Holding

Succession to the Nawab's private properties is governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, not by the rule of primogeniture attached to the Gaddi.

Summary

The plaintiff, a granddaughter of the late Nawab Raza Ali Khan of Rampur, sought partition of the Nawab's private properties, arguing that succession should follow Muslim personal law as the Nawab was a Shia. The defendants contended that the properties were attached to the Gaddi of the State and thus governed by the rule of male primogeniture. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and the Constitution distinguished private property from State property, and that the definition of "ruler" under Art. 366(22) did not affect succession to private assets. Consequently, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 applied, and the estate was to be divided among the legal heirs according to personal law. The Court set aside the High Court judgments, accepted the appeals, and ordered division of the properties as per the shares specified in paragraph 9‑F of the amended plaint.

Issues considered

The applicability of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 to the succession of the Nawab's private properties.
Whether the private properties declared in the merger agreement are subject to the rule of primogeniture attached to the Gaddi of the State.
The legal effect of the definition of "ruler" in Article 366(22) of the Constitution on succession rights.
The relevance of the 26th Amendment and the repeal of Articles 291 and 362 to the dispute.
The impact, if any, of the Raza Trust and lifetime gifts on the determination of heirs.

Legislation cited

26th Amendment Acts. 1971
Constitution of Indias. Art. 291, s. Art. 362, s. Art. 363, s. Art. 363A, s. Art. 366(22)
Government of India Acts. 1935, s. 6
Hindu Women's Right to Property Acts. 1937
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Acts. 1937

Subjects

successionprivate propertyMuslim personal lawprincely statesmerger agreementArticle 366primogenitureprivy purse

Judgment

[2019] 10 S.C.R. 811 811

TALAT FATIMA HASAN THROUGH HER CONSTITUTED A
ATTORNEY SH. SYED MEHDI HUSAIN
v.
NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1773 of 2002) B
JULY 31, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, DEEPAK GUPTA AND
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 – In
C
1947, on the formation of India and Pakistan, the State of Rampur
merged into the Union of India – Ruler of Rampur signed the Merger
Agreement on 15.05.49 under which he was entitled to full
ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as
distinguished from State properties) belonging to him – Constitution
of India came into force on 26.01.50 – Ruler died intestate – D
Certificate issued inter alia certifying the eldest son of the Ruler,
defendant no.1(since deceased) as the sole successor to his private
properties – Certificate quashed– Plaintiff-granddaughter of the
Ruler filed suit inter alia for partition of the suit properties on the
ground that the properties being his private properties, all legal
E
heirs were entitled to share in the property as per personal law –
Contested by the defendants on the ground that the property was
not the personal property of the Ruler but, was attached to the
‘Gaddi’ of the State of Rampur and thus, governed by law of
succession being rule of male priomogeniture i.e. senior most male
heir taking everything to the exclusion of all other heirs – Suit F
dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Definition of ruler
in Cl.(22) of Art.366 itself shows that the person who is defined as
ruler is a former prince, chief or other person, who was, on or
after 26.01.50 recognised as a ruler having signed the covenant of
accession – Such person, though defined as a ‘Ruler’, had no
G
territory and exercised no sovereignty over any subjects – They
had no land other than the private properties – Since, they were
rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to protect their erstwhile titles,
the properties which were declared to be their personal properties
had to be treated as their personal properties and could not be
H
811
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A treated as properties attached to the Gaddi – A Gaddi or rulership
and private property have two different connotations even in the
merger agreement– Rulers enjoyed right to privy purses, private
properties and privileges only because of the Constitution and in
other respects they were ordinary citizens – Thus, on the death of
the Ruler in 1966, succession to his private properties was governed
B
by personal laws – Undisputedly, if personal law is to apply then
the 1937 Act will apply and since the Ruler was a Shia, his estate
will devolve under the Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias
– During the pendency of the suit, the plaint was amended from
time to time because of the death of some of the defendants – After
C the amendment, the shares of all the legal heirs were worked out in
para 9-F of the plaint – These shares have not been disputed by
any one and hence, are accepted to be correct – Parties entitled to
the property as per the shares set out in para 9-F of the plaint
which shall form part of the decree – Judgments of Single Judge
and Division Bench of the High Court, set aside – Decree passed –
D
No order in the Contempt Petition in view of the directions issued –
Succession –Constitution of India– Art.366(2), 363(A), 291 –
Government of India Act, 1935 – s.6.
Words & Expressions –’Gaddi’ – Meaning of – Discussed.
E Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD : 1.1 The facts are not in dispute. It is also not
disputed that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,
1937 was applicable to the State of Rampur. The issue is whether
the rulers continued to be rulers after executing the instruments
F of merger. They had agreed to merge their States with the Indian
Union because they were to be paid privy purses and would enjoy
certain privileges. They were also entitled to declare some
properties to be their private properties. In case of disputes
whether the property is private or State property, the Union could
refer the dispute for decision to a committee headed by a judicial
G officer. The rulers were no longer sovereign. There was no
paramountcy vested in the rulers. They had no land other than
the private properties. They had no subjects. They were rulers
only in name, left only with the recognition of their original title,
a privy purse, some privileges, etc. The rulers were rulers only
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 813
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

in name. They held no land except the personal properties. There A
were no subjects. They were Maharajas or Rajas without a
Praja; without any sovereignty; and without any territory.
[Paras 12, 32, 33] [822-B-C; 833-B-C; F]
1.2 The definition of ruler in clause (22) of Article 366 of
the Constitution itself shows that the person who is defined as B
ruler is a former prince, chief or other person, who was, on or
after 26.01.1950 recognised as a ruler having signed the covenant
of accession. Necessarily, the ruler was a person who was
recognised before independence by the British Crown and was
the sovereign of his State. Such person, though defined as a
‘Ruler’, has no territory and exercises no sovereignty over any C
subjects. He has no attributes of a potentate nor does he enjoy
all the powers and privileges which are normally exercised by a
potentate. The President while exercising his powers under
Article 366 (22) could not notify a ruler at his whims and fancy.
Examples were also given where in cases of disputes, the same D
were referred to committees comprising of the Chief Justices of
the States and erstwhile rulers. However, the declaration under
clause (22) of Article 366 relates only to the Gaddi or the rulership
and not to the properties which were declared to be private
properties by the ruler. [Paras 34-36] [833-G-H; 834-A-E]
E
1.3 These were rulers without any subjects. These were
rulers without any territory. These were so called rulers enjoying
certain privileges and privy purses. They had been given the
choice of declaring certain properties to be their private
properties and these private properties could not be said to be
attached to the Gaddi. When they were actual sovereigns, their F
entire State was attached to the Gaddi and not any particular
property. There are no specific properties which can be attached
to the Gaddi. It has to be the entire ‘State’ or nothing. Since, it is
held that they were rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to protect
their erstwhile titles, the properties which were declared to be G
their personal properties had to be treated as their personal
properties and could not be treated as properties attached to the
Gaddi. In Rajpal Hindi Shabdkosh, Gaddi has been given various
meanings including small mattress, seat of an exalted person,

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814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A title of a ruler. In the Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, the
meanings given are cushion, throne, royal seat, etc. Property is
not mentioned as one of the attributes of a Gaddi. A Gaddi or
rulership and private property have two different connotations
even in the merger agreement/instrument of accession. In Article
2 of the agreement, it is clearly mentioned that Nawab would
B
continue to enjoy the same personal rights, privileges, immunities
and dignities and other titles which he would have enjoyed prior
to the agreement. Conspicuously, the word ‘property’ or
‘personal property’ is missing. Article 2 deals only with personal
rights, privileges, dignities, etc. Article 3 deals with privy purse
C which would also be a part of the rulership or Gaddi. Article 6
which deals with succession, guarantees the succession according
to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State and to the Nawab’s
personal rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and title. Gaddi
would be the ‘throne’ or ‘title’ of Nawab in the context in which it
has been used and the personal rights, privileges, immunities,
D
dignities and titles will be those referred to in Article 2. The
word ‘property’ is also conspicuously absent in Article 6.
[Paras 37-39] [834-E-H; 835-A-D]
1.4 Article 4 states that the Nawab shall be entitled to full
ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties as distinct
E from State properties. Such properties must belong to him as on
the date of agreement. Article 6 does not relate to the properties
mentioned in Article 4 and the private properties would remain
the private properties of the Nawab as a common citizen of the
country. On the death of the ruler, Nawab RAK in the year 1966,
F succession to his private properties was governed by personal
laws. The succession to the estate of Nawab ‘RAK’ opened in
the year 1966, prior to the 26th Amendment Act. However, one
thing which is clear is that the rulers enjoyed right to privy purses,
private properties and privileges only because of the Constitution
and in other respects they were ordinary citizens. It was urged
G that since the rights were guaranteed under the Constitution,
the rule of primogeniture would apply. No force in this contention
because in Article 362 reference is made only to the personal
rights, privileges and dignities of the ruler of an Indian State and

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TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 815
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

rights would not include succession to personal properties. A
[Paras 40, 41 and 42] [835-E-H; 836-A-B; H; 837-A-B]
1.5 The Trust, which has been referred to by the contesting
defendants, was created in the year 1944, much before the Nawab
ceded his property to the Dominion of India. At that time, there
was no doubt that succession to the properties of the State of B
Rampur would be governed by the rule of primogeniture. Even
after Nawab ceased to be the ruler, he gifted a number of extensive
properties to the defendant no.1 during his lifetime including a
property known as Rafat Club in Rampur, which the defendant
no.1 sold to the State of U.P. in 1961. The erstwhile Nawab also
gifted a property known as Kothi Bareilly and a house in Delhi to C
defendant no.1. Both the Division Bench and the Single Judge
held that these properties gifted by the erstwhile Nawab to the
defendant no.1 were given to him only to maintain his status as
the ruler and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration
while deciding the issue of succession of the erstwhile Nawab of D
Rampur. A contradiction is found in the findings of the High Court
in this regard. On the one hand, it is said that the plaintiff and the
other family members cannot urge that the estate of the Nawab
should be governed by personal law because they have derived
benefits from the Raza Trust and gifts in their life time and, on
the other hand, when it comes to the defendant no.1, it is said E
that the gifts were made only with a view that defendant no. 1
should be able to maintain his status as the prospective heir. If
he was to get all the properties of the Nawab, then why gifts would
have to be made in his favour in his life time. Therefore, this
contention is rejected. There is no dispute between the parties F
that if personal law is to apply then the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act, 1937 will apply and since Nawab ‘RAK’
was a Shia, his estate will devolve upon his heirs under the
Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias. [Paras 43, 44 and
45] [837-C-H; 838-A-C]
G
1.6 During the pendency of the suit, the plaint was amended
from time to time because of the death of defendant no.1,
defendant no.1/1 and defendant no.3. After the amendment, the
shares of all the legal heirs were worked out in para 9-F of the

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816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A plaint. These shares have not been disputed by any one nor
there is any dispute with regard to the manner in which the shares
have been worked out. Therefore, these shares are accepted to
be correct. The parties shall be entitled to the property as per
the shares set out in para 9-F of the plaint which shall form a part
of the decree. The judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench
B
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad are set aside, and
the shares of the properties are determined in terms of Para 9-F
of the plaint. A decree is passed. I.A. No. 3 of 2014 is dismissed.
The applicants shall, however, be at liberty to file a Civil Suit to
establish their rights. [Paras 46-49] [838-D-F; 839-A-H;
C 840-A-B]
Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
[1952] SCR 1020 ; Sudhansu Shekhar Singh Deo v.
State of Orissa [1961] 1 SCR 779 – relied on.
K. S. V. R. Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 3
D SCC 150 : [1970] 2 SCR 631 ; Revathinnal B. Varma
v. H. H. Padmanabha Dasa (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 233 :
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 30 ; Pratap Singh v. Sarojini Devi
(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 734 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 607;
Madhav Rao Scindia, Etc. v. Union of India (1971) 1
E SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao
v. Union of India (1994) Supp. (1) SCC 191 : [1993] 1
SCR 480 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1952] SCR 1020 relied on Para 14
F
[1961] 1 SCR 779 relied on Para 15
[1970] 2 SCR 631 referred to Para 16
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 30 referred to Para 18
[1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 607 referred to Para 20
G
[1971] 3 SCR 9 referred to Para 29
[1993] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 41

H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 817
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1773 A
of 2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.01.2002 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 976 of 1997.
With
B
C.A. No. 4012/2002, CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1079/2018 in
C.A. No. 1773/2002.
Sudhir Chandra, Kailash Vasdev, Huzefa Ahmadi, A.K. Ganguli,
Raju Ramachandran, Ms. Tehmina Punwani, Sr. Advs., Parijat Sinha,
Ms. Shahrukh Alam, Gaurav Ghosh, Zulnoor Ali Ahemd, Rudra Dutta, C
Satish Vig, Ranbir Singh Yadav Praveen Agrawal, Ranbir Singh Yadav,
Puran Mal Saini, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, B. Rajesh, P. Kakra, Saurabh S.
Sinha, Shankar N., Aditya Dev Triguna, Ranbir Singh Yadav, D. L.
Chidananda, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Ms. Anil Katiyar, B.V. Balaram Das,
Yatish Mohan, Ms. Vinita Y. Mohan, E.C. Vidya Sagar, Subhash Chandra
Sagar, Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Devesh Mishra, Samar Ali Khan, Abhishek D
Singh, Satish Vig, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Deba Prasad Mukherjee,
D.N. Goburdhan, Tarun Gupta, Imran Ali, Ms. Puja Sharma, Advs. for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
1. “Whether succession to the properties declared by an erstwhile
ruler to be his private properties in the agreement of accession with the
Dominion of India will be governed by the rule of succession applicable
to the “Gaddi” (rulership) or by the personal law applicable to the ruler”,
F
is the question for consideration in the present appeals.
2. The British Government decided to withdraw from the Indian
sub-continent and the plan in this regard was published on 03.06.1947
which envisaged the formation of two countries, India and Pakistan. As
per the Indian Independence Act, 1947 two independent Dominions –
India and Pakistan were created. The ruling princes had the right to G
decide to which Dominion, India or Pakistan, they were to cede to.
Section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided that an
instrument of accession was to be executed by the ruler of the State.
Various rulers signed instruments of accession on various dates. Some
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818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A immediately on 15.08.1947 and some much later. Some rulers voluntarily
ceded their territories to the Indian Union and some had to be cajoled to
do so. In the various talks held by the Indian Government and the princely
States it was decided to give some privileges and perquisites to the rulers.
The privileges which were to be granted to the rulers included exemption
from the operation of certain laws, the enjoyment of Jagirs and personal
B
properties of the rulers, and members of their families, the payment by
the States of the marriage expenses of the brothers and sisters of the
rulers, immunity from some processes of courts of law, distinctive number
plates, gun salutes, etc.
3. Nawab Raza Ali Khan was the ruler of Rampur. The State of
C Rampur merged into the Union of India. Merger Agreement was signed
by the Nawab on 15.05.1949. As per the terms of merger agreement,
the Nawab was entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
properties (as distinguished from State properties) belonging to him and
he was required to furnish to the Dominion Government an inventory of
D such immovable properties etc. The Nawab vide orders (robkars) dated
31.05.1949 and 27.06.1949 declared a number of properties to be his
personal properties. In terms of the merger agreement, Rampur ceded
to the Dominion of India on 01.07.1949 and became a centrally
administered Chief Commissioner’s Province. Nawab Raza Ali Khan
was declared to be a ruler in terms of clause (22) of Article 366 of the
E Constitution of India, 1950. He expired on 06.03.1966. It is not disputed
that Nawab Raza Ali Khan died intestate.
4. The relevant provisions of the instrument of accession executed
on 15.05.1949 between the Governor General of India and the Nawab
of Rampur read as follows:
F
“ARTICLE 2
The Nawab shall continue to enjoy the same personal
rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and titles which he would
have enjoyed had this agreement not been made.
G xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 4
The Nawab shall be entitled to the full ownership, use
and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State
properties) belonging to him on the date of this agreement.
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 819
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

The Nawab will furnish to the Dominion Government A
before the 30th June 1949 an inventory of all the immovable
property, securities and cash balances held by him as such private
property.
If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property
is the private property of the Nawab or State property, it shall be B
referred to a judicial officer nominated by the Government of
India and the decision of that officer shall be final and binding on
both parties.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 6 C

The Dominion Government guarantees the succession
according to law and custom to the gaddi of the State and to
Nawab’s personal rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and titles.”
5. It may also be pertinent to mention that as per Article 1, the D
Nawab ceded full executive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in
relation to the governance of the State of Rampur and transferred all his
powers to the Dominion Government with effect from 01.07.1949. Article
3 entitled the Nawab to receive a privy purse of Rs.7,00,000/- free from
taxes. Under Article 5 all members of the Nawab’s family were entitled
to privileges, dignities and titles as they enjoyed before 15.08.1947. E
Articles 8 and 9 are not relevant for the purpose of deciding this case.
6. It would also be pertinent to mention that after the instrument
of merger was executed, the Constitution of India was adopted on
26.11.1949 and came into force on 26.01.1950. Article 291 of the
Constitution of India, as it stood at the relevant time, provided that the F
ruler of an Indian State would be entitled to privy purse sums as assured
by the Government of the Dominion of India. Article 362 provided that
whenever Parliament or Legislature in exercise of their power make
laws or where the Union or States exercise the executive power, due
regard would be had to the guarantees or assurances given under any
G
such covenant or agreement, which the ruler had entered into with
Dominion of India in respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities
of the ruler of an Indian State. Article 363 barred the jurisdiction of the
Courts to entertain disputes arising out of such treaties, agreements,
covenants, etc. entered into or executed before the commencement of
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820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A the Constitution by any ruler of an Indian State to which the Government
of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor government was a
party. In clause (22) of Article 366, Ruler was defined as follows:-
“366. Definitions.- In this Constitution, unless the context
otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings
B hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
C (22) “Ruler” in relation to an Indian State means the Prince, Chief
or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is
referred to in clause (1) of Article 291 was entered into and who
for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of
the State, and includes any person who for the time being is
D recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler;”
7. After the death of Nawab Raza Ali Khan, the President of
India in terms of clause (22) of Article 366 recognised his eldest son
Nawab Syed Murtaza Ali Khan, defendant no. 1 (since deceased) to be
the ruler. None of the other parties challenged this declaration recognising
defendant no.1 to be the ruler. On 01.04.1966 a certificate was issued
E
in which defendant no. 1 was not only recognised as ruler of Rampur
but it was also certified that he was the sole successor to all private
properties – movable and immovable – held by Late Nawab Raza Ali
Khan. The certificate was challenged by Syed Zulfiquar Ali Khan,
defendant no. 3 (since deceased), the second son of Nawab Raza Ali
F Khan, by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi. Three
other similar petitions were filed by the daughters of Nawab Raza Ali
Khan. The High Court of Delhi quashed the certificate vide judgment
dated 18.12.1969. The defendant no. 1 challenged the said judgment in
this Court.
G 8. After the decision of the Delhi High Court dated 18.12.1969,
the plaintiff who is the granddaughter of Nawab Raza Ali Khan filed a
suit for partition, accounts, mesne profits in respect to the suit properties
left by Nawab Raza Ali Khan. On 28.12.1971, by the 26th Constitution
amendment, the Constitution of India was amended. Articles 291 and
362 were repealed. Article 363A was added and the definition of ruler
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TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 821
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

in clause (22) of Article 366 was amended. In view of the amendments A
so made, the plaintiff on 07.01.1972 withdrew the suit filed in the year
1970 with liberty to file a fresh suit and, in fact, filed a fresh suit on the
same date. This suit was filed before the District Judge, Rampur and
the present proceedings arise out of the said suit. It would also be
pertinent to mention that both in the suit filed in the year 1970 and in the
B
suit filed in the year 1972, the District Judge, Rampur had ordered that
the defendant no. 1 would not transfer or otherwise dispose of the
properties till further orders of the court.
9. This Court, in the appeal filed by the defendant No. 1 against
the judgment of the Delhi High Court, declined to interfere with the
order quashing the certificate due to the pendency of civil litigation C
between the parties for the same property. It further directed that the
certificate which had been quashed would not be set up by either party
in support of the claim of the plaintiff or the defendants in the suit which
had been filed in the meantime. Therefore, this certificate cannot be
taken into consideration while deciding these proceedings. D
10. In January 1995, the said suit being O.S. No. 4 of 1972 was
withdrawn by the High Court of Allahabad and tried by itself. The learned
Single Judge dismissed the suit on 31.07.1996. An appeal therefrom
was heard by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which vide
two separate concurring judgments dismissed the appeal. Hence, the E
present appeals.
11. From a perusal of the pleadings before the Trial Court, it is
apparent that the case of the plaintiff was that the properties declared
by Nawab Raza Ali Khan to be his private properties in terms of the
merger agreement were his private properties and all legal heirs were F
entitled to a share in the property as per personal law. The plaintiff also
asserted that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
was extended to the State of Rampur on 01.01.1950 and after ceding
the property to the Dominion of India and especially after the enforcement
of the Constitution of India, Nawab Raza Ali Khan was a ruler only for
the purposes of enjoying the privy purse and some personal rights, G
privileges, immunities, dignities and titles, but for all other purposes
including succession, he was an ordinary citizen of the country. On the
other hand, the case of the defendants was that the property was not,
strictly speaking, the personal property of the Nawab. According to the
contesting defendants, the property was attached to the ‘Gaddi’ of the H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A State of Rampur and, therefore, it was governed by the law of succession
which was admittedly applicable to the rulership of Rampur which was
the rule of male lineal primogeniture which basically means that the
senior most male heir takes everything to the exclusion of all other heirs.
It was also urged that the property was an impartible estate and,
therefore, the rule of primogeniture would govern the same.
B
12. The facts are not in dispute. It is also not disputed that the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was applicable to
the State of Rampur. The only issue to be decided is whether the
properties held by Nawab Raza Ali Khan would devolve on his eldest
son by applying the rule of primogeniture or would be governed by Muslim
C Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and devolve on all his
legal heirs.
13. Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the original plaintiff submits that the High Court erred in coming to the
conclusion that the personal law was not applicable and the property of
D the Nawab had to be governed by the rule of primogeniture, in view of
the fact that he was a ruler recognised by the Constitution. In support of
his contention, Mr. Chandra relied upon various judgments, on the
interpretation of the merger agreement and also on the various provisions
of the Constitution.
E 14. The first Constitution Bench judgment relied upon by Mr.
Chandra is Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh1. In
that case, some portion of the properties belonging to the ruler and declared
as private properties in the covenant of merger were sought to be taken
over by the State under the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of
F Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949. O n e
of the challenges was that the property of the Maharaja declared to be
his private property could not be taken over by the State as it contravened
the provision of Article 362 of the Constitution. Justice M.C. Mahajan,
dealing with the said contention held as follows:

G “It is true that by the covenant of merger the properties of the
petitioner became his private properties as distinguished from
properties of the State but in respect of them he is in no better
position than any other owner possessing private property. Article

1
[1952] S.C.R. 1020
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 823
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties declared as A
private properties by the covenant of merger and does not
guarantee their perpetual existence. The guarantee contained in
the article is of a limited extent only. It assures that the Rulers’
properties declared as their private properties will not be claimed
as State properties. The guarantee has no greater scope than
B
this. That guarantee has been fully respected by the impugned
statue, as it treats those properties as their private properties and
seeks to acquire them on that assumption……….”
Justice Das in his concurring judgment held as follows:-
“The guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to be had is C
limited to personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler qua
a Ruler. It does not extend to personal property which is different
from personal rights.”
15. The next judgment relied upon is Sudhansu Shekhar Singh
Deo v. State of Orissa2. The facts of this case were that the ruler of D
the erstwhile State of Sonepur, executed a merger agreement with the
Dominion of India, the terms of which were identical to the Rampur
merger agreement. Agricultural income in the State of Orissa was
subjected to taxation under the provisions of the Orissa Agricultural
Income Tax Act, 1947. The ruler of Sonepur filed a petition and contended
that as ruler of the State, before merger of the State, he was immune E
from liability of taxation in respect of his private properties both within
his territory and outside. It was claimed that as far as the properties
within his State were concerned, he being the Sovereign was not liable
to pay any tax and as far as the properties outside the State were
concerned, he was not liable to pay tax in view of the provisions of the F
International Law. According to him, since his privileges and immunities
were protected by the merger agreement, he could not be asked to pay
tax. Repelling his contention, the Constitution Bench of this Court held
as follows:
“…..The privileges guaranteed by Arts. 4 and 5 are personal G
privileges of the appellant as an ex-Ruler and those privileges do
not extend to his personal property……”

2
(1961) 1 SCR 779
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824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 16. Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the appellant
placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in K. S. V. R. Singh
v. Union of India & Ors.3, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Dholpur
case’. The facts were that when the Dholpur State merged in the Union
of India, Maharaja Udaibhan Singh was the recognised ruler of the State.
He executed the covenant of merger and there was a provision in the
B
covenant permitting him to declare his private properties and to enjoy
them as his private properties. Raja Udaibhan Singh died on 22.10.1954.
He did not leave behind him any direct male heir. He left behind a
widow and a daughter who was married to the Maharaja of Nabha. His
widow adopted his grandson i.e. daughter’s son who was declared to be
C the successor of the Maharaja. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed
that they were the sons of the younger brother of the Maharaja and,
thus, entitled to inherit his property by applying the rule of male lineal
primogeniture. The dispute, as to who should be declared to be the ruler
of Dholpur, was referred to a Committee headed by the then Chief Justice
of the Rajasthan High Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. N. Wanchoo).
D
This Committee recommended that the adopted son of the widow of
late ruler, Maharaja Rana Shri Hemant Singh be declared as the ruler of
Dholpur. This recommendation was accepted by the Union Government
and the President of India, in terms of clause (22) of Article 366, declared
Maharaja Rana Shri Hemant Singh as the ruler of Dholpur.
E 17. Thereafter, the nephews of the late ruler filed a petition in
which it was urged that the estate left behind by Rana Udaibhan Singh,
the ruler of Dholpur was an impartible estate and was to be governed by
the rule of male lineal primogeniture. It was contended that as per the
terms of the merger agreement, the Dominion Government had
F guaranteed succession according to the law of succession of the ‘Gaddi’
of the State and, therefore, the petitioners were entitled to be declared
rulers and also entitled to the property. The Constitution Bench held as
follows:
“6.…..It is manifest that the right to private properties of the last
G Ruler depends upon the personal law of succession to the said
private properties. The recognition of the Ruler is a right to succeed
to the gaddi of the Ruler. This recognition of Rulership by the
President is an exercise of political power vested in the President

3
(1969) 3 SCC 150
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TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 825
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and is thus an instance of purely executive jurisdiction of the A
President. The act of recognition of Rulership is not, as far as the
President is concerned, associated with any act of recognition of
right to private properties……”
The Court also held as follows:
“9. The recognition of Rulership is one of personal status. It cannot B
be said that claim to recognition of Rulership is either purely a
matter of inheritance or a matter of descent by devolution. Nor
can claim to recognition of Rulership be based only on covenants
and treaties. That is why Article 363 of the Constitution constitutes
a bar to interference by Courts in a dispute arising out of treaties C
and agreements. No claim to recognition of Rulership by virtue of
a Covenant is justiciable in a Court of law. The Constitution,
therefore, provided for the act of recognition of the Rulership by
the President as a political power.
10. It has to be recognised that the right to private properties of D
the Ruler is not embraced within clause (22) of Article 366 of the
Constitution which speaks of recognition of a Ruler by the
President.
11. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner contended that the
recognition of a Ruler itself instantaneously invested the Ruler E
with property and that Rulership and property were blended
together. An illustration of combination of office and property in
the case of Mathadhapati was cited as an analogy. The property
is an appendage to the office in the case of Maths. The example
of the office of a trustee furnishes the answer where office and
properties are vested in the trustee. It cannot be said that F
recognition of Rulership is bound up with recognition of private
properties of the Ruler because the former is within the political
power of the President and the latter is governed by the personal
law of succession. Recognition of Rulership by the President is
not recognising any right to private properties of the Ruler because G
recognition of Rulership is an exercise of the political power of
the President. The distinction between recognition of Rulership
and succession to private properties of the Ruler has to be kept in
the forefront. The rights to private properties of Rulers are not
the matters of recognition of Rulership. The recognition of
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826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A Rulership is not an indicia of property but it entitles the Ruler to
the enjoyment of the Privy Purse contemplated in Article 291 and
the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian
State mentioned in Article 362 of the Constitution. Therefore,
recognition of Rulership is not a deprivation of right to property. If
the petitioner has any claim to any private property said to belong
B
to the last Ruler, the petitioner has not established any such claim
in any court of law. It was said on behalf of the petitioner that the
Ruler after recognition by the President came to possess private
properties said to belong to the last Ruler. If the petitioner has any
competing rights with the Ruler in relation to such private properties
C such a claim is neither a fundamental right nor is it comprised in
the act of recognition of a Ruler by the President.”
18. A decision of three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Revathinnal B. Varma v. H. H. Padmanabha Dasa4, hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Travancore case’, has been relied upon by both the
D sides. The facts of this case are that Shri Padmanabha Dasa Bala
Rama Verma was the Maharaja of Travancore and the sovereign ruler
thereof. The State of Travancore merged with the erstwhile Cochin
State and became a part of the territory of the Dominion of India w.e.f.
01.07.1949. A covenant was entered into by the Maharaja with the
Union of India, the terms of which are similar and the properties which
E were subject matter of the dispute were declared to be the private
properties of the Maharaja. A suit was filed by Revathinnal Balagopala
Varma, one of the family members of the Maharaja in which it was
claimed that the Maharaja was not the sole owner of these properties
even though they were declared to be the private properties of the ruler.
F It was urged that the ruler held these properties as Karnavan of an
undivided marumakkathayam tarwad or a sthanee of an impartible
estate. The argument raised was that the properties comprised an
impartible estate. Though succession to the estate was earlier governed
by the rule of primogeniture, in view of the fact that the Maharaja had
ceased to be the ruler on 01.07.1949, the properties became properties
G of the family or tarwad to which the ruler belonged and, therefore, the
impartible estate became a partible estate when the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 came into force on 17.06.1956.

4
(1993) Supp. 1 SCC 233
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 827
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

19. It was not disputed that as far as the position before accession A
was concerned the properties devolved from ruler to ruler by applying
the rule of primogeniture. This Court negated the argument holding that
after signing of the merger agreement, the properties became the private
properties of the Maharaja and did not belong to an undivided family. It
was held that when the Maharaja was the sovereign of the State of
B
Travancore, he could exercise his sovereign rights of ownership on all
the properties and there was no distinction between private properties
and properties of the State. No distinction could be drawn between
private properties and properties of the State on the principle that a
sovereign never dies and the succession to the next ruler takes place
without there being a hiatus. However, keeping in view the fact that the C
Maharaja had declared the properties in dispute to be his private
properties, the claim of the plaintiffs that the suit property was joint
family property, was rejected. It was held that the properties were the
private properties of Maharaja, as asserted by him.
20. On this issue, Mr. A. K. Ganguli, learned senior counsel D
appearing for the legal heirs of contesting defendant no. 1, has placed
strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Pratap Singh v. Sarojini
Devi5, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Nabha case’. In this case, this
Court was dealing with two different proceedings though decided by the
same judgment. Nabha was a princely State and Maharaja Ripudaman
Singh was the ruling chief of Nabha State in the early 20s of the 20th E
century. The British Government withdrew his powers as ruler in the
year, 1923. In 1928, the Maharaja was formally deposed from the Gaddi
and exiled. He, thereafter, resided in Kodaikanal in Tamil Nadu till his
death in 1942. He left behind his wife Sarojini Devi, three sons - Pratap
Singh, Kharagh Singh, Gurbaksh Singh and two daughters Kamla Devi F
and Vimla Devi. The eldest son Pratap Singh was recognised by the
British Government as the ruler of Nabha and he later entered into an
agreement of merger with the Dominion of India. Sterling Castle was
mentioned in the list of his private properties.
21. It would be pertinent to mention here that the British G
Government had placed restrictions on the rulers with regard to the
purchase of properties outside their own State. A property known as
‘Sterling Castle’ situated in Shimla was purchased by Maharaja

5
(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 734
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828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A Ripudaman Singh in the name of his friend Dr. Tehl Singh on 21.12.1921
when he was still the Maharaja. On 30.04.1952, Dr. Tehl Singh executed
a relinquishment deed and conferred title of the property upon the three
sons and widow of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh. Pratap Singh as the
recognised ruler claimed absolute rights on the property and denied the
title of the other heirs of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh. It was alleged
B
that this property was purchased out of the funds of Nabha State and
the properties were the properties of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh and,
therefore, governed by the rule of primogeniture. Sarojini Devi, Kharagh
Singh and minor children of Gurbaksh Singh filed a suit for partition, etc.
with regard to the property. The suit was tried on the original side of the
C High Court of Himachal Pradesh. It was held that the property was
purchased benami by Maharaja Ripudaman Singh. The learned Single
Judge held that the rule of primogeniture would not be applicable to the
personal property of the Maharaja and would only be applicable to the
property of the State. In appeal filed by Pratap Singh, the Division
Bench of the High Court held that it had not been established that the
D
property was purchased out of the personal funds of Maharaja Ripudaman
Singh and, therefore, was not the personal property and hence, the suit
was dismissed and the appeal was allowed.
22. The other appeal decided by the same judgment relates to a
property situate in Civil Lines, Delhi. A suit was filed by Pratap Singh
E against his mother, two brothers and two sisters. This property was
purchased in 1922 in the name of one Gurnarain Singh Gill, but was
managed by the officials of Nabha State. This property was declared to
be the personal property of Pratap Singh, when he signed the instrument
of accession and on the basis, that this was his private property, suit for
F possession was filed. The learned Single Judge held that the property
was of Nabha State and was not the personal property of Maharaja
Ripudaman Singh and the suit was decreed. The Division Bench set
aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that the property
was the personal property of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh and on his
death, devolved as per personal law, upon his sons. The widow was
G held entitled to some share under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property
Act, 1937. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
23. Dealing with the issue as to who was the original owner of the
properties, this Court held that when Maharaja Ripudaman Singh was
the ruler, he was the sovereign and exercised paramount power over the
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 829
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

entire State of Nabha. All properties vested in him and there was no A
distinction between State and personal properties. Reliance was placed
upon Para 157 of the White Paper on Indian States which reads as
follows:
“57.….In the past the Rulers made no distinction between private
and State property; they could freely use for personal purposes B
any property owned by their respective States. With the integration
of States it became necessary to define and demarcate clearly
the private property of the Ruler. The settlement was a difficult
and delicate task calling for detailed and patient examination of
each case. As conditions and customs differed from State to State,
there were no precedents to guide and no clear principles to follow. C
Each case, therefore, had to be decided on its merits.”
This Court further held that the rule of impartibility and
primogeniture in relation to the zamindari or other impartible estates must
be established by proving the custom, but in the case of a sovereign
ruler, they are presumed to exist. It was also observed that no distinction D
could be drawn between the public and private property of the ruler.
This Court further went on to hold that there was no rulership in India
after India became a Republic on 26.01.1950 “but if the estate is
impartible in nature it would continue to be governed by the rule of
primogeniture”. E
24. Article 12 of the instrument of merger of Nabha State is
virtually identical to Article 4 of Exhibit 4. This Court in the Nabha
case held as follows:
“78. A careful reading of Article XII shows that there is a clear
distinction between the private properties and the State properties. F
Such private properties must be belonging to the Ruler and must
be in his use and enjoyment even earlier. Therefore, properties
which were recognised even earlier as such private properties
alone were to be left out and submitted for the recognition as
such. As stated in White Paper (para 157, page 23 supra), the G
demarcation and the settlement of the list was carried out for the
purposes of Integration. If this be the correct position of law, the
contrary observations of the learned Single Judge are not correct.”
25. We are of the view that the observations made above run
counter to what was held in the earlier part of the judgment where in the
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830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A same judgment it was held that no distinction could be drawn between
the public and private properties of the ruler. If no such distinction could
be drawn, the question of any properties being recognised as the private
properties of the ruler prior to the State ceding to the Dominion of India
does not arise.
B 26. This Court held that both the properties at Shimla and Delhi
were State properties and not the personal properties of Maharaja
Ripudaman Singh and, therefore, governed by the rule of primogeniture.
27. At the outset, we may note that both in the Travancore case
and the Nabha case, the suits had been filed in the lifetime of the rulers,
C who had ceded the State to the Indian Union. The collaterals of the
rulers filed suits trying to establish their right on the property contending
that the property had become a partible estate in the hands of the ruler.
As far as the Travancore case is concerned, we find that the contesting
defendants can get no benefit from this decision. It, in fact, supports the
case of the appellants inasmuch as it held that the property in question
D was the personal property of the Maharaja of Travancore and, therefore,
not subject to partition. As far as the Nabha case is concerned, we
have given the facts of that case in detail to show that the main dispute
was whether the properties were purchased by Maharaja Ripudaman
Singh out of his own personal funds or from the funds of Nabha State.
E This Court held that there could be no distinction between the private or
personal properties when the Maharaja was the sole sovereign. As
Maharaja Ripudaman Singh was the Sovereign till his powers were taken
away in 1923, and before he was finally deposed in 1928, both the
properties at Shimla and Delhi were purchased when he was the Maharaja
and it was a finding of fact that these properties were purchased out of
F the State funds. These properties also found mention in the list of
properties declared to be the private properties of Maharaja Pratap Singh
in the instrument of merger. The disputes arose when Maharaja Pratap
Singh was still the ruler and was alive. The question of succession had
not opened. The court held that the properties being the personal
G properties of the Maharaja, could not be subjected to partition. We may,
however, observe that there is a fleeting remark that the property formed
part of an impartible estate and therefore, would be governed by the rule
of primogeniture. In our view, this question did not arise for consideration
and this Court did not decide the question as to whether the impartible
estate continued to exist after the ruler ceased to be a ruler.
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 831
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

28. The other two judgments relate to issues not of succession, A
but in both the judgments it was held that after 1950 ‘ruler’ for all purposes
would own these properties like any other common citizen. In
Visweshwar Rao case (supra) it was clearly held that the guarantees
or assurances were limited to the personal rights, privileges and dignities
of the ruler qua a ruler and do not extend to his personal property.
B
Similar observations were made in the case of Sudhansu Shekhar Singh
Deo (supra).
29. The High Court relied on certain observations in the case of
Madhav Rao Scindia, Etc. v. Union of India6, which is commonly
referred to as ‘the Princes Privy Purses case’. This case mainly dealt
with the issue as to what are the executive powers of the State and C
whether the Union by executive directions could withdraw the privy
purses and other privileges which had been guaranteed to the rulers.
The Court held that the executive had no power to flout the mandate of
the Constitution and since the guarantees given by the agreements had
been recognised in the Constitution, they could not be taken away by the D
executive orders.
30. The High Court held that the judgment in the Dholpur case
had been reversed in the Princes Privy Purses case. We are unable to
agree with this finding of the High Court. In the Dholpur case, this
Court held that recognition of rulership by the President is an exercise of E
“political” power vested in the President. It was urged in the Princes
Privy Purses case that even the notification issued withdrawing the
privy purses was in exercise of the “political” power and, therefore, the
court could not interfere in the same. What was held in the Princes
Privy Purses case with regard to these observations was that in the
Dholpur case, the Court had improperly used the words “political F
power”. Justice J.C. Shah in the Princes Privy Purses case, dealing
with the Dholpur case held as follows:
“98..….In Kunvar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India
and Others, 1969 (3) SCC 150, this Court negatived the claim
of an applicant that his right to property was violated because the G
President accepted another claimant to the Gaddi of Dholpur as
Ruler, observing that the recognition of Rulership by the President,
in exercise of his political power, did not amount to recognition of

6
(1971) 1 SCC 85 H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A any right to private properties of the Ruler. The Court did not
attempt to classify the exercise of the Presidential function under
Article 366(22) as distinct from executive functions; that is clear
from the dictum that the exercise of the President’s power was
“an instance of purely executive function”
B Justice Shah, dealing with this argument held as follows:
“141….It is difficult to regard a word or a clause occurring in a
judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a
full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not
fall to be answered in that judgment.”
C Justice K.S. Hegde, who was also a Member of the Bench which
decided the Dholpur case, dealing with this contention, held as follows:
“178. What is said in that case is that the President while acting
under Article 366(22) is exercising his executive jurisdiction and
that jurisdiction was described as “political power”. That expression
D may be inappropriate but that is not the ratio of the decision. It
was a casual observation. There is nothing like political power
under our Constitution in the matter of relationship between the
executive and the citizens. Our Constitution recognises only three
powers, viz. the legislative power, the judicial power and the
E executive power. It does not recognise any other power. In our
country the executive cannot exercise any sovereignty over the
citizens. The legal sovereignty in this country vests with the
Constitution and the political sovereignty is with the people of this
country. The executive possesses no sovereignty……”

F Justice G.K. Mitter, dealing with the same contention, held that
though some observations support the contention of the Attorney General,
but they must be limited to the facts of that case. The appellant in the
Dholpur case did not claim any right to the Gaddi but only to the private
properties of the deceased ruler and the notification issued under clause
(22) of Article 366 of the Constitution did not deal with the private
G properties.
31. In our view, the judgment in the Dholpur case cannot be said
to have been set aside or upset in the Princes Privy Purses case. What
was held was that use of the expression ‘political power’ in the Dholpur
case was inappropriate and the appropriate words should have been
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 833
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

‘executive power’. In fact, in the Dholpur case, the very next part of A
the sentence reads “and is thus an instance of purely executive
jurisdiction of the President”. This clearly shows that the observations
in the Princes Privy Purses case would have no impact on the ratio of
the judgment in the Dholpur case.
32. The issue is whether the rulers continued to be rulers after B
executing the instruments of merger. They had agreed to merge their
States with the Indian Union because they were to be paid privy purses
and would enjoy certain privileges. They were also entitled to declare
some properties to be their private properties. In case of disputes whether
the property is private or State property, the Union could refer the dispute
for decision to a committee headed by a judicial officer. The rulers C
were no longer sovereign. There was no paramountcy vested in the
rulers. They had no land other than the private properties. They had no
subjects. They were rulers only in name, left only with the recognition
of their original title, a privy purse, some privileges, etc.
Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah (as he then was) in his inimitable D
way in the Princes Privy Purses case pithily held as follows:-
“40…….Paramountcy as such was no more as there was no
paramount power and no vassal. The Rulers had lost their
territories and their right to rule and administer them. They were
left only a recognition of their original title, a Privy Purse, their E
private properties and a few privileges. These rights were the
only indicia of their former sovereignty but they enjoyed them by
the force of the Constitution although in every respect they were
ordinary citizens and not potentates…….”
33. It is apparent that the rulers were rulers only in name. They F
held no land except the personal properties. There were no subjects.
They were Maharajas or Rajas without a Praja; without any sovereignty;
and without any territory.
34. The definition of ruler in clause (22) of Article 366 of the
Constitution itself shows that the person who is defined as ruler is a G
former prince, chief or other person, who was, on or after 26.01.1950
recognised as a ruler having signed the covenant of accession.
Necessarily, the ruler was a person who was recognised before
independence by the British Crown and was the sovereign of his State.
Such person, though defined as a ‘Ruler’, has no territory and exercises
H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A no sovereignty over any subjects. He has no attributes of a potentate
nor does he enjoy all the powers and privileges which are normally
exercised by a potentate. As Justice Shah in the Princes Privy Purses
case judgment held, “he is a citizen of India with certain privileges
accorded to him because he or his predecessor had surrendered his
territory, his powers and his sovereignty”.
B
35. The President while exercising his powers under Article 366
(22) could not notify a ruler at his whims and fancy. As held in the
Princes Privy Purses case:-
“288…..The choice of a person as a Ruler to succeed another
C on his death was certainly not left to the mere caprice of the
President. He had to find out the successor and this he could do
not by applying the ordinary rules of Hindu Law or Mohamadan
Law but by the law and custom attaching to the Gaddi of a
particular State…..”
D 36. Examples were also given where in cases of disputes, the
same were referred to committees comprising of the Chief Justices of
the States and erstwhile rulers. However, it is clear that the declaration
under clause (22) of Article 366 relates only to the Gaddi or the rulership
and not to the properties which were declared to be private properties
by the ruler.
E
37. It was contended by Mr. Ganguli that there could be no Gaddi
without a property and the properties which were declared to be the
private properties were, in fact, attached to the Gaddi and the properties
would be of the ruler so declared. We find no force in this submission.
These were rulers without any subjects. These were rulers without any
F territory. These were so called rulers enjoying certain privileges and
privy purses. They had been given the choice of declaring certain
properties to be their private properties and these private properties could
not be said to be attached to the Gaddi. When they were actual
sovereigns, their entire State was attached to the Gaddi and not any
G particular property. There are no specific properties which can be
attached to the Gaddi. It has to be the entire ‘State’ or nothing. Since,
we have held that they were rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to
protect their erstwhile titles, the properties which were declared to be
their personal properties had to be treated as their personal properties
and could not be treated as properties attached to the Gaddi.
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 835
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

38. Mr. Chandra has drawn our attention to the Rajpal Hindi A
Shabdkosh7 in which Gaddi has been given various meanings including
small mattress, seat of an exalted person, title of a ruler. In the Oxford
Hindi-English Dictionary8, the meanings given are cushion, throne, royal
seat, etc. Property is not mentioned as one of the attributes of a Gaddi.
39. A Gaddi or rulership and private property have two different B
connotations even in the merger agreement/instrument of accession. In
Article 2 of the agreement, it is clearly mentioned that Nawab would
continue to enjoy the same personal rights, privileges, immunities and
dignities and other titles which he would have enjoyed prior to the
agreement. Conspicuously, the word ‘property’ or ‘personal property’
is missing. Article 2 deals only with personal rights, privileges, dignities, C
etc. Article 3 deals with privy purse which would also be a part of the
rulership or Gaddi. Article 6 which deals with succession, guarantees
the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State
and to the Nawab’s personal rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and
title. Gaddi would be the ‘throne’ or ‘title’ of Nawab in the context in D
which it has been used and the personal rights, privileges, immunities,
dignities and titles will be those referred to in Article 2. The word
‘property’ is also conspicuously absent in Article 6.
40. Article 4 states that the Nawab shall be entitled to full ownership,
use and enjoyment of all private properties as distinct from State E
properties. Such properties must belong to him as on the date of
agreement. In our view, Article 6 does not relate to the properties
mentioned in Article 4 and the private properties would remain the private
properties of the Nawab as a common citizen of the country as held in
various authorities referred to above. We have, therefore, no hesitation
in holding that on the death of the ruler, Nawab Raza Ali Khan in the F
year 1966, succession to his private properties was governed by personal
laws.
41. Mr. A.K. Ganguli, placed reliance upon the observations in
the case of Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India9, hereinafter
referred to as ‘the second privy purses case’. In this case, the erstwhile G
rulers challenged the 26th Amendment, 1971 of the Constitution whereby
7
Rajpal Hindi Shabdkosh, Dr. Hardev Bahri, Rajpal & Sons, Pg.206 (2018)
8
Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, Edited by R.S. McGregor, Oxford University Press,
Pg.254 (2018)
9
1994 Supp. (1) SCC 191 H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A the benefits given to the rulers, as enshrined in the Constitution in Articles
291 and 362 mentioned hereinabove, were taken away. This was done
after the judgment in the first Princes Privy Purses case wherein it
was held that the guarantees, given to the erstwhile rulers having been
embodied in the Constitution, could not be taken away by executive fiat.
Thereafter, the Parliament amended the Constitution and it was in this
B
context that the following observations were made:
“74. The agreements entered into by the Rulers of the States
with the Government of India were simple documents relating to
the accession and the integration and the “assurances and
guarantees” given under those documents were only for the
C fixation of the privy purses and the recognition of the privileges.
The guarantees and the assurances given under the Constitution
were independent of those documents. After the advent of the
Constitution, the Rulers enjoyed their right to privy purses, private
properties and privileges only by the force of the Constitution and
D in other respects they were only ordinary citizens of India like any
other citizen; of course, this is an accident of history and with the
concurrence of the Indian people in their Constituent Assembly.
75. Therefore, there cannot be any justification in saying that the
guarantees and assurances given to the Rulers were sacrosanct
E and that Articles 291 and 362 reflected only the terms of the
agreements and covenants. In fact as soon as the Constitution
came into force, the Memoranda of Agreements executed and
ratified by the States and Union of States were embodied in formal
agreements under the relevant articles of the Constitution and no
obligation flowed from those Agreements and Covenants but only
F from the Constitutional provisions. To say differently, after the
introduction of Articles 291 and 362 in the Constitution, the
Agreements and Covenants have no existence at all. The
reference to Covenants and Agreements was casual and
subsidiary and the source of obligation flowed only from the
G Constitution. Therefore, the contention urged on the use of the
words ‘guaranteed’ or ‘assured’ is without any force and absolutely
untenable.”
42. We are not stricto sensu dealing with this issue because the
succession to the estate of Nawab Raza Ali Khan opened in the year
H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 837
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

1966, prior to the 26th Amendment Act. However, one thing which is A
clear is that the rulers enjoyed right to privy purses, private properties
and privileges only because of the Constitution and in other respects
they were ordinary citizens. It was urged that since the rights were
guaranteed under the Constitution, the rule of primogeniture would apply.
We find no force in this contention because, as already discussed above,
B
in Article 362 reference is made only to the personal rights, privileges
and dignities of the ruler of an Indian State and, in our view, rights would
not include succession to personal properties.
43. Another argument raised on behalf of the contesting defendants
is that Nawab Raza Ali Khan, knowing that his succession was governed
by the rule of primogeniture, had created a trust named ‘The Raza Trust’ C
for the welfare of his family members other than defendant no. 1. He
had also made various other grants and gifts in favour of his children
whereas the elder son was deprived of such benefits. It is contended
that the plaintiff and the other defendants supporting the plaintiff had
taken benefit of the said Trust and gifts and, therefore, cannot challenge D
the entitlement of defendant no. 1. This argument cannot be accepted.
We have only to decide what was the legal entitlement of the legal heirs
and in what manner the succession to the estate of late Nawab Raza Ali
Khan was to be governed. We may also mention that the Trust, which
has been referred to by the contesting defendants, was created in the
year 1944, much before the Nawab ceded his property to the Dominion E
of India. At that time, there was no doubt that succession to the properties
of the State of Rampur would be governed by the rule of primogeniture.
Even after Nawab ceased to be the ruler, he gifted a number of extensive
properties to the defendant no. 1 during his lifetime including a property
known as Rafat Club in Rampur, which the defendant no. 1 sold to the F
State of U.P. in 1961. The erstwhile Nawab also gifted a property
known as Kothi Bareilly and a house in Delhi to defendant no. 1.
Both the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge held that these
properties gifted by the erstwhile Nawab to the defendant no. 1 were
given to him only to maintain his status as the ruler and, therefore, could
not be taken into consideration while deciding the issue of succession of G
the erstwhile Nawab of Rampur.
44. We find a contradiction in the findings of the High Court in
this regard. On the one hand, it is said that the plaintiff and the other

H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A family members cannot urge that the estate of the Nawab should be
governed by personal law because they have derived benefits from the
Raza Trust and gifts in their life time and, on the other hand, when it
comes to the defendant no. 1, it is said that the gifts were made only
with a view that defendant no. 1 should be able to maintain his status as
the prospective heir. If he was to get all the properties of the Nawab,
B
then why gifts would have to be made in his favour in his life time.
Therefore, this contention is rejected.
45. There is no dispute between the parties that if personal law is
to apply then the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
will apply and since Nawab Raza Ali Khan was a Shia, his estate will
C devolve upon his heirs under the Muslim personal law, as applicable to
Shias.
46. During the pendency of the suit the plaint was amended from
time to time because of the death of defendant no. 1, defendant no.1/1
and defendant no.3. After the amendment, the shares of all the legal
D heirs were worked out in para 9-F of the plaint. These shares have not
been disputed by any one nor there is any dispute with regard to the
manner in which the shares have been worked out. Therefore, these
shares are accepted to be correct. The parties shall be entitled to the
property as per the shares set out in para 9-F of the plaint which shall
E form a part of the decree.
47. In view of the above discussions, we allow the appeals, set
aside the judgments of learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, and determine the shares of the
properties in terms of Para 9-F of the plaint. The appeals are accepted
F and a decree is passed in the following terms:-
(1) The parties shall be entitled to succeed to the properties of
late Nawab Raza Ali Khan, set out in Schedules A and B to the
plaint, as per personal law and in the shares set out in para 9-F of
the amended plaint.
G (2) The first effort shall be to divide the immovable properties
(set out in Schedule A to the plaint) as per the respective shares,
by metes and bounds and for this purpose the Trial Court may
appoint a Commissioner to assist it.

H
TALAT FATIMA HASAN v. NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI 839
KHAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

(3) In case the division of the immovable properties (set out in A
Schedule A to the plaint) is not feasible by metes and bounds the
Trial Court shall fix the owelty money and follow the procedure
prescribed by law so that at the first instance efforts are made to
keep the properties within the family.
(4) To evaluate the value of moveable properties left behind by B
Nawab Raza Ali Khan (set out in Schedule B to the plaint), we
direct the Trial Court to appoint a Commissioner. Properties
shall also be divided as per the shares and if that is not feasible
owelty money will be fixed.
(5) Prayer for decree of mesne profits is rejected since no evidence C
has been led in this regard.
(6) The defendant no.1/2 and defendant no. 1/3 shall render
accounts in respect of the incomes, profits, usufructs and benefits
inherited by them or enjoyed by deceased defendant no.1 and
deceased defendant no. 1/1. These shall be adjusted while D
determining the value of the properties falling to their shares and
also the owelty money.
(7) The Trial Court shall also determine whether the defendant
no.1 (since deceased), defendant no.1/1 (since deceased),
defendant no.1/2 or defendant no.1/3 have sold or transferred E
any movable property or immovable property during the pendency
of these proceedings. The value of such immovable property or
movable property sold or transferred shall obviously be deducted
from the shares of defendant no.1 /2 and defendant no.1/3.
(8) We direct all the parties to appear before the District Judge, F
Rampur on 02.09.2019 and request the District Judge, Rampur to
keep the case on his docket and proceed further. The District
Judge may first try to impress upon the parties to make the actual
division of the properties by settlement by mutual agreement since
the main dispute with regard to the rule of succession and the
shares has been determined. G
(9) As the suit has been pending for almost half a century and the
parties have been litigating for more than 5 decades and some of
the parties are at an advanced age, we direct the trial court to
dispose of the matter in terms of our directions above at the earliest
but, in any case, not later than 31.12.2020. H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 48. I.A. No. 3 of 2014 is dismissed. The applicants shall, however,
be at liberty to file a Civil Suit to establish their rights.
49. No order in the Contempt Petition in view of the directions
issued.
50. All other applications are disposed of. No order as to costs.
B

Divya Pandey Appeals allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H