TATA MOTORS LTD.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

A                             TATA MOTORS LTD.
                                          V.
                   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

                                   MAY 6, 2004

B      [RAJENDRA BABU. CJ. AND P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.]

         Sales Tax :

         Maharashtra Sales Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Repeal) Act,
C 1989-Sections 26. 27 and 30-Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959-Rule
    41 £-Retrospective amendment-Retrospective withdrawal of benefit of
    set-off in respect of sales tax payable from 1. 7.1981 to 31.3.1988 in respect
    of waste, scrap goods or by products generated-Constitutional validity
    of-Held: In absence of any tangible or rational ground retrospective
D   amendment being confined only to a period of eight years and not either
    before or subsequently riot justified and hence unconstitutional-Bombay
    Sales Tax Act, 1959--Sectiori, 42, Schedule B, Entry 6-Constitution of
    India, 1950.

          Rule 41D--Claim of set off by assessee-Plea that requirement of
E
    registration under Central Sales Tax Act at appropriate place to which
    goods are exported impossible of performance since Act not extended to
    that place-Held: Though all conditions imposed therein must be complied
    with but it is not necessary for the assessee to carry his business in a place
    where Act is not extended-Assessee can carry his business elsewhere and
F   claim benefit in a place where Act is applicable-Central Sales Tax Act.

       Appellant-assessee procured steel in primary form covered by
  Entry B-6 of Schedule B to Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, for
  manufacturing which resulted in the production of vehicles or parts
G thereof and iron and steel scrap. They claimed set off in respect of sales
  tax payable by them from 1.4.1982 to 31.3.1983 in terms of Rule 41E
  of Born bay Sales Tax Rules, 1959 for the quantum of iron and steel
  purchased which was converted into iron and steel scrap. The claim
  was allowed. Thereafter, writ petition was filed challenging the
H computation of this amount. Meanwhile the tribunal passed an order
                                        452
                        TATA MOTORS LID. v. STATE                      453
..   with regard to the modalities of working out the relief. Thereafter, A
     Maharashtra Act IX of 1989 was enacted and benefit of set off under
     Rule 41E was denied altogether where the manufactured goods falling
     under Schedule B are in the nature of waste goods/scrap goods/by
     products for the period from 1.7.1981 to 31.3.1988. The constitutional
     validity of the retrospective amendment of Rule 41E was challenged. B
     High Court upheld the validity of the same. Thereafter, by the
     amendment to Rule 41E by Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Rules,
     1992 exclusionary clause of goods manufactured out of waste or scrap
     goods or by products was removed and the position as it stood prior
     to 1981 was restored. Hence the present appeal.
                                                                             c
           Appellant contended that retrospective withdrawal of benefit of
     set-off for period of eight years imposed prima facie an unreasonable
     restriction and as such must be struck down as unconstitutional; that
     subsequently by deleting the amendment the original provision as it
     stood prior to 1981 has been restored; that there is no material to show D
     as to why a special treatment has to be given only for that period of
     eight years; and that the requirement under Rule 41-D that the
     assessee has to register in the place to which the goods are 'exported'
     under the Central Sales Tax Act is impossible of performance because
     the Central Sales Tax Act was not extended to the place where the E
     assessee's branch office is located.

          Respondent-State contended that the amendments had been made
     to overcome certain defects arising on account of the decision of the
     tribunal in regard to the modalities of working out the relief.
                                                                             F
          Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

           HELD : 1. The State has enormous powers in the matter of
     legislation both prospectively and retrospectively and in enacting fiscal
     laws. Great leverage is allowed in the matter of taxation laws because G
     several fiscal adjustments have to be made by the Government
     depending upon the needs of the Revenue and the economic
     circumstances prevailing in the State. Even so an action taken by the
     State cannot be so irrational and so arbitrary so as to introduce one
     set of rules for one period and another set of rules for another period H
    454               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by amending the laws in such a manner as to withdraw the benefit that
                                                                                ...
  had been given earlier resulting in higher burdens so far as the assessee
  is concerned without any reason. Retrospective withdrawal of the
  benefit of set-off only for a particular period should be justified on
  some tangible and rational ground, when challenged on the ground of
B unconstitutionality. In the instant case, the State could not succeed in
  doing so. Also the view of the High Court that the impugned amendment
  of Rule 41-E was of clarificatory nature to remove the doubts in
  interpretation cannot be upheld as it did not elaborate as to how
  the impugned legislation is merely clarificatory. Therefore, since
C no material has been placed before the Court as to why the
  amendments were confined only to a period of eight years and
  not either before or subsequently, Section 26 of the Maharashtra
  Act IX of 1989 amending the benefit of set off under Rule 41-E
  deserves to be quashed by striking down the words "not being waste
  goods or scrap goods or by-products" occurring therein and the
D authorities concerned would rework assessments as if that law had not
   been passed and give appropriate benefits according to law to the
   parties concerned. [462-G-11; 463-A-DJ

          Rai Ramkrishna & Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1964) 1 SCC 897, referred
E to.
          Statutes and Statutory Construction by Sutherland, referred to.

         2. Set-off in respect of sales tax payable claimed by appellant is
F   in the nature of benefit under taxation law and as such all conditions
    thereto must be complied with. One of the conditions imposed therein
    is that the assessee has to register under the Central Sales Tax Act at
    the appropriate place to claim the benefit. It is not necessary for the
    appellant to carry his business in a place where the Central Sales Tax
    Act is not extended. It is open to the appellant to carry on his business
G   elsewhere and claim the benefit in a place where the Central Sales Tax
    Act is applicable. There is therefore no justification to attack the
    validity of Rule 41-D. [463-E-GJ

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1153 of
H   1998.
             TATA MOTORS LTD. v. STATE (RAJENDRA BABU, J.)               455

          From the Judgment and Order dated 22.7.97 of the Bombay High A
     Court in W.P. No. 789 of 1987.

                                     WITH

          C.A. No. 3014 cif 2004.
                                                                               B
          T.R. Andhyarujina, R.F. Nariman, S. Srikumaran, Ms. Kavita Dahiya,
     Ms. Sushma Sharma, Ms. Puja Sharma, Rajan Narain, A.S. Bhasme (NP)
     and Mukesh K. Giri for the Appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                           c
          RAJENDRA BABU, CJ. :

     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1153 OF 1998.
                                                                               D
           The assessees are engaged in the manufacture of motor vehicle
     chassis and spare parts. The assessees claimed certain set off in respect of
     sales tax payable by them for the period from 1st April 1982 to 31st March
     1983 invoking the benefit available under rules 41 D and 41 E framed under
     the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 [for short 'the Act'): The set off claimed E
     by the assessees was in terms of Rule 41D and 41E read with Rule 440
     framed under Section 42 of the Act which enables a draw back, set-off or
     refund of the whole or any part of the tax in such circumstances and subject
     to such conditions as may be specified in respect of tax paid or levied or
     leviable in respect of any earlier sale or purchase of goods under the Act F
     or any earlier law to be granted to the purchasing dealer. Rule 41 D enables
i.   draw back, set-off or refund of tax paid by the manufacturers in respect
     of certain purchases made by claimant dealer. It lays down that in assessing
     the tax payable in respect of any period by a registered dealer who
     manufactures taxable goods for sale or export, the Commissioner shall, in
     respect of purchases made by such dealer on or after the notified day of G
     any goods specified in Part II of Schedule C and used by him within the
     State in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale or in the packing of
     goods manufactured, grant him a draw-back, set-off or, as the case may
     be, a refund of the aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with
     Rule 440. The concept of export is defined to include dispatches made by H
    456                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the claimant to his own place of business or to his agent outside the State
  where the claimant dealer produces certificate in Form 31 C issued
  declaring that the goods would in fact be sold by him or would be used
  by him in the manufacture of goods which would in fact be sold by him
  and that he, his manager or, as the case may be, his agent is registered under
B the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of that place of business. The aggregate
  of the sum referred to in sub-rule (I) shall be reduced by 5 per cent of the
  purchase price representing the sums in respect of the goods which are
  dispatched in the manner referred to in clause (iii) of sub-rule (2), provided
  that the aggregate of such sum shall be reduced by certain percentage of
C such purchase price. Rule 41 E provides that in assessing the amount of tax
  payable in respect of any period by a registered dealer the Commissioner
  shall in respect of the purchases made by the claimant dealer on or after
  the notified day of goods specified in any entry of Schedule B which were
  used by him in the manufacture of goods specified in the same entry of
D Schedule B for sale or export, grant him a draw-back, set off or, as the
  case may be, a refund of the aggregate of the sums determined in
  accordance with the provisions of Rule 440.

          By Section 26 of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Laws [Levy, Amendment
E and Repeal] Act, 1989 during the period from I st July 1981 to 31st March,
    1984 Rule 41-E as it existed before 1.4.1984 was deemed to have been
    re-enacted in the same form as it then existed but with certain modifications.
    The amended version of Rule 41 E by the 1989 Act reads as follows :

             "41 E. Draw-back, set-off etc. of tax paid by a manufacture of
F            goods specified in Schedule B.-ln assessing the amount of tax
             payable in respect of any period of any registered dealer [hereinafter
             in this Rule referred to as the 'claimant dealer'] the Commissioner
             shall, in respect of the purchases made by the claimant dealer on
             or after the notified day, of goods specified in any entry of
G            Schedule B which were used by him in the manufacture of goods
             [not being waste goods or. scrap goods or by productsJ speci tied
             in the same entry of Schedule B, for sale or export, grant him a
             draw back, set off or, as the case may be, a refund of the aggregate
             of the sums determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule
H            440."
        TATA MOTORS LTD. v. STATE (RAJENDRA BABU, J.]                 457

      Section 27 of the said amendment Act of 1989 further amended the A
Rule 41E as follows :-

        "27. Amendment of Rule 41E of Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959-
        "ln the existing rule 41E of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959,
        during the period commencing from !st April, 1984, and ending B
        on JI st March, 1988, after the words "manufacture of goods" the
        brackets and words "(not being waste goods or scrap goods or by-
        products)" shall be deemed to have been inserted."

        Section 30 of the Act (IX of 1989) also enac,1ed a validating C
provision. The effect of the amendment is that facility of draw-back, set-
off etc., of tax paid by a manufacturer of goods specified in Schedule-B
is not applicable to manufacture of goods out of waste, scrap goods or
products for the period between 1.7.1981 to 31.3.1988 by virtue ofSections
26 and 27 of the said Amendment Act of 1989.
                                                                            D
    By the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Rules, 1992 Rule 41-E was
amended as follows :-

        (a)   "for the words, brackets, figures and letter "from one Group
              to another of the Groups specified in clause (xviii-a) of rule E
              3'', the words, figure and letter "specified in entry 6 of
              Schedule B" shall be substituted;

        (b)    in the second proviso, for the words, figures and letter "on
              the basis of the sale prices of such manufactured goods and F
              shall be allowed only to the extent that it pertains to the
              manufactured goods specified in entry 6 of Schedule B", the
              words, figures and letters "on the basis of the purchase price
              of goods specified in entry 6 of Schedule B used in the
              process of manufacture and shall be allowed only to the G
              extent to which it pertains to the manufactured goods
              specified in entry 6 to Schedule B and where such purchase
              prices are not ascertainable, the apportionment shall be on
              the basis of the sale prices of such manufactured goods and
              shall be allowed only to the e-xtent that it pertains to the H
    458                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A                 manufactured goods specified in entry 6 of Schedule B"
                  shall be substituted."

          On incorporation of this amendment, the said Rule reads as follows:

B            "Jn assessing the amount of tax payable in respect of any prriod
             by a registered dealer (hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the
             claimant dealer") the Commissioner shall, in respect of the
             purchases made by the claimant dealer on or after 1st April 1984,
             of goods specified in Entry 6 of Schedule B for sale of export,
             grant him a draw back, set off, or as the case may be, refund, of
c            the aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with the
             provisions of Rule 44 D.

                   Provided that, no draw back set off, or as the case may be,
             refund shall be granted under this rule where the goods
D            manufactured by the claimant dealer have been sold by him in the
             state in respect of which sale the claimant dealer has been allowed
             deduction under clause (i), (ii), or (ii) of sub-section (I) or sub-
             section (2) of Section 7.


E                  Provided further that where the process of manufacturing
             results in the production of goods specified in Entry 6 of Schedule
             B as well as goods other than those specified in entry 6 of schedule
             B, then such draw-back, set-off or as the case may be, the refund
             shall be apportioned as between goods specified in Entry 6 of
             Schedule B and goods other than those specified in Entry 6 of
F            Schedule B on the basis of sale price of such manufactured goods
             and shall be allowed only to the extent that it pertains to the
             manufactured goods specified in Entry 6 of Schedule B.

                   Provided further that where the process of manufacturing
G            results in the production of goods specified in Entry 6 of Schedule
             B as well as goods other than those specified in entry 6 of
             Schedule B, then such draw-back, set-off or as the case may be,
             the refund shall be apportioned as between goods specified in
             Entry 6 of Schedule B and goods other than those specified in
H            Entry 6 of Schedule B on the basis of purchase price of goods
        TATA MOTORS LTD. v. STATE (RAJENDRA BABU, J.]                459

        specified in Entry 6 of Schedule B used in the process of A
        manufacture and shall be allowed only to the extent to which it
        pertains to the manufactured goods specified in Entry 6 of
        Schedule B and where such price are not ascertainable, the
        apportionment shall be on the basis of sale price of such
        manufactured goods and shall be allowed only to the extent that B
        it pertains to the manufactured goods specified in the Entry 6 of
        the Schedule B.

        Explanation:- for the purpose of this Rule, the explanation
        "export" means a sale in the course of inter-state trade or C
        commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of territory
        of India, where such sale occasions movement of the goods from
        the .State."

      These amendments had the effect of removing exclusionary clause of
goods manufactured out. of waste or scrap goods or products thereby D
restoring the position as it stood prior to 1981. Some amendments have
been effected to this Rule on 19 .11.200 I but the same have no bearing on
the present case.

      The validity of the amendment made to Rule 41-D and 41-E of the E
Bombay Sales Tax Rules retrospectively by Section 26 of the Amendment
Act IX of 1989 was challenged before the High Court. The High Court
upheld the validity of the same and the writ petitions were partly allowed.
In the writ petitions, several other contentions were also raised and the
same were rejected or upheld by the High Court but has no relevance to F
the present cases.

      In these appeals, the contentions put forth before us are two-fold:

        I.   the constitutional validity of retrospective amendment of G
             Rule 41-E;

        2.   the scope of set off under Rule 41 D before transfer of stock
             to regional sales office at Silvassa located in the Union
             Territory of Dadra & Nagar I-laveli.                          H
    460               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A       Rule 41-E was introduced in the Rules with effect from I. 7 .1981
  providing for set off of tax paid on purchases falling under Schedule Bused
  in the manufacture of goods also falling under Schedule B. The Rule did
  not provide for any apportionment or any other method when goods                 \
  purchased fall under Schedule B but goods manufactured would fall under

B Schedule B in part and another part in any other Schedule. The mid Rule
  41-E was amended in 1984 restricting its scope but had no impact upon
  the appellant. On 3.5.1988, Rule 41-E was amended with effect from
  1.4.1984 providing for proportignate set off in proportion to sale price of
  manufactured goods falling under Schedule B and those falling in any other
  Schedule where the process of manufacturing resulted in the manufacture
c of goods falling under Schedule 'B' partly and any other Schedule partly.
  By an amendment made on 31.3.1989, the benefit of Rule 41-E was
  altogether denied forthe period l.7.1981to31.3.1988. By further amendment
   made in 1992, Rule 41-E provided proportionate set off as was earlier in
   force except for the period 1.4.1984 to 31.3.1988.
D
        So far as the constitutional validity is concerned, it is submitted that
  the appellant procured steel in primary form covered by Entry B-6 for use
  in manufacture and the appellant's manufacturing process resulted mainly
  in the production of vehicles or parts thereof and to some extent, iron and
E steel scrap in the form of off-cuts, end pieces; turning and boring scrap etc.
  In the sales tax returns filed by the appellant, set off of Rs. 38.64 lakhs
  was claimed• in terms of Rule 41E for the quantum of iron and steel
  purchased which was converted into iron and steel scrap as the iron and
  steel ·scrap is also covered by Entry B-6 which they were eligible for set
  off. Rule 41-E was amended and benefit was restricted only to Entry B-
F 6 in 1984 and in the assessment order passed for 1982-83, set off under
   Rule 41-E was allowed by the quantum restricted to tax collected on sale
  of iron and steel scrap. Computation of this amount was disputed in the
  writ petition filed before the High Court. The Tribunal in the meanwhile
   rendered a decision and held that rule 41 E did not provide for apportionment
G of set off where the manufactured goods were partially covered under
  Schedule 'B' and partially under any other Schedule and in such a case
  the manufacturer would be entitled to claim set off tax paid on entire
   purchases falling under Schedule B. Thereafter the Maharashtra Act IX of
   1989 was enacted and by Sections 26 and 27, the benefit of Rule 41E set
H  off was denied altogether where the manufactured goods falling under


                                                                                   ;;.
         TATA MOTORS LTD. v. STATE [RAJENDRA BABU, J.]                  461

 Schedule B are in the nature of waste goods/scrap goods/by products for A
 the period 1.7.1981 to 31.3.1988.

       The constitutional validity of the amend!llent was challenged before
 the High Court on the basis that the withdrawal with retrospective effect ·
 of any relief granted by a valid statutory provision to an assessee stands B
 on a footing entirely different from that which may necessitate the passing
 of a validating Act seeking to validate any statutory provision declared
 unconstitutional or to make the law clear. While the legislature makes an
 amendment validating any provision, which might have been found to be
 defective, the legislature seeks to enforce its intention which was already C
 there by removing the defect or lacuna. However, withdrawal or modification
 with retrospective effect of the relief properly granted by the statute to an
 assessee which the assessee has lawfully enjoyed or is entitled to enjoy as
 his vested statutory right, depriving the assessee of the vested statutory
 right has the effect of imposing a levy with retrospective effect for the years
 for which there was no such levy and cannot, unless there be strong and D
 exceptional circumstances justifying such withdrawal or modification
 cannot be held to be reasonable or rational.

         The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision
  of this Court in Rai Ramk.rishna & Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1964] 1 SCC E
  897, wherein at para 17 it was observed by this Court that it is conceivable
  that cases may arise in which the retrospective operation of a taxing or
  other statute may introduce such an element of unreasonableness that the
  restrictions imposed by it may be open to serious challenge as
  unconstitutional. The learned counsel contends that if the retrospective F
  operation covers a long period like ten years [eight years in the present
· case] it should be held to impose a restriction which is prima facie
  unreasonable and as such must be struck down as being unconstitutional.
  Our attention was also drawn to the Statutes and Statutory Construction
  by Sutherland to the effect that "Tax Statutes" may be retrospective if the
  legislature clearly so intends. If the retrospective feature of a law is G
  arbitrary and burdensome the statute cannot be sustained. The reasonableness
  of each retroactive tax statute will depend on the circumstances of each
  case. "In general, income taxes are valid although retroactive, if they affect
  prior but recent transaction. This Court, in fact, noticed that retrospective
  operation of a taxing or other statute may introduce such an element of H
    462               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A unreasonableness that the restrictions imposed by it may be open to serious
  challenge as unconstitutional. Therefore, it is submitted that particularly
  when subsequently the same rule in the same form has been reintroduced
  deleting the amendment made by repealing of the provisions which have
  been introduced, it is submitted that there is no material forthcoming to
B show as to why a special treatment has to be given only for that period
  of eight years to which we have adverted to.

         The learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra, except to make
    available the amendments of the enactment and Rules, was not able to meet
C   the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. We specifically and
    repeatedly asked him as to why the denial of benefit of Rule 41-E as
    amended was confined only to the period between 1.7.1981and31.3.1988
    but he had no answer at all.

          It is no doubt true that the legislature has the powers to make laws
D retrospectively including tax laws. Levies can be imposed or withdrawn
  but if a particular levy is sought to be imposed only for a particular period
  and not prior or subsequently it is open to debate whether the statute passes
  the test of reasonableness at all. In the present case, the High Court
  sustained the enactment by adverting to Rai Ramkrishna 's case when the
E benefit of the rule had been withdrawn for a specific period. The learned
  counsel for the State contended that the amendments had been made to
  overcome certain defects arising on account of the decision of the tribunal
  in regard to the modalities of working out the relie£ But, the impugned
  amendment brought about by Section 26 is not for that purpose. Assuming
F that it was the legislative policy not to grant set off in respect of waste or
  scrap material generated, it becomes difficult to appreciate the stand of the
  State in the light of the fact that the original Rule continued to be in
  operation (with certain modifications) subsequent to 1.4.1988. The reason
   for withdrawal of the benefit retrospectively for ;i limited period is not
   forthcoming. It is no doubt true that the State has enormous powers in the
G matter of legislation and in enacting fiscal laws. Great leverage is allowed
   in the matter of taxation laws because several fiscal adjustments have to
   be made by the Government depending upon the needs of the Revenue and
   the economic circumstances prevailing in the State. Even so an action taken
   by the State cannot be so irrational and so arbitrary so as to introduce one
H set of rules for one period and another set of rules for another period by
        TATA MOTORS LTD. v. STATE (RAJENDRA BABU, J.]                  463

amending the laws in such a manner as to withdraw the benefit that had A
been given earlier resulting in higher burdens so far as the assessee is
concerned without any reason. Retrospective withdrawal of the benefit of
set-off only for a particular period should be justified on some tangible and
rational ground, when challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality.
Unfortunately, the State could not succeed in doing so. The view of the B
High Court that the impugned amendment of Rule 41-E was of clarificatory
nature to remove the doubts in interpretation cannot be upheld. In fact, the
High Court did not elaborate as to how the impugned legislation is merely
clarificatory. In that view of the matter, although we recognise the fact that
the State has enormous powers in the matter oflegislation both prospectively
and retrospectively and can evolve its own policy, we do not think that in C
the present cases any material has been placed before the Court as to why
the amendments were confined only to a period of eight years and not
either before or subsequently and, therefore, we are of the view that the
impugned provision, namely, Section 26 deserves to be quashed by striking
down the words "not being waste goods or scrap goods or by-products" D
occurring in the said Section 26 of the Maharashtra Act IX of 1989 and
the authorities concerned shall rework assessments as if that law had not
been passed and give appropriate benefits according to law to the parties
concerned.
                                                                             E
      Another contention has been advanced with regard to the requirement
under Rule 41-D that the assessee concerned has to register in the place
to which the goods are 'exported' under the Central Sales Tax Act and such
requirement is impossible of performance because the Nagar Haveli, where
the assessee's branch office is located. Inasmuch as what is claimed by the F
appellant is one in the nature of benefit under taxation law, all conditions
thereto must be complied with. One of the conditions imposed therein is
that he should have registered under the Central Sales Tax Act at the
appropriate plac~ to claim the benefit claimed thereunder. It is not
necessary for the appellant to carry his business in a place where the Central
Sales Tax Act is not extended. It is open to the appellant to carry on his G
business elsewhere and claim the benefit in a place where the Central Sales
Tax Act is applicable. He cannot put forth a ground that what is impossible
of performance cannot be done by him and, therefore, that condition arising
under the relevant provision should be ig_nored. We do not think there is
any justification to do so. This contention stands rejected.                   H
    464                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A          The appeal is allowed accordingly.

    Civil Appeal @ 3014/2004.

    SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 526011999

B           Leave granted.

        Following the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1153 of 1998 (Tata
  Motor Ltd. v. State ofMaharashtra & Ors.) just now delivered, this appeal
  is allowed in terms of that judgment. The assessment for the relevant year
C shall be redone in the light of the judgment.
    N.J.                                            Appeals partly allowed.