SYED ASADULLAH KAZMIversusTHE ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,I ALLAHABAD AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 1981 INSC 125
- Decided
- 23 July 1981
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R S PATHAK
Holding
The appellate authority’s order of 25 March 1977 had acquired finality and could not be reopened even in view of the landlord’s death; the Prescribed Authority was bound to give effect to that order.
Summary
Syed Asadullah Kazmi was a tenant of a bungalow owned by Raj Kumar Sinha. After the landlord’s applications for ejectment, the Prescribed Authority ordered the release of the bungalow in May 1976, which the appellate authority modified on 25 March 1977 to release only a portion to the landlord’s son and allow the tenant to retain the rest, directing a division of the premises. The tenant’s writ petition against this order was dismissed, and the order became final after the appellant’s challenges failed. Following the landlord’s death, the tenant sought to stop the partition scheme, but the Prescribed Authority refused, and the appellate authority again held the 1977 order final. The Supreme Court held that the appellate order had acquired finality before the landlord’s death and could not be reopened, and that the Prescribed Authority was bound to give effect to it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a subsequent event, such as the death of the landlord, can reopen a final order of an appellate authority granting partial release of premises under landlord‑tenant law.
- Whether the Prescribed Authority has jurisdiction to revisit or set aside the appellate order after it has become final.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
77
SYED ASADULLAH KAZMI
v.
THE ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,1 ALLAHABAD
AND OTHERS
July 23, 1981 B
[R.S. PATHAK AND A.D. KoSHAL, JJ.]
Landlord and tenant -Prescribed authority allowing the landlord to recover his
building tenanted, but the appellate authority nwdifying the order of part recovrry
only and and the said order becomes final due to successive falures in appeal by the
tenant including in the Supre1ne Court-Any application to re-open the issue due to C
the subsequent event i.e. the death of the landlord is not maintainable.
Jn February 1965, Bungalow No. 16-D, Beli Road (now 26 B.K. Banerjee
Road), Allahabad was allotted to the appellant. On an application made in
April 1975 the prescribed authority allowed, on 24th May, 1976, the application
directing the release of the bungalow to the landlord. On appeal the appellate
authority by its order dated 25th March, 1977 moditied the order by releasing D
only a portion of the building and by permitting the appellant to continue in the
remaining portion with a direction to the prescribed authority to divide the
bungalow accordingly. The said order dated 25th March, 1977 became final, since
the writ petition challenging the said order was dismissed. On the death of the
landlord the appellant filed a fresh application before the prescribed authority
not to proceed with the partition scheme. Since the prescribed authority refused
to take note of this subsequent event, the issue bas come up before this Court E
by way of special leave.
Dismissin~ the appeal, the Court
HELD : I. The order dated 25th March, 1977 of the appellate authority
releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the third respondent and leaving
the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant acquired .finality when the F
proceedings taken against it by the appellant failed. The prescribed .luthority
was bound to give effect to that final order and was not acting outside its
jurisdiction or contrary to law. [79 C~D]
2. It is true that subsequent events must be taken into account by a
statutory authority or court when considerings proceeding arising out of a
landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's G
personal need. But in the present case the order for release of a portion of the
accommodation acquired finality before the death of the landlord and the con-
troversy concluded by it could not b~ reopened now. (79 E·F]
3. The present appeal being limited to the question which arose before the
prescribed authority on the application of the appellant after the proceedings for H
release had acquired finality, it is not open even to the Supreme Court, to reopen
the proceeding for release. [79 G-H]
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] I S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1440 of 1979.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the
15th November, 1978 cf the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 8736 of 1978.
8 R.K. Garg, Manoj Swarup and Miss La/ita Kohli for the
Appellant.
Yogeshwar Prasad, and Mrs Rani Chhabra, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c: PATHAK, J. The appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a tenant's writ
-
petition arising out of proceedings consequential upon an order of
ejectment.
The bungalow, 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, was owned by
()
Raj Kumar Sinha, fatlier of the third respondent, Kailash Shanker
Sinha. In February 1965, the bungalow was allotted to the appel-
lant, Syed Asadullah Kazmi, and he was accordingly treated as the
tenant of the premises. At the time, Raj Kumar Sinha, with his
family, including the third respondent, occupied another house at
14-D, Beli Road, Allahabad. In October 1973, the third respondent
E applied for the release of the bungalow 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad,
now described as 26, B.K. Banerjee Road, Allahabad. The attempt
failed. A fresh application was made in April, 1975. It was allowed
by the Prescribed Authority on 24th May, 1976 after overruling an
objection filed by the appellant. The appellant appealed and the
F
appellate authority by its order dated 25th March, 1977 modified the
order of-the Prescribed Authority inasmuch as a portion only of the
building was released in favour of the third respondent and the
-
appellant was permitted to continue in the remaining portion, and
the Precribed Authority was directed to divide the bungalow accor-
dingly. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against
the order of the Appellate Authority, but the writ petition was
G dismissed. Against its dismissal he applied in this Court for special
leave to appeal and on 3rd January, 1978, that petition was also
dismissed.
H To give effect to the direction of the Appellate Authority, the
Prescribed Authority meanwhile initiated proceedings for demar-
S.A. KAZMI v. ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE ALLAfIABAD (Pathah, J.) 79
cation of the premises and a partition scheme was prepared. Duriug A
r the preparation of the partition scheme, Raj Kumar Sinha, the third
respondent's father, died. On 22nd September, 1978, the appellant
filed an application before the Prescribed Authority bringing the fact
of this dea_th to its notice and praying that the partition scheme
should not be prepared. The Prescribed Authority rejected the
application. Appeal by the appellant was dismissed by the Appel- B
late Authority on the ground that the order dated 25th March, 1977
directing a division of the premises had become final and the contro-
versy could not be re-opened. The appellant then filed a writ petition
before the High Court, and the High Court has maintained the view
taken by the Appellate Auhority and dismissed the writ petition by
-· its judgment dated 25th November, 1978. c
We are of opinion that the High Court is right. Plainly, the
order dated 25th March, 1977 of the Appellate Authority releasing
a portion of the premises in favour of the third respondent and
leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant
acquired finality when the proceeding taken against it by the appel- D
lant failed. The order having become final, the Prescribed Authority
was bound to give effect to it. In doing so, the Prescribed Authority
was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law. The appli-
cation moved by the appellant before the Prescribed Authority
requesting it to take into account the death of Raj Kumar Sinha was
misconceived, because it did not lie with the Prescribed Authority to E
reopen proceedings which had been taken to the highest Court and
had become final. It is true that subsequent events must be taken
into account by a statutory authority or court when considering
proceedings arising out of landlord's petition for ejectment of a
tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need. But in the
present case, the order for release of a portion of the accommodation F
required_ finality before the death of Raj Kumar Sinha and the
controversy concluded by it could not be reopened,
The appellant has vehemently urged that being the highest
court of the land it is open to us to reopen the proceeding for release
initiated by the third respondent. We do not think we can. The G
present appeal is limited to the question which arose before
the Prescribed Authority on the application of the appellant
after the proceedings for release had acquired finality and we
must be confined to the consideration of that that question
alone. We cannot reopen that which has become final after H
this court dismissed the special leave petition of the appellant. We
may point out that we have been referred to s. 24 of the U.P. Urban
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R.
A Building Act, 1972 in support of the contention that the Prescribed
Anthority retains control over ejectment proceedings, but we are
not impressed by that contention.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
B
S. R. Appeal dismissed.
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