SWAROOP SINGHversusSTATE OF M.P.

                    [2013] 2 S.C.R. 765

                                                                  A
                     SWAROOP SINGH
                              v.
                       STATE OF M.P.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 376 of 2010)
                     ·APRIL 10, 2013                              B
     [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
               IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

    PENAL CODE, 1860:
                                                                  c
    s~376(1) - Rape - Statement of prosecutrix that accused
committed forcible sexual intercourse against her wish at knife
point - Held: Except simply denying the offence alleged in the
statement uls 313 Cr.P.C., accused did not let in any evidence
to contradict the version of the prosecutrix -Trial court on a    D
detailed consideration of the evidence concluded that the
case of prosecutrix was cogent and convincing and was also
supported by evidence of other witnesses and the recoveries
made from the place of occurrence - Judgments of Courts
below call for no interference.                                   E

    State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh 1996 (1) SCR 532 =
1996(2) sec 384 - relied on

                     Case Law Reference:
                                                                  F
    1996 (1) SCR 532          relied on             para 14

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 376 of 2010.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2008 of the           G
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal
No. 301 of 1994.


                             765                                  H
    766      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A        Ranvir Singh Kundu, Jetendra Singh, S.K. Sabharwal for
    the Appellant.

          Vibha Datta Makhija for the Respondent.

          The following order of the Court was delivered by
B
                                 ORDER

      1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of High
  Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur dated 16.7.2008 in
C Criminal Appeal No.301/1994.

       2. According to the prosecution on 28.9.19992 at 12.30
  p.m., the prosecutrix P.W.2 was proceeding to the field for'
  cutting grass. On the way, the appellant who was roasting
  Maize/Bhutta in the field of Pyarelal, blocked P.W.2 and asked
D her to go alongwith him into the field of sugarcane. When P.W.2
  refused, the appellant caught hold of her by hand and forcibly
  took her _to the sugarcane field, throw her down, gagged her
  mouth with the saree of P.W.2 and forcibly had intercourse with
  her by threatening her life at knife point. According to her by
E virtue of the said act of the appellant, white liquid started oozing
  out from her private parts, that she went to the boundary wall
  (Mound) where a well is situated and where Ram Singh Dada
  (P.W.4) was cutting grass. P.W.2 informed Ram Singh Dada
  as to what happened, who in turn passed on the information to
F her Kakaji Hari Prasad. Thereafter, her Kakaji Hari Prasad took
  P.W. 2 to home, where she narrated the whole incident. She
  stated to have informed her sister Chain Bai as well as her Kaki
  and Shanta Bai. She thereafter reported the matter to the Vilkis
  Ganj Police Station and after registering the report reached
G back home. She identified the report as Exhibit P2.

         3. Subsequent to the registration of the case, the Police
    inspected the spot, seized the broken bangles and prepared
    a rough sketch. She was examined by the doctor who seized
    her peticoat and X-ray was also taken. The appellant was
H
         SWAROOP SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                       767


proceeded against in Criminal Case No.84/1992 for the                A
offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506 Part II, IPC.
The appellant having denied comission of the offence,
witnesses were examined and in his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C., the appellant pleaded total ignorance and that he
was falsely implicated.                                              B

     4. On the side of the prosecution P.W. 1 to 10 were
examined. P.W.1 Dr. Manju Saxena, who examined the
prosecutrix in her evidence stated that on internal examination
of P.W.2, hymen was found to be torn in irregular manner and         C
that two finger could easily be inserted in the vagina. She also
stated that there was no flow of fresh blood. Two slides of
vagina slabs prepared and sealed and were handed over to
the police for forwarding the same for chemical examination
alongwith the Peticoat of the prosecutrix on which spots were
present.                                                             D

     5. In the course of cross examination, P.W.2 deposed that
when the appellant threw her on the ground she did not sustain
any injury; that she was not assaulted by way of fist blow, though
the appellant threatened her not to raise any alarm by showing       E
a knife. She further deposed that when white fluid was oozing
out from her private parts, blood was also found and that she
washed the stains with water when she reached the well from
the place of occurrence and before she met Ram Singh. She
also deposed that she had swelling. in her private parts and was     F
suffering from pain for 2-3 days. A suggestion put to her as to
why she did not object when the appellant pulled her hand to
go, she categorically denied the said suggestion.

     6. The trial court after detailed analysis of the evidence
placed before it held that there was no reason to disbelieve the     G
version of the prosecutrix, that since the appellant had sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix against her consent, the same
would fell within the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC and
such a gruesome offence was committed under the threat of
                                                                     H
    768     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A   knife point, the offence of criminal intimidation was also made
    out falling under Section 506 Part II, IPC.

         7. The trial Court after convicting the appellant for the
    aforesaid offences imposed punishment for 7 years rigorous
    imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.2000/, in default, sentence
8
    of 2 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section
    376(1) IPC and imprisonment of 2 years with fine of
    Rs.2,000/-, in default six months rigorous imprisonment for the
    offence under Section 506 Part II, IPC.

C       8. The trial court while reaching the above conclusion and
  while convicting the appellant has held that the version of the
  prosecutrix was fully supported by the other witnesses namely,
  Ram Singh (P.W.4), to whom she immediately informed, her
  Kakaji Hari Prasad (P.W.5), Bansi Lal (P.W.3) and Radhey
D Shyam (P.W.6). The trial court has found that those witnesses
  fully confirmed the version of the prosecutrix. The evidence of
  P.W.10 Dr. V.K. Chaudhary who examined the appellant on
  17.9.1992 gave his opinion in Exhibit P6 that the appellant was
  capable of performing sexual intercourse.
E
         9. The sole contention of the appellant before the trial court
    was that even as per the evidence of Dr. Manju Saxena (P.W.1),
    who examined the prosecutrix, it was clear that the prosecutrix
    was approximately 17 to 18 years of age, that since she was
F   having frequent sexual intercourse no definite opinion of rape
    could be given and therefore, it cannot be held that the
    appellant had any forcible sexual intercourse against the wish
    of the prosecutrix in order to be convicted for the offence under
    Section 376 IPC read with Section 506 Part II, IPC.

G         · 10. The High Court having considered the judgment of the
    trial court in extenso found that there ~as no ground made out
    to interfere with the judgment and confirmed the conviction and
    sentence imposed on the appellant.

          11. Heard Mr., Ranbir Singh Kundu, learned counsel
H
         SWAROOP SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                       769


appearing for the appellant and Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija,             A
learned counsel appearing for the State. We also perused the
judgment of the trial court as well as that of the High Court. In
the course of submission, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted except the version of P.W.2 prosecutrix there was
nothing stated before the trial court to prove that the appellant    B
committed the offence rape on her, that even going by the
medical evidence as the prosecutrix was having frequent
intercourse though not married, it cannot be a case of rape
falling under Section 376 IPC. The learned counsel therefore,
submitted that the conviction and sentence imposed on the            c
appellant by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court is
liable to be interfered with.

     12. As against the above submission, Ms. Makhija, learned
counsel for the State contended that it is a case of offence of
rape falling under Section 376 IPC, the question whether it was      D
with the consent of the women alleged to have been raped has
to be accepted based on her simple statement in the court and
proceed on that basis. Learned counsel contended that when
based on the evidence of P.W.2 prosecutrix., it was
demonstrated before the court that the appellant had sexual          E
intercourse with her against her consent, it was for the appellant
to have proved beyond reasonable doubt that either there was
no sexual intercourse or was there a consent existed in order
to relieve the appellant of the offence alleged and found proved
against him.                                                         F

     13. Therefore, the only question that remains for
consideration in the case in hand is as to whether the sexual
intercourse committed by the appellant on the prosecutrix P.W.2
was with her consent in order to hold that the appellant cannot      G
be convicted under section 376 IPC. In that respect, when we
examined the evidence let in, what is noted by us hereinbefore
and as found by the trial court as well as by the High Court, the
version of the prosecutrix P.W. 2 was unassailable. She was
stated to be 17/18 years of age on the date of occurrence and
                                                                     H
    770       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A she categorically stated that the appellant who was a known
  person, performed the act of forcible sexual intercourse against
  her wish at knife point. Except the mere denial of the offence
  alleged, there was no evidence let in on behalf of the appellant
  to counter the allegation levelled against him by the prosecutrix.
B In such circumstances, the trial court on a detailed
  consideration of the evidence placed before it concluded that
  the case of the prosecutrix was cogent and convincing and also
  supported by the evidence of other witnesses in so far as the
  commission of offence of forcible sexual intercourse at knife
c point.
       14. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer to the
  principles laid down by this Court as to the manner in which
  the evidence of a rape victim should be evaluated to ascertain
  the truth. The said decision is reported in State of Punjab Vs.
D Gurmit Singh 1996(2) SCC 384. Para 8 and 21 are relevant
  which reads as under:-

          "8 ..... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain
          alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting
E         woman would come forward in a court just to make a
          humiliating statement against her honour such as is
          involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases
          involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations
          which have no material effect on the veracity of the
F         prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement
          of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are
          such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an
          otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent
          bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal
          outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts
G
          should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such
          cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons
          which necessitate looking for corroboration of her
          statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the
          testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an
H
        SWAROOP SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                     771


    accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is A
    found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her
    statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such
    cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the
    evidence of a girl of a woman who complains of rape or
    sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or B
    suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of
    a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her
    statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a
    witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge
    levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist c
    upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of
    an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault
    stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness
    and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness
    who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which 0
    is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good
    witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real
    culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is
    entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration              '
1   notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an
    imperative component of judicial credence in .every case E
    of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance
    on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of
    law but a guidance of prudence under given
    circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman
    or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice F
    to the crime but is a victim of another persons's lust and it
    is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a
    certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an
    accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set
    of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not G
    dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule
    of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial
    tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a
    fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken
    as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime     H
    772       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A         strikes the judicial mind as probable .... "

           "21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in
           particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are
           celebrating women's rights in all ·spheres, we show little or
B          no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the
          attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation
          of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must
           remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy
          and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious
          psychological as well as physical harm in the process.
c          Rape is not merely a physical assault - it is often
          destructive of the whole personality of the victirT). A
          murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a ra'pist
          degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Courts,
          therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an
D         accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such
          cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine
          the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
          minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the
          statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature,
E         to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If
          evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be
          relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement
          in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds
          it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may
F         look for evidence which may lend assurance to her
          testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of
          an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be
          appreciated in the background of the entire case and the
          trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be
G         sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual
          molestations."
         15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
    having perused the judgment of the trial court as well as of the
    High Court, we are convinced that the judgment of the trial court
H
         SWAROOP SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                     773


does not call for interferenca. From what has been let in by way   A
of evidence by the court below, the prosecutrix P.W.2- has
spoken that she knew the appellant, that she was forcibly taken
to the sugarcane bush at knife point and was subjected to
sexual intercourse against her consent. She revealed the
gruesome act committed by the appellant immediately after the      B
occurrence to Ram Singh PW 5. When she was examined by
the doctor, nothing could be traced about the presence of sperm
or blood since admittedly before going to the Police Station,
she washed herself in the well which was nearby the place of
occurrence to which place she immediately went where she           c
also reported the incident to Mr.Ram Singh Dada who was
examined as P.W.5.
      16. The doctor who examined the prosecutrix stated clearly
that the hymen of the prosecutrix was torn and ruptured.
     17. Except simply denying the offence alleged in the          D
statement under section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant did not let
in any evidence to contradict the version of the prosecutrix. No
motive was either alleged or proved as against the prosecutrix
or any of the witnesses to disbelieve the version of the
prosecution witnesses or to hold that the Appellant was falsely    E
implicated. Broken bangles were also recovered from the place
of occurrence at the instance of the prosecutrix. No previous
grudge of the prosecutrix as against him in order to falsely
implicating the appellant was also suggested.
                                                                   F
      18. A careful reading of the judgment of the trial court
discloses that the reasons adduced by it were cogent and
convincing and there was no reason to disbelieve the same.
The conclusion of the High Court is also equally well reasoned
and we do not find any fault in the same in order to interfere     G
with the same. We find no good ground to interfere with the well
considered conclusion of the trial court as well as that of the
High court. In the light of our above conclusion, we do not find
any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.       H