TASSADIQ HUSSAINversusMOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS.

                 [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 591


                      TASSADIQ HUSSAIN                              A,
                                 v.
             MOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 1825 of 2006)

                      NOVEMBER 23, 2010
                                                                    B
       [J.M. PANCHAL AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

       Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1957 - s.50(3) -
  Eligibility to contest election - Expression "a resident of
  Poonch District" in proviso to sub-Section (3) of s.50 - C
  Interpretation of - Legislative Council of Jammu and Kashmir
  - Election process for filling up reserved seat for resident of
  Poonch District - Three candidates including appellant, a
  resident of District Rajouri - Whether appellant, being a
  resident of District Rajouri, was ineligible to contest the D
  election for the seat reserved for a resident of Poonch District ,
  - Held, Yes - The word 'resident of Poonch District' in its .
• ordinary sense would mean a resident of Poonch District and ~
  a resident of Rajouri cannot be regarded as resident of
  Poonch District - If the framers of the Constitution had E
  intended to give representation by reservation to the residents
  of Poonch as well as of Rajouri, nothing prevented them from
  defining the territories of District Poonch as inclusive of
  Rajouri - In the absence of such definition, the expression
  "Poonch District" must be understood in its natural, ordinary F
  or popular meaning - Even historically, Rajouri was never
  part of Poonch District either before or after the
  commencement of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir
  - No material brought on record by the appellant to indicate,
  even remotely, that a resident of Rajouri is called or known G
  as resident of Poonch District for the purposes of the proviso
  to sub-Section (3) of s.50 of the Constitution - The expression
  "a resident of Poonch District" in the proviso to sub-Section
  (3) of s.50 of the Constitution, does not include a resident of
  Rajouri.
                                 591                                 H
    592   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A        Interpretation of Statutes - Golden rule of construction -
    Held: The words of a statute must prima facie be given their
    ordinary meaning - Parliament should prima facie be
    credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament or
    Constitution - Courts to apply the golden rule of construction,
B   that is to read the statutory language grammatically and
    terminologically in the ordinary and primary sense, which it
    bears in its context without omission or addition - However,
    Parliament should also be credited with good sense that when
    such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction
c   or stultification of statutory objective the language may be
    modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage.

       The Election Commission of India initiated election
  process for filling up six vacancies having fallen vacant
  in the Legislative Council of Jammu and Kashmir
D including the reserved vacancy for a person resident of
  Poonch District by a notification dated March 24, 2005,
  issued under Section 29 of the Jammu and Kashmir
  Representation of People Act, 1957.

E      For the reserved seat for resident of Poonch District,
  three candidates including respondent No.1 and
  appellant filed their nomination papers with the Returning
  Officer. The third candidate did not contest the election.
  Respondent No. 1 is a resident of District Poonch,
F whereas the appellant is resident of District Rajouri. At
  the time of scrutiny of nomination papers, respondent
  No.1 raised an objection to the candidature of the
  appellant before the Returning Officer, stating that the
  appellant being a resident of District Rajouri was not
G eligible to contest the election for the seat reserved for a
  resident of Poonch District and, therefore, his nomination
  be rejected. The Returning Officer, taking into
  consideration clarification given by the Election
  Commission of India dated March 30, 2005, rejected the
  objection raised by respondent No.1 and accepted the
H
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                593
                 AND ORS.
nomination papers of the appellant. Thereafter, the              A
election was held and as the appellant got more votes
than respondent No.1, he was declared elected.

    Aggrieved, respondent No. 1 filed Election Petition
before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and
                                                                 8
challenged election of the appellant to the Legislative
Council on the ground that the appellant, being ineligible
to contest the election, his election was null and void.
Respondent No.1 further prayed that after declaring the
election of the appellant as null and void, he should be         C
declared to have been elected as Member of Legislative
Council in place of the appellant.

     The High Court took into consideration the historical
background, which resulted into creation of Poonch
District and Rajouri District and held that Rajouri was          D
never part of the District Poonch either before or after the
commencement of the Constitution of Jammu and
Kashmir and, therefore, a resident of Rajouri District
cannot and could not be in any manner deemed to be a
resident of Poonch District. The High Court further held         E
that the language of sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
Constitution is absolutely clear and unambiguous and,
therefore, the reservation provided thereby for a resident
of Poonch District, should not be construed to mean to
include a resident of Rajouri District, and accordingly          F
allowed the Election Petition.        ·

      The instant appeal, filed under Section 123 .of the
 Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act,
  1957, was directed against judgment rendered by the
  High Court. The questions which arose for determination        G
 of the Court were: 1) whether the expression "Poonch
  District" used in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section
· 50 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1957,
  reserving a seat in the Legislative Council for the resident
                                                                 H
    594    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A of Poonch District means Poonch District as it existed on
  March 24, 2005 when the election notification was
  published or it includes Rajouri also; and 2) whether the
  District Rajouri was ever constituted and notified under
  the law as a part of Poonch District prior to or on the date
B of commencement of the Constitution of Jammu and
  Kashmir, 1957..

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD:1.1. The conclusion drawn by the High Court
C in the impugned judgment that the expression "a resident
  of Poonch District" in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of
  Section 50 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir,
  does not include a resident of Rajouri is just and no
  ground is made out to interfere with the same in the
D instant appeal. [Para 22] (618-F]

       1.2. It is well settled that the words of a statute
  should be first understood in their natural, ordinary or
  popular sense and phrases and sentences should be
E construed according to their grammatical meaning,
  unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is
  something in the context, or in the object of the statute
  to suggest the contrary. If the language used has a
  natural meaning, normally the Court cannot depart from
F that meaning, unless reading the statute as a whole, the
  context directs the· Court not to do so. In the
  construction of the statutes their words are normally
  interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense. Of
  course, the context in which they occur and the object
  of the statute has to be kept in mind while adopting
G ordinary grammatical sense of the word. It is often said
  that the golden rule is that the words of a statute must
  prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Parliament
  should prima facie be credited with meaning what is said
  in an Act of Parliament or Constitution. The drafting of
H
 TASSADIQ HUSS~..N v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI            595
                 AND ORS.
statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under    A
the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the
Courts seek, whenever possible, to apply the golden rule
of construction, that is to read the statutory language
grammatically and terminologically in the ordinary and
 primary sense, which it bears in its context without        B
 omission or addition. Of course, Parliament should also
 be ~redited with good sense that when such an
 approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or
 stultification of statutory objective the language may be
.modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage. [Para     c
 14) [612-8-F]

     1.3. If the expression "Poonch District", appearing in
the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
Constitution, is interpreted in its ordinary and grammatical
meaning, it means District Poonch as was constituted at D
the time when election notification was published. If an
ordinary meaning of the expression "Poonch District" is
accepted, it would mean the geographical area of District
Poonch as it existed on the date of notification issued for
holding elections in the year 2005. The word 'resident of E
Poonch District' in its ordinary sense would mean a
resident of Poonch District and resident of Rajouri cannot
be regarded as resident of Poonch District. If the framers
of the Constitution had intended to give representation
by reservation to the residents of Poonch as well as of F
Rajouri, nothing prevented them from defining the
territories of District Poonch as inclusive of Rajouri. In
the absence of such definition, the expression "Poonch
District" must be understood in its natural, ordinary or
popular meaning. It is an admitted position that as per G
the definition of the term "District" mentioned in the
provisions of Revenue Department Reorganization Act,
2008, the word "District" means a "Revenue 'District" and
if this interpretation is adopted, it becomes at once clear
                                                             H
    596   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A   that the expression "District Poonch" appearing in the
    proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
    Constitution, does not include Rajouri. [Para 15] [612-H;
    613-A-D]

         Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm v. T.N. Electricity Board and
8
    another (2004) 4 SCC 705; Dr. Ajay Pradhan v. State of
    Madhya Pradesh and others AIR 1988 SC 1875; State of UP.
    and others v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and others 1995
    Supp. (2) SCC 305; K. Venkataramiah v. A Seetharama
C   Reddy and others 1964 (2) SCR 35; Jeet Mohinder Singh v.
    Harminder Singh Jassi (1999) 9 SCC 386; Supreme Court
    Advocates-on-Record Association and others v. Union of
    India (1993) 4 SCC 441; Printers House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mst
    Saiyadan (deceased) by LRs. And others (1994) 2 SCC 133;
    Narender Singh v. Mala Ram and another (1999) 8 SCC 198
D   - referred to.

       2. Even historically it is found that Rajouri was never
  part of Poonch District either before or after the
  commencement of the Constitution of Jammu and
E Kashmir. The High Court had recorded a finding that
  since there was no separate and independent District
  Administration provided for District Rajouri and District
  Rajouri as well as District Poonch continued to be
  administered by joint District Administration from
F Poonch, both the Districts for the purpose of
  administration were being referred to as one District,
  namely, Rajouri-Poonch District. The record, however,
  does not indicate that any such district known as Rajouri-
  Poonch District was ever formed by the Administration.
G The record also shows that this position continued up to
  the year 1957, when the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution
  was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1957.
  The General Department of the State had issued
  Government Order No. 137-C of 1967 dated September
H 30, 1967 splitting Poonch District into two Districts, i.e.,
   TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI              597
                  AND ORS.

    (1) Poon ch District comprising Have Ii and Mendhar A
    Tehsils with Head Quarters at Poonch and (2) Rajouri
    District comprising Rajouri and Nowshera Tehsils with
    Head Quarters at Rajouri, in the interest of revenue and
    law and order. By the said order Tehsils Rajouri and
    Nowshera which were excluded from the Poonch District, B
    constituted a separate district known as District Rajouri.
    Further the Revenue Department of the State issued
    notification SRO 444 dated October 21, 1967 under
    Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act,
    SVT 1996, directing that the territorial limits of Tehsil c
  . Rajouri and Nowshera shall be excluded from the existing
     Poonch~Rajouri District and shall constitute a separate
     District to be known as District Rajouri. If one reads the
    above mentioned two orders, a glaring fact, which cannot
     be ignored, becomes evident is that though no fresh
                                                                 0
     notification under Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir
     Land Revenue Act for creation of the District Rajouri as .
     an independent District was required, yet the same was
   . issued again to emphasis that Tehsil Rajouri and
     Nowshera were excluded from the District
     administratively known as Poonch-Rajouri District and E
     constituted into a separate District known as District
. __ Rajouri. Though in the above mentioned two orders,
     there is a reference to Poonch-Rajouri District, in fact,
     there was no district formed or constituted, which was
     known as Poonch-Rajouri District and probably all the F
     confusion has arisen only because of reference of a
     district known as Poonch-Rajouri District in the above
     mentioned two orders. [Para 16] [613-E-H; 614-A-H; 615-
     A-D]
                                                                 G
          3. The contention advanced by the appellant that if
     the expression "Resident of District Poonch", appearing
     in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
     Constitution, is interpreted to mean a resident of District
     Poonch and does not include resident of Rajouri, would H
    598   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. ·


A have adverse effect on the interpretation to be put to the
  proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the
  Constitution, in which reference is made to Kargil and
  Leh, is an argument in terrorem and cannot be
  accepted.The argument that the interpretation canvassed
B by the respondent No. 1, if accepted by the Court, would
  have effect on the interpretation of the proviso to sub-
  section (2) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is no ground
  to place an incorrect interpretation on the proviso to sub-
  section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution. [Paras 17,
C 18) [615-E-G]

        Indian Overseas Bank v. I. 0. B. Staff Canteen Workers'
    Union and another 2004) 4 sec 245 - relied on.

       4. The clarification issued by the Election
D Commission of India is not only contrary to historical
  background of the two districts concerned, but is also
  plainly against the well-settled principles of interpretation
  of statute. It is true that under Section 138 of the
  Constitution       of Jammu         and    Kashmir,      the
E superintendence, direction and control of elections to
  either House of the State Legislature held under the
  Constitution vest in the Election Commission of India.
  However, in exercise of powers under Section 138 of the
  Constitution, the Election Commission of India cannot
F define boundaries of the constituencies or territorial
  limits either of State Legislature or of Legislative Council.
  May be, the view taken by the Election Commission of
  India can be taken into consideration by the Court of Law
  while interpreting the provisions of proviso to sub-
G Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution. However,
  the power to superintend, direct and control elections
  does not make the clarification binding either on the State
  Government or the persons contesting the elections and
  voters. It is certainly not binding on this Court. [Para 19)
H [616-F-H; 617-A-F]
       .  ..
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI 599
                 AND ORS.
     Laxmi Kant Bajpai v. Haji Yaqoob and others (2010) 4    A
.sec 81 - referred to.
       5. The last plea that the burden to prove that the
  expression "Resident of Poonch District". does not
  include a resident of Rajouri is on the respondent No. 1,
                                                               8
  who has filed petition challenging the election of the
  appellant as a Member of the Legislative Council and as
  the said burden was not discharged, the petition should
  have been dismissed, has no substance at all. A glance
  at the impugned order makes it evident that both the
  parties had accepted before the High Court that this was C
  purely a legal issue to be decided on the interpretation
  of the provisions of the Constitution.             In such
  circumstances question of burden of proof never arose
  before the High Court. This Court finds that it was the
  specific case of the appellant that the expression "a D
  resident of District Poonch" includes a resident of District
  Rajouri and, therefore, the appellant, if advised, could
  have. brought the evidence on record to substantiate the
  said plea. The fact remains that no material was brought
  on record of the case by the appellant to indicate, even E
. remotely, that a resident of Rajouri is called or known as
  resident of Poonch District for the purposes of the
  proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
   Constitution. Under the circumstances, the High Court
  was justified in not dismissing the petition filed by the F
   respondent No. 1, questioning the election of the
   appellant as a Member of the Legislative Council on the
   ground that the respondent No. 1 had failed to discharge
  the burden of proof. [Para 21] [618-C-E]
                                                               G
                        Case Law Reference:
      (2004) 4 sec 705      referred to        Paras 4, 8
     AIR 1988 SC 1875       referred to        Para 4
                                                              H
                                                .:
                                                 ... _.;'

    600     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C R.


A         1995 Supp. (2) SCC 305 referred to                Para 6
          1964 (2) SCR 35         referred to               Para 6

          (1999) 9 sec 386        referred to               Para 6

          (1993) 4 sec 441        referred to               Para 6
B
          (1994) 2 sec 133        referred to               Para 6

          (1999) 8 sec 198        referred to               Para 6

          (201 O) 4 sec 81        referred to               Paras 7, 19
c
          (2004) 4 sec 245        relied on                 Para 18
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1825
    of 2006.
        From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2006 of the
0
    High Court of Jam mu and Kashmir at Jammu in Election Petition
    No. 1 of 2005.
        Rajeev Dhawan, Satpal Singh, Kunwar C.M. Khan, M.A.
    Khan, Vikas Singh and lrshad Ahmad for the Appellant.
E      Ranjit Kumar, Gaurav Sharma, M.R. Qureshi, Abhinav
    Mukherji, Surbhi Mehta, Mukesh K. Giri, Sunil Fernandes, Vikrant
    Nagpal and S. Goel for the Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F        J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. This appeal, filed under Section 123
    of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act,
    1957, is directed against judgment dated March 13, 2006,
    rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jammu
    and Kashmir at Jammu in Election Petition No. 1 of 2005 by
G   which the Election Petition filed by the respondent No. 1,
    challenging election of the appellant to the Legislative Council
    of the State Legislature, is allowed and his election is declared
    void. Further the learned Single Judge has declared that in place
    of the appellant the respondent No. 1, i.e., Mr. Mohd. Rashid
H
 TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                     601
         AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Qureshi, advocate, is proclaimed as elected.                           A
    2. The facts, giving rise to the instant appeal, are as under:
     The Constitution of Jam mu and Kashmir ('the Constitution'
for short) was implemented on January 26, 1957. Section 50
of the Constitution deals with composition of Legislative Council.     B
Sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution provides that
eleven members of the Legislative Council shall be elected by
the members of the Legislative Assembly from amongst persons,
who are residents of the Province of Jammu. However, the
proviso to the said sub-section stipulates that at least one           c
member out of eleven members shall be resident of Doda District
whereas at least one shall be a resident of Poonch District.
       The Election Commission of India initiated election process
for filling up six vacancies having fallen vacant in the Legislative
Council of Jammu and Kashmir including the reserved vacancy            D
for a person resident of Poonch DistriCt by a notification dated
March 24, 2005, issued under Section 29 of the Jammu and
Kashmir Representation of People Act, 1957 ('the Act of 1957'
for short). Under the notification dated March 30, 2005 it was
specified that the last date for filing nominations was March 31,      E
2005 whereas scrutiny of the nomination papers was to take
place on April 2, 2005, which was also the last date for withdrawal
of the candidatures. According to the election schedule, the
polling was to take place on April 11, 2005 and election process
was to be completed on April 15, 2005.                                 F
      For the reserved seat for resident of Poonch District, three
candidates, namely, Mr. Mohd. Rashid Qureshi, i.e., the
respondent No. 1 herein, Mr. Tassadaq Hussain, i.e., the
appellant herein and one Mr. lmtiyaz Ali Sanday filed their
nomination papers with the Returning Officer. The respondent G
No. 1 was the sponsored candidate of National Conference
Political Party whereas two other candidates were sponsored
by People's Democratic Party. Mr. lmtiyaz Ali Sanday did not
contest the election and withdrew his candidature on the last
da_te fixed for withdrawal of the nominations. Admittedly, the H
    602    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A  respondent No. 1 is a resident ofTehsil Mendhar, District Poonth,
   whereas the appellant is resident of Village Larkoti, Tehsil
   Budhal, Kotranka, District Rajouri. At the time of scrutiny of
   nomination papers, the respondent No. 1 raised an objection to
   the candidature of the appellant before the Returning Officer,
B stating that the appellant being a resident of District Rajouri was
   not eligible to contest the election for the seat reserved for a
   resident of Poonch District and, therefore, his nomination be
   rejected. The Returning Officer, taking into consideration
  clarification given by the Election Commission of India vide letter
c No. 332/JK-LC/2005 dated March 30, 2005, rejected the
  objection raised by the respondent No. 1 and accepted the
  nomination papers of the appellant. While accepting the
  nomination papers of the appellant, the Returning Officer
  recorded reasons and observed that any change/alteration in
  the boundaries of Poonch District by an adm.inistrative or
0
  statutory order would not deprive the residents of the erstwhile
  Poonch District of the right to ~uch reservation as is provided
  to them under the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of
  the Constitution. Thereafter, the election was held and the
  appellant got 60 votes of the Members of the Legislative
E Assembly of the State as against 28 votes cast in favour of the
  respondent No. 1. Thus, the appellant was declared to have
  been elected as a member of the Legislative Council by the
  Returning Officer for the seat reserved for a resident of Poonch
  District.
F
         3. Being aggrieved by this, the respondent No. 1 filed
    Election Petition No. 1 of 2005 before the High Court of Jammu
    and Kashmir and challenged election of the appellant to the
    Legislative Council held in the year 2005 on the ground that the
G   appellant, being ineligible to contest the election, his election
    was null and void. The respondent No. 1 further prayed that
    after declaring the election of the appellant as null and void, he
    should be declared to have been elected as Member of
    Legislative Council in place of the appellant.
H       4. The learned Single Judge took into consideration the
. TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI 603
     .    AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

historical ~ackground, which resulted into creation of Poonch A
District and Rajouri District, which was available on the official
websites ofthe two Districts. The learned Judge observed that
vide order No. 667-C of 1949 dated August 20, 1949 it was
decided that the then existing Reasi District comprising Tehsils
Reasi and Rampur-Rajouri' was to be abolished and a new B
district comprising Tehsil Rampur-Rajouri and Nowshera to be
formed with the name of Rajouri having Head Quarter at Rajouri.
The Court noticed that after the notification dated August 20,
1949 District Rajouri stood constituted under Section 5 of the
Jammu· and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 (1939 AD) as C
independent District. The Court also found that vide Order No.
1451-C of 1950 dated December 11, 1950, District Rajouri, for
administrative and revenue purposes, was administered by
 District Administration, headquartered at District Poonch. The
Court further noticed that no Government order or notification
was brought on the record to show that a distriyt known as District D
 Rajouri-Poonch was ever constituted. The learned Judge further ,
 found that the Revenue Department, while issuing SRO 444
 dated October 21, 1967, by which District Rajouri was excluded .
from Poonch-Rajouri District, did not take note of the '
 Government Order No. 667of1949 dated August 20, 1949 and, E
therefore, no fresh notification under Section 5 of the Jammu
 and Kashmir Land Revenue Act for creation of Rajouri District
 as an independent District was required, but surprisingly the
 same was issued again. The learned Judge observed that
 Rajouri was never part of the District Poonch either before or F
 after the commencement of the Constitution and, therefore, a
 resident of Rajouri District cannot and could not be in any manner
 deemed to be a resident of Pooncli District. According to the
 learned Judge, in absence of definition of words "Poonch
 Dist~ict" in the Constitution the said expression has to be G
 understood injts natural and ordinary or popular meaning. The
 learned Judge observed that the ordinary and popular meaning
 of the expression "Poonch District" read with the provisions of
 Revenue Department Re-organisation Act, 2008, would mean
 the revenue- administrative district and placed reliance on the H
      604    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S CR


  A   decision of this Court in Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm vs. T.N.
      Electricity Board and another [(2004) 4 SCC 705] and Or. Ajay
      Pradhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others [AIR 1988
      SC 1875], for coming to the above mentioned conclusion.
      According to the learned Judge, the language of sub-Section
  B   (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution is absolutely clear and
      unambiguous and, therefore, the reservation provided thereby
      for a resident of Poonch District, which should not be construed
      to mean to include a resident or Rajouri District. In view of the
      above-referred conclusions, the learned Judge allowed the
 c    Election Petition, filed by the respondent No. 1 and election of
      the appellant to the Legislative Council of the State Legislature
      is declared to be void whereas in his place the respondent No.
      1 is declared as elected by judgment dated March 13, 2006,
      which has given rise to the instant appeal.
 D         5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
      at great length and in detail. This Court has also considered the
      documents forming part of the appeal.
            6. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior advocate for the
      appellant, contended that the view expressed by the Election
 E    Commissioner in communication dated March 30, 2005 was
      rightly taken into consideration by the Returning Officer while
      accepting the nomination papers of the appellant and rejecting
      the objection raised by the respondent No. 1. It was contended
      that as view expressed by the Election Commission has binding
 F    effect, in view of Section 138 of the Constitution, the election of
      the appellant could not have been declared as void. The learned
      counsel emphasized that Poonch including Rajouri are border
      Districts next to the Actual Line of Control with Paki~tan and are
      known as hardship districts and, therefore, the learned Single
 G    Judge of the High Court committed an error in holding that Rajouri
      was not part of Poonch District. It was emphasized by the
      learned counsel for the appellant that at the time of making the
      Constitution under Order dated December 11, 1950, Poonch
      was administratively identified as including Rajouri and,
· H   therefore, the finding, that a resident of Rajouri is not entitled to
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                  605
          AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
contest the election as Member of the Legislative Council for A
the reserved seat of Poonch District, is erroneous and deserves
to be set aside. According to the learned counsel for the
appellant, interpretation of a constitutional provision cannot
depend on what Government or Revenue Department of the
Government thinks and if this is permitted, the reservation . B
contemplated by proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
Constitution would go on changing from day-to-day and,
therefore, it should have been held that the appellant, who is
resident of Rajouri District, was entitled to contest election for
the seat reserved for a resident of Poonch District. The learned
counsel submitted that if the interpretation placed by the learned
                                                                   c
Single Judge of the High Court were to be accepted, the same
would adversely affect a resident of Tehsil Ladakh and Tehsil
Kargil for whom reservation is made under the proviso to sub-
section (2) of Section 50 of the Constitution as well as a resident
                                                                    D
of Doda District for whom reservation is made under sub-
section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution and, therefore, the
same should not have been adopted by the High Court.
According to the learned counsel, the onus was on the
respondent No. 1 to prove by leading evidence that Rajouri did
not form part of Poon ch District and the respondent No. 1, having E
failed to discharge the onus, the Election Petition filed by him
should have been dismissed. What was maintained was that
the Constitution must be given an expansive interpretation
because it is the Grand norm and the document from which the
other enactments flow and as intent of the framers of the F
Constitution was to provide reservation to a resident of Poonch
District having geographical area envisaged, the Election
Petition challenging the election of the appellant should have
been dismissed by the High Court.. The learned counsel asserted
that the expression "Poonch District" includes Rajouri District G
and, therefore, without any amendment in the Constitution, as
contemplated by Section 147 of the Constitution, the election of
the appellant could not have been voided on the ground that the
expression "Poonch District" does not include "Rajouri District".
The learned counsel argued that no revenue authority can change H
    606   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A the Constitution or its intent and, therefore, the reliance placed
  by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on the notification
  dated October 21, 1967, issued under the Jam mu and Kashmir
  Land Revenue Act was misplaced. The learned counsel
  stressed that the judgment impugned is erroneous and deserves '
B to be set aside. In support of above-mentioned contentions, the
  learned counsel relied on the decisions of this Court in (1) State
  of U. P. and others vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and
  others [1995 Supp. (2) SCC 305], (2) K. Venkataramiah vs. A.
   Seetharama Reddy and others [1964 (2) SCR 35], (3) Jeet
C Mohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi [(1999) 9 SCC
  386], (4) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association
  and others vs. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 441], (5) Printers
  House Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mst Saiyadan (deceased) by LRs. And
  others [( 1994) 2 SCC 133] and (6) Narender Singh vs. Mala
  Ram and another [(1999) 8 sec 198].
0
        ·7. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior advocate for the
   respondent No. 1, contended that the phrase "resident of Poonch
   District", appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section
   50 of the Constitution, should be construed to mean its ordinary
E meaning, which can only mean the geographical area of District
   of Poon ch as it existed on the date of notification of the elections
   in the year 2005. According to the learned counsel, the ordinary
   meaning of the word "District" is to be found in J&K Revenue
   Department Reorganisation Act, 2008, which means a "Revenue
F District" whereas Articles 243A and 243P(b) of the Constitution
   of India define the word "Districts" to mean as District in the
   State and, therefore, the judgment impugned should be upheld
   by this Court. The learned counsel also pointed out the Legal
   Glossary published by the Government of India which defines
G the word "District" as portion of territory marked off or defined
   for some special administrative or official purpose and includes
   a division or sub-section of a province or presidency. The
   learned counsel emphasized that a word in the Constitution
   should not be given historical meaning as the Constitution is
  ·always dynamic, organic living document which goes on
H
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                    607
          AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
  changing to meet the needs of the people as well as the A
  exigencies of the time. The learned counsel stressed that the
  intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from
 the language used and while ascertaining the intention, attention
  should be paid to what has been said and not to what has not
  been said. According to Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for B
  the respondent No. 1, the words of the statute should be first
  understood in their natural ordinary or popular sense and
  phrases and sentences should be construed according to their
  grammatical meaning unless such a construction leads to some
  absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the   c
  object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. It was argued
  that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used by the
  Legislature should not be departed from unless it can be shown
  that the legal context in which the words are used, requires a
  different meaning and a statute should be read in the ordinary
                                                                      0
  and primary sense without any omission or addition. The learned
  counsel contended that the language employed in the proviso
  to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is precise,
  plain, categorical as well as unambiguous and also expresses
  the intention of the framers of the Constitution, which is that the
  expression "Poonch District" does not include District Rajouri.
                                                                      E
  The learned counsel argued that different principles of
   interpretations as suggested by the learned counsel for the
  appellant, for understanding as to what was in the mind of the
   framers of the Constitution while enacting the proviso to sub-
. Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution need not be gone F
   into, more particularly, when the ordinary meaning of the phrase
   "Resident of Poonch District" is clear and unambiguous. It was
   submitted that even otherwise Rajouri District was not even
   historically a part of the Poonch District and merely because
   the Head Quarters of DM/SSP of both Rajouri and Poonch G
   Districts were directed to be located at Poonch, vide ord.er dated
   December 11, 1950, Poonch and Rajouri cannot be regarded
   as one District. It was submitted that the District Rajouri was a
   part of District Bhimber in 1904 (A.O.) and thereafter it was
   bifurcated from District Bhimber and was affiliated to Reasi H
    608    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A    District, but in the year 1949, vide order No. 667-C of 1949 dated
    August 20, 1949, District Reasi comprising Tehsils Rampur-
    Rajouri and Reasi, was abolished and a new District known as
    District Rajouri comprising Tehsils Rampur-Rajouri and
    Nowshera was formed, whereas pursuant to Cabinet Order No.
B   667-C, mentioned above, issued in exercise of powers under
    Section 5 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996 (SVT), District Rajouri
    was formed, which was constituted comprising Tehsil Rajouri
    Tehsil Nowshera. The submission, which was placed by the
    learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 for consideration of
c   the Court, was that burden of proof was not on the respondent
    No. 1 to prove that District Poonch did not include District Rajouri
    because both the parties had accepted, as mentioned in the
    impugned order of the High Court, that it was purely a question
    of law to be decided by the Court. According to the learned
D   counsel for the respondent No. 1, the appellant was not
    precluded to bring evidence on record to establish that a resident
    of Rajouri should be called as Resident of Poonch District. The
    learned counsel emphasized that no material having been
    produced by the appellant to show that District Poonch includes
    District Rajouri, the ordinary meaning of the expression "Resident
E   of Poonch District" as appearing in the proviso to sub-Section
    (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, should be adopted by the
    Court. What was maintained was that though Election
    Commission of India has a duty to superintend, direct and control
    elections, there is no power available to Election Commission
F   of India to define boundaries of the constituencies or territorial
    limits as a result of which th.e view expressed by the Election
    Commission in its communication dated March 30, 2005 that
    a resident of Rajouri District would be entitled to contest election
    on a seat reserved for a resident of District Poonch, has no
G   value at all. The learned counsel referred to the decision of this
    Court in Laxmi Kant Bajpai vs. Haji Yaqoob and others ((2010)
    4 SCC 81], to buttress his arguments that Election Commission
    of India has no power to change the boundaries or area or extend
    the boundaries of any constituency. It was argued by the learned
H   counsel for the respondent No. 1 that if the framers of the
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                       609
          AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Constitution had intended to give representation by way of               A
reservation to the residents of Poonch as well as Rajouri for all
time to come, the framers of the Constitution would have defined
the territories of District Poonch as well, but, it is an admitted
position that the territories of District Poon ch were never defined
by the Government and, therefore, in the absence of any such             B
definition, "Poonch District" will have to be given its natural,
ordinary or popular meaning. It was pointed out that Section
5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of People Act
provides for delimitation of constituencies, i.e., MLC constituency
and in case the intention of the Government was to provide               c
special status to the residents of Rajouri, there could have been
an appropriate delimitation of constituencies of MLC also and
in absence of such a delimitation for MLC the historical meaning
should not be assigned while interpreting the provisions of the
Constitution.
                                                                         D
     8. In support of the above mentioned submissions, the
learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance
on the decision of this Court in Maheshwari Fish Seed Fram
vs. T.N. Electricity Board and another [(2004) 4 SCC 705].
                                                                         E
        9. The learned counsel for the State of Jammu and Kashmir
  argued that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
  that the appellant was entitled to contest election for the reserved
  seat of District Poonch on the ground that at the time of
  commencement of the Constitution, Rajouri was part of District
  Poonch is misconceived and incorrect. It was submitted that            F
. Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996
  Svt. (1939 AD) inter alia provides that the Government may by
  notification vary the limits of Tehsils, Districts and Provinces
  under which the territories administered by each are defined
  and may also by notification alter the number of those Tehsils,        G
  Districts and Provinces. What was pleaded was that in exercise
  of powers under Section 5 of the said Act, notifications had been
  issued from time to time by the Government for demarcating
  the areas of the Districts. According to the learned counsel, the
  Districts or Tehsils for any purposes means Districts or Tehsils,      H
    610    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 15 {ADDLJ S.C.R.


A   as the case may be, as notified by the Government from time
    to time under Section 5 of the said Act. It was maintained that
    in the year 1949 the General Department of Prime Minister's
    Secretariat had issued_ an order bearing No. 667-C of 1949
    Whereby District Rajouri was constituted comprising Tehsil
B   Rampur-Rajouri and Nowshera with its Head Quarters at Rajouri
    and, therefore, it is wrong to contend that District Poonch, as
    mentioned in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the
    Constitution, includes Rajouri. The learned counsel for the State
    contended that as on the date of the election in the instant case,
c   District Rajouri was a separate District and distinct from Poonch
    District and, therefore, the benefit of the reserved seat that is
    provided under Section 50(3) of the Constitution would not be
    available to the residents of District Rajouri. The learned counsel
    stressed that the High Court by its impugned judgment has
0   correctly appreciated the facts as well as rightly interpreted the
    law and, therefore, the said judgment should not be interfered
    with by this Court.
         10. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at
    length and in great detail. This Court has also taken into
E   consideration the documents forming part of the appeal as well
    as relevant provisions of law to which attention of the Court was
    drawn by the learned counsel for the parties and the authorities
    cited at the Bar.
        11. Before proceeding to consider the submissions
F advanced at the Bar it would be relevant to note that the learned
  counsel for the appellant conceded that the appellant was not
  claiming recrimination. It means that the appellant has given up
  his prayer to declare that the respondent NO. 1 was not qualified
  to be elected as member of the Legislative Council. The
G concession made by the learned counsel for the appellant was
  in view of the fact that this point was not raised by the appellant
  herein before the High Court.
          12. Another relevant fact, which requires to be noticed, is
H   that the learned counsel for the appellant agreed that the Poonch
   TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                      611
           AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
                     I

   District stands divided for the purpose of law and order, revenue     A
   and for Assembly constituencies. However, he emphasized that
   for the purpose bf the Legislative Council, there was no division
   of Poonch District. This Court finds that the latter argument, if
   accepted, would lead to absurd results. It may be mentioned
   that it was averred by the respondent No. 1 in his petition before    s
   the High Court that right from the elections in the year 1967 till
   date no resident of District Rajouri was elected as a member
   of Legislative Council for the seat reserved for residents of
   District Poonch. In fact, an averment was made that the
   respondent No. 3 herein, i.e., the Returning Officer in 2005          c
   elections was also the Returning Officer in 1999 elections and
   he had rejected the nomination paper of a resident of Rajouri
- as being not eligible. This Court finds that that the Returning
   Officer was given a reward within one week of rejection of
   nomination papers of a resident of Rajouri District and the           D
   extension of one year in service was granted to him. Therefore,
   this Court finds some force in the argument advanced by the
   learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and learned counsel
   for the State Government that the Government and Election
   Commission had always interpreted the word "Poonch District"
   under the proviso to Section 50(3) of the Constitution to mean        E
   as Revenue District of Poonch and Rajouri was not considered
   to be part of District Poonch. This Court finds that the above-
   stated averments could not be demonstrated to be untrue. The
.. past history does not support the case of the appellant that though
   for all practical purposes including for the purpose of Assembly      F
   election, District Poonch was divided, it stood integrated for the
   purpose of election to Legislative Council.
      13. In view of the rival submissions advanced at\the Bar,
 the question which arises for determination of the Court is G
 whether the expression "Poonch District" used in the proviso to
 sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution of Jammu and_
 Kashmir, 1957, reserving a seat in the Legislative Council for
·the resident of Poonch District means Poonch District as it
 existed on March 24, 2005 when the election notification was .
                                                                 H
    612   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL) S C.R.


A   published or it includes Rajouri also. Another question which
    arises for consideration by the Court is whether the District
    Hajouri was ever constituted and notified under the law as a
    part of Poonch District prior to or on the date of commencement
    of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1957.
B       14. It is well settled that the words of a statute should be
  first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
  phrases and sentences should be construed according to their
  grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or
  unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the
C statute to suggest the contrary. If the language used has a natural
  meaning, normally the Court cannot-depart from that meaning~,·>···"'
  unless reading the statute as a whole, the context directs the·
  Court not to do so. In the construction of the statutes their words
  are normally interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense.
D Of course, the context in which they occur and the object of the
  statute has to be kept in mind while adopting ordinary
  grammatical sense of the word. It is often said that the golden
  rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their
  ordinary meaning. Parliament should prima facie be credited
E with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament or Constitution.
  The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to
   live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the
   Courts seek, whenever possible, to apply the golden rule of
   construction, that is to read the statutory language grammatically
F and terminologically in the ordinary and primary sense, which it
   bears in its context without omission or addition. Of course,
   Parliament should also be credited with good sense that when
   such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction
   or stultification of statutory objective the language may be
G modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage.
         15. If the expression "Poonch District", appearing in the
    proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is
    interpreted in its ordinary and grammatical meaning, it means
    District Poonch as was constituted at the time when election
H   notification was published. If an ordinary meaning of the
  TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                        613
          AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

 expression "Poonch District" is accepted, it would mean the              A
 geographical area of District Poonch as it existed on the date
  of notification issued for holding elections. io the year 2005. The
 word 'resident of Poonch District' in its ordinary sense would
  mean a resident of Poon ch District and resident of Rajouri cannot
. be regarded as resident of Poon ch District. If the framers of the      B
  Constitution had intended to give representation by reservation
  to the residents of Poonch as well as of Rajouri, nothing
  prevented them from defining the territories of District Poonch
  as inclusive of Rajouri. In the absence of such definition, the
  expression "Poonch District" must be understood in its natural,         c
  ordinary or popular meaning. It is an admitted position that as
  per the definition of the term "District" mentioned in the provisions
  of Revenue Department Reorganization Act, 2008, the word
  "District" means a "Revenue District" and if this interpretation is
  adopted, it becomes at once clear that the expression "District         D
  Poonch" appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section
  50 of the Constitution, does not include Rajouri. ·
     16. Even historically this Court finds that Rajouri was never
part of Poonch District either before or after the commencement
of the Constitution. There was no Constitution of Jammu and E
Kashmir in the year 1949, but what was applicable and prevalent
was J&K Constitution Act of SVT 1996 (year equivalent to 1939
AD). Under the said Act Prime Minister was head of the State.
The General Department of Prime Minister's Secretariat issued
an order No. 667-C of 1949 dated August 20, 1949 mentioning F
that Reasi District comprising Tehsil Reasi and Rampur-Rajouri
be abolished and instead a new District to be known as District
Rajouri comprising Tehsils Rampur-Rajouri and Nowshera be
formed as a temporary measure with Head Quarters at Rajouri.
It may be stated that Tehsil Rampur-Rajouri is the present Tehsil . G
of Rajouri which earlier used to be known and called as Rampur-
Rajourl. After publication of above mentioned order dated
August 20, 1949, the Government formed and constituted a new
District known as District Rajouri with Head Quarters at Rajo1;1ri
comprising Tehsil Rajouri and reconstituted Tehsil of Nowshera,
                                                                          H
    614    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010]' 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A by issuing an order under Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir
  Land Revenue Act, 1996 (Samvat). Again, an order No. 1451-
  C of 1950 dated December 11, 1950 was issued mentioning
  that the Head Quarters of District Magistrate and Waz;jr Rajouri
  and Poonch and Superintendent of Police, Rajouri be located
B at Poonch and that of Assistant Superintendent of Police at
  Rajouri. A conjoint and meaningful reading of above mentioned
  notifications/orders makes it abundantly clear that though District
  Rajouri stood constituted as an independent District, its Head
  Quarters for District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner was
c located at Poonch, which was also the Head Quarters of District
  Poonch. Thus for administrative and revenue purposes District
  Rajouri was administrated by District Administration Head
  Quarters located at District Poonch. This Court finds that under
  these circumstances, the High Court had recorded a finding that
D since there was no separate and independent District
  Administration provided for District Rajouri and District Rajouri
  as well as District Poonch continued to be administered by joint
  District Administration from Poonch, both the Distric;ts for the
  purpose of administration were being referred to as one District,
E namely, Rajoliri-Poonch District. It is pertinent to note that the
  record does not indicate that any such district known as Rajoari-
  Poonch District was ever formed by the Administration. The
  record also shows that this position continued up to the year
  1957, when the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was brought
  into force with effect from January 26, 1957. What is relevant
F to notice is that the General Department of the State issued
  Government Order No. 137-C of 1967 dated September 30,
  1967 splitting Poonch District into two Districts, i.e., (1) Poonch
  District comprising Haveli and Mendhar Tehsils with Head
  Quarters at Poonch and (2) Rajouri District comprising Rajouri
G and Nowshera Tehsils with Head Quarters at Rajouri, in the
  interest of revenue and law and order. By the said order Tehsils
  Rajouri and Nowshera which were excluded from the Poonch
  District, constituted a separate district known as District Rajouri.
  It is worthwhile to note that the Revenue Department of the State
H issued notification SRO 444 dated October 21, 1967 under
   TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                       615
           AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

   Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, SVT              A
   1996-, directing that the territorial limits of Tehsil Rajouri and
   Nowshera shall be excluded from the existing Poonch-Rajouri
   District and shall constitute a separate District to be known as
   District Rajouri. If one reads the above mentioned two orders,
   a glaring fact, which cannot be ignored, becomes evident is that       B
   though no fresh notification under Section 5 of the Jammu and
   Kashmir Land Revenue Act for creation of the D'istrict Rajouri
   as an independent District was required, yet the same was
   issued again to emphasis that Tehsil Rajouri and Nowshera
   excluded from administratively known as Poonch-Rajouri District        c
. and constituted into a separate District known as District Rajouri.
   Though in the above mentioned two orders, this Court finds, a
  ·reference to Poonch-Rajouri District, in fact, there was no district
   formed or constituted, which was known as Poonch-Rajouri
 , Oistrict and probably all the confusion has arisen only because        D
   of reference of a district known as Poonch-Rajouri District in
   the above mentioned two orders.
      17. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for
 the appellant that if the expression "Resident of District Poonch",
 appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the         E
 Constitution, is interpreted to mean a resident of District Poonch
 and does not include resident of Rajouri, would have adverse
 effect on the interpretation to be put to the proviso to sub-Section
 (2) of Section 50 of the Constitution, in which reference is made
 to Kargil and Leh, is found by this Court to be an argument in           F
 terrorem and cannot be accepted.
      18. The argument that the interpretation canvassed by the
 respondent No. 1, if accepted by the Court, would have effect
 on the interpretation of the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section
 50 of the Constitution, is no ground to place an incorrect               G
 interpretation on the proviso to sub-Section (3) ofSection 50 of
 the Constitution. In Indian Overseas Bank vs. 1.0.B. Staff
 Canteen Workers' Union and another [2004) 4 SCC 245], the
 contractor, who was running canteen, was removed and the
 Indian Overseas Bank ('1.0.B.' for short) agreed for floating a          H
    616   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A  cooperative society to run the canteen. The Central Office of
   1.0.B. agreed to provide all infrastructural facilities. The staff
   required was employed by promoters, who were administering
   ~he crnteen. The canteen was successfully being run by the
   Central Office from the amounts realized from day-to-day ··
B receipts. However, the canteen was not able to meet its financial
   requirements and was closed. Consequently the canteen
   workers were thrown out of employment. At the instance of the
   workers' union, Government of India made two references to
   the Industrial Tribunal. Meanwhile, Central Office made
c .arrangement with a third party for running the canteen on
   contractual basis. Aggrieved by this, the workers filed a
   complaint under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The
   Tribunal held that the employees of the canteen were to be
   treated as workmen of IOB and entitled to same status and
D facilities. The Tribunal also allowed the claim made in the
   complaint. On writ petitions filed by the IOB, a single Judge of
   the High Court set aside the Award of the Tribunal, which was
   subsequently restored by the Division Bench of the High Court.
   Before this Court the IOB expressed an apprehension that ifthe
E claim of the canteen workers was upheld, the appellant Bank
   would also have to face similar claims from every employee of
   the canteens run everywhere. Negativing the said argument this
   Cou11 held that such an argument in terrorem cannot deprive the
   workers of such status if they are entitled to such status.
F      19. It is significant to note that a query had been made to
  the Election Commission of India as to whether the benefit of
  reservation under Section 50(3) of the Constitution of Jammu
  and Kashmir can be given to a resident of Rajouri. To this, the
  Election Commission of India had responded vide
G communication dated March 30, 2005 clarifying that the Poonch
  District referred to in Section 50(3) of the Constitution of Jammu
  and Kashmir, would include District Rajouri, which was a part
  of undivided Poonch District at the time of commencement of
  the Jammu and Kashmir State. It is argued on behalf of learned
H counsel for the appellant that under Section 138 of the
 TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI                      617
         AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Election Commission ,of             A
India has power to superintend and control elections held in the
State of Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, the view taken by
the Election Commission of India in its communication dated
March 30, 2005 is binding and should be accepted by this Court.
It is true that under Section 138 of the Constitution of Jammu         B
and Kashmir, the superintendence, direction and control of
elections to either House of the State Leg isl atu re held under the
Constitution ves~in the Election Commission of India. However,
in exercise of powers under Section 138 of the Constitution, the
Election Commission of India cannot define boundaries of the           c
constituencies or territorial limits either of State Legislature or
of Legislative Council. After analyzing the different provisions
of the Constitution of India and role expected to be played by
the Election Commission of India, this Court in Laxmi Kant
Bajpai vs. Haji Yaqoob and others (supra), has ruled that the          D
Election Commission of India has no power to change the
boundaries or areas or extend the boundaries or areas of any
constituency. May be, the view taken by the Election
Commission of India can be taken into consideration by the Court
of Law while interpreting the provisions of proviso to sub-Section
                                                                       E
(3) of Section 50 of the Constitution. However, the power to
superintend, direct and control elections does not make the
clarification binding either on the State Government or the
persons contesting the elections and voters. It is certainly not
binding on this Court. Having taken into consideration the view
expressed by the Election Commission of India in its                   F
communication dated March 36, 2005, this Court finds it difficult
to agree with the view expressed therein. The clarification
issued by the Election Commission of India is not only contrary
to historical background of the two districts concerned, but is
also plainly against the well-settled principles of interpretation     G
of statute.
     20. The last plea that the burElen--to.prove that the
expression "Resident of Poonch District" does not include a
resident of Rajouri is on the respondent No. 1, who has filed
    618   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   petition challenging the election of the appellant as a Member_
    of the Legislative Council and as the said burden was not
    discharged, the petition should have been dismissed, has no
    substance at all.                      :
        21. A glance at the impugned order makes it evident that
9
   both the parties had accepted before the High Court that this
   was purely a legal issue to be decided on the interpretation of·
   the provisions of the Constitution. In such circumstances question
   of burden of proof never arose before the High Court. This Court
   finds that it was the specific case of the appellant that the
C expression "a resident of District Poonch" includes a resident
   of District Rajouri and, therefore, the appellant, if advised, could
   have brought the evidence on record to substantiate the said
   plea. The fact remains that no material was brought on record
   of the case by the appellant to indicate, even remotely, that a
D resident of Rajouri is called or known as resident of Poonch
   District for the purposes of the proviso to sub-Section (3) of
   Section 50 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, this
   Cour1 is of the view that the High Court was justified in not
 · dismissing the petition filed by the respondent No. 1, questioning
E the E~lection of the appellant as a Member of the Legislative
   Council on the ground that the respondent No. 1 had failed to
   discharge the burden of proof.
       22. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court does not
  find any substance in the appeal. The conclusion drawn by the
F High Court in the impughed judgment that the expression "a
  resident of Poonch District" in the -proviso to sub-Section (3) of
  Section 50 of the Constitution, does not include a resident of
  Rajouri is just and no ground is made out to interfere with the
  same in the instant appeal. Therefore, the appeal, which lacks
G merit, deserves to be dismissed.
         23. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There
    shall be no order as to costs.

    B.B.B.                                       Appeal dismissed.
H