Holding

The evidence failed to establish that the appellant subjected his wife to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, so no dowry death under Section 304B IPC.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered the appeal of T. Arunthperunjothi, who had been convicted under Section 304B of the IPC for the alleged dowry death of his wife Davamani, who committed suicide in 1994. The prosecution alleged that the husband or his relatives had demanded dowry and harassed the deceased, relying on statements of the deceased’s mother, a teacher, and other relatives, but no direct demand by the husband was proved. The Court held that the mother’s testimony was hearsay, the alleged dowry demands were made by persons other than the appellant, and there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment by the husband "soon before" the death. Consequently, the essential ingredients of Section 304B were not satisfied and the presumption under Section 113B could not be invoked. The conviction was set aside and the appellant was released.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution proved that the husband subjected the wife to cruelty or harassment for dowry "soon before" her death as required under Section 304B IPC.
Whether hearsay statements of the deceased's mother regarding alleged harassment are admissible.
Whether the demand for dowry made by persons other than the accused can satisfy the requirement of dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
Whether the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be invoked in the absence of direct evidence of dowry demand and harassment.
Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to infer dowry death.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304B IPCSection 113B Evidence Acthearsaycircumstantial evidencesuicidedowry demandpresumption

Judgment

T. ARUNTPERUNJOTHI A
v.
STATE THROUGH S.H.0., PONDJCHERRY

APRIL 5, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860:

Section 304 B-Dowry death-Held, it is necessary for the prosecution
to establish that the deceased must have been subjected to cruelty or C
harassment by her husband or relative of her husband soon before her death.

Appellant and the deceased (wife) were married on 04.09.1992. She
admittedly committed suicide on 14.03.1994. She was brought back from her
maternal home in February 1994. According to the appellant, the deceased
proposed to go back to her mother's house to see her mother which he refused D
stating that she had come back only a month back. At the time when the
deceased committed suicide neither the appellant nor his mother was present
in the house. The family members of the deceased namely, her mother, sister,
maternal uncle, another relative, and brother (who was not examined), came
to the house and allowed the cremation of the dead body in his village. They E
took back all the articles which were given to her at the time of or after the
marriage. No first information report was lodged by them. The police was
informed by the appellant himself whereupon a case under Section 176 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated. It is the Deputy Tahsildar-cum-
Executive Magistrate who conducted an enquiry and in his report submitted
before the Station House Officer, Mettupalyam Police Station, raised some F
suspicion as regards the death. In his report, it was suspected that there
could be harassment for demand of dowry by the in-lawsiand husband of the
deceased, based on the statements recorded in this regard. Hence he opined
that this could be a case of dowry death. On the basis of the suspicion expressed
by him, a case under Section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code came to be G
registered against the appellant alone. His mother was not made an accused.
She was made a prosecution witness.

So far as demand of dowry is concerned, allegedly a demand was made

799
I-I
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A of8 sovereign of gold. No witness stated that the demand of dowry was made
by the appellant himself. Evidence brought on record by the prosecution as
-
regard the alleged demand of dowry is : (i) PW-3 Arumugham had been
demanding dowry; (ii) a demand was made also by the brother of the accused;
and (iii) the hearsay evidence PWs that the deceased herself told that she was
B being harassed for demand of dowry. The mother of the deceased did not
depose that she had ever been intimated by the deceased about harassment
meted out to her. She is said to have received the information from her son
who was not examined.

The trial court has not given any cogent reason for disbelieving the
C evidence of PW-1 the mother of the accused, upon whom even the prosecution
placed reliance. The statement of PW-1 that the deceased was short tempered
girl has not been discarded. The statement of PW-2 that even hour before
committing suicide the deceased behaved normally had also not been taken
into consideration. Even the trial court did not discard the explanation given
by the accused as regard suicide of the deceased. It proceeded on the basis
D that there was no evidence either directly or indirectly as regard harassment
or cruelty committed by the appellant against his wife and there are only
circumstantial evidence therefor. The necessary ingredients of circumstantial
evidence for holding the appellant guilty of commission of the offence had not
been deliberated upon either by the trial court or by the High Court.

E Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. Evidence led by prosecution failed to establish involvement
of the Appellant as regards the alleged demand of dowry. [805-0, El

1.2. The mother of the deceased did not depose that she had ever been
F intimated by the deceased about harassment meted out to her. She is said to
have received the information from her son who was not examined. Her evidence,
thus, being hearsay in nature is inadmissible in evidence. She allegedly came
to know about the alleged harassment through her son and daughter only.
[805-FI

G 2.1. No cogent evidence had been adduced by the prosecution to establish
that the appellant had demanded any dowry. Therefore, demand of dowry or
any harassment being the cause for the death of the deceased, cannot be said
to have been established beyond all reasonable doubt. [811-E; 812-EI

State uf A.P v. Raj vopal Asawa and Anr., 120041 4 SCC 470, Harjit
H Singh v. State uf Punjab, [20061 1 SCC 463 and Kamesh Panjiyar alias
T. ARUNTPERUNJOTHI r. STA TE THROUGH SH.O., PONDICHERRY [S.B. SINHA,).] 80]

Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005] 2 sec 388, referred to. A
Sudhakar and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 6 SCC 671,
distinguished.

2.2. There is no reason to disbelieve the defence version that the cause
of death was that she had insisted to go to her mother's house but she was not B
allowed. (812-E]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 779 of
2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.7.2004 of the High Court of C
Madras in Crl. A. No. 627/97.

Ms. Mahlakshmi Pavani and G. Balaji, (for Mis. Mahalakshmi Balaji &
(Co.) for the Appellant.

R. Sundaravaradan, V.G. Pragasam and G.N. Reddy for the Respondent. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Davamani (the deceased) was the wife of the appellant
herein. She admittedly committed suicide on 14.03.1994. They were married on
04.09.1992. The deceased gave birth to a female child at Pondicherry in July E
1993. The appellant for one reason or the other did not bring her back from
her maternal home for a period of about eight months. She was brought back
in February 1994. According to the appellant, the deceased proposed to go
back to her mother's house to see her mother which he refused stating that
she had come back only a month back.
F
It is not in dispute that at the time when the deceased committed suicide
neither the appellant nor his mother was present in the house. Somehow or
the other the people of the neighbourhood came to know about it. They broke
open the door and found the dead body. The deceased committed suicide at
about 1 p.m .. The mother of the appellant came back at 3.30 p.m. G
It also stands admitted that the family members of the deceased, namely,
her mother (PW-7), sister (PW-8), maternal uncle (PW-6), another relative
(PW-9), and brother (who was not examined), came to the house and allowed
the cremation of the dead body in his village. They took back all the articles
which were given to her at the time of or after the marriage. No first h1fonnation H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A report was lodged by them. The police was informed by the appellant himself
whereupon a case under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was
initiated. The matter was also considered by panchayat. One Rajarajan
Veerasamy, Deputy Tahsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, (PW-14), conducted
an enquiry. He examined the prosecution witnesses and others. He submitted
B a report before the Station House Officer, Mettupalayam Police Station on or
about 1S.03.1994 wherein he is said to have raised. ome suspicion as regards
the dearh of the said Davamani. In his report, it was stated :

" ... Further, their statements also stress the harassment for want of
dowry. The Panchayatars statement does not clear the doubts as they
C are not aware of any facts and they could not confirm that there are
no problems between the deceased and her husband. There is an
injury on the right hand side of the neck of the deceased and an
internal injury could be traced out only in the post mortem report.

In my opinion, I suspect that there could be harassment for
O demand of dowry by the in-laws and husband of the deceased, based
on the statements recorded in this regard. Hence, in my opinion, this
could be a case of dowry death ..... "

On the basis of the suspicion expressed by him, a case under Section
3048 of the Indian Penal Code came to be registered against the appellant
E alone. His mother was not made an accused. She was made a prosecution
witness. She was examined on behalf of the prosecution as PW-I. It is
furthermore not in dispute that an investigation into the offence was required
to be carried out by a Superintendent of Police. Upon the said report of PW-
14, Smt. Anita Roy, Superintendent of Police (PW-10), took up the investigation.
F She was not conversant with the local language. She went to the village
Kilinchikuppam and examined the mother, sister and brother of the deceased.
The Circle Inspector Munisam and Head Constable Ramaswami (PW-15)
accompanied her. Admittedly, the evidences of the witnesses were recorded
by the said PW-15. They were said to have been translated in English.
Although, according to PW- I0, she verified the said statements, but did not
G state as to how she did it. PW-10 and PW-I I being not available at that time
in the village, were asked to come to Pondicherry. PW Nos. 7, I0 and 11
visited Pondicherry on 8.05.1994. Their statements were said to have been
recorded by PW-15, in her presence. The said statements were also allegedly
translated. She again allegedly verified the said statements without disclosing
the mode and manner thereof. Upon completion of the investigation a
H
T. ARUNTPERUNJOTHI v. STATE THROUGH S.H.O., PONDICHERRY[S.B. SINHA, J.] 803

chargesheet was filed. A
The learned Sessions Judge framed the following charge against the
appellant:

"That you from 4.9.1992 to 14.3.1994 had subjected your wife
Davamani to cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry demand B
and had driven her to commit suicide by hanging at her residence at
Shanmugapuram on 14.3.1994 between 8-15 and 13-00 hours which
occurred within seven years of her marriage and that you thereby
committed an offence punishable under Section 3048 of the Indian
Penal Code and within my cognizance."
c
In support of its case, the prosecution examined Kasiammal (PW- I),
Amudha (PW-2), Arumugharn (PW-3), Seethapathy (PW-6), Amaravathi (PW-
7), Chandrakantha (PW-8) and Jaya (PW-9) .

In this case three witnesses were also examined on behalf of the
prosecution who instead of supporting its case directly or indirectly supported D
the case of the appellant herein. PW- I is the mother of the appellant. PW-
2 is a neighbour and PW-3 was a teacher of the village, who himself had even,
according to prosecution witnesses, been demanding dowry. We would refer
to their depositions before the court a little later.

We would, however, at this stage notice the deposition of those
E
witnesses who supported the case of the prosecution completely.

PW-7 is the mother of the deceased. She was, presumably her best
friend. It is expected that the deceased would share her agonies with her
motheronly. F
Three periods are involved in this case. The marriage took place on
04.09.1992. The deceased stayed with her husband for about seven months,
i.e., upto February 1994. According to PW-7 they were living happily during
that period. The deceased went back to her mother's place for delivery of a
child. She delivered a child in a hospital. According to the deceased's mother G
the appellant came and saw the child. She was later on discharged from the
hospital after informing the appellant. The deceased stayed with her mother
from March 1993 to February 1994.

The incident took place on 14.03.1994.
H
804 SUPREMF COURT REPORTS (2006] 3 S.C.R.

A So far as demand of dowry is concerned, allegedly a demand was made
of 8 sovereign of gold. One witness PW-9, Jaya, however, states that the
accused party demanded 9 sovereigns. It was stated by other prosecution
witnesses that 6.5 sovereign of gold was given at the time of marriage,
whereas according to PW-9 only five sovereign of gold was given. Another
demand by way of dowry was said to be in the form of a silk saree as it was
B missing at the time of marriage and the groom's family wanted them to
purchase a new saree.

We may notice that no witness stated that the demand of dowry was
made by the appellant himself. Evidence brought on record by the prosecution
as regard the alleged demand of dowry is : (i) PW-3 Arumugham had been
C demanding dowry; (ii) a demand was made also by the brother of the accused;
and (iii) the hearsay evidence of PWs that the deceased herself told that she
was being harassed for demand of dowry.

It is of some significance to note that the mother of the deceased
categorically stated. :
D
·· ... The accused has not demanded for the jewels and saree. The
teacher only demanded. The teacher is responsible for my daughter's
death."
It is furthennore of some significance to note that a categorical statement
E was made by PW-7 that when PW-3 had visited her house and demanded a
silk saree and jewels, she had told him that she would ask her son-in-law
regarding the same which demonstrate that she had confidence in him. It is
not her case that at any point of time she had asked the appellant as regard
any demand of dowry made by him.

F . PW-6 is the maternal uncle of the deceased. His evidence cannot at all
be relied upon as what he stated in his deposition had not been stated by
him before the investigating officer or before the Deputy Tehsildar. He, in his
deposition, went beyond the prosecution case. According to him, the accused
and his family demanded TVS Moped, Cot, Bureau. Grinder and vessels made
of stainless steel. No such case was made out by the family members of the
G deceased. According to him. when he visited the deceased six months after
the marriage, she had allegedly informed him about being beaten by the
appellant and demanding of remaining 1.5 sovereign of gold jewels. He spoke
about giving of Y, sovereign of gold during Valaikappu function.
The said function is indisputably held when the woman is about seven
H months' pregnant. It may, therefore, be that Y, sovereign of gold might have
T. ARUNTPERUNJOTHI v. STATE THROUGH S.H 0, PONDICHERRY [S.B. SINHA, J.] 805
been given as a customary gift. He is said to have been informed that it was A
PW-3 alone who came to his sister's house and demanded the balance of
jewels and a silk saree which had been missing at.the time of marriage. Even
this witness, thus, did not say that the said teacher was making any demand
on behalf of the appellant.

As noticed hereinbefore, according to PW-7, she believed that the B
cause of death of the deceased was the demand of dowry made by PW-3.

PW-8 is the sister of the deceased. She visited her sister three months
after marriage and was allegedly to Id by her that her in laws had been
demanding the balance of jewels which had been agreed to by them. At that C
time admittedly no allegation was made by her as regard harassment meted
out to her by anybody far less the appellant herein.

PW-9 is the aunt of the deceased. She was examined by the
Superintendent of Police three months after the death of the deceased
Davaman i. She of course told about the alleged torture meted out to the D
deceased by the appellant for not giving the balance jewels but her evidence,
in our considered view, is not reliable. Evidence led by prosecu1ion, thus,
failed to establish involvement of the Appellant as regards the alleged demand
of dowry.

We may now scrutinize the evidence led by the prosecution as regards E
the alleged harassment of the deceased.

The mother of the deceased did not depose that she had ever been
intimated by the deceased about harassment meted out to her. She is said to
have received the information from her son who was not examined. Her
evidence, thus, being hearsay in nature is inadmissible in evidence. She F
allegedly came to know about the alleged harassment through her son and
daughter only. PW-8, however, does not say that she had ever stated the
same to her mother. PW-7's statement as regard harassment, thus, is not
admissible at all.

We have noticed hereinbefore that when PW-8 visited the deceased for G
the first time, i.e., three months after the marriage, she did not speak about
any harassment. Only when she allegedly came to see her sister after the
delivery of the child and asked as to how she was, she allegedly cried stating
that she was in apprehension of danger to life. She is said to have made a
similar statement before the police also but in relation 1hereto no date or H
806 Sl!PRE\IE COURT R[PORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A month was mentioned. She deposed that she allegedly had told the Tahsildar
that the deceased was beaten up by the appellant: but no such statement
appeared to have been made. She in her evidence categorically stated that :

" ... When I invited my sister to come to my house along with her
husband. she told that her husband wou Id come only after his mother
B in law come and go to his house ..... "

The explanation offered by the accused is exactly the same. We for the
reasons mentioned hereinbcfore, do not intend to place any reliance on the
statement of PW-9 even on this score.

C We may at this juncture may notice the peculiar features of the case.
PW-1, the mother of the accused and PW-3, the teacher, who were responsible
for the demand of dowry had not been made accused in the case. They have
been examined as prosecution witnesses. PW- I has not even been declared
hostile. She was examined by the prosecution, as presumably before the police
D because she had deposed against the accused and in support of the
prosecution. As regards the suicide committed by the deceased. she offered
an explanation not as a defence witness but as a prosecution witness stating
that after a month of her coming back after delivery of child, the deceased had
requested her son to permit her to go to her parents' house. but he had told
her that she could do so only after her parents come to their house but despite
E the same she had been insisting to visit her parents. According to PW-! she
was a short tempered girl. She categorically stated that she committed suicide
for not being allowed to go to her parents house by the appellant and there
was no other reason therefor.

PW-2 is another witness. who was examined by the prosecution. She
F was the last person to see the deceased. According to her at about 12.30 p.m.,
she visited her house. She was in normal mood. She also bears testimony that
the couple had been leading a happy life. She had also not been-·declared
hostile by the prosecution.

G PW-3 is th~ teacher, who according to PW-7 was solely responsible for
causing her daughter's death. He was declared hostile. He had been examined
by the police as also by the Superintendent of Police. He categorically stated
that there had never been any problem as regard dowry nor any complaint was
made by the appellant to the deceased's family about missing of the silk saree.
Although he was declared hostile, only some suggestions were given to him.
H In fact he had nor been cros~-examined in the true sense of the term. His
T. ARUNTPERUNJOTHI r. STATE THROUGH S.H.0., PONDICHERRY [S.B. SINHA, J.] 807

attention had not been drawn to his earlier statements, if any, before the A
police or before the Deputy Tahsildar. Why he was examined as a prosecution
witness and why he was.declared hostile is not known.

In the aforementioned factual backdrop, we have to consider as to
whether a case has been made out for conviction of the appellant under
Section 304-8 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under : B
"3048. Dowry death.-(!) Where the death of a woman is caused
by any bums or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection, any C
demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and
such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall
have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, D
1961 (28of1961).

(2) Whosoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life."

The essential ingredients of the said offence, therefore, are (i) death of E
a woman must have been caused by any bums or bodily injury or otherwise
than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have been occurred
within seven years of marriage (iii) soon before her death she was subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relative of her husband; (iv) such
cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand of dowry; and F
(v) such cruelty is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before
her death.

The significant words are "soon before her death". Here, it was, thus,
necessary for the prosecution to establish that the deceased must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relative of her husband G
soon before her death.

It is now well-settled in view of a catena of decisions of this Court that
what would constitute 'soon before her death· depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 3 S.C.R.

A We would examine some of them.

In State ofA.P. v. Raj Gopa/ Asawa and .4nr.. [2004] 4 SCC 470, it is
stated

.. 10. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case
B at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)
Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry
deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:

"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. When the question is
C whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it
is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected
by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry, the cou;t shall presume that such person had
caused the dowry death.

D Explanation· ·-For the purposes of th is section 'dowry death·
shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860)."

The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply
analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated
E I0-8-1988 on ''Dowry Deaths and Law Reform". Keeping in view the
impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove
dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a
provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain
essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in
the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of ''dowry
F
death" in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients,
amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned
must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or
harassment "for, or in connection with, the demand for dowry".
G Presumption under Section 1I3-B is a presumption of law. On proof of
the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court
to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The
presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:

( l) The question before the court must be whether the accused
H has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the
T ARUNTPERUNJOTHI 1·. STATE THROUGH S.H 0, PONDICHERRY [S.B. SINHA, J.J 809

presumption can be raised only if the accused. is being tried for the A
offence under Section 304-B IPC.)

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any B
demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death."

[See also Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [2006] 1 SCC 463]

In Kamesh Panjiyar. alias Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005] 2
c
SCC 388, this Court opined :

"12. Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health, whether mental or physical of the woman is required to be D
established in order to bring home the application of Section 498-A
!PC. Cruelty has been defined in the Explanation for the purpose of
Section 498-A. Substantive Section 498-A !PC and presumptive Section
113-A of the Evidence Act have been inserted in the respective
statutes by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983. It is to E
be noted that Sections 304-B and 498-A !PC cannot be held to be
mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences.
It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and
that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the
meaning of "cruelty". In Section 304-B there is no such explanation
about the meaning of "cruelty". But having regard to the common F
background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of
"cruelty" or "harassment" is the same as prescribed in the Explanation
to Section 498-A under which "cruelty" by itself amounts to an
offence. Under Section 304-B it is "dowry death" that is punishable
and such death should have occuITed within seven years of marriage. G
No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. If the case is established,
there can be a conviction under both the sections. (See Akula Ravinder
v. State ofA.P. ') Period of operation of Section 113-A of the Evidence
Act is seven years, presumption arises when a woman commits suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of marriage."
H
In the decision of this Court in Sudhakar and Anr. v. State of
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A Maharashtra, (2000] 6 SCC 671 whereupon Mr. R. Sundaravardan relied, this
Court opined that the proximity test is one of the tests which must be held
to be applicable for the purpose of consideration as to whether such a
statement of a deceased should be relied upon or not. Therein, Sethi, J.,
speaking for a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that only because allegedly
B the deceased made a statement giving out circumstances in which she was
allegedly raped by two accused, which was recorded by police 11 days after
the occurrence whereas she committed suicide about 5-1 /2 months thereafter.
it would not lead to the conclusion that rape upon her was the reason for
commission of her committing suicide, stating:

C "I I. There is no legal evidence on record that the prosecutrix at or
about the time of making the statement had disclosed her mind for
committing suicide allegedly on account of the humiliation to which
she was subjected to on account of the rape committed on her person.
The prosecution evidence does not even disclose the cause of death
of the deceased. The circumstances stated in Exhibit P-59 do not
D suggest that a person making such a statement would, under the
normal circumstances, commit suicide after more than five-and-a-half
months. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in relying upon
Exhibit P-59 as a dying declaration holding that the said statement
was in series of circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the
E death of the deceased on 21-12-1994. The conviction of the persons
accused of offences cannot be based upon conjectures and suspicions.
Statement Exhibit P-59 if not treated as a dying declaration, there is
no cogent and reliable evidence which can connect the accused with
the commission of the crime ..... "
F The said decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the prosecution.

The conduct of the family members of the deceased, in the
aforementioned backdrop, assumes importance. They did not make any
complaint themselves. It was the appellant who lodged the first information
G report. On the basis of the said first information report, an investigation must
have been commenced. It was stated to be a case of unnatural death. However.
an enquiry was made by the Tahsildar. Before him only for the first time, some
statements had been made by some of the prosecution witnesses. We have
noticed hereinbefore that the members of the Panchayat did nut state anything
about the cause of the death. The Tahsildar in his report memioned about an
H injury "on the right hand side of the neck" of the deceased. No such injury
T ARUNTPERUNJOTlll r. STATE THROUGH S.H.O., PONDICHERRY [S.B. SINHA, .I] 8] )

was found in the post mortem report. He in his evidence as PW-14 categorically A
stated

" ... In my report, I have examined some witnesses who have not stated
that Davamani was ill-treated by her mother-in-law ... "

His evidence in this behalf is not very clear, when he stated : B
" ... ! have not received any information when I examined 5 persons
who are residing in the local area that the death might not have been
happened due to dowry ... "

He further stated : c
" .. .In my enquiry, Chandrakantha has stated that Davamani was beaten
up by her husband demanding Yi sovereign of gold Jhimki.
Chandrakantha went to her sister house I 0 days before the death and
she was told by her sister that she was well. In my report, I have not
stated that Chandrakantha was told by her sister Dawamani that she D
was well while weeping. When I examined Seethapathy he has not
stated that Dawamani was ill treated and beaten up by her husband
for dowry. Jn the examination of Amarvathy, she has not stated that
Dawamani returned to her mother-in-law's house for one month and
she was ill treated for dowry ..... " E
It, therefore, appears that no cogent evidence had been adduced by the
prosecution to establish that the appellant had demanded any dowry. It would
bear repetition to state that according to the mother of the deceased, PW-7
only PW-3 demanded dowry and only he was responsible for the death of her
daughter. If that be so, he should have also been prosecuted. F
The trial court has not given any cogent reason for disbelieving the
evidence of PW- I; upon whom even the prosecution placed reliance. The
statement of PW- I that the deceased was short tempered girl has not been
discarded. The statement of PW-2 that even Yi hour before committing suicide
the deceased behaved normally had also not been taken into consideration. G
The prosecution did not cross-examine PW-3, except making some suggestions;
although he was declared hostile. Even the trial court did not discard the
explanation given by the accused as regard suicide of the deceased. It proceeded
on the basis that there was no evidence either directly or indirectly as regard
harassment or cruelty committed by the appellant against his wife and there H
·-
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 3 S.C.R.

A are only circumstantial evidence therefor. The necessary ingredients of
circumstantial evidence for holding the appellant guilty of commission of the
offence had not been deliberated upon either by the trial court or by the High
Court. Even <1n attempt had been made to show that the accused had on an
earlier occasion tried to murder the deceased but the same was found to be
B false by the trial court holding that there was no evidence that the "accused
had already attempted to burn away his wife''. The trial court opined :

" ... The fact that the deceased was living with her mother for about
eight months after delivery would speak volumes of the
misunderstanding between the accused and his wife ...... "
c If it was a case of misunderstanding between the accused and the
deceased, the same would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
appellant had committed an offence under Section 304-8 of the Indian Penal
-
Code. The law does not raise any such presumption

D The trial court proceeded on the basis that as if PW-3 was acting as
a messenger, although there was no evidence in this behalf It was held by
the trial court that 'the insistence of the PW-3 revealed that what was
demanded by PW-3 was a dowry demand'. We fail to understand as to how
a so-called misunderstanding or a hypothesis could be made the basis for
conviction.
E
There was no reason to disbelieve that the defence version that the
cause of death was that she had insisted to go to her mother's house but she
was not allowed, was plausible.

Having regard to the peculiar features of the case, we are of the opinion
F that demand of dowry or any harassment being the cause for the death of
the deceased, cannot be said to have been established beyond all reasonable
doubt.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
G sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant
shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in rnnncction with any other
case.

B.B.B. Appeal allowed.