Holding

A revision application before the High Court against an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is maintainable; the Arbitration Act contains no express bar to such revision.

Summary

Syam Sunder Agarwal & Co. entered into a contract with the Union of India, which later gave rise to an arbitration award of Rs. 6,72,645.56 in favour of the appellant. The award was made a rule of court by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, and the Union of India appealed the award under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940; the appeal was dismissed. The Union then filed a revision petition under Rule 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937, before the Gauhati High Court. The High Court held the revision maintainable, prompting the appellant to challenge that decision before the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the Arbitration Act bars any revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over an appellate order under Section 39, whether the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner qualify as civil courts for purposes of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether the Rules apply only to tribal disputes. The Supreme Court held that no express embargo exists in the Arbitration Act; the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC (and Rule 36A) remains intact, and the officials are deemed civil courts within the territorial limits. Consequently, the revision is maintainable and the appeal is dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a revision under Rule 36A (or Section 115 CPC) is maintainable against an appellate order passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Whether the Arbitration Act, 1940 expressly bars any revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over such appellate orders.
Whether the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner are 'civil courts' within the meaning of Section 115 CPC and Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act.
Whether the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 apply only to disputes involving tribal parties.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 39, s. 40, s. 41, s. 47
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Meghalaya Act No. 6 of 1972
Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937s. Rule 31, s. Rule 36A

Subjects

ArbitrationSection 39Revision jurisdictionHigh CourtRule 36ASpecial statuteFinalityCivil Procedure CodeMeghalayaTribal law

Judgment

SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL AND CO. A
., v.
UNION OF INDIA

JANUARY 9, 1996

[G.N. RAY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.] B

Arbitratio11 Act, I 940 :

Section 39--Appellare order passed under--Revision against such an
order is pennissible--Held there is 1to express provision in the Act which bars
revision against appellate order.
c
Rules for the Albni11istratio11 of Justice and Police in the Khusi and
Janitia Hills, 1937:

Rule 36-A-Revision against appellate order u11der section 39of Arbitra- D
tion Act held pennissible--Revision power under Rule 36-A should be
exercised in <.:01~forn1ity with revision power under section 1I5 o.f Civil
Procedure Code-Applicabilify of rules Jo 11on-tribals-Assistant to Deputy
Commissioner and Com1nissio11er held cloth~d with powers of Civil Court.

Code ~f Civil Procedure, 190R : E

Section I 15-R.evision-Special statute-Provrsion o.f finality-Does
not take a\vay revision power o.f High Court.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent. A dispute
arose between the parties and the matter was referred to a sole arbitrator F
who passed an award for a sum of Rs, 6,72,645.56 in favour of the
appellant, The Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner at Shillong made the
award a rule of court and rejected the respondent's objection filed under
section 30 of the Arbitration act, 1940. Respondent's appeal under Section
39 was dismissed by Deputy Commissioner, Shillong. A revision was G
preferred under Rule 36-A of the Rules for the Administration of justice
and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 and a single Judge referred
the revisions case to a Division Bench for adjudication of the issue as to
maintainability of the revision. The Division Bench of the High Court
answered the reference in favour of the maintainability of the revision and H
245
,
)

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] l s.C.R.
A held that (i) against an appellate order under section 39 of the Arbitration
Act a revision lies before the High Court; (ii) there was no provision in
the Arbitration Act which puts an embargo on the revisional jurisdiction
of the High Court against the appellate order. In coming to this conclusion
the Division Bench relied on • derision of the Allahabad High Court in l.
B Chnran Dns v. l. Gur Saran Dns, AIR (1945) All. 146 and a decision of
Pepsu High Court in Lnl Chnnd v. Dev Raj, AIR (1951) Pepsu 115 and held
that the contrary view expressed by a Single Judge in Union of lndin v.
D.S. Nnntln & Co., Civil Revision No. 33(H) of 1985 (1991) GLJ 400, was
incorrect.

c In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that (i) Rules 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police
in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 apply only to the disputes between the
tribes known as the Khasi or the Janitias. They do not govern the disputes
between the non triabal people of the area. Therefore, the revision appli-
D cation under Rules 36A was not maintainable; (ii) the Arbitration Act does
not contemplate any revision of the appellate order; (iii) assuming that the
High Court was clothed with r<evisional power under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to revise an order passed by a court subor-
dinate to it no such revisional application was filed and the revisional
E application filed under Rule 36A was alien to the scheme under the Arbi-
tration Act; and (iv) the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner may be clothed with the power to entertain arbitra-
tion award for making the award Rule of Court or to entertain appeal but
they cannot be held to be a civil court as contemplated under Section 115
CPC or a Court as defined in Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act.
F
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. A revisional application before the High Court against
an appellate order passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is
G maintainable. There is no express provision in the Act putting an embargo
against filing a revisional application against appellate order under
Section 39 of the Act. The Act is a special statute having limited
application relating to matters governed by the said Act. Such special
statute, therefore, must have its application as provided for in the said
statute. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code or
H under any other statute therefore shall not stand superseded under the
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL F. U.0.1. 247
Arbitration Act if the Act does not contain any express bar against A
.' exercise of rcvisional po,ver by the High Court provided exercise of such
revisional po\ver does not nlitigate against given effect to the provisions
of the Arbitration Act. [260-C-D]

U11ion of India v. The Mohiru/er Supply Co., AIR (1962) SC 256;
B
Chhagan/al v. Mu11icipal Coporatio11, Indore, [1977) 2 SCC 409 and R. Medi/
and Co. Ltd. v. Gauri Shw1kar Sarda, (1991) 2 ScC 548, referred to.

L. Clwmu Das v. L. Gur Sara11 Das, AIR (1945) All. 146 and Lal
Cha11d v. Dev Ra;, AIR (1951) Pepsu 115, Approved.
c
.. Union of bu/ia v. D.S. Nani/a & Co., Civil Revision No. 33(H) of
(1985) (1991 GLJ 400), disapproved.

2. Even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate
order passed under that statute, such provision of finality will not take
away revision powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the code of D
Civil Procedure. There is also no such express provision in the Arbitration
Act attaching finality to the appellate order under Section 39 of the said
Act. The only bar under sub-section (2) of Section 39 is of a second appeal
from an appellate order under Section 39. The impugned order of the
High Court upholding maintainability of revisional application under E
Rule 36A of the Rules, therefore, is justified and no interference against
such decision is warranted. [260-G-H; 261-A]

Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal, (1962] Suppl. 1 SCR 933, Referred
to.
F
3. The appellant filed the award in the court of the Assistant to the
Deputy Commissioner for making the award rule of court and also
conceded to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner in entertaining
appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. In the aforesaid circum-
stances, the contention as to non applicability of Rule 36A of the Rules to G
non-Tribals by the respondent as sought to be raised only at this stage,
could not be countenanced. (254-F-GJ

4. The Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong and the
Deputy Commissioner, Shillong have been clothed with the jurisdiction to
act as civil courts in some parts of Meghalaya. Under the Meghalaya Act H
i

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] I S.C.R.
A No. 6 of 1972, the Rules have been made applicable to the whole of United
Khasi Hills District and Janitia Hills District. The appellant, therefore,
filled the arbitration award in the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner and obtained the order making the award of rule of Court.
The respondent-Union of India also preferred appeal under Section 39 of
B the Arbitration Act before the Deputy Commissioner accepting it as
appellate civil court. No material has been placed to show that the
Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner have
not been clothed with powers of Civil Court for decision of Civil disputes
in general within the territorial limits but they have been empowered to
C decide only a special category of civil disputes confined to particular
tribal people. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellate order having
been passed by a civil court, constituted under a special statute, subordi-
nate to the High Court, the High Court does not cease to have revisional
jurisdiction under Section ll5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [259-B-E]

.D 5. The appellant Union of India filed a revisional application under
Rule 36A before the Single Bench of the High Court because against an
appellate order of Deputy Commissioner, no appeal is provided for under
the Ruies. Even if there w~s any provision for filing an appeal from such
appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner under the Rules, such second
E appeal, being expressly barred by Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act,
would have been incompetent. In such circumstances revision application
under Rule 36A is to be considered in conformity with Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Such limited application of revisional jurisdic-
tion under Rule 36A in assailing an appellate order under Section 39 of
the Arbitration Act is to be read otherwise revisional power under Rule
F
36A will have occasion to cause hostile discrimination. Revisional power
under Rule 36A of the High Court therefore, must be exercised in
conformity with the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. (259-F-H; 2611-A-B]

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1536 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.10.91 of the Assam High Court
in C.R. No. 74(SH) of 1989 .

H . '
H.L. Tikku, Kailash Vasdev and Ms. Aparna Bhat for the Appellant.
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY. J.] 249
V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Indira Sawhney, Ms. A
Sushma Suri (NP) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.N. RAY, J. Leave granted.
B
Heard learned counsel. for the parties. This appeal is directed against the
judgment dated October 8, l 99 l passed by the Division Bench of Gauhati High
Court in Civil Revision Case No. 74 (SH) of 1989. The aforesaid decision was
made by the Division Bench of the High Court on a reference by a learned
Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court in the said Civil Revision Case No. 74 C
(SH) of 1989. The learned Single Judge having disagreed with a decision by
a Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court in UHio11 o.f bulit1 v. D.S. Narula &
Co., in. Civil Revision No. 33(H) of 1985 (l 991 GLJ 400) that no revision lies
against the appellate judgment passed in the appeal under Section 39 of the
Arbitration Act, referred the Revision Case to the Division Bench for deciding
D
the maintainability of the Revision Petition filed under Ruic 36A of the Rules
for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Janitia Hills l 937,
against the appellate order dated March 28, l 968 passed by the learned Addi-
tional Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Nille. Shillong arising out of the order
dated July 21. 1984 passed by the Assistant to the Deputy commissioner at
Shillong rejecting the objections made under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act E
and making the award in question, a rule of court.

A contract was awarded to the appellant by the respondent for levelling
of the sites at Kashipur near Silcher, In view of disput~ between the parties
on the claim of the appellant for the aforesaid work, the dispute was referred p
to the sole arbitrator being Engineer-in-Chief, Defence Headquarters, New
Delhi by an order of Court. The sole arbitrator after hearing the parties made
a non speaking award on July 28,' 1982, for a sum of Rs. 6,72,645.56 in favour
of the appellant with interest on the said sum at 10% from the date of award
till realisation.
G
On August 11, l 982 the appellant filed the award in the Court of the
Assistant to the Deputy Conunissioner at Shillong and the respondent filed
objection to the award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act to which the
appellant filed their rejoinder. The learned Assistant to the Deputy Commis-
sioner rejected the objection and made the award a rule of Court. H
)

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] I S.C.R.
A The respondent thereafter filed an appeal under Section 39 of the
Arbilration ,l\ct againsl the said decision of the Assistant to the Deputy
Co1nmissioner before the learned Deputy Comrnissioncr at Shillong and the
said appeal \Vas dis1nissed by the learned Deputy Conunissioner. A decree was
drawn up in tenns of the sJid award.

B The respondent challenged the said appellate order by filing a revision
petition under Rule 36 A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and
Police in the Khasi and Janitia Hills, 1937 before a Single Bench of the •
Gauhati High Court.

c The learned Single Bench was of the view that the said revision petition
under Rule 36 A was maintainable by disagreeing with a contrary view
expressed by another Single Bench of the said High Court in the case of Union
o.f India v. D.S. Narula & Co. and referred the revision case for adjudication
of the issue as to n1aintainability of the ~aid revision application by a Division

D
Bench of the Gauhati High Court. ..
)
By the impugned Judgment, the Division Bench has held that under
Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, a second appeal from appellate judgment
and order has been expressly barred. There is no provision in the Arbitration
Act which puts an embargo on the rcvisional jurisdiction of the High Court
E against the appellate order. It has been held by the Division Bench that there
is no provision conferring revisional jurisdiction _on the High Court against an
appellate order: But 'Court' has been defined under Section 2 (c) of the
Arbitration Act. The proceedings before the appellate court under Section 39
of the Arbitration Act are judicial proceedings and.the Judge exercises a power
F under Section 39 as a judicial officer. Section 115 Civil Pnicedure Code
confers revisio11:al powers on the High c:ourt in respect of a decision of a court
subordinate to it if no appeal lies against such decision of the subordinate court
provided any of the three clauses under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code is
fulfilled. It appears that relying on the decision of Allahabad High Court in
L. Charan Das v. L. Gur Saran Das, AIR ( 1945) Allahabad 146 and a decision
G ·of the Pepsu High Court in Lal Chand v. Dev Raj, AIR (1951) Pepsu 115
·holding that against an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, ;
revision lies before the High Court, the Division Bench of the Gauhati High
Court answered the reference in favour of maintainability of the said revision
application before the Gauhati High Court by indicating that the contrary view
H expressed by a Single Bench of the said High Court in D.S. Narula & Co. 's

'
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.O.I. [G.N. RAY, J.] 251
Case was incorrect. The Division Bench directed that the revision case being A
;, , maintainable should be disposed of on merits by the appropriate Single Bench
of the High Court .

For the purpose of appreciating rival contentions of the parties to this
appeal, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of sections 39, 40,
B
41 and 4 7 of the Arbitration Act.

"39. Appealable orders - (I) an appeal shall lie from the following
orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court
authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court
passing an order : c
An order ·

(i) superseding an arbitration

(ii) on an aw.ard st.ated in the fomi of a special case :
D
(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;

(iv) filing or .refl.Jsing to file an arbitration agreen1ent;

(v.) staying or refusing to stay legal ·proceedings where there is
an arbitration agreement;
E

(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award;

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not app/y to any
order passed by a small Cause Court. .
F
(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under
this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any
right to appeal to the Supreme Court."

"40. .Small Cause Court not to have jurisdiction over arbitrations G
save arbitrations in suit be,(ore it. - A Small Cause Court shall have
no jurisdiction over any arbitration prOceedings or over any applica-,
tion arising thereout save on application made under Section 2."

"41. Procedure and powe'r.o/Court - Subject to the provision of this
Act and of rules made thereunder - H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] I S.C.R.

A (a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, I 90B, shall apply
to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under this Act,
and

(b) the Court shall have, for the purpose of, and in relation to,
arbitration proceedings, the same power of making orders in respc<;t
B of any-of the matters set out in the Second Schedule as it has for the
purpose of, and in relation 10, any proceedings before the Court :

Provided that nothing in clause (b) shall be taken to prejudice any
power which may be vested in an arbitrator or umpire for making
c orders with respect to any of such matters."

"47. Act to apply to all arbitrations. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law
for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to
all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder :
D
Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the
consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a
compro1nise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the
suit is pending.
E It will also be appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions
of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and
Janitia Hills. 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The Rules were
published under Notification No. 2618-A.P. dated March 29, 1937 after they
were promulgated by the Govenunent under the powers vested in him by
F Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act XIV of 1874. These Rules extend to
the whole of the United Khasi Janitia Hills Districts excluding the areas which
were known as the khasi State before the com1nencc1nent of the Constitution
of India. Rule 31 of the Civil Rules framed under Chapter 4 of the Rules deals
with the exercise of original jurisdiction by the Deputy Commissioner and his
G Assistants. It appears that there is no dispute that the Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner was cotnpetent to entertain an a~bitration award filed before it
for the purpose of making it a rule of court. There is also no dispute that
against such order of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner the party
aggrieved by the order making the arbitration award a rule of court can prefer
H an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. Rule 31 and Rule 36A of the
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY, J.] 253
Rules are set out hereunder : A
.~

"31. Exercise of original jurisdiction by Deputy Commissioner and
his Assistants. The Deputy Conunissioncr and his Assistants shall not
ordinarily hear suits triable by sardars and dalois or other duly
recognised village authorities, but they have a discretion to do so
\vhen they think right: and suits, which under these rules the village
B
.authorities cannot try, must be tried by the Deputy Cominissioner, or
• his Assistants. A register of all suits tried by the Deputy Connnis-
sioner and his Assistants shall be kepi in such form as the High Court
shall direct."
c
"36-A. Appeal and revisim1 - The High Court or the Deputy Commis-
sioner may, on application or otherwise, call for the proceedings of
any case decided by any officer subordinate to him and pass such
orders as he may deem fit.

The Deputy Commissioner shall be a court of appeal from a decision
D
' of an Assistant. The High Court shall be a court of appeal from an
original decision of the Deputy Commissioner if the value of the suit
be rupees five hundred or.over, or if the suit involves a question of
tribal right or customs, or of right to, or possession of, immovable
property." E

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Rules apply
only to the disputes between the tribes known as the Khasi or the Janitias.
They do not govern the disputes between the non tribal people of the area. It,
however, appears to us that the Rules provide for trial of certain categories of F
civil cases by village authorities like sardars and dolois and other chief village
authorities as may be recognised by the Deputy Commissioner by samad under
his signatures as competent to try cases \Vithout limit as to amount but with
the reservations mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 26. Rule 32 provides
for reference of Civil disputes to Panchayat by Deputy Commissioner or his
G
Assistant in all cases in which the parties are indigenous inhabitants o.f the
hills. Rule 33 provides for appeal from decision of village authorities to
Deputy Commissioner Or an assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. (emphasis
supplied)

Rule 36A provides for 'appeal and revision before the High Court and H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] J S.C.R.
A to the Deputy Commissioner as the case may be, as indicated in Rule 36A.
Rule 36A provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall be a court of appeal
from a decision of an Assistant. The High Court shall be a court of appeal from
an original decision of the Deputy Conunissioner if lhe value of the suit be
Rupees five hundred or over or (f the suit involves question of tribal right or
B customs or of right -to or possession n,f i1111novable JJrnperty. (emphasis
supplied).

The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Rules
apply to the disputes between the tribes known as the Khasi or the Janitias
cannot be accepted. Such contention does not appear to have been raised
c before the High Court. Moreover, no material has been placed before us to
indicate that the Rules are applicable only lo Khasi or Janitia tribes. It appears
lo us on a reference to Chapter IV of the Rules dealing with administration
of civil Justice that a special forum for trial of civil disputes has been made
in respect of the area where Rules have been made applicable. The specific
D provision of referring all disputes to village Panchayats in which the parties
are indigenous inhabitants of the hill in Ruic 32 only indicates that such
reference is to be made in respect of all indigenous inhabitants of the hill and
not not only in respect of members of Kha~i or Janitia tribes. Similarly, in Rule
36A, the High Court has been made a court of appeal from an original decision
E of the Deputy Commissioner if the suit involves question of tribal rights and
customs. Such provision indicates that the original decision of Deputy
Commissioner may .be in respect of other matters and in respect of persons
other than Khasi and Janitia tribals.

The appellant filed the award in the court of the Assistant to the Deputy
F
Commissioner for making the award rule of court and also conceded to the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner in entertaining appeal under Section
39 of the Arbitration Act. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention as to
non availability of Rule 36A of the Rules by the respondent as sought to be
raised only at this stage, should not countenanced.
G
It has been very strongly contended that the Arbitration Act does not
contemplate any revision of the appellate order. The very purpose of the
Arbitration Act is to achieve adjudication within a short time by avoiding time
consu1ning procedure in civil court in respect of the dispute between the
H parties to the arbitration agreement as covered by such agreement, by a judge
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY. J.] 255
to be chosen by the parties in terms of arbitration agreement or by the A
arbitrator to be appointed by court where parties have failed in selecting their
arbitrator. Jn order to expedite the finality of an arbitration proceedings.
Section 39 of the Arbitration Act clearly indicates that only one appeal will
lie from such orders passed under the Arbitration Act as have been indicated
in Section 39. Sub section (2) of Section 39 specifically indicates that no B
second appeal will lie from an order passed on an appeal made under Section
39. It has been submitted that although under Letters Patent, an appeal lies to
the Di vision Bench from the decision of Single Bench of the High Court but
it has been clearly held by this Court that within the Scheme of Arbitration
Act, any second appeal from appellate order under Section 39 is barred and
Letters Patent from an appellate order under Section 39 before a Division
c
Bench is no exception to such embargo on a second appeal. For this
contention, reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Union o.f
India v. The Mohinder Supply Co., AIR (1962) SC 256.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that even if it is D
assumed that the High Court is clothed with revisional power under Section
115 Civil Procedure Code to revise an order passed by a court subordinate to
it within the specified ambit indicated in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 115 Civil
Procedure Code no such reviSional application under Section 115 Civil
Procedure Code has been filed before the High Court, but a revisional E
application under Rule 36A of the Rules has been filed before the High Court
for the purpose of assailing the correctness of the appellate order under Section
39 of the Arbitration Act. Such revisional application under Rule 36A is alien
to the scheme under the Arbitration Act.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Rule 36A
contemplates revision of original or appellate decision of the Deputy Commis-
sioner because under the Rules, there is no provision to approach the High
Court against the appellate decision of the Deputy Commissioner. As a matter
of fact, appeal before the Iligh Court iS·conte1nplated againsl original decision
of the Deputy Commissioner (i) if the value of the suit be rupees five hundred G
or over, or (ii) if the suit involves question of trial right or custom or (iii) if
right to and possession of immovable property. As rule 36A contemplates
revisional power of the High Court entirely in a different situation, the
principle for exercise of revisional powers within the ambit of clauses (a) to
(c) of Section 115, may not be strictly applicable to revisional power H
I
j

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] 1 S.C.R.
A contemplated under Rule 36A of the Rules.

It has been contended by _the learned counsel for the appellant that the ·
Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Conunissioner may be
clothed with the power to entertain arbitration award for making the award
rule of Court or to entertain appeal from the decision of the Assistant to the
B Deputy Commissioner but for such exercise of statutory powers with which
the said authorities are clothed, they cannot be held to be a civil court as
contemplated under Section 115 Civil procedure Code or a 'Court as defined
in Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act. The Division Bench, therefore, erred
in relying on the decisions of Allahabad High Court (AIR 1945 Allahabad
C 146) and pepsu High Court( AIR 1951 Pepsu 115) which are not authorities
for the decision of the question of maintainability of revision application under
Rule 36A of the Rules. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended
that revisional application under Rule 36A not being maintainable against an
appellate order under Section 39 of.the Arbitration Act. The impugned order
D should be set aside and the revision applicati?n pending before the High Court
should be dismissed in limine. •
Mr. Reddy the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
respondent has submitted that Section 39 of the Arbitration Act has expressly
E barred a second appeal against an appellate order under Section 39 of the Act.
A bar of a second appeal does not ipso facto bar supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court. He has submitted exercise of revisional power by the High
<2-0urt even when a statutory appeal is expressly barred has been recognised
by various High Courts and also by this Court. In support of such contention.
Mr. Reddy has referred to the decisions of Allahabad High Court (AIR 1945
F Allahabad 146) and Pepsu High Court (Allahabad 1951 Pepsu 115) since
relied on by the High Court in the impugned decision. Mr. Reddy has also
referred to. a decision of this Court in Chhaganlal v. Municipal Corporation,
Indore, [1977] 2 SCC 409. In that case, maintainability of a revisional
application under Section 115 o:f Code of Civil procedure, against an order
G. passed by the appellate authority (District Court) mi an appeal preferred
against the decision of fv1unicipal ConunissiOners was taken into considera-
I·
tion. Although Section 149(1) of M.P. Municipal Corporation Act provides
that the order passed by the appellate authority (District Court) on an appeal
against the decision of the Municipal Commissioners will be final, it has been
H held by this Court that the District Court being subordinate to High Court, the
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY, J.] 257
High Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction against such appellate order of A
the District Court and finality attached to such order does not oust the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

Mr. Reddy has submitted that Section 39 (2) only indicates that no
second appeal from appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act
can be filed. Because of such express bar of a second appeal, this Court in
B
Mohinder Supply Co. e case (supra) has held that such bar of second appeal
will also apply to any form of second appeal and even by way of appeal under
Letters Patent. In the instant case, only revisional application under Rule 36A
of the Rules has been made.
c
Mr. Reddy has submitted that considering socio political and economic
situation prevailing in the United Khasi Hills District and Janitia Hills District,
the Rules were framed for administration of justice and police in the said area.
There is no dispute that such Rules are applicable in the area in question. Such
Rules provide for forum for resolution of civil and criminal cases. In view of D
such provisions in the Rules the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and
• the Deputy Commissioner exercise power of Civil Courts. Such authorities
exercising powers of civil court within the said territorial limits must be held
to be civil courts subordinate to Gauhati High Court. Hence. High Court has
revisional jurisdiction in respect of decision rendered by Deputy Commis-
sioner under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Since Rule 36A specifically E
provides for revision before the High Court against the appellate decision of
the Deputy Commissioner, such revisional application has been made. But
there is no difficulty in treating the said revisional application also under
Section 115 C.P. Code.
F
Mr. Reddy has submitted that bar of a second appeal before the High
Court under Section 39 (2) of the Arbitration act does not operate as a bar to
exercise of revisional powers in respect of a decision of civil court even if such
decision has been made in exercise of appellate power. It is inunaterial if such
revisional power is to be exercised under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code
G
or under any specific statutory provisions under which revisional application
is permitted before the High Court. Mr. Reddy has submitted that the legal
principle enunciated by the High Courts of Allahabad and pepsu and also by
this Court in Chhaganlal's case (supra) that the bar of second appeal under
Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act or finality attached to in appellate order
does not oust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, applies in all fours H
J

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A to the revisional application under Rule 36A and the contention decisions in
respect of maintainability of revisional applications under Section 115 Civil
Procedure Code have no application in deciding the maintainability of
revisional application under Rule 36A should be discarded as devoid of any
substance.
B Mr. Reddy has further submitted that although there is no indication in
Rule 36A as to how and to what extent revisioqal powers under Rule 36A are
to be exercised by the High Court, Judicial decisions are quite clear that
revisional power is not co extensive with appellate power. Such power is quite
limited in its application. In this connection. Mr. Reddy has referred to a
C decision of this Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Giridhari Lal, [1962] Suppl 1
SCR 933. In the said decision, scope of revision under Section 35 (i) of Delhi
and Ajmer Rent Control Act was considered by this Court. In this Case, the
trial Judge decreed the suit for evic.tion and the appeal court confirmed the
decision under Section 34. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section
D 35 (i) of the said Act, a Single Bench of the High Court reconsidered the
decision upon reappreciation of evidence and on such reconsideration inter- -
fered with the impugned decision of the appellate authority affirming the
decision of trial Judge. This Court has held by the majority decision in the said
case that distinction between appeal and revision is a real one. A right of
E appeal carries with it right of rehearing on law as well as on fact unless the
statute conferring right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way. It has been
indicated by this Court that power of revision is generally to a superior court
so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according
to law. The phrase according to law appearing in Section 35 of the said Rent
Act, according to the majority decision of this Court, refers to the decision as
F
a whole and not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simplicitor. It has
been indicated that all that the High Court can see that there has been no
miscarriage of justice and the decision is according to law in the sense
mentioned. This Court has held that in exercise of revisional power under
Section 35 of the Rent Act, the High Court was not justified in reassessing the
G value of the evidence and substituting its own conclusion on facts in place of
those reached by courts below. Mr. Reddy .has submitted that the High Court
in exercising revisional Jurisdiction will not act as a court of appeal but will
consider the propriety of the appellate order within the limited scope of
.revisional jurisdiction. He has, therefore, submitted that the impugned judg-
H ment of the High Court being just and proper does not warrant any interference
\
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY, J.] 259
by this Court and the appeal should be dismissed. A
•' After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of
the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel, for the parties, it
• appears to us that the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. Shillong and the
Deputy Commissioner, Shillong have been clothed with the jurisdiction to act
B
as civil courts in some parts of Meghalaya. Under the Meghalaya Act No. 6
of 1972, the Rules have been made applicable to the whole of United Khasi
Hills District and Janitia Hills District. The appellant, therefore, filed the
arbitration award in the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner
and obtained the order making the award a rule of Court. The respondent
union of India also preferred appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act c
·- before the Deputy Commissioner accepting it as appellate civil court, it has
already been indicated that no material has been placed before us to show that
the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner have
not been clothed with powers of Civil Court for decision of Civil disputes in
general within the territorial limits but they have been empowered to decide D
only a special category of civil disputes confined to particular tribal people.
In the aforesaid circumstances, such appellate order having been passed by a
civil court, constituted under a special statute, subordinate to the High Court,
the High Court does not cease to have revisional jurisdiction under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure. E
The appellant Union of India filed a revisional application under Rule
36A before the Single Bench of the High Court because against an appellate
order of Deputy Commissioner, no appeal is provided for under the Rules.
Even if there was any provision for filing an appeal from such appellate order .
of the Deputy Commissioner under the Rules, such second appeal, being
F
expressly barred by Section 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act, would have been
incompetent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, revision application
under Rule 36A is to be considered in conformity with Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Such limited application of revisional jurisdiction under
Rule 36A in assailing an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration G
Act is to be read, otherwise revisional power under Rule 36A will give
. \
occasion to hostile discrimination. For exaniple, in the State of Meghalaya
where the Rules are not applicable, a litigant can on\y move the High Court
in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
against an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act but another H
j

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A litigant where the Rules are applicable; will avail larger rights in exercise of
revisional power by the High Court under Rule 36A against a similar appellate
'
order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Such a situation is not
permissible. Revisional power under Rule 36A of the High Court in such case
therefore, must be exercised in conformity with the revisional power under
B Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In our view, a revisional application before the High Court against an
appellate order passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is maintainable.
There is no express provision in the Arbitration Act putting an embargo
against filing a revisional application against appellate order under Section 39
c of the Act. The Arbitration Act has put an embargo on filing any second appeal
from appellate order under Section 39 of the Act. The Arbitration Act is a -·
special statute having limited application relating to matters governed by the
said Act. Such special statute, therefore, must have its application as provided
for in the said statute. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the
D Code or under any other statute therefore shall not stand superseded under the
Arbitration_ Act if the Act does not contain any express bar against exercise
of revisional power by the High Court provided exercise of such revisional
power does not mitigate against giving effect to the Provisio1'1s of the
Arbitration Act.
E
It may also_ be indicated that in R. Meci/ and Company Ltd. v. Gauri
Shanker Sarda, [1991] 2 SCC 548, this Court has held that Section 41 of the
Arbitration Act provides that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall
apply to all proceedings before a Court under the Act. As the Arbitration Act
has not expressly taken away the applicability of Order 23 of the Civil
F procedure Code in an application under Section 34 of the said Act, such
provision of Order 23 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable.

It may be stated that even if a special statute expressly attaches finality
to an appellate order passed under that statute, it has been held by this Court
G in the case of Hari Shanker (Supra) that such provision of finality will not take
away revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. There is also no such express provision in the Arbitration Act
attaching finality to the appellate order under Section 39 of the said Act. As
already indicated, only bar under sub-section (2) df Section 39 is of a second
H appeal from an appellate order under Section 39. The impugned order of the
\
SYAM SUNDER AGARWAL v. U.0.1. [G.N. RAY,J.] 261

High Court upholding maintainability. of revisional application under Rule A
36A of the Rules, therefore, is justified and no interference against such
decision is warranted. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without
any order as to costs. As the revision application is pending for a long time,
the High Court is directed to dispose of revisional application on merits as
early as possible but not exceeding four months from the date of communi- B
cation of this order.

T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.

•

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