Holding

A modified scheme need not be re‑published, service of notice on any one co‑owner is valid notice to all, and the three‑year limitation period starts from the date of publication of the notification under section 36, rendering the scheme valid.

Summary

The Improvement Trust of Ludhiana framed a Development‑cum‑Housing scheme which was later modified and sought State sanction under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The appellants challenged the scheme on the grounds that the modified scheme required re‑publication, that notices under sections 36 and 38 were not served on all co‑owners, and that the three‑year limitation for sanction should be measured from the scheme’s preparation date. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not mandate re‑publication of a modified scheme, and that service of notice on any one co‑owner satisfies the statutory requirement for all co‑owners under sections 38 and 79(2)(a). It further clarified that the limitation period under section 40 begins from the date of publication of the notification under section 36, not from the scheme’s preparation, and rejected the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Consequently, the scheme was deemed valid and the appeals were dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

The Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 requires re‑publication of a modified scheme under sections 36 and 38.
Whether service of notice on one co‑owner suffices as notice on all co‑owners under sections 38 and 79(2)(a).
From which date does the three‑year limitation period for sanction under section 40 commence.
Whether provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (section 6) apply to the scheme.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4(1), s. 6
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922s. 36, s. 38, s. 40, s. 41, s. 79(2)(a)

Subjects

Punjab Town Improvement Actnotice serviceco‑ownersscheme modificationlimitation periodland acquisitionre‑publication

Judgment

I
\
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A operation of section 6 of the 1894 Act.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1. The Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 does not con-
template any re-publication of modified scheme. The omission in that
B behalf is discernible. The Act enjoins the trust to frame the scheme and
its publication so as to invite objections within thirty days from the date
of the publication. On receipt of the objection, if any, and after bearing the
parties, the Trust is required to approve the scheme. When the objections
were duly considered and the scheme was modified, there arises no need
C for publication of the approved scheme. Therefore, the modified scheme is ')v!
not required to be re-published under sections 36 and 38 of the Act.
[437-D-E]
2. Service of notice on one of the co-owners, when more than one have
interest in the acquired land, would be sufficient service of notice on other
D co-owners. Therefore, non-service of notice on the petitioners does not
invalidate the scheme framed by the Trust. [439-F]

3. A conjoint reading of sections 38 and 79(2) (a) would clearly
postulate that when the Act has not otherwise specifically provided, the
notice served etc. on one is a notice to or on behalf of co-owners a'1d is a
E valid notice. Section 38 did not expressly state that notice shall be served
on all owners if more than one co-owners has interest in the land under
acquisition. Reliance on dause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 38 to
contend that "every person" referred therein would include all co-owners
and that , therefore, notice is required to be served on all the co-owners is
F misconceived. What clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 38 con-
templates is only to find out who is believed to be owner or occupier of the
land sought to be acquired by the trust. If this is noted, it would be clear
that the aforesaid clause does not deahvith service of notice, which has
been dealt by section 79(2)(a); [439-,¢'EJ

G 4. It would thus be clear that the legislature itself being aware of the
existence of co-owners or occupier, authorised the trust to have the notice
given, tendered or served on one owner or occupier and such service of
notice is legal and valid notice. Even otherwise on principle of law also, it
is common knowledge that every co-owner may not be in occupation of the
H land or may not be cultivating the land or be in actual possession. He may
I
TEJASINGH v.STAIBOFPB. 435

be residing elsewhere due to educational or pursuit of professional job etc., A
So, they may not be available for service. Legislature being cognizant to
this situation has taken care to see that if more than one owner or occupier
have interest in the land and the land belonging to co-owners or occupiers
is sought to be acquired, service on one is taken as service on all the
/
co-owners. (438-G-H, 439-A]
B
5. Section 40 clearly indicates that the period of three year_s would

. 1
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begin to run only from the date when the notification under section 36 was
published and not from the date on which the sc~eme was prepared by the
Trust. Though the scheme was prepared on June 21, 1976 since it was
published on July 2, 1976 the limitation began to run only from July 2,
1976 and the Government has sanctioned it within three years from the
date namely on June 28, 1979. Hence it was within time. (440-D]
C

Bhatinda Improvement Tmst v. Ba/want Singh, A.LR. (1992) SC 2214,
held inapplicable.
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 201-206
./ • of 1991.

From the Judgments and Orders dated 31st July, 1989, 3rd January,
1989 and 1st June, 1989 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 5873 of 1985, 5772 of 1981, 3124 of E
1987, 5772 of 1981, 3285 of 1986 and 411 of 1986 respectively.

O.P. Sharma, K.R. Gupta, Vivek Sharma, Mr. Namila Sharma, Ashok
Sudan, R.C. Gubrele, Ashok Mathur, Sanjay Sareen, Mr. Neelam Sharma,
Uma Datta, T.C. Sharma, Ms. S. Sarani, Sanjay Bansal and G.K. Bansal
F
for the appearing parties.

---< The following Order of the Court was delivered :

These appeals are disposed of by a common judgment since a
common question of law has arisen in these appeals. The material facts in G
C.A. Nos. 202-03/91 need be noted for disposal of these appeals, which are
as under:

The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana had framed a scheme called
'Development-cum-Housing Accommodation Scheme' on the right side of
Pakhowal road beyond Sidhwan Canal at Ludhiana which was approved by H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A Resolution No. 28 dated March 24, 1976. After following the procedure
prescribed under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short 'the
Act') the approval of the State Government under s.41 of the Act was
sought for the granted by the State on June 28, 1979. The appellants and
some others questioned the correctness of the aforesaid scheme in Sunder
Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (W.P. No. 3056/82). By judgment dated
B Feb. 9, 1984 the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
on yoncession made by the counsel appearing for the State, quashed the
scheme qua the petitioners therein. The appellants had also sought to
quash the scheme on the grounds that the scheme sanctioned by the
Government was different from the scheme framed by the Trust; the
C notices as required under ss. 36 and 38 have not been served; there was
inor~ate delay in finalisation of the scheme and that, therefore, the entire
schenie required to be quashed. All the contentions were negatived by the
High Court. On the effect of the decision of Sunder Singh's case, the
Division Bench pointed out that since the decision was on the concession
made by the State counsel that the scheme was not approved within three
D years from the date of the publication of the Notification under s.36, which
legally and factually was not correct, the ratio therein does not bind the
respondents. Thus the Writ Petition No. 3124/81 came to be dismissed by
the High Court in the impugned order dated March 1, 1979. Similar are
the facts in other appeals.

E Shri O.P. Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appel-
lants, while reiterating the first two contentions raised in the High Court,
strenuously contended that notice served on one of the co-owners was not
a service of notice on all the owners. Admittedly notices on other three
owners were not served. Their brother was not on speaking terms with the
F appellants. Sections 36 and 38 speak of personal notice to the owner or
occupier. The omission to serve on all the co-owners renders the entire
scheme void and inoperative. 'fhese contentions have been resisted by the
learned counsel for the respondents.

The first question, therefore! is whether there is any ambiguity in the
G identity of the scheme framed by the Trust and the scheme sanctioned by
the State Government. The High Court had sent for the record and after
perusal of the record, it pointed out that the scheme was in relation to
"Development-cum-Housing Accommodation Scheme on the right side of
the Pakhowal road beyond Sidhwan Canal at Ludhiana". That scheme, after
H following the procedure, was passed by the Board in Resolution No. 66
I
TEJASINGH v. SfATEOFPB. 437

dated May 7, 1979 and was sent for sanction of the Government. The A
approved scheme was published on July 2, 1976 and the Government had
sanctioned it as required under s.41 on July 1, 1979. The High Court thus
came to the conclusion that there was no ambiguity or discrepancy as to
the identity of the scheme.

In this behalf the contention raised by Shri O.P. Sharma is that the B
High Court had noted that the trust had modified the scheme and the
approval by the State Government was in respect of that modified scheme
and that, therefore, by operation of sub-s. (3) s.41 of the Act, there is no
re-publication of the scheme under s.36. Therefore, the scheme is bad in
law. We find no force in the contention. It is to be seen that the trust itself, C
after hearing objections, had passed the resolution modifying the scheme
initially framed on March 24, 1979 and sent it for sanction of the State
Government. The service of notices required under ss.36 and 38 are in
relation to the scheme initially framed by the trust. The Act does not
contemplate of any re-publication of modified scheme. The omission in D
that behalf is discernible. The Act enjoins the trust to frame the scheme
and its publication so as to invite objections within thirty days from the
date of the publication. On receipt of the objection, if any, and after
hearing the parties, the trust is required to approve the scheme. Therefore,
when the objections were duly considered and the scheme was modified,
there arises no need for publication of the approved scheme. Sub-s.(1) of E
s.40 itself provides that "the trust may either abandon the scheme or apply
to the State Government for sanction of the scheme with such modifica-
tions" as the trust may deem necessary. Therefore, the modified scheme is
not required to be re-published under ss.36 and 38 of the Act. .
/
F
It is next contended that there is no notice served on any of the
persons and that, therefore, the mandatory requirement of ss.36 and 38
have not been complied with. We find no force in the contention. The High
Court in this behalf also had sent for the record and after perusing the
record i.e. summons issued by the trust, it found, as a fact, that the notices
were served on all the persons except the petitioners Nos. 1, 4 and 6. Notice G
was also served on Sukhdev Singh, petitioner No. 5 therein, their brother.
All of them are appellants before us. The High Court, therefore, noted that
notice had been duly served on all the persons. The Gazette Notifications
have been placed before us which would clearly show that the notices
required under s.36 were published in the State Gazette on July 2, 1976, H
\
I

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A July 9, 1976 and July 16, 1976, in three consecutive weeks and the same
notices were published in Tribune, local newspaper on July 3, 1976, July
10, 1976 and July 17, 1976, respectively. Therefore, as enjoined under
sub-s.(3) and s.36 notices have been duly served. As seen, notices under
s.38 have been served on all of them except three persons, namely,
petitioner Nos. 1, 4 and 6, and also on the brother of Bikram Singh,
B petitioner No. 10, namely, Kartar Singh his co-owner. Thus as a fact notices
have been served under s.38 on all the persons except the aforesaid four
persons.

The question thus arises whether notices on one co-owner is notice
. C on other co-owners. Indisputably the petitioner Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6 being
brothers, are co-owners. Similarly, Vikram Singh and Kartar Singh are
brothers and are co-owners. It is stated across the bar by Shri Sharma that
the brothers are not on speaking terms. The fact that all of them have
jointly filed the appeal in this Court and engaged the same counsel, would
D clearly indicate that they are sailing together and the professed hostile
terms is a pretence.

It is true that s.38(1) provides that every person whom the trust has
reason to believe, after due enquiry, to be the owner of any immovable
property which it is proposed to acquire in executing the scheme or the
E occupier, shall be served with the notice thereof. Section 79(2) of the Act
in this behalf lends some clue on the due service of notice on co-owner. It
states that every notice other than a public notice and every bill issued
under this Act shall, unless it is otherwise .expressly provided under this
Act, be served or presented when a notice is required or permitted under
p this Act to be served upon an owner or occupier, as the case may be, of
a building or land, it shall not be necessary to name the owner or occupier
therein, and the service thereof in such cases not otherwise specifically .').._,
provided for in this Act shall be effected either by giving or tendering the
notice, or sending it by post, to the owner or occupier, or if there be "more
owners or occupiers than one, to any one of them". It would thus be clear
G that the legislature itself being aware of the existence of co-owners or
occupier, authorised the trust to have the notice given, tendered or served
on one owner or occupier and such service of notice is legal and valid
notice. Even otherwise on principle of law also, it is common knowledge
that every co-owner may not be in occupation of the land or may not be
H cultivating the land or be in actual possession. He may be residing else-
TEJASINGH v. STATEOFPB. 439

where due to educational or pursuit of professional job etc. So, they may A
not be available for service. Legislature being cognizant to this situation,
has taken care to see that if more than one owner or occupier have interest
in the land and the land belonging to co-owners or occupiers is sought to
be acquired, service on one, is taken as service on all the co-owners.

Sri Sharma contends that if the Act would not have provided for any B
procedure for such service, then only the benefit of s.79(2)(a) gets at-
tracted; and since s.38 has otherwise provided, the procedure for service
·'
j r
of notice, benefit under s.79(2)(a) is not available. We find no force in the
contention. A conjoint reading of these clauses would clearly postulate that
1 when the Act has not otherwise specifically provided, the notice served etc. C
on one is a notice to or on behalf of co-owners and is a valid notice. Section
38 did not expressly state that notice shall be served on all owners if more
than one co-owners has interest in the land under acquisition. Reliance on
clause (a) of sub-s.(1) of s.38 to contend that "every person" referred
therein would include all co-owners and that, therefore, notice is required D
to be served on all the co-owners is misconceived. It is to be remembered
that clause (a) of sub-s.(1) of s.38 gives power to the trust to effectuate
service of notice on the person, whom the trust has reason to believe, after
due enquiry, to be the owner or occupier of the immovable property sought
to be acquired for implementing the scheme. The formation of belief of
ownership or occupation is distinct and separate from the service of notice E
on those found to have joint ownership. What clause (a) of sub- s.(1) of
s.38 contemplates is only to find out who is believed to be owner or
occupier of the land sought to be acquired by the trust. If this is noted, it
would be clear that the aforesaid clause does not deal with service of
notice, which has been dealt by s.79(2){a).
F
Thus we hold that service of notice on one of the co-owners, when
more than one have interest in the acquired land, would be sufficient
service of notice on other co-owners. Therefore, non- service of notice on
the petitioner Nos. 1, 4 and 6 and Bikram Singh does not invalidate the
scheme framed by the trust. So it is a valid scheme. G

It is true that the scheme was quashed by the High Court qua the
petitioners therein. When counsel for the respondent stated that the special
leave petition has been filed against the judgment, we have got verified and
we are informed by the Registry that the matter is pending decision. So we H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1995) 2 S.C.R.

A do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness of the above
judgment. Suffice it to say that the ratio therein was confined to those
petitioners. Since the entire scheme was not quashed, we do not find any
necessity to declare the entire scheme to be invalid.

It is next contended that since notification under s.36 is equivalent
B to s.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (for short, 'the Central Act')
and as the scheme was not published within three years, notification under
s.38 shall be deemed to have lapsed by operation of s.6 of the Central Act.
We find no force in the contention. We find that the High Court is right
in its conclusion that the notification under s.36 was published on July 2,
C · 1976 and the sanction of the notification was made under s.40(1) on June
28, 1979. Section 40 clearly indicates that the period. of three years would
begin to run only from the date when the notification under s.36 was
published and not from the date on which the scheme was prepared by the
trust. Though the scheme was prepared in June 21, 1976 since it was
published on July 2, 1976, the limitation began to run only from July 2,
D 1976, and the Government had sanctioned it within three years from the
date, namely on June 28, 1979. The ratio in Bhatinda Improvement Trust v.
Ba/want Singh, AIR (1992) SC 2214, on facts has no application. Therefore
we need not go into the question of the applicability of the Central Act •
and the limitation in that behalf.
E It is finally contended that in the year 1991 the State itself had
· withdrawn part of the scheme and that, therefore, the appellants are
equally entitled to the same benefit. We have seen that scheme which does
not relate to the scheme in question. Under these circumstances, we cannot
set aside the scheme as in hand.
F
The appeals (C.A. Nos. 201-206/91) are accordingly dismissed but in
the circumstances without costs.

C.A. No. 5032 of 1995 S.L.P. (C) No. 6734/94

G Leave granted.

The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.