Holding

An order of the Governor under Article 161 is subject to judicial review and must be set aside if exercised arbitrarily or without material facts, as was the case here.

Summary

Shri Doodh Nath, an MLA, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a remission petition before the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, which was granted despite the Governor not being informed of material facts such as five other serious criminal cases pending against him, the earlier dismissal of his first remission petition, and his extensive parole period. The victim's son challenged the Governor's order in the High Court, which held the order non‑justiciable; the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that orders under Article 161 of the Constitution are subject to judicial review when exercised arbitrarily, mala fide, or in disregard of constitutional principles, and that the Governor had been deprived of essential information, rendering the remission order arbitrary. Consequently, the Court quashed the remission order and directed the Governor to reconsider the petition afresh, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether an order passed by the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution is amenable to judicial review.
Whether the Governor's remission order was arbitrary or mala fide due to non‑disclosure of material facts.
Whether the remission order should be set aside and the petition reconsidered.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 72

Subjects

Article 161remissionpardonjudicial reviewarbitrarinessconstitutional lawclemencyGovernor's powerlife imprisonmentmurder

Judgment

A SWARAN SINGH
v.
\..
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

MARCH 5, 1998
I
B [M.M PUNCHHJ CJ., K.T. THOMAS AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 161-Power of Governor to grant
remission of punishment-Conviction for murder-Accused sentenced to
imprisonment for life-Remission petition to Governor-Concealment of
c material facts-Remission granted-Held, Governor not posted with material
facts-Deprived of opportunity to exercise power in fair and just mannel'-
Remission order quashed-Remission petition to be considered afresh.

Judicial review-Orders passed by Governor under Article of 161 of
the Constitution of India-Held, is subject to judicial review if the powers are
D exercised arbitrarily mala fide or in absolute disregard to Constitutionalism.

The third respondent an M. L.A. of U.P. Assembly was convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for life, for murdering one 'J'. He was also
accused in five other criminal cases of serious nature. The appeal against
E his conviction was dismissed by both the High Court and this Court. The
third respondent made a pardon/remission petition before the Governor. His
earlier remission petition was dismissed by the same Governor. This fact
was not brought to the notice of the Governor while deciding the second
remission petition. The Governor in exercise of his powers under Article
161 of the Constitution of India, 1950 granted remission of the remaining
F period of sentence. The appellant, son of the deceased 'J' challenged the \
action of the Governor before the High Court, which dismissed the petition
on the ground that a decision of the Governor under Article 161 of the
Constitution was not justiciable. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
G
HELD: 1.1. An order of the Governor under Article 161 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 is subject to judicial review within the strict
parameters laid down in Maru Ram,* case and reiterated in Kehar Singh,**
case. If the power under Article 161 of the Constitution was exercised by the
H Governor arbitrarily, mala fide or in absolute disregard of the finer canons
206
SW ARAN SINGH v. STA TE [THOMAS, J.] 207
of the constitutionalism, the by...prodtlct order cannm get the approval oflaw A
and in such cases, the jucidcal hand must be stretched to it. 1211-C]

*Maru Ram v. VO/ & Ors., [198111 SCC 107 and Kehar Singh & Anr.
v. VO/ & Anr., [198911 SCC 204, followed.

1.2. In the present case, the Governor was not posted with material B
facts such as the involvement of the third respondent in five other criminal
cases of serious nature, the rejection of his earlier clemency petition filed
on the same grounds and that out of two years and five months jail, he was
on parole during substantial part of it. Thus, the Gllvernor was apparently
deprived of tile opportunity to exercise the powers in a fair and just manner. C
(210-C; 211-DI

1.3. In the circumstances the order passed by the Co¥ernor is quashed
to enable him to pass a fresh order. The GoverllDt" shall consider the petition
of third respondent in the light of relevant material whtch were not brought
to his notice earlier. 1211-FI D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5962 of
1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated I I.I 1.92 of the l\llahabad High
Court in W. P. No. 8848of1991. E
Rajiv Grag for N.D. Garg, A.S. Pundir, Vishwajit Singh Bahur U. Barqui,
Z.K. Faizan and P.K. Jain for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
THOMAS, J. Shri Doodh Nath, third respondent in this appeal, was
found guilty of murdering !me Joginder Singh. He was convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment for life along with some other persons who too were involved
ill the same offence. His appeal to the High Court and Special Leave petition
to this Court did not give any help to extricate himself from the penal clutches G
of the offence. But within a period of less than two years, he succeeded in
escaping from prison as the Governor of Uttar Pradesh granted remission of
the remaining long period of his life sentence. That step of the Constitutional
functionary was far beyond the tolerance capacity of the bereaved members
of the family of deceased Joginder Singh and hence his son (the present
appellant) moved the Allahabad High Court challenging the aforesaid action H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A of the Governor. A division bench of the High Court, which heard his writ
petition dismissed it on the premise that a decision of the Governor under
Article 161 of the Constitution of India is not justiciable. That necessitated
the appellant to reach this Court with this appeal by special leave.

Shri Doodh Nath was an M.L.A. of the U.P. Assembly when he was
B convicted of the offence of murder. He was unseated as a sequel to the said
conviction and his wife succeeded in becoming his successor in the same
constituency. Appellant alleged that when Governor passed the order granting
remission of sentence Shri Doodh Nath was already accused in five other
criminal cases involving serious offences. That and many other relevant
C materials were not posted before the Governor when he considered the question
of granting reprieve to the convict, according to the appellant.

In fact, the same Governor had, on an earlier occasion (on 7.6.1990)
dismissed a petition filed by shri Doodh Nath for grant of reprieve and
remission of the sentence passed on him by the Court in the very same case
D of murder of Joginder Singh. Undaunted by the rejection of his earlier clemency
motion, Shri Doodh Nath ventured to present a second petition for the same "---
purpose within a period of about five months, that too on almost the same
grounds which were not found favour with the Governor on the earlier
occasion. When he moved for remission on the second occasion, he was out
on parole. It is the case of the appellant that Doodh Nath did not even
E mention in his second petition for pardon that an earlier petition for the same
purpose was rejected by the Governor.

The police officials whose report was called for in connection with the
consideration of the second application for grant of remission sent up a report
which was unfavourable to Doodh Nath. But the same police officials after
F
one week, forwarded another report containing recommendation for remitting
the sentence as prayed for by Doodh Nath on "humanitarian grounds".

On 4.1.1991, the widow of Joginder Singh (mother of the present
appellant) made a representation to the Governor pointing out facts which she
G considered relevant for rejecting the clemency petition. On 9.2.199 l, the
Governor passed the impugned order under Article 16 l of the Constitution
in the following terms:

"The Governor of Uttar Pradesh under the special circumstances by
exercising the power under Article 16 l of the Constitution of India
H remits the remaining sentence of the convict Doodh Nath, son of Shri
SW ARAN SINGH v. STA TE (THOMAS, J.] 209
Deoraj, resident of Khairuddinpur, P.S. Mariahun, District Jaunpur, A
who is undergoing punishment under sections 302/148/149 !PC in S.T.
No. 102of1980 passed by Third Additional Sessions Judge, Jaunpur,
sentencing life imprisonment on 9.2.1982 and directs that the aforesaid
convict accused be released from jail on furnishing two sureties and
personal bond in the same amount to the satisfaction of the District B
magistrate, Jaunpur".

In the High Court, when challenge was made against the said order, an
affidavit was filed by Shri Brij Bhushan Chaturvedi who was then the Joint
Secretary of Home (Jail) in the State of U.P. in which he admitted that a
petition filed by Doodh Nath in April, 1990 was dismissed on 5.6.1990 and that C
next application was filed in November, 1990. The Joint Secretary conceded
that Shri Doodh Nath has undergone only a very small portion of the life term,
i.e., two years and three months when he secured the remission.

It is interesting to note that another affidavit was filed by Shri Sunil
Agarwal who held the same office of Joint Secretary, Home (Jail), in the same D
High Court, when the writ petition filed by the appellant was under
consideration. (perhaps, Shri Sunil Agarwal would have been the successor
in office of the other deponent Shri Brij Bhushan Chaturvedi). In the second
affidavit, the Joint Secretary conceded that the five criminal cases mentioned
by the appellant involving serious offences against Doodh Nath were still
pending at the time of grant of remission and that Governor was not apprised E
of that fact. He also pointed out that the fact of the rejection of the earlier
mercy petition was not brought to the notice of the Governor. The deponent
of that affidavit has further stated that:

"In fact the Governor's acceptance was obtained on the basis of false p
and misleading recommendation, wherein it had not been stated that
the request of the petitioner was rejected only six months ago and it
did not meet the various guidelines given for the purpose were not
taken into consideration. It has been wrongly stated that there was
no adult member in the family of the convict while his wife is a sitting
member of Legislative Assembly. The recommendation also stated G
that the district magistrate and the police have requested sympathetic
consideration but they did not categorically recommend acceptance of
the mercy petition. It is a fact that the recommendation itself mentions
that the case may not be treated as precedent for others. It has shown
that it was not recommended on merits. The recommendation in the H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 2 S.C.R.

A case was made on extraneous and political consideration which is
evident from the mercy petition (filed as annexure 'C' to the petition).
The fact that the matter was recommended be recons.idered on the
basis of a letter addressed 1'> the chief Minister by several MLA~."

On our direction, the Standing Counsel for the State ofU.P. has produceo
B the files concerning the grant of remission of sentence to Doodh Nath. We
have noted therefrom that the ~vernor was not told of certain vital facts
concerning the prisoner such as his involvement in five other criminal cases
of serious offences, the rejection of his earlier clemency petition which was
filed on the same grounds, the report of the jail authorities that his conduct
C inside the jail was far from satisfactory, and out of two years and five months
he was supposed to have been in jail, he was in fact on parole during the
substantial part thereof.

Learned counsel for the third respondent Doodh Nath resisted this
appeal on the main plank that any order issued by the President of India
D under Artie4e 72 of the Constitution of h1dia or by the Governor of a State
under Article 161 thereof is non-justiceable and hence the Court cannot look
irno the reasons which persuaded the Constitutional functionary to grant
reprieve or remission to a prisoner.

A Constitution Bench of this Court has considered the scope of judicial
E review of exercise of powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution
of India in Kehar Singh & Anr. v. Union ofIndia and another, (1989) 1 SCC
204. The bench after observing that the ConstitJJtion of India is .a constitutive
document which is fundamental to the governance of the country under
which people of India have provided a constitutional polity consisting of
certain primary organs. institutions an<l functionaries to exercise the powers
F provided in the Canstitution, proceeded to add thus:

"All power belongs to the people and it is entrusted by them to
specified institutions and functionaries with the intention of working
out, maintaining and operating a constitutional order."

G The Constitution Bench laid down that judicial review of the Presidential
order cannot be exercised on the merits except within the strict limitations
defined in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCC 107. The
limitations.of judicial review over exercise of powers under Articles 72 and 161
of the Constitution have been delineated in the said decision by the
H Constitution Bench. It has been observed that "all public power, including
SWARAN SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.) 211
constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or ma/a fide, and A
. ordinarily guidelines for fair and equal execution are guarantors of valid play
of power". The bench stressed the point that the power being of the greatest
moment, cannot be a law unto itself but it must be informed by the finer
canons of constitutionalism.

It was therefore, suggested by the bench to inake rules for its own B
guidance in the exercise of the pardon power keeping a large residuary power
to meet special situations or sudden developments.

In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, we cannot accept the
rigid contention of the learned counsel for the third respondent that this C
Court has no power to touch the order passed by the Governor under Article
161 of the constitution. If such power was exercised arbitrarily, mala fide or
in absolute disregard of the finer canons of the constitutionalism, the by-
product order cannot get the approval of law and in such cases, the j\jdicial
hand must be stretched to it.
D
In the present case, when the Governor was not posted with material
facts such as those indicated above, the Governor was apparently deprived
of the opportunity to exercise the powers in a fair and just manner. Conversely,
the order now impugned fringes on arbitrariness. What the governor would
have ordered if he were apprised of the above facts and materials is not for
us to consider now because the Court cannot then go into the merits of the E
grounds which persuaded the Governor in taking a decision in exercise of the
said power. Thus, when the order of the Governor impugned in these
proceedings is subject to judicial review within the strict parameters laid down
in Maru Ram Case (supra) and reiterated in Kehar Singh Case (supra), we
feel that the Governor shall reconsider the petition of Doodh Nath in the light p
of those materials which he had no occasion to know earlier.

We, therefore, quash the impugned order to enable the Governor ofU.P.
to pass a fresh order in the petition filed by the third respondent Doodh Nath
for remission of the sentence in the light of the observations made above.
G
S.V.K.I. Appeal allowed.