SUSHIL MURMUversusSTATE OF JHARKHAND

A                              SUSHIL MURMU
                                        v.
                           STATE OF JHARKHAND

                             DECEMBER 12, 2003

B           [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860/Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 201,
   3021354(3)-Sacrifice of a young child-Severing and throwing the head
  ofthe child in a pond-Death sentence awarded by trial court-High Court
C confirming the death sentence-Correctness of-Held, on facts, this is a
  fit case to be treated as 'r:irest of rarest cases '-Hence conviction and
  death sentence upheld.

         A 9-year old child was sacrificed before Goddess Kali by the
    appellant. The appellant severed the head of the child and threw it in
D   a pond. The trial court found the appellant guilty under sectiOns 302
    and 201 IPC and awarded death sentence and 7 years imprisonment
    respectively. The High Court confirmed the death sentence.

           In appeal, the appellant contended that the death sentence awarded
E   to the appellant be altered to life sentence on the ground that the killing
    of the child was not done with any motive;. th-at the appellant was an
    illiterate and a tribal and brought upJn an atmosphere surcharged
    with super:otition; and that the appellant could be reformed.

         The State contended that the appellant was rightly awarded death
F sentence as this is a case which clearl~ falls within· the "rarest of rare"
    category; that the appellant was also charged for commission of a
    similar offence which is pending.

         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
          HELD : l.1. The principle of proportion between crime 3'11d
    punishment is a principle of just desert that serves as the foundation of ·
    every criminal sentence that is justifiable. As a principle of criminal
    justice, it is hardly less familiar or less important than the principle that
H   only the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed the requirement that

                                        702
           SUSHIL MURMU v. STA TE OF JHARKHAND                      703

punishment not be disproportionately great, which is a coroloary of just A
desert, is dictated by the same principle that does not allow punishment
of the innocent, for any punishment in excess ofwhat is deserved for the
criminal conduct is punishment without guilt. (712-F-H]

     1.2. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of B
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of
each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant
discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case. Judges
in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet
in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. C
Sometimes, it is the correctional need of the perpetrator that are
offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him
out of circu~ation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime.
Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as
the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are
serious and widespread. (713-A-C)                                        D
      Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P., [1974] 4 SCC 443; Bachan Singh
v. State ofPunjab, (1980] 2 SCC 684 and Machhi Singh v. State ofPunjab,
[1983] 3 sec 470, referred to.
                                                                          E
      1.3. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected
in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence
in the determmation of sentences. ~nything less than a penalty of
greatest severity for any serious crime is thought to be a measure of
toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact quite apart from
those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out F
of proportion to the crime uniformly disproportionate punishment has
some very undesirable practical consequences. (713-C-DJ

     1.4. The appellant was not possessed of the basic humanness and
he completely lacks the psyche or mind set which can be amenable for G
any reformation. He had at the time ofoccurrence a child of same as the
victim and yet he diabolically designed in a most dastardly and revolting
manner to sacrifice a very hapl~ss and helpless child of another for
personal gain and to promote his fortunes by pretending to appease the
de\~. The brutality of the act is amplified by the grotesque and revolting H
    704                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A   manner in which the helpless child's head was severed. Even if the
    helpless and imploring face and voice of the innocent child did not
    arouse any trace of kindness in the heart of the accused, the non-challant
    way in which he carried the severed head in a gunny bag and threw it
    in a pond unerringly shows that the act was diabolic of most superlative
B   degree in conception and cruel in execution. The tendency in the accused
    and for the matter in any one who entertains such revolting ideas cannot
    be placed on pa_r with even an.intention to kill someone but really borders
    on a crime against humanity indicative of greatest depravity shocking
    the conscience of not only any right thinking person but of the Courts
    of law, as well. The socially abhorrent nature of the crime committed
C   also ought not to be ignored in this case. If this act is not revolting or
    dastardly, it is beyond comprehension as to what other act can be so
    described is the question. Superstition is a belief or notion, not based on
    reason or knowledge in or the ominous significance of a particular thing
    or circumstances, occurrence or the like but mainly triggered by thoughts
D   of self aggrandizement and barbaric at times as in the present case.
    Superstition cannot and does not provide justification for any killing,
    much less a planned and deliberate one. No amount of superstitious
    colour can wash away the sin and offence of an unprovoked killing,
    more so in the case of an innocent and defenceless child.
E                                                        [713-E-H; 714-A-E)

          1.5. Criminal propensities of th_e accused are clearly spelt out
    from the fact that similar accusations involving human sacrifice existed
    at the time of trial. Though the result could not be brought on record,
F   yet the fact that similar accusation was made against the accused-
    appellant for which he was facing trial co,urt also be lost sight of. Hence
    this is not a fit case where any interference is called for, looking to the
    background facts. This is an illustrative and most exemplary case to
    be treated as the 'rarest of rare cases' in which death sentence is and
G   should be the rule with no exception whatsoever. [714-D-E]

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    947 of 2003.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.2003 of the Jharkhand High
H   Court in D.R. No. 312002 with Crl. A. No. 874 of 2002.
    SUSHIL MURMU v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 705

     Anil Kumar Mittal (A.C.) for the Appellant.                          A
      A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, Mrs. Alka Rani Jha and Anil Kumar Jha
for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                          B
      ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. The little drops of humanness which con-
jointly make humanity a cherished desire of mankind had seemingly dried
up, when a young child of 9 years was sacrificed before Goddess Kali by
the appellant for his own prosperity is what the prosecution alleges.

        "Little drops of
                                                                          c
        Water, little grains of sand,'
        Make the mighty ocean
        And the pleasant land,
        Little deeds of kindness, little
        Words of love,
                                                                          D
        Help to make earth happy
        Like the heaven above."

Said Julia A.f. Cabney in "Little Things".
                                                                          E
       The still, sad music of humanity had become silent when it was
forsaken oy the accused-appellant is what has been found by the Courts
below.

      11th December, 1996 turned out to be a heart-breaking day for Somlal
Besra (PW-2). In the evening of that day he found his son Chirku Besra F
(hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') missing from house. He searched
for him making inquiries from various persons. Information surfaced that
he was sacrificed before Goddess Kali by the appellant. Two other persons,
his wife and mother were also said to be parties to the gruesome killing.
The prosecution case centered round extra judicial confession made by G
accused before large number of persons, recovery of dead body at the
behest of the accused-appellant and evidence of a witness who saw the
accused carrying a bag on a bicycle which was thrown to a pond and after
throwing the bag to the pond the accused returning by bicycle. The severed
head was recovered from the bag thrown to the pond. Information was H
    706                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A given to police, investigation was undertaken.        All the three accused
    persons were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 20 I of
    the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the IPC'). The appellant was found
    guilty for both the accusations and was sentenced to death for the former
    and 7 years rigorous imprisonment for the latter. Benefit of doubt was,
B   however, given to the co-accused al)d they were acquitted. Reference was
    made by the trial Judge i.e. the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jamtara
    for confirmation· of death sentence under Section 366 qf the Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in sho1t 'the Code') by the Jharkhand High
    Court which by the impugned judgment upheld both the convictions and
    sentence. It was held that the murder was gruesome and death sentence
C   was most appropriate sentence. Ag::iinst the said judgment the present
    appeal has been filed. While granting leave, by order dated 4.8.2003 scope
    of appeal was limited to the question of sentence.

             Mr. Anil Kumar Mittal, learned amicus curiae submitted that even
D   according to prosecution killing was not done with any motive. Though
    superstition is not expected and encouraged in modern society, yet an
    illiterate and tribal born and brought up in an atmosphere surcharged with
    superstiti~n should not be awarded death sentence. The modern trend,
    according to him, is reformation and when in the case at hand balance sheet
E   of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is drawn up, the mitigating
    circumstances far outweigh the aggravating situation and, therefore, the
    death sentence should be altered to life sentence.

            In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that
    a 9 years old child was sacrificed in the most brutal and diabolic manner.
F   This is a case which falls within the "rarest of rare" category and, therefore,
    death sentence has been rightly awarded. It was pointed out that it is not
    the first instance when the accused is charged with commission of such
    offences. In fact, as records reveal, the appellant along with two of his
    relatives was facing trial at the relevant time for committing murder by
G   sacrificing of his own brother- before Goddess Kali.

       Section 302 IPC prescribes death or life imprisonment as the penalty
  for murder. While doing so, the Code instructs the comt as to its
  application. The changes which the Code has undergone in the last three
H decades clearly indicate that Parliament is taking note of contemporary
    SUSHIL MURMU v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 707

criminological thought and movement. It is not difficult to discern that in A
the Code, there is a definite swing towards life imprisonment. Death
sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be imposed for "special
reasons'', as provided in Section 354(3). There is another provision in the
Code which also uses the significant expression "special reason". It is
Section 361. Section 360 of the Code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 B .
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (in short "the old Code"). Section
361 which is a new provision in the Code makes it mandatory for the court
to record ;'special reasons" for not applying the provisions of Section 360.
Sectio!1 361 thus casts a duty upon the court to apply the provisions of
Section 360 wherever it is possible to do so and to state "special reasons" C
if it does not do so. In the context of Section 360, the "special reasons"
contemplated by Section 361 must be such as to compel the court to hold
that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining
the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the
offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This
is some indication by the legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of D
 offenders and not mere deterrence, are now among the foremost objects
 of the administration of criminal justice in our country. Section 361 and
 Section 354(3) have both entered the statute book at the same time and they
are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the legislature of the new
trends in criminology. It would not, therefore, be wrong to assume that E
the personality of the offender as revealed by his age, character, anteced-
 ents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform
 must necessarily play the most prominent role in determining the sentence
 to be awarded. Special reasons must have some relation to these factors,
 Criminal justice deals with complex human problems and ·diverse human F
 beings. A Judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the
 circumstances, situations and the reactions and choose the appropriate
 sentence to be imposed.

     It should be borne in mind that before the amendment of Section
367(5) of the old Co~ Q)' the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, G
1955 (26 Qfiil.955) which came into force on 1.1.1956, on a conviction for
an offence ""'punishable with death, ifthe court sentenced the accused to any
punishment other than death, the reason why sentence of death was not
passed had to be stated in the judgment. After the amendment of Section
367(5) of the old Code by Act 26of1955, position is clear that the normal H
    708                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A penalty is imprisonment for life. It can be awarded in the presence of
  extenuating circumstances which reduce the gravity of the offence. The
  matter is left, after the amendment, to the discretion of the court. The court
  must, however, take into account all the circumstances, and state its reasons
  for whichever of the two sentences it imposes in its discretion. Therefore,
B the former rule that the normal punishment for murder is death is no longer
  operative and it is nciw within the discretion of the court to pass either of
  the two sentences prescribed in this section; but whichever of the two
  sentences he passes, the Judge must give his reasons for imposing a
  particular sentence. The amendment of Section 367(5) of the old Code
C does not affect the law regulating punishment under IPC. This amendment
  relates to procedure and now courts are no longer required to elaborate the
  reasons for not awarding the death penalty; but they cannot depart from
  sound judicial considerations preferring the lesser punishment.

          Section 354(3) of the Code marks a significant shift in the legislative
D policy underlying the old Code as in force immediately before 1.4.1974,
    according to which both the alternative sentences of death or imprisonment
    for.. Jife provided for murder were normal sentences. Now, under Section
    354(3) of the Code the normal punishment for murder is imprisonment for
    life and death penalty is an exception. The court is required to state the
E   reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of death sentence "special
    reasons" are required to be stated, that is to say, only speciai facts and
    circumstances will warrant the passing of the death sentence. It is in the
                                                                                    ..
    light of these successive legislative changes in the Code that the judicial
    decisions prior to the amendment made by Act 26 of 1955 and again Act
    2 of 1974 have to be understood.
F
         This Court in Ediga Anamma v. State ofA.P., [1974] 4 SCC 443 has
    observed : (SCC pp. 453-54, para 26)

             "26. Let us crystallize the positive indicators against death
             sentence under Indian law currently. Where the murderer·is too
G
             young or too old, the clemency or penal justice helps him. Where
             the. offender suffers from socio-economic, psychic or penal
             compulsions insufficient to attract a legal exception or to down-
             grade the crime into a lesser one, judicial commutation is permis-
             sible. Other general social pressures, warranting judicial notice,
H
    SUSHIL MURMU v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 709

        with an extenuating impact may, in special cases, induce the lesser A
        penalty. Extraordinary features in the judicial process, such as
        that the death sentence has hung over the head of the culprit
        excruciatingly long, may persuade the court to be compassionate.
        Likewise, if others involved in the crime and similarly situated
        have received the benefit of life imprisonment or if the offence B
        is only constructive, being under Section 302, read with Section
        149, or again the accused has acted suddenly under another's
        instigation, without premeditation, perhaps the court may hu-
        manely opt for life, even like where a just cause or real suspicion
        of wifely infidelity pushed the criminal into the crime. On the C
        other hand, the weapons used and the manner of their use, the
        horrendous features of the crime and hapless, helpless state of the
        victim, and the like, steel the heart of the law for a sterner
        sentence. We cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer all
        such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an
         imperfect and undulating society. A legal policy on life or death D
         cannot be left for ad hoc mood or individual predilection and so
         we have sought to objectify to the extent possible, abandoning
         retributive ruthlessness, amending the deterrent creed and accent-
         ing the trend against the extreme and irrevocable penalty of
         putting out of life."                                              E
     In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980] 2 SCC 684 it has been
observed that: (SCC p. 751, para 209)

              "A real and abiding concern for the dignity qf human life
         postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality.   F
         That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when
         the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed."

      A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to
be drawn up and in doing so. the mitigating circumstances have to be G
accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the
aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exer-
cised. In order to apply these guidelines, inter alia, the following questions
may be asked and answered, (a) is there something uncommon about the
crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls H
    710                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   for a death sentence?; and (b) are the circumstances of the crime such that
    there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according
    maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour
    of the offender?

B        Another decision which illuminatingly deals with the question of
    death sentence is Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 3 SCC 470.

          In Machhi Singh (supra) and Bachan Singh (supra) cases the guide-
    lines which are to be kept in view when considering the question whether
    the case belongs to the rarest of the rare category were indicated.
c
          In Machhi Singh case (supra) it was observed: (SCC p. 489, para 39)

          The following questions may be asked and answered as a test to
    determine the "rarest of the rare" case in which death sentence can be
    inflicted:-
D
                  (a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which
             renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for
             a death sentence?


E                  (b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no
             alternative but to impose death sentence even after according
             maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak
             in favour of the offender?

         The following guidelines which emerge from Bachan Singh case
F   (supra) will have to be applied to the facts of each individual case where
    the question of imposition of death sentence arises: (SCC p. 489, para 38):-

                  (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except
             in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
G
                  (ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of
             the 'offender' also require to be taken into consideration along
             with the circumstances of the 'crime'.

                  (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
H
    SUSHIL MURMU v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 711

        exception. Death sentence must be imposed only when life A
        imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment
        hav.ing regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and
        provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of
        imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having
        regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the B
        relevant circumstances.

             (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circum-
        stances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating
        circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just
        balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigat- C
        ing circumstances before the option is exercised.

      In (arest of rare cases when collective conscience of the community
is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre
to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards D
desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty, death sentence can be
awarded. Thi! community may entertain such sentiment in the following
circumstances:

             (1) When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal,       E
        grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to
        arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.

              (2) When the murder is committed for a motive which
        evinces total depravity and meanness; e.g. murder by hired
        assassin for money or reward or a cold-blooded murder for gains     F
        of a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating
        position or in a position of trust, or murder is committed in the
        course for betrayal of the motherland.

            (3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or G
        minority community etc., is committed not for personal reasons
        but in circumstances which arouse social wrath, or in cases of
        'bride burning' or 'dowry deaths' or when murder is committed
        in _order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again
        or to marry another woman on account of infatuation.
                                                                            H
    712                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A                (4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance
             when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the members of
             a family or a large number of person,s of a pa1ticular caste,
             community, or locality, are committed.

                  (5) When the victim of murder is an innocent child, or a
B            helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person vis-a-vis
             whom the murderer is in a dominating position or a public figure
             generally loved and respected by the community.

          If upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances in the
C light of the aforesaid propositions and taking into account the answers to
    the questions posed by way of the test for the rarest of rare cases, the
    circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is warranted, the
    court would proceed to do so.

D          A convict hovers between life and death when the question of gravity
    of the offence and award of adequate sentence comes up for consideration.
    Mankind has shifted from Jhe state of nature towards a civilized society
    and it is no longer the physical opinion of the majority that takes away the
    liberty of a citizen by convicting him and making)J,im suffer a sentence
    of imprisonment. ·Award of punishment following conviction')t a,_ trial in
E   a system wedded to the rule of law is the outcome of cool delib~ration in
    the court room after adequate hearing is afforded to the parties, accusations
    are brought against the accused, the prosecuted is·given an opportunity of
    meeting the accusations by establishing his innocence. It is the outcome
    of cool deliberations and the screening of the material by the informed man
F   i.e. the Judge that leads to determination of the lis.

          The principle of proportion betwe.en crime and punishment is a
    principle of just desert that serves as the foundation of every criminal
    sentence that is justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice it is hardly
G   less familiar or less important than the principle that only the guilty ought
    to be punished. Indeed, the requirement that punishment not be dispro-
    portionately great, which is a corollary of just desert, is dictated by the same
    principle that does not allow punishment° of the innocent, for any punish-
    ment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment
H without guilt.
    SUSHIL MURMU v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 713

      The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality A
in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal
conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in
arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that
reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the
special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought B
always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by
other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpe-
trator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of
keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even. the tragic results of
his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert C
as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are
serious and widespread.

      Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in
principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in
the determination of sentences. Anything less than a penalty of greatest D
severity for any serious crime is thought to be a measure of toleration that
is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact quite apart from those considera-
tions that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of yroportion to
the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesir,.
able practical consequences.                                                 E
      A bare look at the fact situation of this case shows that the appellant
was not possessed of the basic humanness and he completely lacks the
psyche or mind set which can be amenable for any reformation. He had
at the time of occurrence a child of same age as the victim and yet he
diabolically designed in a mos( dastardly and revolting manner to sacrifice F
a very hapless and helpless child of another for personal gain and to
promote his fortunes by pretending to appease the deity. The brutality of
the act is amplified by the grotesque and revolting manner in which the
helpless child's head was severed. Even if the helpless and imploring face
and voice of the innocent child did not arouse any ~race of kindness in the G
heart of the accused, the non-challant way in which he carried the severed
head in a gunny bag and threw it in the pond unerringly shows that the
act was diabolic of most superlative degree in conception and cruel in
execution. The tendency in the accused and for that matter in any one who
entertains such revolting ideas cannot be placed on par with even an H
                                                                                      •...
    714                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   intention to kill someone but really borders on a crime against humanity
    indicative of greatest depravity shocking the conscience of not only any
    right thinking person but of the Courts of law, as well. The socially
    abhorrent nature of the crime committed also ought not to be ignored in
    this case. If this act is not revolting or dastardly, it is beyond comprehen-
B   sion as to what other act can be so described is the question. Superstition
    is a belief or notion, not based on r'!ason or knowledge, in or of the ominous
    significance of a particular thing or circumstance, occurrence or the like
    but mainly triggered by thoughts of self aggrandizement and barbaric at
    times as in the present case. Superstition cannot and does not provide
C   justification for any killing, much less a planned and deliberate one. No
    amount of superstitious colour can wash away the sin and offence of an
    unprovoked killing, more so in the case of an innocent and defenceless
    child.

           Criminal propensities of the accused are clearly spelt out from the fact
D that similar accusations involving human sacrifice existed at the time of
    trial. Though the result could not be brought on record, yet the fact that
    similar accusation was made against the· accused-appellant for which he
    was facing trial cannot also be lost sight of. In view of the above position,
    we do not think this -to be a fit case where any interference is called for,
E   looking to the background facts highlighted above. This in our view is an
    illustrative and most exemplary case to be treated as the 'rarest of rare
    cases' in which death sentence is and should be the rule, with no exception.
    whatsoever. Appeal fails and is dismissed.

         We record our appreciation- for the fair presentation and assistance
F   rendered by Mr. Anil Kumar Mittal, learned amicus curiae and Mr. A.T.M.
    Rangaramanujam, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-State who
    very ably highlighted the legal principles revolving round the question of
    death sentence.

    B.S.                                                       Appeal dismissed.