Holding

The suit for specific performance is not maintainable because the agreement fails to meet conditions (i) and (ii) of Section 14(3)(c), and a purposive reading of clause (iii) limits its bar, leading to dismissal of the appeal.

Summary

The appellant, a developer, entered into a development agreement with the respondents, owners of a plot of land, to construct a building, but the owners later denied execution of the agreement. The developer sued for specific performance of the contract. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars a developer’s suit and whether the agreement satisfied conditions (i) and (ii) of the same provision. The Court held that the agreement was vague, failing to define the exact nature of the work and the remuneration, and that the developer’s loss could be compensated in money, so conditions (i) and (ii) were not met. It further adopted a purposive interpretation of clause (iii) to avoid absurdity, concluding that the clause does not bar the suit but the other conditions do. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars a developer from filing a suit for specific performance of a development agreement.
Whether the development agreement satisfies condition (i) of Section 14(3)(c) – precise description of the work.
Whether the agreement satisfies condition (ii) of Section 14(3)(c) – substantial interest not adequately compensable by money.
Whether a purposive interpretation of Section 14(3)(c)(iii) is warranted to avoid an anomalous result.
Whether the amendment to Section 14 by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 affects the applicability of the provision.

Legislation cited

Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 14(3)(c)(i), s. 14(3)(c)(ii), s. 14(3)(c)(iii)
Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018s. 14

Subjects

Specific performanceDevelopment agreementSpecific Relief ActSection 14(3)(c)Purposive interpretationContract enforceabilityVague contractDeveloper rights

Judgment

756 [2018]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 756 [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL
v.
MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1129 of 2012)
B OCTOBER 09, 2018
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.14(3)(c)(i) and (ii) – Specific
performance of contract under – Appellant-developer and
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents entered into a
C
development agreement for construction of a building on the land
of the respondents – Respondent denied execution of the agreement
– Appellant filed for specific performance of the contract against
the respondent – Held: The appellant-developer need to satisfy the
two conditions laid out in sub clause (i) and (ii) of s.14(3)(c), for
D the suit for specific performance to be maintainable against the
owner – The clauses 8, 13, 20 and 22 of the agreement had not
clearly brought out, the exact extent of work to be carried out by
the developer and the obligation of the parties – Parties had not
clearly defined, inter alia, the nature of material to be used, the
requirements of quality, structure of building, sizes of flats and
E
obligations of the owner after the plan is sanctioned – Also, clause
9 of the agreement stated that the owner shall pay the contractor
costs, expenses along with agreed remuneration only after
completion of the building on receiving the possession – However,
exact amount of remuneration payable by the owner to the contractor
F was not found in the agreement – Agreement between the parties
was vague, so the first condition in s.14(3)(c)(i) was not fulfilled –
Furthermore, the developer had incurred an expenditure of
Rs.18,41,000/- towards clearing outstanding dues, security deposit
and development, incidental and miscellaneous expenses – The
alleged losses/damages incurred by the plaintiff could be quantified
G and recompensed with – Thus, developer had failed to satisfy the
conditions under sub-clause (i) and (ii) of s.14(3)(c) of the Act – In
such a case, specific performance could not be granted.
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.14(3)(c)(iii) – Interpretation of
– Held: Anomaly is created by the use of the words “the defendant
H has, by virtue of the agreement, obtained possession of the whole
756
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 757

or any part of the land” in s.14(3)(c)(iii) – Under a development A
agreement, an interest in the property may have been created in
favour of the developer – If the developer is the plaintiff and the
suit is against the owner, strictly applied, clause(iii) would require
that the defendant should have obtained the possession under the
agreement, however, the owner is in possession of the land by virtue
B
of the lawful title, the defendant-owner cannot be said to have
obtained possession of the land by way of the agreement – This
would lead to an anomalous situation where the condition in
s.14(3)(c)(iii) would not be fulfilled in the case of a suit by a
developer – Thus, purposive interpretation has to be given to
s.14(3)(c)(iii), departing from the literal rule of interpretation – By C
giving a purposive interpretation to s.14(3)(c)(iii), the anomaly and
absurdity created by the third condition will have no applicability
in a situation where the developer who has an interest in the property,
brings a suit for specific performance against the owner – The
developer will have to satisfy the two conditions laid out in sub
D
clause (i) and (ii) of Section 14(3)(c), for the suit for specific
performance to be maintainable against the owner – This will ensure
that both owners and developers can avail of the remedy of specific
performance under the Act – Interpretation of Statutes – Purposive
rule of Interpretation.
Appellant and predecessor-in-interest of the respondents E
entered into a development agreement for construction of a
building on the land of the respondents. Respondent denied
execution of the agreement. Appellant filed a suit against the
respondent for specific performance of the contract. Trial Court
held that sanctioned plans of the proposed building was not F
obtained by the appellant as per agreement and therefore, it could
not be said that he had obtained possession of the land, as a result
suit was barred by s.14(3)(c). Appeal was dismissed by the High
Court. Thus, the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court G
HELD: 1. The issue before this Court is whether Section
14(3)(c)(iii) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 is a bar to a suit by a
developer for specific performance of a development agreement
between himself and the owner of the property. The condition
under Section 14(3)(c)(iii)is that the defendant has, by virtue of
H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A the agreement, obtained possession of the whole or any part of
the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work
is to be executed. If the rule of literal interpretation is adopted
to interpret Section 14(3)(c)(iii), it would lead to a situation where
a suit for specific performance can only be instituted at the behest
of the owner against a developer, denying the benefit of the
B
provision to the developer despite an interest in the property
having been created. This anomaly is created by the use of the
words “the defendant has, by virtue of the agreement, obtained
possession of the whole or any part of the land” in Section
14(3)(c)(iii). Under a development agreement, an interest in the
C property may have been created in favour of the developer. If
the developer is the plaintiff and the suit is against the owner,
strictly applied, clause (iii) would require that the defendant should
have obtained possession under the agreement. In such a case if
the developer files a suit for specific performance against the
owner, and the owner is in possession of the land by virtue of a
D
lawful title, the defendant (i.e. the owner) cannot be said to have
obtained possession of the land by way of the agreement. This
would lead to an anomalous situation where the condition in
Section 14(3)(c)(iii) would not be fulfilled in the case of a suit by a
developer. Application of the literal rule of interpretation to
E Section 14(3)(c)(iii), would lead to an absurdity and would be
inconsistent with the intent of the Act. [Para 23] [775-C-H]
2. By giving a purposive interpretation to Section
14(3)(c)(iii), the anomaly and absurdity created by the third
condition will have no applicability in a situation where the
F developer who has an interest in the property, brings a suit for
specific performance against the owner. The developer will have
to satisfy the two conditions laid out in sub clause (i) and (ii) of
Section 14(3)(c), for the suit for specific performance to be
maintainable against the owner. This will ensure that both owners
and developers can avail of the remedy of specific performance
G under the Act. A suit for specific performance filed by the
developer would then be maintainable. Whether specific
performance should in the facts of a case be granted is a separate
matter, bearing on the discretion of the court. [Para 24] [776-E-G]
3. It is necessary to determine whether, in the facts of the
H present case, the agreement between the appellant and the
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 759

respondent is capable of specific performance. For this purpose, A
it would be necessary to consider the terms and conditions of the
agreement between the parties. The condition under
Section14(3)(c)(i) is that the building or other work described in
the contract is sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine
the exact nature of the building or work. Clause 8 of the agreement
B
provides that the building shall be constructed in accordance with
approved plans and built with “first class materials” with wooden
doors, mosaic floor, basin and lavatories, tap water arrangement
etc. Further, at clause 13 of the agreement, the parties have agreed
that the contractor would construct a building at the premises
consisting of “residential apartments of various sizes and C
denomination” in the said building complex in accordance with
plans sanctioned by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the
owner shall convey the proportionate share in the land to the
respective buyers. Clause 22 of the agreement states that if for
any reason after the plan is sanctioned or “for any act or omission
D
on the part of the owner” the building cannot be constructed; the
owner shall refund to the contractor ¹ 4,00,000/- in addition to all
costs, charges and expenses incurred by the contractor. At clause
20 of the agreement, the parties have agreed that the apartments
of the owner shall be constructed and be made in “similar
condition” as that of the contractor with water connection, E
sewerage, electric wiring except “special fittings”.Use of such
vague terms in the agreement such as “first class materials”,
“residential apartment of various sizes and denomination”, “etc.”,
“similar condition”, and “special fittings”, while discussing the
scope of work clearly shows that the exact extent of work to be
F
carried out by the developer and the obligations of the parties,
have not been clearly brought out. Parties have not clearly defined,
inter alia, the nature of material to be used, the requirements of
quality, structure of the building, sizes of the flats and obligations
of the owner after the plan is sanctioned. Further, clause 9 of the
agreement states that the owner shall pay the contractor costs, G
expenses along with agreed remuneration only after completion
of the building on receiving the possession. However, the exact
amount of remuneration payable by the owner to the contractor
is not to be found in the agreement. The agreement between the
parties is vague. The court cannot determine the exact nature of
H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A the building or work. The first condition in Section 14(3)(c)(i) is
not fulfilled. [Paras 25 and 26] [777-A-H; 778-A-B]
4. Another condition under Section 14(3)(c)(ii) is that the
plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the
contract and the interest is of such a nature that compensation in
B money for non-performance of the contract is not an adequate
relief. The intent of the section is to make a distinction between
cases where a breach of an agreement can be remedied by means
of compensation in terms of money and those cases where no
other remedy other than specific performance will afford adequate
relief. Therefore, before granting the remedy of specific
C performance, there is a need to analyze the extent of the alleged
harm or injury suffered by the developer and whether
compensation in money will suffice in order to make good the
losses incurred due to the alleged breach of the agreement by
the owner. From the facts of the case, it is clear that the case of
D the developer is that he incurred an expenditure of `18,41,000/-
towards clearing outstanding dues, security deposit and
development, incidental and miscellaneous expenses. The alleged
losses/damages incurred by the Plaintiff can be quantified. The
plaintiff can be provided recompense for the losses allegedly
incurred by payment of adequate compensation in the form of
E money. The developer has failed to satisfy the conditions under
sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act. In such a case,
specific performance cannot be granted. [Para 27] [778-B-E]
Vipin Bhimani v. Smt Sunanda Das (2006) 2 CHN 396;
B Gangadhar v BG Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 239;
F Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v Haradeb Banerjee (1991) 4
SCC 572 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 245 ; Chheda Housing
Development Corporation v Bibijan Shaikh Farid
(2007) 3 Mah LJ 402; Della Developers Private Limited
v Noble Organics Private Limited (2010) 2 Bom CR
G 13; Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v Ashim Kumar Kar AIR
2014 Cal 92; Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi
P Gaikwad v Savjibai Haribai Patel AIR 2001 SC
1462 : [2001] 2 SCR 590 ; Faqir Chand Gulati v Uppal
Agencies Private Limited (2008) 10 SCC 345 : [2008]
10 SCR 697 – referred to.
H
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 761

Wolverhampton Corporation v. Emmons [1901] 1 K. B. A
515; Carpenters Estate v. Davies (1940) Ch. D 160;
Price v Strange [1978] 1 Ch. 337; Stock v Frank Jones
(Tipton) Ltd. (1978) 1 WLR 231 – referred to.
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume
44(1); Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts, B
Eleventh Edition, Volume 1; Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 12th Edition - 2010, Lexis Nexis - page
144 and Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11 th
Edition – referred to.
Case Law Reference C
(2006) 2 CHN 396 referred to Para 7
(1995) 5 SCC 239 referred to Para 17
[1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 245 referred to Para 17
(2007) 3 Mah LJ 402 referred to Para 18 D
(2010) 2 Bom CR 13 referred to Para 19
AIR 2014 Cal 92 referred to Para 20
[2001] 2 SCR 590 referred to Para 29
[2008] 10 SCR 697 referred to Para 30 E

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1129
of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2009 of the High
Court at Calcutta in F.A. No. 175 of 2007. F
Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Ms. Daisy Hannah, Ms. Ekta Pradhan,
Shekhar Kumar, Advs. for the appellant.
Bhaskar P. Gupta, Sr. Adv., Prateek Jalan, Rauf Rahim, Rahul
Kripalani, Ankit Yadav, Advs. for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. The present appeal1 is from
the judgment of a DivisionBench of the High Court of Calcutta2. The
1
Leave was granted on 12 January 2012.
2
The High Court delivered judgment on 18 February 2009. H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A appellant, who is a builder, instituted a suit for specific performance of a
development agreement, against therespondents, who are owners of the
premises. The suit was dismissed by the City Civil Court. The High
Court dismissed the first appeal.
2. The subject matter of the suit for specific performance is a
B development agreement dated 14 April 1992, entered into by the appellant
with the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (Late Kalidas Sadhu)3
in respect of premises situated at 243N, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road,
P.S. Burtolla, Kolkata – 700006.Theagreement recites that the
ownershad approached the appellant for construction of a building on
the land and that the following terms, interalia, were agreed upon by
C and between the parties:
a) The appellant agreed to apply at his own costs and expenses for
sanction of the plan of a proposed building complex on 14 cottahs
5 chittacks and 40 square feet, to the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation(Clause-1 of the agreement);
D
b) The plan of the building complex would be prepared and submitted
by the appellant to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, after the
approval of the respondent (Clause -2 of the agreement);
c) The appellant shall deposit with the respondent an amount of ¹
E 4,00,000/-without interest which shall be refundable upon the
completion of the building (Clause-3of the agreement);
d) If for any reason after the plan is sanctioned or for any act or
omission on the part of the appellant, the construction cannot
take place, the appellant shall refund the deposit in addition to all
F costs, charges and expenses incurred by the respondent(Clause-
22of the agreement);
e) The respondent shall retain 42% of the total constructed area as
‘soleowned’ and the balance 58% of the total constructed area
shall remain secured for due payment of the construction costs.
The total construction cost shall not exceed the value of 58% of
G
the constructed area. The respondent agreed to pay the appellant
the costs and expenses along with agreed remuneration upon
completion of the construction and if the respondent failed to
3
Late Kalidas Sadhu was the original respondent. Upon his death, by an order dated
12 May 2018, the legal heirs of the original respondent were substituted as existing
H respondents.
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 763
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

pay, the appellant was entitled to realise its money by selling A
58% of the total constructed area (Clauses – 6, 10 and 11of
the agreement); and
f) The respondent was entitled to demand any loss and/or damage
suffered by him for any illegal activities of the appellant and the
appellant was also entitled to recover damages from the B
respondent for lapse and negligence, in addition to the right of
the parties to claim specific performance(Clause -24of the
agreement).
3. The appellant alleged that upon the execution of the agreement,
he found that the premises wereencumbered and that there were arrears C
of municipal tax and electricity dues, besides which there were labour
and industrial disputes and ‘factory closure problems’. The respondent
is alleged to have requested the appellant to make payments and assured
that he will reimburse him before the sanction of the building plan was
obtained. Accordingly, the appellant claims to have made a payment of ¹
7,03,000/-. D

4. On 18 March 2002, the respondent addressed a letter to the
appellant and denied the execution of the agreement. The appellant, by
a letter dated 4 April 2002 protested the denial and requested the
respondent to give him the authority to obtain sanction of the building
plans.Parties thereafter met and agreed to modify the terms of the E
agreement with revised terms under which (i) allocation of the owner
would be 47% instead of 42%; and (ii) allocation of the developer would
be 53% instead of 58%.
5. On 26 May 2003, the appellant issued to the respondent a
notice for payment of his share of the sanctioned fees. On 3 June 2003 F
the owner wrote a letter to the appellant through his advocate, denying
the contents of the notice on the ground that he had by a notice dated 19
May 2003cancelled the agreement and requested the appellant to return
all documents and collect the deposit.
6. On 6 August 2003, the appellant instituted a suit4 in the City G
Civil Court seeking a declaration that the cancellation of the agreement
by the respondent was invalid and a permanent injunction restraining the
respondent from entering into any agreement with a third party for sale
of the premises. On 28 September 2005 the City Civil Court allowed an
4
TS No.1150/03 H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A amendment of the plaint, by which a prayer for specific performance
was included.
7. On 28 February 2007, the City Civil Court dismissed the Suit
with the following observation:
“No tangible evidence is forthcoming in the instant suit by which
B it can be said that the plaintiff (developer) obtained possession
of the suit property i.e. the possession of the suit property is/has
handed over to him after the execution of the agreement in
question.”
The City Civil Court relied on a judgment of a Division Benchof
C the High Court of Calcutta in Vipin BhimanivSmtSunanda Das5, that
a suit for specific performance of a development agreement at the instance
of a developer is barred by the provisions of Section 14(3)(c) of the
Specific Relief Act 1963 (“the Act”).Upon examining various clauses of
the agreement, the City Civil Court concluded that the appellant had
D agreed to apply at his own cost and expense to the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation for getting the plansof the proposed building approved. The
City Civil Court noted that it was an admitted fact that sanctionwasnot
obtained by the appellant and therefore, it could not be said that he had
obtained possession.As a result, the suit at the instance of the appellant
was held to be barred by Section14(3)(c).
E
8. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the City Civil Court,
the appellant preferred an appeal6 before the High Court of Calcutta.On
18 February 2009 the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
appeal, on the ground that the suit was not maintainable under Section
14(3)(c) of the Act.
F
The High Court rejected the appellant’s argument that even if Section
14(3)(c) stood in the way of getting a decree for specific performance,
the Specific Relief Act not being exhaustive, there was no bar in granting
a decree. The High Court held:
“….if in the Act there is a clear prohibition in granting a decree
G
for specific performance in a given situation, such provision is
exhaustive and cannot be made nugatory by contending that the
Act is not exhaustive and thus, the Court can ignore such
provision.”
5
(2006) 2 CHN 396
H 6
F.A. No. 175 of 2007
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 765
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

9. The High Court also rejected the argument of the appellant A
that the agreement in question was not a contract for construction of
buildingon the land in a real sense, as the respondent was not getting any
consideration for building. The High Court held that the agreement was
in substance a contract of construction within the meaning of sub-section
(3)(c) of Section 14 and the consideration was payable only upon the
B
completion of the work.
10. The issue which has been raised before this Court is whether
Section 14(3)(c) of the Act is a bar to a suit by a developer for specific
performance of a development agreement between himself and the owner
of the property. In dealing with this issue, the court needs to assess
whether the word “defendant” in Section 14(3)(c)(iii) has the effect of C
confining the scope of the suit for specific performance only to a particular
class (consisting of owners) or whether a purposive interpretation to the
legislation would be required, so as to provide a broader set of remedies
to both owners and developers. In deciding this issue the court will need
to scrutinise the nature of a development agreement. D
11. Section 14 provides thus:
“14. Contracts not specifically enforceable-
(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced,
namely - E
(a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation
in money is an adequate relief;
(b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details
or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition
of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the court F
cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms;
(c) a contract which is in its nature determinable;
(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance
of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise.
G
(2) Save as provided by the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940),
no contract to refer present or future differences to arbitration
shall be specifically enforced; but if any person who has made
such a contract (other than an arbitration agreement to which
the provisions of the said Act apply) and has refused to perform
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A it, sues in respect of any subject which he has contracted to
refer, the existence of such contract shall bar the suit.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause
(c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the court may enforce specific
performance in the following cases—
B (a) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract,-
(i) to execute a mortgage or furnish any other security for securing
the repayment of any loan which the borrower is not willing to
repay at once:

C Provided that where only a part of the loan has been advanced
the lender is willing to advance the remaining part of the loan in
terms of the contract; or
(ii) to take up and pay for any debentures of a company;
(b) where the suit is for-
D
(i) the execution of a formal deed of partnership, the parties
having commenced to carry on the business of the partnership;
or
(ii) the purchase of a share of a partner in a firm;
E (c) where the suit is for the enforcement of contract for the
construction of any building or the execution of any other work
on land:
Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:-
(i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms
F sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine the exact
nature of the building or work;
(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of
the contract and the interest is of such a nature that compensation
in money for non-performance of the contract is not an adequate
G relief; and
(iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained
possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the
building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.”

H
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 767
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Section 14(1) provides categories of contracts which are not specifically A
enforceable. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 is an exception to clauses(a),
(c) and (d) of sub-section (1). Though the species of contract stipulated
in clauses (a), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) cannot be specifically
enforced, a suit for specific performance of contracts of that
descriptionwill be maintainable if the conditions set out in sub-clauses
B
(i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (c) of Section 14(3) are satisfied.
12. The consistent position of the common law is that courts do
not normally order specific performance of a contract to build or
repair.But this rule is subject to important exceptions, and a decree for
specific performance of a contract to build will be made only upon meeting
the requisite requirements under law. According to Halsbury’s Laws C
of England7,the discretion to grant specific performanceis not arbitrary
or capricious; it is governed by principles developed in precedents. The
judge must exercise the discretion in a judicious manner. Circumstances
bearing on the conduct of the plaintiff, such as delay, acquiescence and
breach or some other circumstances outside the contract, may render it D
inequitable to enforce it. The position as elucidated in Halsbury’s Laws
of England8 is thus:
“… the court does not normally order specific performance of a
contract to build or repair. However, this rule is subject to
important exceptions, and a decree for specific performance of E
a contract to build will be made if the following conditions are
fulfilled: (1) that the building work is defined by the contract
between the parties; (2) that the plaintiff has a substantial interest
in the performance of the contract of such a nature that he cannot
be adequately be compensated in damages; (3) that the defendant
is in possession of the land on which the work is contracted to be F
done.”
13. This principle was followed by the Court of Appeal in
Wolverhampton Corporation v Emmons9, where the plaintiff, the
urban sanitary authority, in pursuance of a scheme of street improvement,
sold and conveyed to the defendant a plot of land abutting a street, the G
defendant covenanting with them that he would erect buildings within a
certain time. Upon the defendant failing to perform the agreement, the
7
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 44(1), para 801
8
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 44(1), para 806
9
[1901] 1 K. B. 515 H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A plaintiffs brought asuit against him claiming specific performance. Romer
L.J, held that a plaintiff can bring himself within the exception, if three
things are shown to exist: (i) the building work, the performance of which
the plaintiff seeks to enforce, is defined by the contract allowing the
court to know the exact nature and extent of work; (ii) the plaintiff must
have a substantial interest in having the contract performed and the
B
interest must be of such a nature that damages will not be an adequate
compensation for the non-performance of the contract; and (iii) the
defendant has obtained from the plaintiff by means of the contract the
possession of the land on which the work is to be done. The case was
held to come within the class of cases which had been recognised as
C forming an exception to the general rule that specific performance of a
building contract will not be ordered.
14. In a decision of the Chancery Division in Carpenters Estate
v Davies10, an owner of land sold a certain portion of it to the purchaser
for development, retaining land adjoining it, and agreed to lay roads and
D provide mains, sewers and drains on the land retained. The purchaser
brought a suit for specific performance against the owner for not
performing his obligations under the agreement. Farwell J., observed
that the plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant is in possession
of the land on which the work is contracted to be done. The facts of the
case, indicated that the defendant was already in possession of the land,
E and there was no difficulty for her to carry out her obligations. Finding
that the plaintiff proved all three conditions as laid out in Wolverhampton
Corporation (supra), the court granted specific performance to the
plaintiff.
15. The requirements to be satisfied by the plaintiff bringing forth
F a suit for specific performance have been analysed in Hudson’s Building
and Engineering Contracts11 and in Price v Strange12, where the
rule has been settled that the court will order specific performance of an
agreement to build if:
(i) the building work is sufficiently defined by the contract, for
G example by reference to detailed plans;

10
(1940) Ch. D 160
11
Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts, Eleventh Edition, Volume 1, page 677
12
[1978] 1 Ch. 337 at page 359
H
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 769
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the A
contract of such a nature that damages would not compensate
him for the defendant’s failure to build; and
(iii) the defendant is in possession of the land so that the plaintiff
cannot employ another person to build without committing a
trespass. B
16. The expression “development agreement” has not been defined
statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclature which is used to be
describe a wide range of agreements which an owner of a property may
enter into for development of immovable property. As real estate
transactions have grown in complexity, the nature of these agreements C
has become increasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without intending
to be exhaustive), development agreements may be of various kinds:
(i) An agreement may envisage that the owner of the immovable
property engages someone to carry out the work of construction
on the property for monetary consideration.This is a pure D
construction contract;
(ii) An agreement by which the owner or a person holding other
rights in an immovable property grants rights to a third party to
carry on development for a monetary consideration payable by
the developer to the other. In such a situation, the owner or right E
holder may in effect create an interest in the property in favour
of the developer for a monetary consideration;
(iii) An agreement where the owner or a person holding any other
rights in an immovable property grants rights to another person
to carry out development. In consideration, the developer has to F
hand over a part of the constructed area to the owner. The
developer is entitled to deal with the balance of the constructed
area. In some situations, a society or similar other association is
formed and the land is conveyed or leased to the society or
association;
G
(iv) A development agreement may be entered into in a situation
where the immovable property is occupied by tenants or other
right holders. In some cases, the property may be encroached
upon. The developer may take on the entire responsibility to settle
with the occupants and to thereafter carry out construction; and
H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A (v) An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop a plot of
land which is occupied by slum dwellers and which has been
declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be old and dilapidated
buildings which are occupied by a number of occupants or tenants.
The developer may undertake to rehabilitate the occupants or,
as the case may be, the slum dwellers and thereafter share the
B
saleable constructed area with the owner.
When a pure construction contact is entered into, the contractor has no
interest in either the land or the construction which is carried out. But in
various other categories of development agreements, the developer may
have acquired a valuable right either in the property or in the constructed
C area. The terms of the agreement are crucial in determining whether
any interest has been created in the land or in respect of rights in the
land in favour of the developer and if so, the nature and extent of the
rights.
17. In a construction contract, the contractor has no interest in
D either the land or the construction carried out on the land. But, in
otherspecies of development agreements, the developer may have
acquired a valuable right either in the property or the constructed area.
There are various incidents of ownership of in respect of an immovable
property. Primarily, ownership imports the right of exclusive possession
E and the enjoyment of the thing owned. The owner in possession of the
thing has the right to exclude all others from its possession and enjoyment.
The right to ownership of a property carries with it the right to its
enjoyment, right to its access and to other beneficial enjoyments incidental
toit. (B Gangadhar v BG Rajalingam13). Ownership denotes the
relationshipbetween a person and an object forming the subject matter
F of the ownership. It consists of a complex of rights, all of which are
rights in rem, being good against the world and not merely against specific
persons. There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which
need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right
to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy
G or alienate it. (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v Haradeb Banerjee14).An
essential incident of ownership of land is the right to exploit the
development, potential to construct and to deal with the constructed area.
In some situations, under a development agreement, an owner may part
13
(1995) 5 SCC 239 at para 6
14
H (1991) 4 SCC 572
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 771
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

with such rights to a developer. This in is essence is a parting of some of A
the incidents of ownership of the immovable property. There could be
situations where pursuant to the grant of such rights, the developer has
incurred a substantial investment, altered the state of the property and
even created third party rights in the property or the construction carried
out to be carried out. There could be situations where it is the developer
B
who by his efforts has rendered a property developable by taking steps
in law. In development agreements of this nature, where an interest is
created in the land or in the development in favour of the developer, it
may be difficult to hold that the agreementis not capable of being
specifically performed. For example, the developer may have evicted or
settled with occupants, got land which was agricultural converted into C
non-agricultural use, carried out a partial development of the property
and pursuant to the rights conferred under the agreement, created third
party rights in favour of flat purchasers in the proposed building. In such
a situation, if for no fault of the developer, the owner seeks to resile from
the agreement and terminates the development agreement, it may be
D
difficult to hold that the developer is not entitled to enforce his rights.
This of course is dependent on the terms of the agreement in each case.
There cannot be a uniform formula for determining whether an
agreement granting development rights can be specifically enforced and
it would depend on the nature of the agreement in each case and the
rights created under it. E
18. In Chheda Housing Development Corporation vBibijan
Shaikh Farid15, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court while
dealing with the question of whether specific performance should be
granted of a development agreement held as follows:
“In our opinion from a conspectus of these judgments, what is F
relevant would be the facts of each case and the agreement
under consideration. Agreements considering what is discussed,
amongst others, could be:
(a) An Agreement only entrusting construction work to a party
for consideration. G
(b) An Agreement for entrusting the work of development to a
party with added rights to sell the constructed portion to flat
purchasers, who would be forming a Co-operative Housing
15
(2007) 3 Mah LJ 402 H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Society to which society, the owner of the land, is obliged to
convey the constructed portion as also the land beneath
construction on account of statutory requirements.
(c) A normal agreement for sale of an immovable property.
An Agreement of the first type normally is not enforceable as
B compensation in money is an adequate remedy. An Agreement
of the third type would normally be specifically enforceable unless
the contrary is proved. A mere agreement for development, which
creates no interest in the land would not be specifically enforced.”
19. The judgement of the Bombay High Court in Della
C Developers Private Limited v Noble Organics Private Limited16,
deals with a case where a development agreement was executed
between the petitioners and the respondents. A dispute arose between
the parties and arbitration proceedings were initiated. An order was passed
by the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
D Act 1996 against which an appeal was filed under Section 37. Before
the High Court, the findings of the sole arbitrator under Section 17 were
challenged. Upon examining the agreement, the High Court held that
the agreement created a right or interest in immovable property. On the
issue of the maintainability of a proceeding initiated by the developer
against the owner under Section 14(3)(c), the court reiterated the
E requirement of fulfilling the three conditions under Section 14(3)(c).
Hon’ble Mr. Justice AM Khanwilkar (as my learned Brother then was)
held as follows:
“Insofar as present case is concerned, out of the three conditions
specified in Section 14(3)(c), prima facie, from the terms of the
F Agreement as executed between the parties, there is nothing to
indicate that the Petitioner in pursuance of the contract, was put
in possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the
building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.”
20. InAshok Kumar Jaiswal vAshim Kumar Kar17, a Full
G Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a development agreement
with a clause for conditional sale of the premises in question will also be
an agreement for sale subject to certain conditions. While deciding
whether a suit at the instance of a developer is maintainable in view of
16
(2010) 2 Bom CR 13
17
H AIR 2014 Cal 92
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 773
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Section 14(3)(c), the Court, inter alia, held that in the absence of a A
definition of “developer” or “development agreement” the nature of
the agreement which is the subject-matter of a suit must be considered
in order to determine whether it is an agreement to merely provide
construction of a building or whether the developer has obtained a share
of, and interest in, the developed propertywhich is the outcome of the
B
agreement, creating a contract for transfer of immovable property. The
Full Bench observed thus:
“An owner without any funds or the independent resources to
construct a new building on such owner’s land may engage for
such purpose with the consideration for the construction being
paid by allocation of a part of the constructed area. There could C
be several variants of the same basic structure of a development
agreement…..Such agreements are not merely for the
construction of any building or for the mere execution of any
other work on the land. The developer is not merely a contractor
engaged to undertake the construction; the developer is, under D
the agreement with the owner, promised a part of the constructed
premises as owner thereof together with the proportionate area
of the land.”
The Full Bench held that a right to seek specific performanceof a
development agreement is not barred either expressly or by E
necessaryimplication by the 1963 Act and a broadinterpretationshould
be given to allow an adequate remedy:
“….it would be preposterous to say that only the owner can
maintain a suit against the developer for enforcing his rights and
not vice-versa. If the developer has a right under the contract he F
must be having a remedy in the form of approaching a forum for
appropriate redressal. A question of maintainability of a suit is
completely different from the question of whether the suit will
succeed or not on the facts of the case and in the light of the
applicable law. Section 14 (3)(c) of the Act can in no manner
be interpreted as debarring a developer from approaching the G
legal forum for redressal of his grievance.”
21. In the present case, the respondent agreed to pay the appellant
the costs and expenses along with the agreed remuneration upon
completion of the construction. If the respondent failed to pay, the appellant
H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A was entitled to realise its money by selling 58% of the total constructed
area.Clauses 6, 10 and 11 of the agreement indicate that the respondent
would retain 42% of the total constructed area and the balance 58%
would remain secured for due payment of the construction costs. It was
further agreed, that the total construction costs shall not exceed 58% of
the constructed area. The intention of the parties is clear from the
B
agreement. This was an agreement to carry out the construction of the
building for which payment of the construction costs and agreed
remuneration had to be made. The agreement did not create an interest
in the land for the developer. If the payment due to the developer was
made, there would arise no security interest. Moreover, the security
C interest in respect of 42% of the constructed area would arise only if the
construction came up and the payment due to the builder was not made.
In present case, admittedly there is no construction at all.
22. Various High Courts have interpreted the requirements under
Section 14(3)(c) of the Actand opined on the maintainability of a suit by
D the developer for specific performance against the owner of the property
for a breach in the conditions of the development agreement. A common
thread that runs through the analysis in decided cases is the following:
(i) The courts do not normally order specific performance of a
contract to build or repair. But this rule is subject to important
E exceptions, and a decree for specific performance of a contract
to build will be made only upon meeting the requirements under
law;
(ii) The discretion to grant specific performance is not arbitrary or
capricious but judicious; it is to be exercised on settled principles;
F the conduct of the plaintiff, such as delay, acquiescence, breach
or some other circumstances outside the contract, may render it
inequitable to enforce it;
(iii) In order to determine the exact nature of the agreement signed
between the parties, the intent of the parties has to be construed
G by reading the agreement as a whole in order to determine
whether it is an agreement simpliciter for construction or an
agreement that also creates an interest for the builder in the
property.Where under a development agreement, the developer
has an interest in land, it would be difficult to hold that such an
agreement is not capable of being specifically enforced; and
H
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 775
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(iv) A decree for specific performance of a contract to build will be A
made if the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) the work of construction should be described in the contract in
a sufficiently precise manner in order for the court to determine
the exact nature of the building or work;
b) the plaintiff must have a substantial interest in the performance B
of the contract and the interest should be of such a nature that
compensation in money for non-performance of the contract
is not an adequate relief; and
c) the defendant should have, by virtue of the agreement, obtained
possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the C
building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.
23. The issue before this Court is whetherSection 14(3)(c)(iii) is
a bar to a suit by a developer for specific performance of a development
agreement between himself and the owner of the property.The condition
under Section 14(3)(c)(iii)is that the defendant has, by virtue of the
D
agreement, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land on
which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.
If the rule of literal interpretation is adopted to interpret Section
14(3)(c)(iii), it would lead to a situation where a suit for specific
performance can only be instituted at the behest of the owner against a
developer, denying the benefit of the provision to the developer despite E
an interest in the property having been created. This anomaly is created
by the use of the words “the defendant has, by virtue of the agreement,
obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land” in Section
14(3)(c)(iii). Under a development agreement, an interest in the property
may have been created in favour of the developer.If the developer is the
F
plaintiff and the suit is against the owner, strictly applied, clause (iii)
would require that the defendant should have obtained possession under
the agreement. In such a case if the developer files a suit for specific
performance against the owner, and the owner is in possession of the
land by virtue of a lawful title, the defendant (i.e. the owner) cannot be
said to have obtained possession of the land by way of the agreement. G
This would lead to an anomalous situation where the condition in Section
14(3)(c)(iii) would not be fulfilled in the case of a suit by a developer.
Application of the literal rule of interpretation to Section 14(3)(c)(iii),
would lead to an absurdity and would be inconsistent with the intent of
the Act.
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 24. The conditions that should be present to justify a departure
from the plain words of any statute, have been elucidated in Justice GP
Singh’s treatise on Principles of Statutory Interpretation18 (while
discussing the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v Frank Jones
(Tipton) Ltd.19):
B “...a court would only be justified in departing from the plain
words of the statute when it is satisfied that (1) there is clear
and gross balance of anomaly; (2) Parliament, the legislative
promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such
anomaly and could not have been prepared to accept it in the
interest of a supervening legislative objective; (3) the anomaly
C can be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective;
and (4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the
modification required to obviate the anomaly.”
The principle has been also adverted to in Maxwell on Interpretation
of Statutes20:
D
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of
the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience
or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a
construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of
E the words, and even the structure of the sentence.”
By giving a purposive interpretation to Section 14(3)(c)(iii), the anomaly
and absurdity created by the third condition will have no applicability in a
situation where the developer who has an interest in the property, brings
a suit for specific performance against the owner.The developer will
F have to satisfy the two conditions laid out in sub clause (i) and (ii) of
Section 14(3)(c), for the suit for specific performance to be maintainable
against the owner. This will ensure that both owners and developers can
avail ofthe remedy of specific performance under the Act. A suit for
specific performance filed by the developer would then be maintainable.
G Whether specific performance should in the facts of a case be granted
is a separate matter, bearing on the discretion of the court.

18
Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition - 2010, Lexis Nexis - page 144
19
(1978) 1 WLR 231
H 20
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 221
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 777
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

25. Having dealt with the first aspect of the matter, it is now A
necessary to determine whether, in the facts of the present case, the
agreement between the appellant and the respondent is capable of specific
performance. For this purpose, it would be necessary to consider the
terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties.
26. The condition under Section14(3)(c)(i) is that the building or B
other work described in the contract is sufficiently precise to enable the
court to determine the exact nature of the building or work.To examine
the question as to whether the scope of the building or work described in
theagreementissufficiently defined,the Court needs to determine the exact
nature of the work by referring to the relevant clauses of the agreement.
Clause 8 of the agreement provides that the building shall be constructed C
in accordance with approved plansand built with “first class materials”
with wooden doors, mosaic floor, basin and lavatories, tap water
arrangement,masonry work, electric points, finished distemper and bath
room fittings of glazed tiles up to 6" height and lift,”etc.”Further, at clause
13 of the agreement, the parties have agreed that the contractor would D
construct a building at the premises consisting of “residential apartments
of various sizes and denomination” in the said building complex in
accordance with plans sanctioned by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation
and the owner shall convey the proportionate share in the land to the
respective buyers. Clause 22 of the agreement states that if for any
reason after the plan is sanctioned or “for any act or omission on the E
part of the owner” the building cannot be constructed; the owner shall
refund to the contractor ¹ 4,00,000/- in addition to all costs, charges and
expenses incurred by the contractor. At clause 20 of the agreement, the
parties have agreed that the apartments of the owner shall be constructed
and be made in “similar condition”as that of the contractor with water F
connection, sewerage, electric wiring except “special fittings”.Use of
such vague terms in the agreement such as “first class materials”,
“residential apartment of various sizes and denomination”, “etc.”,
“similar condition”,and “special fittings”,while discussing the scope
of work clearlyshows that the exact extent of work to be carried out by
the developer and the obligations of the parties, have not been clearly G
brought out. Parties have not clearly defined, inter alia, the nature of
material to be used, the requirements of quality, structure of the
building,sizes of the flats and obligations of the owner after the plan is
sanctioned. Further, clause 9 of the agreement states that the owner
shall pay the contractor costs, expenses along with agreed remuneration H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A only after completion of the building on receiving the possession. However,
the exact amount of remuneration payable by the owner to the contractor
is not to be found in the agreement. The agreement between the parties
is vague.The court cannot determine the exact nature of the building or
work. The first condition in Section 14(3)(c)(i) is not fulfilled.
B 27. Another condition under Section 14(3)(c)(ii) is that the plaintiff
has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the
interest is of such a nature that compensation in money for non-
performance of the contract is not an adequate relief. The intent of the
section is to make a distinction between cases where a breach of an
agreement can be remedied by means of compensation in terms of money
C and those cases where no other remedy other than specific performance
will afford adequate relief. Therefore, before granting the remedy of
specific performance, we need to analyse the extent of the alleged harm
or injury suffered by the developer and whether compensation in money
will suffice in order to make good the losses incurred due to the alleged
D breach of the agreement by the owner. From the facts of the case, it is
clear that the case of thedeveloper is thatheincurred an expenditure of
` 18,41,000/- towards clearing outstanding dues, security deposit and
development, incidental and miscellaneous expenses.The alleged losses/
damages incurred by the Plaintiff can be quantified. The plaintiff can be
provided recompense for the losses allegedly incurred by payment of
E adequate compensation in the form of money. The developer has failed
to satisfy the conditions under sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 14(3)(c)
of the Act. In such a case, specific performance cannot be granted.
28. By the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 201821, Section 14
has been amended to read as follows:
F
“14. The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced,
namely:—
(a) where a party to the contract has obtained substituted
performance of contract in accordance with the provisions of
G section 20;
(b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance
of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise;

21
H Act 18 of 2018
SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL v. MEENAKSHI SADHU & ORS. 779
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(c) a contract which is so dependent on the personal qualifications A
of the parties that the court cannot enforce specific performance
of its material terms; and
(d) a contract which is in its nature determinable.”
However, the amended section has been notified on 19 September 2018
and the central government has appointed 1 October 2018 as the date B
on which the provision of Act 18 of 2018 will come into force22.
However, in the present case, we are not called upon to examine the
effect of this amended provision. In any case, we have indicated the
reasons why Section 14(3)(c) was not attracted.
29. The appellants have relied on the decision of this Court in C
Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P Gaikwad v SavjibaiHaribai
Patel23,where an agreement was entered into between the landowner
and the developer for the purpose of construction of houses for the
weaker sections on excess vacant land under a scheme sanctioned
under Section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act D
1976. This Courtreversed the decision of the High Court that granted
the decree of specific performanceto the developer on the grounds that
it wasinequitable to enforce specific performancein view of a change in
the Master Plan. The court noted that a contract which involved
continuous supervision of the court, was not specifically enforceable.
Further, in the opinion of the court, at best the plaintiff - builder could E
claim damages and the expenditure incurred by him for the implementation
of the terms of the agreement. The above case has no applicability to
the facts of the present caseand is of no relevance as the issue in relation
to the maintainability of a suit for specific performance by the builder
against the owner has not been discussed. F
30. The appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in Faqir
Chand Gulati v Uppal Agencies Private Limited24, where the issue
before this Court was whether a landowner, who enters into an agreement
with the builder, for construction of an apartment building is a “consumer”
entitled to maintain a complaint against the builder as a service provider G
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Court held:

22
S.O.4888(E) dated 19.09.2018
23
AIR 2001 SC 1462
24
(2008) 10 SCC 345 H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A “We may notice here that if there is a breach by the landowner
of his obligations, the builder will have to approach a civil court
as the landowner is not providing any service to the builder but
merely undertakes certain obligations towards the builder, breach
of which would furnish a cause of action for specific performance
and/or damages. On the other hand, where the builder commits
B
breach of his obligations, the owner has two options. He has the
right to enforce specific performance and/or claim damages by
approaching the civil court. Or he can approach the Forum
under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for relief as consumer,
against the builder as a service- provider.”
C The issue involved before this Court was in relation to the interpretation
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and not on the maintainability of a
suit filed by the developer against the owner for specific performance in
view of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act. Therefore, the decision cannot be
relied upon in relation to the issue before us.
D 31. Ordinarily, if there was an alternative plea for damages or
monetary relief, we would have remanded the case to the High Court
for consideration of the prayer. However, in the impugned judgment, the
Division Bench has observed thus:
“Although we find no merit in this appeal, we wanted to give
E liberty to the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint for the purpose
of getting alternative relief by way of return of security of money
and damages, if at all suffered, in terms of Section 22 of the
Specific Relief Act; but Mr. Das, the learned Advocate appearing
on behalf of the appellant after taking instruction from his client
F submitted before us that his client did not want to avail of such
remedy and wanted to challenge our decision by preferring an
appeal if we decided to refuse the prayer for specific performance
of the contract. “
The same statement has been made before this Court, as was made
G before the High Court. In the absence of any plea for damages or
monetary relief by the respondents, there is no reason to remit the appeal
back to the High Court.
32. For the above reasons we find no merit in this appeal. The
appeal stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
H Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.