Holding

The appellant, as an occupant under the Jagirs Abolition Act, is entitled to the forest trees because the 1936 survey settlement is deemed a valid settlement under the Land Revenue Code, thereby conceding the right to the trees to the occupant.

Summary

The petitioners, former proprietary jagirdars of Idar State, claimed that after the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953 they became occupants of their lands and were therefore entitled to the forest trees standing there. The High Court had held that, because no survey settlement under the Bombay Land Revenue Code was proved, the petitioners could not rely on Section 40 of that Code to claim the trees. The Supreme Court examined whether the 1936 survey settlement carried out by the princely state, later accepted by the State Government, amounted to a valid settlement under the Code, and whether Section 5(1)(b) of the Jagirs Abolition Act conferred the right to the trees on the occupant. It held that the 1936 settlement is deemed valid under Section 216(2) of the Land Revenue Code, that the petitioners became occupants of unalienated land together with the trees, and that the State had no authority to interfere with their use of the trees. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and allowed the writ petitions.

Issues considered

Whether a survey settlement carried out in 1936 under the former princely state, and later accepted by the State Government, is deemed a valid settlement under the Bombay Land Revenue Code.
Whether, under Section 5(1)(b) of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, an occupant of a former proprietary jagir acquires the right to cut and remove forest trees standing on the land.
Whether Section 40 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, read with Section 216(2), confers the right to trees to the occupant in the present facts.
Whether the High Court erred in interpreting the interplay between the Jagirs Abolition Act, the Land Revenue Code and the Indian Forest Act.

Legislation cited

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879s. 107, s. 112, s. 117R, s. 216(2), s. 3(16), s. 3(4), s. 40
Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953s. 5(1)(b), s. 8, s. 9
Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act
Gujarat Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1972
Indian Forest Act, 1927s. 34A
Merged State Lands Act, Bombay Act 6 of 1950

Subjects

Jagir abolitionsurvey settlementoccupant rightsforest treesland revenue codeprivate forestunalienated landIndian Forest Actsection 40section 5(1)(b)

Judgment

290

A TIIAKORESHRI NAHARSINGHJI DOLATSINGIUI & 2 ORS.
v.
•
y
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
August 17, 1979
B [N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J
Bo1nbay Merged Territories & Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953-
Section 5(1)(b)-Scope of

The lands in dispute, ·which were part of a former Princely State, were
unalienated lands so long as the land revenue in respect of then1 was collected
by the Princely State. They became alienated lands \.Vhcn the Princely State
c gra11ted proprietary jagir to the jagirdars. The jagirdars made settlement of the
lands in dispute with the appellants iQ 1949.

In the year 1936 survey settlement was made in the State and the land
revenue payable by the jagirdars was assessed. When the State territory Vias
merged \Vith tile province of Bombay the Land Revenue Code wa-s made applic·
able to the lands in dispute.
D
In 1953 Jagirs were abolished by the Bombay Jv1erged Territories and Areas
(Jagir Abolition) Act, 1953. A proprietary jagir, as dofined by this Act, is a
jagir in respect of which the jagirdar was entitled to any right or interest in the
soil. Section 5(l)(b) of the Act made the j&girdar primarily liable to the
State Government for the payment of land revenue due in respect of such
land as an occupant under the Land Revenue· C'ode "or any other la\.V for the
time being in force. The term "occupant" is defined in the Code to mean "a
holder in actual possession of unalienated land other than a< tenant". As a
result of these two provisions the appellant, having been in actual posst.-ssion of
unalienated land, became "occupant", (that is to say, holder in actu<:-1 possession
of the land under the State).
After the land was settled by the ffiagirdar upon the appellant, new survey
F numbers were given to the lands in place of the old. \Vith the con1ing inlo
force of the Jagirs Abolition Act the a·ppeliant claimed that he b~carne an
"occupant" of the land together with the forest trees standing thereon. Before
the year 1965, he was allowed to cut and remove the forest trees in his lanJ;
but after the decision of this Court in U. R. Mavinkurve v. Tlzakor Madhav~
singhji Gan1b'1irsi11gh & Ors. [1965} 3 SCR 177 the authorities concerned took
the stand that the forest trees had vested in the State and that the appemant \VaB
G not entitled to cut or remove them.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. Purporting to folloy,•
the decision of this Court in Mavinkurve the High Court held that there being
no surYey settlen1ent of any of the lands, the forn1er Jagirdars or their settlees
did not acquire any right or interest in the forest trees. The High Court also
took the view that under s. 5(l)(b) of the Jagirs Abolition Act a person
who became an occupant of the land was entitled to all the rights and liable
II to all the obligations in respect of such land under the Land Revenue Code
and since there ¥.'as no settlement, the appellant could not fall back upon
any provision of the Land Revenue Code for claiming a right in the trees.
NAHARSJNGHJJ v. GUJARAT (Untwalia, J.) 291

In appeal to this Court it was contended that if a survey settlement Was A
f carried out by son1e authority, though not under the provisions of the _Land
Revenue Code and was. accepted a.nd acted upon by the State Government,
• it became a survey settlement under the Code itself. No reservation of any
trees having been made at the survey settleme!nt or a{ any ti1ne thereafter the
tre'es belonged to the former jagirdars or their settlees.

' AJlowing the appeals,

HELD: (a) The appellant became occupant of the land in question together
B

with the forest trees standing thereon and the governrnental authorities had no
right to interfere \vith the appella<11ts dealing with the. forest trees, at any rate,
before the passing of the Gujarat Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1972.
[299FJ

(b) The High Court has taken too· narrow a vie¥/ of the procedure for c
survey settlement. In the writ petitions there was not only a specific aYerment
that there \\'as a survey settlement but documents had been filed to shov.· that
there was a survey settlement in the State in 1936. There being no reservation
of the trees in favour of the State the occupant became entitled to the san1e
on the abolition of the jagirs. [296C-D]

(c) By legal fiction as introduced in s. 216(2) of lhe Code the survey D
settlement should be deemed to have been completed in 1936 which was after
the passing of the Land Revenue Code in 1879. The alienated lands beca1u0
unalienated on the abolition of the jagirs. Therefore, the right to O\Vn the
trees must be deemed to have been conceded to the occupant of such land as
there was no reservation made by the Government or the Survey Authority.
[297 F-G]
E
Slate of Gujarat and another v. Ibrahbn Akabarali a11d others AIR 1974
Gujarat, 54 approved.

(d) The case of Mavinkurve is distinguishable·. In that case the dispute
related to cutting of teak and other trees standing in the forest land, that is
to say, a specia-1 kind of trees in respect of which a notification under the
Indian Forest Act had been issued. The view of the High Court that the F
occupants, on the abolition of the jagirs, became entitled to trees standing on
the forest lands was rejected by this Court. In the instant case there was survey
settlement and the occupants were entitled to the benefit of para 2 of s. 40
of the Land Revenue Code. [297H]

The State of Gujarat v. Kumar Shrl Ranjlt Singhji Bl1avansi11ghji and othl·rs
AIR 1971 S.C. !645=[1971] 3 S.C.C. 891 referred to.
G
2. There is no _force in ~h~ contention that on the abolition of the jagirs
the occupant was given perm1ss1on to occupy the land and such permission shall
be deemed to include the concession of the right of tI1e Government to all trees
• g:owlng on that land. Permission meoos factual permission and not giving a
nght to a person as an occupant under s. 5(1)(b) of the Abolition Act. [299·D-EJ
H
CivIL APPELLATE JURISD!CT!Oc-1 : Civil Appea:l No. 2469-2471 of
1969.
292 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] ! S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 4th/5th May, 1967 of the
Gujarat High Court in SCA Nos. 1234, 1242 and 1244/65.
Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. !. John, C. D. Patel and J. Sinha for the
Appellant.
M. N. Shro[f for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, }.-Several Writ Petitions were heard together by a
Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court involving interpretation ot
certain provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, herein-
after referred to as the Land Revenue Code, and The Bombay Merged
c. Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, hereinafter called
the Jagirs Abolition Act. They were disposed of by a common judg-
ment whereby all the Writ Petitions were dismissed. In the present
three appeals brought to this Court by certificate the facts and Ja.w
involved are almost identical. In our common' judgment disposing of
....
D these three appeals, we shall discuss the law with reference to the facts
of Civil Appeal No. 2469 of 1969.
All the three sets of appellants in the three appeals were proprietary
Jagirdars under Idar State. Survey settlement had been made in that
State in the year 1936 and the land revenue payable by the Jagirdars
E was assessed. In the year 1948 the Land Revenue Code was appliell
by the province of Bombay to the lands in question under the Extra
Provincial Jurisdiction Act. The territory comprising the lands in
question was merged in the Bombay State, first by an ordinance pro-
mulgated in 1949, followed by the Merged State Lands Act, Bombay
Act 6 of 1950. The father of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2469,
the old Jagirdar, made a settlement of certain land in village Torda with
the appelJant in this appeal on the 5th of June, 1949. The Survey
number of this land in Idar Stat'e was 42 but after merger it comprised
of two numbers i.e. 42-B and 355. On the 1st of August, 1954 came
into force the Jagirs Abolition Act abolishing the Jagirs. According
to the case of the appellant he became an occupant of the land together
G with the forest trees standing thereon. Before 1965 the appellant was
allowed to cut and remove the forest trees in his land but after the deci-
sion of this Court in Shri U. R. Mavinkurve v. Thakor Mad!w ..singhji
....
Gambhirsingh and others(') the authorities concerned changed their
view and took the stand that the forest trees had vested in the State
and the appelJant was not entitled to cut or remove them. The Divi-
H
sional Forest Officer intended to sell the trees by a public auction.
(I) 11965] 3 S.C.R. 177.
NAHARSINGHJI v. GUJARAT (Untwa/ia, J.) 293

The.appellant set a telegram to him on the 15th of October, 1965 pro- A
.i testing against his proposed action and eventually along with many
others filed his Writ Petition in the High Court on the 4th of Novem-
ber, 1965. Some of the Writ Petitioners in the High Court were
f' contractors from the ex-jagirdars. But we are not concerned with

• their cases. As stated above in these three appeals we are concerned
with the land which at one time was in the proprietary Jagir of the B
J agirdars of the Idar State.
J The facts in these three appeals do not admit of any controver>y.
The trees were a part of the private forest. Neither it was a reserved
forest nor a protected forest within the meaning o[ the Indian Forest
Act, 1927. Mr. M. N. Shroff appearing for the State of Gujarat drew c
our attention to the Gujarat Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1972
which wa.s passed during the pcndcncy of these appeals whcrcunder,
it appears the appellants' right, title or interest in the forest seems to
have been acquired. We have not cx·amined the provisions of the said
• Act and its effect on the right of the appellants. We, however, pro-
ceed to decide these appeals dehors the said Act and leave the parties I>
for settlement of theif disputes, if any, under the 1972 Act to a
different forum.
When proprietary Jagir was granted by the former ruler of !dai
Stat'e to the Jagirdar the lands became alienated lands. They were
unalienated so long as the land revenue in respect of those lands was E
collected by the ruler. Under clause (xviii) of Section 2 of the Jagirs
Abolition Act "proprietary Jagir'" means a jagir in respect of which ,he
jagirdar under the terms of a grant or agreement or by custom or usage
is entitled to any rights or interest in the soil. As a consequence of
that it has been provided in section 5 (1) ( b) of the Jagirs Abolition
M:- F
"In a proprietary jagir village,- ................... .
(b) in the case of land other than Gharkhed land, which is in
the actual possession of the jagirdar or in the possession of a
person other than a permanent holder holding through or
from the jagirdar, such jagirdar ..................... .
. . . . . . . . . . shall be primarily liable to the State Govern- G
ment for the payment of land revenue due in respect of
such land and shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be
liable to all the obligations in respect of such land as an
• occupant under the Code or any other law for the time being
in force . ............... '' H
The term 'occupant' is defined in section 3 (16) of the Land Re-
venue Code to mean "a holder in actual possession of unalienated land,
294 >UPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l s.c.Ii.

A other than a tenant : provided that where the holder in actual possession
\
is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall
be deemed fo be the occupant." The effect of the two provisions
aforesaid, therefore, was that the appellant became an occuP'ant that
is to say a holder in actual possession of the land dir,ctly under the y
State. Thus he was in actual possession of umlienated land. Sec- I
B tion 3 (4) of the Land Revenue Code says:-
" "Land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things \.
attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything
atrached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the
revenue or rent of villages, or other defined portions of
c territory."
On reading these provisions simplicitcr one could say that the trees
attached to the earth formed part of the land and the appellant became
occupant of the land alongwith the trees. Under section 8 of the
Jagirs Abolition Act all public roads etc. situate in Jagir villages vest m
D the Government. Indisputably the land or the trees in question are
not covered by section 8. Under section 9 "the rights to trees specially
reserved under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, or any other law for the '
time being in force ............ shall vest in the State Government
.......... " In the present case neither the rights to trees were spe-
cially reserved under the Indian Forest Act nor was it a case where
E the State Government by any notification in the official gazette had
declared any trees or class of trees in a protected forest to be reserved
from a date fixed by notificaion. In the case of Mavinkurve (supra)
it appears the State Government had issued a notification under section
34A (Sfate Amendment) of the Indian Forest Act declaring all un·
cultivated lands in the 39 villages in question in that case to be
F forcests for the purposes of Chapter V of the Forest Act. No such
thing seems to have been done in t'he present case. But the matter
does not stop there. The High Court following the decision of this
Court in Mavinkurve's case held that there was no Survey settlement
of any of the lands in question before the High Court and hence the
G ratio of the case fully applied and the former Jagirdars or their settlees
did not acquire any right or interest in the forest trees. This is on the
basis of the view that under section 5 (1) (b) of the Jagirs Abolition
Act a person who becomes an occuP'ant of the land is entitled to all
the rights and liable to all the obligations in respect of such land under
the Land Revenue Code. And in absence of a Survey settlement the
'
•.
H person aforesaid could not fall back upon any provision of the Land
Revenue Code, such 'aS, section 40 or section 41 for claiming a right
in the trees. In our opinion the view so expressed by the High Court

I
NAHARSINGHJI v. GUJARAT (Untwalia, J.) 295
I

is not correct and the cases of the appellants in these three appeals are A
clearly distinguishable from the decision of this Court in Mavinkurve's
case. We shall presently show that there has been a Survey settlement
in these cases.
Along with the Writ Petition in the High Court was annexed a copy
of the Jamabandi disposal Registrar of village Torda which showed that
J the land had been surveyed in the year 1936 under the ruler of the
B
Idar State and permanent assessment had been made. Sub-section (2)
of section 216 of the Land Revenue Code, which correspended to sub-
section ( 4) of the earlier law, says:- "All survey settlements here-
tofore introduced in alienated villages shall be valid as if they had been
introduced in accordance with the provisions of thi.s section." Sub- c
section (1) says that "the provisions of Chapters VllI, VIII-A, IX ami
, X shall be applicable to all alienated villages and alienated shares of
villages subject to the following modifications."
Distinguishing Mavinkurve's case the argument put forward by Dr.
Y. S. Chitley on behalf of the appellants was that if a survey settlement
D
was carried out by some other authority not under the provisions of
the Land Revenue Code and it was accepted and acted upon by the
State Government it became a survey settlement under the Code itself
and there being no reservation of any trees made at the said survey
settlement or at any time thereafter the trees belonged to the former
Jagirdars or their settlees. In the State of Gujarat and another v. E
Ibrahim Akabarali and othu,(') a Division Bench of the Gujarat High
Court pointed out at pages 67-68 that the survey settlements carrieu
out by the Chhotaudepur State and recognised, accepted and acted
upon by the State of Bombay could not be said to be a, survey settle-
ment contemplated under section 112 of the Land Revenue Code. But
it would be so in view of the provisions contained in section 216 (2).
The High Cour! says : - '
"This section refers to the introduction of survey settle-
ments in alienated villages. The relevant provisions of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code relating to survey settlements
have reference· to unalienated villages. In order, therefore,
to provide for the introduction of survey settlements in alie-
• nated villages, sub-section (2) of Section 216 was enacted .
Chimli and Kosum were alienated villages in Chhotaudepur
State and if Chhotaudepur State had introduced survey settle-
ments in those alienated villages we sec no reason to take the
view that they would not be valid under the provisions of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code by virtue of Sub-secti0n (2)
(l) A.I.R. 1974 Gujarat, 54.
20""47SSCI79
. ~96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.R.

A of section 216. Kosum and Chimli were alienated villages
in Chhotaudepur State and they were alienated villages in
the State of Bombay until 1st August 1954. On the ~bolition
of Jagirs under the Jagir Abolition Act with effect from the
said date they became unalienated villages. Therefore, we
are not inclined to take a narrow view of the matter so as to
B lay down that alienated villages contemplated by sub-sec-
tion(2) of section 216 were alienated villages merely of
British -India and not alienated villages which in course of
time came to be a part of the State of Bombay prior to the
promulj,lation of record of rights in respect of them."
c We think the above is a correct enunciation of law and we approve
of the same. The High Court in the present cases has taken too narrow
a view of the procedure for survey settlement and when the attention
of the learned Judges was drawn to sections 107, 112, ll 7R and 216
of the Land Revenue Code to press the point that there was a survey
D settlement in the cases before the High Court the point was rejected
on the ground of lack of pleading to that effect. But in the Writ Peti-
tions with which we are concerned in these appeals there was not
only a specific averment and it was not specifically denied but docu-
ments had been filed along with the Writ Petitions to show that there
was a survey settlement in the Jdar State in the year 1936. That being
so, we hold that there being no reservation of the trees in favour of the
State, the occupant became entitled to the same on the abolition of
Jajirs.

Section 40 of the Land Revenue Code reads as follows
"In villages, or portions of villages, of which the original
F survey settlement has been completed before the passing -0f
this Act, the right of the Government to all trees in unalien-
ated land, except trees reserved by the Government or by
any survey officer, whether by express order made at, or
about the time of such settlement, or under any rule, or
general order in force at the time of such settlement, or by
notification made and published at, or at any time after, such
settlement, shall be deemed to have been conceded to the
occupant. But in the case of settlement completed before the
passing of Bombay Act I of 1865 this provision shall not
apply to teak, black-wood or sandal-wood trees. The right
.:H of the Government to such trees shall not be deemed to have
been conceded, except by clear and express words to that
eitct.
NAHARSINGHJI v. GUJARAT (Untwalia, !.) 297

In the case of villages or portions or villages of which the A
original survey settlement shall be completed after the passing
ef this Act, the right of the Government to all trees in un-
alienated land shall be deemed to be conceded to the occu-

• pant of such land except in so far as any snch rights may
be reserved by the Government, or by any survey officer on
B
behalf of the Government, either expressly at or about the
J time of such settlement, or generally by notification made and
published at any time previous to the completion of the
survey settlement of the district in which such village or
portion of a village is situate.
When permission to occupy land has been, or shall c
hereafter be, granted after the completion of the survey
settlement of the village or portion of a village in which
such land is situate, the said permission shall be deemed to
include the concession of the right of the Government to all
trees growing on that land which may not have been, or
which shall not hereafter be, expressly reserved at the time D
of granting such permissions, or which may not have been
reserved, under any of the foregoing provisions of this sec-
tion, at or about the time of the original survey settlement of
the said village or portion of a village.
Explanation.-In the second paragraph of this section,
E
the expression "In the case of villages or portions of villages
of which the original survey settlement shall be completed
after the passing of this Act" shall include cases where the
work of the original survey settlement referred to therein
was undertaken before the passing of this Act as well as
cases where the work of an original survey settlement may F
be undertaken at any time after the passing of this Act."
This case is not covered by para 1 extracted above. But by legal fiction ·
as introduced in section 216(2) the survey settlement should be
deemed to have been completed in 1936, which was after the passing
of the Land Revenue Code in the year 1879. The alienated lands
became unalienated on the abolition of the Jagirs. Therefore, the G
right to own the trees must be deemed to have been conceded to the
occupant of such land as there was no reservation made by the Gov-
ernment or the Survey Authority.
In Mavinkurve's case from the facts stated in the beginning of the
judgment or this Court it would appear that the dispute related to cut- II
ting of teak and Pancharao trees standing in the forest lands, that is to
say, special kind of trees in respect of which a notification under
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] I S.C.R.

A section 34A of the Indian Focest Act had been issued. The High
Court in that case had expressed the view that the occupants. on the
abolition of the J agirs became entitled to trees standing on the forest
lands. But this Court did not countenance that view stating at page
184 :C......
B "In our opinion, the rights of the occupants under the
Bombay Land Revenuo Code do not include the right to cut
and remove the trees from the forest lands. The reason is
that the 36 villages in dispute have not been surveyed or
settled and until there is completion of the survey and settle-
ment there is no question of concession on the part of the
c State Government of the right to the trees in favour of the
occupants. Section 40 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
provides that in the case of villages of which the original
survey settlement has been completed before the passing of
the Act, the right of the Government to all trees in un-
alienated land, ·except trees reserved by the Government or
D by any survey officer, whether by express order made at, or
about the time of such settlement, or under any rule, or
general order in force at the time of such settlement, or by
notification made and published at, or at any time after,
such settlement, shall be deemed to have been conceded to
the occupant. The second para of s. 40 deals with conces-
E sion of Government rights to trees in case of settlements
completed after the passing of the Act. The second para
states that in the case of villages or portions of villages of
which the original survey settlement shall be completed after
the passing of the Act, the right of the Government to all
trees in unalienated land shall be deemed to be conceded
F
to the ·occupant of such land except in so far as any such
rights may be reserved by the Government, or by any survey
officer on behalf of the Government, either expressly at or
about the time of such settlement, or generally by notifica-
tion made and published at any time previous to the com-
G pletion of the survey settlement.
We distinguish this case on the ground that there was survey settle-
ment in the cases before us and the occupants are entitled to the bene-
fit of para 2 of section 40.
In pas~ing we may also refer to another decision of this Court in
Iii The State of Gujarat v. Kumar Shri Ranjit Singhji Bhavansinghji and
othus(') where Shah J., as he then was, delivering the judgment on
. (!) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1645=[1971] 3 S.C.C. 891.
NAHARSINGHJI v. GUJARAT (Untwalia, J.) 299

behalf of the Court pointed out that the High Court rightly held tha~ A '
• the respondent was entitled to receive compensation in respect of the
trees because the restriction on the power of alienation put upon the
• absolute grantee "did not limit the title of the respondent in the lands
and in things attached thereto." Mavinkurve's case was distinguished
on the ground that in that case "the State of Bombay which had at the '
B
relevant time jurisdiction issued a. notification under Section 34-A
of the Indian Forest Act, declaring till uncultivated lands in the villages
ef the Jagir to be forests for the purposes of Chapter V of that Act.
On that account the forests were deemed protected forests and the
J agirdar had no right to cut and remove trees from the forest lands
as owner and that under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, C
the rights of occupancy did not carry the right to cut and remove
trees from forest litnds."
Lastly we may just note that Mr. Chitley with reference to para 3
of section 40 of the Land Revenue Code argued that on the abolition
of the Jagir the occupant was given permission to occupy the land,
whether the permission was as a matter of law or in fact Is immaterial D
and such permission shall be deemed to include the concession of the
right of the Government to all trees growing on that land. We do not
think that reliance on para 3 of section 40 by learned counsel for the
appellant is correct. Permission means factual permission and not
giving the right to a person as an occupant under section 5(1) (b) of
E
the J agirs Abolition Act.
For the reasons stated above, we allow these three appeals, set
aside the decision of the High Court in them and allow the Writ Peti-
tions filed by the appellants and declare that the appellants became
occupants of the land in question together with the forest trees stand-
ing thereon and governmental authorities had no right to interfere with F
the appellants' dealing with the forest trees, at any rate before the
....... passing of the Gujarat Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1972. In the
special circumstances of these cases we shall make no order as to costs,

" P.B.R. Appeals allowed.