into force, power was conferred on
local Governments and local authorities to impose taxes on such
H activities. This was obviously in conflict with S. 100 of the Govt. of
CANTONMENT BOARD v. KRISHNA BRICKS AND LlMEFACIORY [N.P.SINGH,J.) 141

India Act. When this was realised S. 142-A was enacted by the A.
British Parliament which saved the power conferred by pre- exist-
ing laws but limited the amount payable to Rs. 50 after 31st March,
1939. A saving was made, however, of pre-existing laws subject to
certain conditions with which we are not concerned. The provisions
of this section have been substantially reproduced in Article 276 B
of the Constitution with the modification that the upper limit of
- such tax payable per annum would be Rs. 250 instead of Rs. 50.
A tax can be recovered only if it is 'payable' and it would be payable
only after it is assessed. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the
ban placed by the aforesaid provisions extends only to recoveries
and not to an earlier stage. C

(emphasis supplied)

D
We may further observe that where there is an express prohibi-
tion in a statute against a local authority from imposing a tax, as
for instance, the recovery in the Statute construed by this Court in
the Poona City Municipal Corporation case, C.A. No. 582 of 1961,
date 5.5.1964: (AIR 1965 SC 555) (supra) or where a prohibition
can be implied - whether it be with regard to an item of taxation E
or with regard to the rate of tax or the quantum of tax payable by
an individual assessee - the action of a local authority or of any of
its instrumentalities in transgressing that prohibition must be
regarded as being in excess of its jurisdiction. Here there is a
prohibition in S. 142-A of the Government of India Act and now F
in Art. 276 of the Constitution, which precludes a State Legislature
from making a law enabling a local authority to impose a tax on
"professions, trades, callings and employments" in excess of Rs. 250
per annum. These provisions have to be read in the A~t or to be
deemed by implication to be there as the Constitution is the G
paramount law to which all other laws are subject as was the
Government of India Act, 1935 before January 26, 1950. If, there-
fore, after the date specified. in S. 142-A of the Government of
India Act or after the commencement of the Constitution a local
authority or any of its instrumentalities imposed or imposes a tax
which is in excess of the permissible amount, it would be exceeding H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A its jurisdiction and a provision like S. 84(3) of the Act will not bar
the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain a suit instituted by a
person from whom it is collected for the repayment of the money
recovered from him in excess of the permissible amount.. ........ Here
since the Assessing Officer had no authority to levy a tax beyond
what S. 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 permitted or
B
what Art. 276 permits his proceedings are void in so fa~ as they
purport to levy a tax in excess of the permissible amount and
authorise its collection and the assessment order is no answer to
the suit for the recovery of the excess amount. To this .::xtent, even
the order of assessment cannot obtain the protection of S. 84(3)
c of the Act and, therefore, the appellant's suit is maintainable."

Again in the case of Malzapalika of the city of Agra v. The Agra Brick
Kiln Owners Association and Anotl!CI; (1976) 3 SCC 42, the scope of Article
276(2) was considered by this Court in connection with the aforesaid U.P.
Municipalities Act, 1916. The State Government issued a notification in the
D year 1947 imposing a tax under Section 128(1)(ii) of the said Act, at the
rate of 14 annas per thousand bricks. Brick kiln owners who were effected
by the said notification filed a suit for declaration that the tax was void as
such could not be realised in view of Section 142-A of the Government of
India Act, 1935 and Article 276 of the Constitution. This Court said :
E
"The Government of India Act, 1935, certainly set a maximum
on t~e tax on trades and callings and we agree that the High Court
was right in holding that the Municipal Board's light to levy tax
under the notification Ex. H could be valid up to Rs. 50 per year
and, to the extent it went beyond that limit, was void. So, we affirm
F the High Court' holding for the period upto January 26, 1960 that
no sum higher than Rs. 50 as set out in the Government of India
Act, 1935 can be exacted under Section 128 of Act II of 1916.

From the Raj to the Republic was a big break in constitutional
law, but there was some continuity maintained. A certain ceiling
G
on taxes on professions. trades, callings and employments had been
set by Article 276 of one Constitution of India, but this maximum
was not Rs. 50 as in the Government of India Act, 1935 but Rs.
250.

H
CANTONMENTBOARD v.KRISHNABRICKSANDLIMEFACIDRY[N.P.SINGH,J.) 143

Inevitably it follows that during the post- constitution period noth- A
ing by way of taxes on trades or callings above the limit so set is
recoverable and hence the maximum levy form each person under
the notification issued under Act II of 1916 rises to Rs. 250.

B
This does not mean that anything beyond Rs. 250 (the tax freeze
under Article 276(2) can be levied. No. The constitutional maxi-
mum prevails as it covers all taxes on trade or calling even today.
Therefore, until Parliament makes any other law, as contemplated
in the proviso to Section 172 of the Adhiniyam, the maximum of C
Rs. 250 binds. We have to read down the notification Exhibit H
for the post-Constitution period, i~ tune and conformity with the
Constitution and uphold its validity to the extent of constitutional
permissibility."

In the case of Mahapalika of Agra v. Agra blick Kiln Owners Association D
(supra) the validity of a notification issued under Section 128(1)(ii) of the
U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 in respect of Agra Municipal Board imposing
a tax on brick manufacturers at the rate of 14 annas per thousand bricks
was considered by this Court and it was held that any such notification
must conform and fulfil the requirement of the ceiling fixed by Article E
276(2) of the Constitution.

In view of Article 276, it has to be held that no law of legislature of
a State relating to imposition of taxes for the benefit of the State _or of a
municipality, district board, local board, or other local authority therein in
respect of professions, trades, callings shall be valid, if it provides the total F
amount payable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one
municipality, district board, local board, or other local authority in the
State, exceeding the limit fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution.

Now the question which is to be answered is whether the ceiling
prescribed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution shall also be applicable to G
Board which has been established under the Cantonments Act. It need not
be pointed out ~hat the Board has been established under Cantonments
Act which is a Central Act. So far Article 276 is concerned, it relates to
the power of the legislature of a State to make law for the benefit of the
State or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A authority in respect of taxes on professions, trades, callings saying that it
shall not be invalid on the ground that it relates to tax. on income. But at
the same time, by Article 276(2) a ceiling has been fixed in respect of the
amount payable to the State, or anyone municipality, district board, local
board or other local authority in the State. This was necessary because the
power to tax on income has been provided under Entry No. 82 of List I in
B the Seventh Schedule and only Parliament can ena;;t a law in respect
thereof. The State legislature cannot make a law in respect of taxes on the
income of individuals within the State. It can be said that Article 276 of
the Constitution within a prescribed limit, enables the legislature of a State
to make law for imposition of taxes on income for the benefit of the State
c or municipality, district board, local board or other local authority from
professions, trades, callings saying that such law shall not be invalid on the
ground that it relates to a tax on income.

So far the Board is concerned which has been established under the
Cantonments Act, has issued the impugned notification in exercise of the
D power under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act. As such the said notifica-
tion shall not be deemed to have been issued exercise of power under a
law enacted by the legislature of the_ State for the objects mentioned in
Article 276. To that extent, we are not in agreement with the opinion
expressed by the learned Judge of the High Court. Whether the provisions
E of Article 276 shall be applicable has to be examined by construing the
scope of Section 60 of the Cantonments Act. Section 60 of the Canton-
ments Act, prescribes two conditions for imposition of tax. by the Board.
Firstly, that there must be a previous sanction of the Central Government
and secondly .that only such tax can be imposed within any cantonment
which under any enactment for the time being in force may be imposed in
F
any municipality in the State wherein such cantonment is situated. The
framers of the Cantonment Act did not desire to delegate and authorise
the Board to impose any tax. The power of the Board to impose a tax was
circumscribed by prescribing a limitation that the Board may impose in the
cantonment any tax which under any enactment for the time being in force,
G may be imposed in any municipality in the State wherein such cantonment
is situated. ·

Section 128(1)(ii) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 provides :

H "A tax on trades and callings carried on within the municipal limits

..
CA!fi;ONMENTBOARD v. KRISHNABRICKSANDUMEFACTORY(N.P.SINGH,J.] 145

and deriving special advantages from, or imposing special burdens A
o~, municipal services."
J• I '

., . of power
In exercise . .
under Section 128(1)(ii), the Municipal Board. . .
of
. any
municipality within the State of Uttar Pradesh could impose a tax on trades
and callings carried on with~n the municipal limits. Therefore, any .Board
.-~i4~~ .the ·state oJ U.P. can also impose such tax within t~r cantonment
B
area because of Section 60 of the Cantonments Act. In view . ( of- the clear
~ : ..

.and unambiguous provision of Section 60, the learned counsel appearing
. ·fQr the·<\P.pellant-Board did not contest this position. But according to him,
it does not mean, that Board is also bound by the rates of the taxes so
. imposed by the municipality or the local board within that State. It can c
prescribed its own rates of taxes on the trades and callings. According to
us, it is difficult to accept this contention. If the framers of the Constitution
did not give this liberty and latit)..lde to the legislature of a State in respect
of' taxes on professions, trades or callings for benefit of the State or
municipality, district board, local board· or other authority under Article
.D
276 of the Constitution, how an unlimited power so far the rate of tax is
concerned, can be conceded in favour of the Board which is a creature and
· · authority established under the Cantonments Act? When Section 60 links
the power to impose tax with any enactment for the time being in force in
respect of any municipality in the State where the cantonment is situated,
then it shall be deemed that it has also prescribed the limit of the ceiling E
' of suth tax with reference to the said enactment in force in fosp~ct of any
municipality in that State. If it is held otherwise, it will lead to an anomalous
position; so far the nature of tax is concerned, because of Section 60 the
powbr of the Board· is· circumscribed with reference to any enactment for
the 'tin\e being in force in respect of municipality in that State whereas so
F
faf ihe 'rate of such tax which is more vital, has been left t~ 'the discFetion
1

of the Board.
• j j ~ , I( • I ~

. ,, On .b~halLof: the appellant-Board .it was p,pinted out that the Board
,,. c(!.nnQl1 ~~ercise.,arbitrary power. under Section _60 because any such tax
-,_;including the rate th,ereof, has to be_first sanctioned by the._ Central Govern- G
,. ,rnent, According .~o us, because of Article 279 .if ~he State legislature cannot
~ hta?(, on, pr9fes.sipps trades or cal~ings for the benefit of the State,
.. municipality, district boan,l, local board or other local authority, beyond
1,Jhe limit,prei;;cribed by Article 276(2) as it amounts to tax on income, then
>lhow,it.can be,,held that the Board 1hii$,Unli!llited power without any ceiling 1 H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A to tax on professions, trades or callings being carried on within the canton-
ment area? When Section 60 provides that Board may with Previous ·
sanction of the Central Government impose in any cantonment any tax
which under any enactment for the time being in force may be imposed in
any municipality in the State wherein such cantonment is situated, such
restriction shall not be only in respect of the nature of the tax, but also in
B respect of the ceiling on rates prescribed under the enactment, relating to
the municipality.

On behalf of the appellant, reference was made to the judgment of
Allahabad High Court in the case of Mis. Punjab Lime and Lime-stone Co.,
c Dehradun v. Cantonment Board, Dehradun and Anotlw; AIR (1967) Al-
lahabad 15. A learned Judge in connection with Section 60 of the Canton-
ments Act said :

"Section 60 of the Cantonments Act nowhere says that Canton-
ment Boards can levy taxes which can be levied by municipalities ·
D subject to the same limitatioris. It simply provides that the taxes
which are realisable by Municipal Boards are also realisable by
Cantonment Boards. This does not mean that the limitations on
the powers of Municipal Boards to levy thdr taxes must also be
applied to taxes levied by Cantonment Boards."
E A contrary view was expressed in the case of Madan Lal v. Canton-
ment Board, Mathura, (1978) All L.J. 1147 by a learned Judge of the same
High Court saying that Cantonment Board while imposing a tax on per
thousand of bricks must fix the maximum limit which does not contravene
the provisions of Article 276 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of
F Rajasthan High Court in the case of Narain and Another v. Cantonment
Board, Nasirabad, AIR (1963) Rajasthan 190 said :

"Considering section 60 of the Act, we may point out that the
legislature empowering the respondent to levy and collect taxes
used the word "impose only and evidently, therefore, the terms
G should be taken lo have been used in a wider sense. Besides the
object and purport underlying section 60 appears to be that the
taxes to be imposed by the respondent (Cantonment Board) should
be consistent with and should conform to the State laws relating
to imposition of taxes by the local authorities. Section 60 further
H does not refer to State laws in force at a particular point of time
CMTONMENTBOARD v.KRISHNABRICKSANDLIMEFACIDRY(N.P.SINGH,J.) 147

but the State laws gen~ally as might be from time to time have A
been referred to. It will be hardly in keeping with the object and
policy underlying section 60 that the respondent should be per-
mitted to continue taxes in contravention of State laws. The term
"impose" should, therefore, be taken to have been used in wider
sense in sectiQn 60 and that being so, the respondent cannot collect
taxes in contravention of State laws."
B
In the case of Hira Lal and Another v. Union of India and Another, (1972)
Tax L.R. 2051, the Himachal Pradesh High Court has also come to the
conclusion that under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, while imposing
a profession tax, Article 276(2) of the Constitution cannot be violated.

Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed. There shall be no C
order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.

,