Holding

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies, so the election date is excluded and the petition filed on 12‑January‑1999 was within the 45‑day limitation.

Summary

In the 1998 Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly election, the appellant was declared elected on 28 November 1998. The respondent filed an election petition under Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on 12 January 1999, seeking to challenge the result. The appellant contended that the petition was filed beyond the 45‑day limitation because the date of election should be counted, whereas the High Court held that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 required the election date to be excluded, making the petition timely. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 9 applies to the computation of the limitation period and interpreted the words "from" and "within" in Section 81(1). It affirmed that Section 9 is applicable, the election date must be excluded, and consequently the petition was filed within the prescribed period. The appeal was dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to the computation of the 45‑day limitation period under Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether the date of election of the returned candidate should be excluded or included in calculating the limitation period for filing an election petition.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 9
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 67(A), s. 81(1)

Subjects

election petitionperiod of limitationRepresentation of the People ActGeneral Clauses Actstatutory interpretationexclusion of first daylegislative assembly election

Judgment

A TARUN PRASAD CHATTERJEE
v.
DIN ANA TH SHARMA

OCTOBER 10, 2000

B [DR. A.S. ANAND, C.J., R.C. LAHOTI AND
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.]

Election
c Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section 81(1) Election
Petition-Presentation of-Computation of period of limitation under-
Provisions of General Clauses Act-Applicability of-Held, applicable-
Thus, the date of election of returned candidate should be excluded for
computing the period of limitation-Genera/ Clauses Act, 1897-Section 9.
D Election Petition-Presentation of-Period of limitation-Computation
of-Presentation of Election Petition on the date of election of returned
candidate-Maintainability of-Held, well within limitation period

Words & Phrases
E "From" and "within "-Meaning and connotation of in the context of
Section 81(1) of Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Appellant and respondent contested the Legislative Assembly election
and appellant was declared elected on 28.11.1998. Respondent filed an election
p petition under section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on
12.1.1999. Appellant filed an application for dismissing the said election
petition as not maintainable as not filed within 45 days from the date of election
of the returned candidate. However, Single Judge of High Court dismissed
the application of appellant holding that the election petition was filed within
time in view of Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897. Hence the present
G appeal

On behalf of appellant it was contended that in view of the specific
language used in Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, the
words "within" and "from" used therein indicate that Section 9 of the General
H Clauses Act has no application; that if the date of the election of the candidate
634
TARUN PRASAD CHATTERJEE v. DINANATH SHARMA 635
was excluded for computing the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of A
limitation would extend by one day which would be against the mandate of the
statute.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable in B
computing the period of limitation under Section 81(1) of the 'Representation
of the People Act, 1951. The principle contained in Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has
both a beginning and an end and the word "from" is used indicating the
beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included C
the word "to" is to be used. Thus, in order to apply Section 9 the first condition
to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed "from" a particular point
When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the
canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 require to exclude the first day. The words "from" and "within" used
in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 do not express any contrary intention. D
Thus, the date of election of the returned candidate has to be excluded for
computing the period of limitation for presenting a petition under Section
81(1) of the R.P. A~t. In the instant case, the date of election of the returned
candidate being 28.11.1998, the election petition filed on 12.1.1999 on
exclusion of the first day from computing the period of limitation was in time.
(639-A; 640-A-B-D; 641-CJ E
K. Venkateswara Rao and Anr. v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddiand Ors.,
AIR (1969) SC 872; Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Anr., AIR
(1996) SC 796; H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and Ors., AIR
(1957) SC 271; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra, AIR (1974) F
SC 480 and Simhadri Satya Narayana Rao v. M Budda Prasad and Ors.,
[1994) Supp. 1 SCC 449, relied on.

Hals bury Laws ofEngland, 37th Edition, Volume 3 page 92, referred to.

2. Any election petition presented on the date of election of the returned G
candidate would be certainly within the period of limitation as it is a
presentation on the date of election of the returned candidate. (641-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2937 of2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.9.99 of the Madhya Pradesh H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A High Court in E.P. No. 27of1999.
P.P. Rao, Prakash Shrivastava and Dilip Tandon for the Appellant.

B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BALAKRISHNAN, J. The short question involved in the present appeal
is whether in computing the period of limitation as provided in Section 81 (I)
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter mentioned as "R.P.
Act, 1951 "), the date of election of the returned candidate should be excluded
C or not.

The appellant and the respondent herein contested the election of the
Legislative Assembly held on 25.11.1998 from 127, Raipur Gramin Assembly
Constituency of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant was declared elected on
28.11.1998. The respondent filed an Election Petition under Section 81 (I) of
D the R.P. Act, 1951 challenging the election of the appellant. That Petition was
filed on 12.1.1999. The appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC read with Section 81 of the R.P. Act 1951, praying that the Election
Petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as not maintainable as the
same had not been filed within 45 days from the date of election of the
E returned candidate. The respondent contended that in view of Section 9 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Election Petition was filed in time. The plea
of the respondent-Election Petitioner was accepted by the learned Single
Judge and that decision is assailed before us.

We heard both Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned senior Counsel on behalf of the
F appellant and Mr. B.S. Banthia, learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent.
The contention of the appellant's Counsel is that in view of the speci~c
language used in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act 1951, Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 has no ~pplication and it was argued that the mandate of
Section 81 of the R.P. Act provides that the Election Petition should be filed
G within 45 days of the date of election and not a single day beyond that,
whereas the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that Section 9 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable and the date of election of the
returned candidate is to be excluded in view of the application of Section 9
of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

H In order to appreciate the rival contentions, the relevant provisions of
TARUN PRASAD CHATTERJEE v. DINANA TH SHARMA [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 637
the R.P. Act, 1951 and General Clauses Act, 1897 are to be looked into..Section A
81 of the R.P. Act, 1951 reads as follows:-

..
81. Presentation of petitions.--{!) An election pet1t1on calling in
question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds
specified in sub-section (I) of section 100 and section IOI to the High
Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty- B
five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the
returned candidate or if there are more than one returned candidates
at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of
those two dates .
..,.
Explanation-In this sub-section, "elector" means a person who was c
entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates,
whether he has voted at such election or not.

(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies
thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every
such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature D
to be a true copy of the petition.
(Emphasis added)

The "date of election" of the returned candidate has been defined under
Section 67(A) of the R.P. Act, 1951, which is as under:-
E
"Date of election of candidate-For the purposes of this Act, the
date on which a candidate is declared by the returning officer under
/
the provisions of section 53, or section 66, to be elected to a House
of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall be the date of
election of that candidate." F
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows:-

9. Commencement and termination of time.--{l) In any Central Act
or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be
sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or G
any other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the purpose
'.' of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time,
to use the word "to".

(2) This section applies to all Central Acts made after the third day
of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth H
- ..
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A day of January, 1887."

As per Section 81 ( 1) of the R.P. Act, the period of limitation prescribed
for filing an election petition is forty-five days from the date of election of

B
the returned candidate. It is also stated that it may not be filed earlier to the
date of election of the returned candidate. Prior to Act No. 27 of 1956, the
period of limitation for presentation of election petition was not provided in
..
Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. The period of limitation for presentation
of election petition was provided under Rule 119 of Representation of the
People (Conduct of Election & Election Petitions) Rules, 1951. In this code
of rules, by Rule 2(6), it was expressly provided that the provisions of the
C General Clauses Act would apply. This express provision was required since
the General Clauses Act would not normally be applicable to Rules framed
under the Central Act. By Act No. 27 of 1956, a prescribed period for
presentation of petition was provided under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act,
1951 instead of giving such legislative power to the rule making authority. R.P.
Act, 1951 being a self-contained code, it was held by Courts in a series of
D decisions that the provisions contained in the Limitation Act have no
application. However, in a line of decisions it has also been held that the
provisions contained in General Clauses Act, 1897 are applicable in computing
the period of limitation for filing election petition under the R.P. Act, 1951.

E
There is nothing in Section 81(1) to indicate that the provisions contained in
the General Clauses Act have no application.
...
This question came up for consideration in K Venkateswara Rao &
Another v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi & Others, AIR ( 1969) SC 872 and it was
held that Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply in
computing the period of limitation under Section 81 ( l) of the R.P. Act, 1951.
F It was observed in Para 20 at page 879 as under:-

"It is to be noted however, that even though the Indian Limitation
Act, 1963 does not apply to an election petition, provisions like
Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 providing for
computation of time which are in pari materia with Section 12( 1) and
G 4 of the Limitation Act would apply to such a petition."

In Manohar Joshi v. Ni tin Bhaurao Patil & Anr., AIR (1996) SC 796,
this question was dealt with in detail and this Court held that Section 10 of
the General Clauses Act is applicable to the presentation of election petition.
(See also: H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnai/ Singh and Ors., AIR (1957)
H SC 271; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra, AIR (197 4) SC 480
.-
TARUN PRASAD CHATTERJEE v. DINANATH SHARMA [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 639

- and Simhadri Satya Narayana Rao v. M Budda Prasad and Ors., [1994]
Supp. 1sec449.
A

So there cannot be any dispute to the proposition that Section 9 of the

- General Clauses Act would apply in computing the period of limitation under
Section 81{1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. However, the contention urged by the
learned Counsel for the appellant in this case is that even if it is held that B
Section 9 has an application to a petition filed under Section 81(1) of the R.P.
Act, 1951, it could be applied only in appropriate cases and is not to be

-
applied universally. The contention of the appellant is that in view of the
specific language employed in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, the words
"within" and "from" used therein would indicate that Section 9 has no C
application. It was also urged that the legislative mandate is that the election
petition should be filed within 45 days from the date of election of the
returned candidate and not earlier than the said date or after 45 days of the
said date. On these premises, it was argued that section 9 has no application
in the instant case.
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 gives statutory recognition D
to the well-established principle applicable to the construction of statutes that
ordinarily in computing the period of time prescribed, the rule observed is to
exclude the first and include the last day.
In Halsbury Laws of England, 37th Edition, Volume 3 page 92, it is
stated as follows:- E
"Days included or excluded.-When a period of time running
from a given day or even to another day or event is prescribed by law
or fixed as contract, and the question arises whether the computation
is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of
the last- mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the F
purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is
room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed
as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the
parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as "from such a day"
or "until such a day" are equivocal, since they do not make it clear G
whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be
intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period
in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last
day."

Section 9 says that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the
purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time,
to use the word "from'', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series
of days or any period of time, to use the word "to". The principle is that when

B
a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an
end and the word "from" is used indicating the beginning, the opening day
is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word "to" is to be
used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be
-
noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or
by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience
that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has
C to be good for· one day from the 1st January, it might be valid only for a few
hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance
policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless the 1st January is
excluded from the period of computation.

It was argued that the language used in Section 81(1) that "within forty-
D five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned
candidate" expresses a different intention and Section 9 of the General Clauses
Act has no application. We do not find any force in this contention. In order
to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed
period is fixed "from" a particular point. When the period is marked by
E terminus a quo and terminus ad quern, the canon of interpretation envisaged
in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to exclude the first day.
The words "from" and "within" used in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951
do not express any contrary intention.

By Section 81 (I), the legislation fixes the period for filing election
F petition and at the same time states that no elector or candidate shall file
election petition before the date of election of the returned candidate and if
there are more than one returned candidates at the election and dates of their
election are different, the later of those two dates. The learned senior Counsel
for the appellant contended that if the date of election of the candidate is
G excluded from computing the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of
limitation would be extended by one day and, therefore, it is against the
mandate of the statute. It was also contended that the filing of the application
on the date of election of the returned candidate cannot be considered as a
valid presentation of petition as envisag~d in the section. We do not think
that any such interpretation is possible by a conjoint reading of Section 81 ( 1)
H of the R.P. Act, 1951 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The first
TARUN PRASAD CHATTERJEE v. DIN ANA TH SHARMA [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 64 J
day for the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the convenience A
of the parties and if the declaration of the result is delayed or is done late
in the night, the candidate or elector would hardly get any time for presentation
of the election petition. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full
forty-five days period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any petition
presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be certainly
within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of election B
of the returned candidate.

In the instant case, the date of election of the returned candidate being
28.11.1998, the election petition filed on 12.1.1999 on exclusion of the first day
from computing the period of limitation, was in time and the learned Single C
Judge rightly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. This appeal is
with9ut any merits and the same is dismissed, however, without costs.
',
S.V.K Appeal dismissed.