SURINDER SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                     [2013) 14 S.C.R. 825


                      SURINDER SINGH                                 A
                                v.
                    STATE OF HARYANA
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1791 of 2008)
                    NOVEMBER 13, 2013                                B
             [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND
                 MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 3048 and 498A - Dowry death
  - Conviction of husband by courts below - On appeal, held:         c
  Prosecution successfully proved its case against the
  husband-accused - The deceased died on account of burns
  in the house of the accused otherwise than under normal
  circumstances within 94 days of her marriage - The PWs
  (brothers of deceased) proved that she was unhappy in the          D
  matrimonial house being ill-treated for having brought
· insufficient dowry - Conviction upheld.

      Presumption - Dowry death - Presumption uls. 1138 of
 Evidence Act and s. 3048 /PC - When can be raised - Held:           E
 Such presumption can be raised when it is shown that cruelty
 or harassment was caused soon before death of the
 deceased - 'Soon before' is a relative term - The time-lag
 may differ from ca~~ to case - In the present case, the bride
 died within 94 days of her marriage, the cruelty meted out to       F
 her any time during this period would be construed as 'soon
 before'.

      Interpretation of Statutes - Penal statutes - Interpretation
 of - Held: Penal statute, even if has to be strictly construed,
 must be so construed as not to defeat its purport - The             G
 provisions in ss. 1138 of' Evidence Act and 3048 of /PC,
 being beneficent provisions, even though construed strictly,
 care will have to be taken to see that their object is not

                               825                                   H
    826      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A   frustrated - Meaning to be applied to each word of these
    provisions, has to be in accord with the legislative intent.

          Words and Phrases:

     'Dowry' - Meaning of, in the context of s. 3048 /PC and
B Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

          'Soon before' - Explained in the context of s. 1138 of
    Evidence Act and s. 3048 of Penal Code.

C       Appellant-accused No.1 was tried alongwith his
    other relatives i.e. Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 for the
    offences punishable u/ss. 498A and 3048 IPC for killing
    his wife.

       The prosecution case was that the accused were not
D satisfied with the dowry and on that account they used
  to ill-treat and harass the deceased. The deceased had
  informed her brothers (PWs 4 and 6) and her father about
  the same. On the day of the incident, accused No.3 came
  to the house of the parents of the deceased and informed
E her brothers and father that the deceased had committed
  suicide by burning herself. After reaching the spot of
  occurrence, brother of the deceased lodged FIR
  narrating ill-treatment meted out to the deceased. The
  accused denied the allegations and stated that after her
F abortion, the deceased was in depression and therefore,
  she committed suicide.

      Trial court convicted all the accused u/s. 3048 IPC
  and sentenced them to 7 years RI, and further convicted
  them u/s. 498A IPC and sentenced them to RI for 2 years,
G and fine of Rs. 1000/- with default clause. High Court, in
  appeal, confirmed the conviction of appellant-accused
  and acquitted the other accused. Hence the present
  appeal by the appellant accused.

H         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
     SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                 827


    HELD: 1. Penal statute, even if it has to be strictly      A
construed, must be so construed as not to defeat its
purport. Harassment of a married woman in an Indian
household is a peculiar phenomenon. In most cases it is
seen that the husband or the members of his family are
never satisfied with what they get as dowry. The wife's        B
family is expected to keep fulfilling this insatiable demand
in some form or the other for some period of time after
marriage. Such demands are also fulfilled by parents of
the wife for fear of their daughter being ill-treated. The
courts of law cannot lose sight of these realities. The        c
presumption under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act,
1872 and the presumption under Section 3048 of the IPC
have a purpose. These are beneficent provisions aimed
at giving relief to a woman subjected to cruelty routinely
in an Indian household. The meaning to be applied to
                                                               0
each word of these provisions has to be in accord with
the legislative intent. Even while construing these
provisions strictly care will have to be taken to see that
their object is not frustrated. [Para 19) [844-A-D]

    Appasaheb and anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9       E
SCC 721: 2007 (1) SCR 164; Murlidhar Meghraj Loya vs.
State of Maharashtra (1976) 3 SCC 684: 1977 (1) SCR 1;
Kisan Trimbak Kothula its. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1
SCC 300: 1977 (2) SCR 102; State of Maharashtra vs.
Natwar/a/ Damoqardas Soni (1980) 4 SCC 669: 1980 (2)           F
SCR 340 - relied on.

    2. Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 states that
when the question is whether a person has committed
the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon          G
before her death such woman has been subjected by
such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall
presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Section 3048 of the IPC states that where the death of a
                                                               H
    828     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
  otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
  years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
  her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
  her husband or any relative of ¥r husband for, or in
B connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
  be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative
  shall be deemed to have caused her death. Thus, the
  words 'soon before' appear in Section 1138 of the
  Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 3048 of the IPC.
C [Para 13] [838-F-H; 839-A-8]

         3. For the presumptions contemplated .under these
    Sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that
    the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the
    death. The interpretation of the words 'soon before' is,
D   therefore, important. The question is how 'soon before'?
    This would obviously depend on facts and
    circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment
    differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of
    people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can
E   be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of
    different shades. It can be verbal or emotional like
    insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can be
    giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones.
    It can be depriving her of economic resources or
F   essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on
    her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the
    outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
    Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain
    and harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance
G   of cruelty and related harassment has a different impact
    on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so
    grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman. Some
    instances which degrade her dignity may remain etched
    in her memory for a long time. Therefore, 'soon before'
H   is a relative term. In matters of emotions one cannot have
     SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                829


fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case to case.    A
This must be kept in mind while examining each case of
dowry death. [Para 13] [839-B-F]

    Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 (
3) SCR 662 - relied on.                                       B

    4. Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand
of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such
demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will
have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends
on facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a       C
pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the
confines of law. [Para 14] [840-G-H]

    5. The evidence of brothers of the deceased show
that after marriage, the deceased was unhappy in the          D
matrimonial house because of the ill-treatment meted out
to her. She died otherwise than under normal
circumstances in her husband's house within three
months and four days of marriage. It is, indeed, a very
short period. The cruelty was spread over the short           E
period covering the date of her marriage till her death
displaying a course of conduct. In her case, cruelty
caused to her on any day from the date of her marriage
could be cruelty caused 'soon before' her death.
Therefore, even if date of their visit to the appellant's     F
house, when the demand was made, is not stated by her
brothers in the court, that hardly makes any difference.
In any case, the brothers have stated that on 0~/07/1994
she came to their house and told them about the demand.
She died shortly thereafter. [Para 15] [841-A-D]
                                                              G
     6. Explanation to Section 3048 of the IPC states that
for the purpose of this sub-section, dowry shall have the
same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, so far
as it is material to the present case, states that dowry      H
    830    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A means any property or valuable security given or agreed
  to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a
  marriage to the other party to the marriage at or before
  or at any time after the marriage in connection with the
  marriage of the said party. Thus, the emphasis is on
B property or valuable security given 'at or before' or 'at any
  time after' the marriage in connection with marriage. The
  amount or things demanded must, therefore, have a
  nexus with the marriage. In the present case , both the
  brothers of the deceased, have clearly stated that the
c accused were unhappy by the quality and quantity of the
  dowry and the deceased was being taunted and beaten-
  up for that. The words 'insufficient and inferior quality of
  dowry' are important. They indicate that the transaction
  of giving dowry was not complete. Sufficient quantity of
  dowry was not given and that transaction was sought to
0
  be completed by asking for Rs.60,000/- after the marriage
  for the business of the appellant. [Para 16] [842-8-F]

         7. No medical record was produced to show that the
    deceased was in depression and she was taking
E   medicine for the same. There is nothing on record to
    show that the deceased was told that she will never
    conceive a child. It is not, therefore, possible to say that
    the deceased committed suicide because she was in
    depression. Reliance was placed on a letter, allegedly
F   written by the deceased to her husband's brother-in-law.
    It was submitted that this letter does not indicate that the
    deceased was tortured or harassed. In fact, in this letter
    the deceased has fondly referred to the members of the
    appellant's family. PW-6 .and PW-7 (brothers of the
G   deceased) have not admitted that this letter was written
    by their sister. It is also improbable that the deceased
    would write a letter to the brother-in-law of her husband.
    Assuming that she wrote such a letter, she would never
    complain him about the ill-treatment meted out to her in
H   her matrimonial house. In any case, even if this letter is
     SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                 831


held to be genuine, that does not dilute the evidence of       A
PW-6 and PW-7. This submission, therefore, is rejected.
[Para 21) [845-C-G]

    8. The prosecution has successfully proved its case
against the appellant. The trial court and the High Court
have concurrently held the appellant guilty of offences        8
punishable under Sections 3048 and 498A of the IPC.
[Para 26) [847 -E-F]

    Surinder Kaur and anr. vs. State of Haryana (2004) 4
SCC 109; Durga Prasad and anr. vs. State of Madhya             C
Pradesh (2010) 9 SCC 73: 2010 (7) SCR 104; Geeta
Mehrotra and anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and anr. (2012)
10 SCC 741: 2012 (9) SCR 641; Vipin Jaiswal (A-I) vs. State
of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor (2013)
3 SCC 684: 2013 (3) SCR 449 - distinguished.                   D

     9. It is true that the relatives of the appellant have
been acquitted on the ground that there are no specific
allegations against them. There is a great difference
between the allegations levelled against the relatives of
the appellant and the appellant. The entire prosecution        E
story revolves around the appellant. The demand of
Rs.60,000/- relates to the appellant. The witnesses are
specific on this point. PW-7 ·(brother of the deceased) has
stated so in the FIR also. Therefore, the appellant's case
stands on a different footing. [Para 11) [838-A-D]             F

                     Case Law Reference:
    2000 (3) SCR 662         relied on            Para 14
    2013 (3) SCR 449         distinguished        Para 17      G
    2007 (1) SCR 164         relied on            Para 17
    1977 (1) SCR 1           relied on            Para 18
    1977 (2)-SCR 102         relied on            Para 18
                                                               H
    832      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A         1980 (2) SCR 340        relied on             Para 18
          (2004) 4 sec 109        distinguished         Para 22
          2010 (7) SCR 104        distinguished         Para 23
          2012 (9) SCR 641        distinguished         Para 24
8
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1791 of 2008.

          From the Judgment & Order dated 01.11.2007 of the High
c Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision
    No. 635-SB of 1998.

          Nidhesh Gupta, Tarun Gupta, M.K. Ghose (for S. Janani)
    for the Appellant.

D       Kamal Mohan Gupta, Mohd. Zahid Hussain for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. In this appeal
E judgment and order dated 01/11/2007 passed by the Punjab
  and Haryana High Court is under challenge.

       2. The appellant is original accused no. 1. He was tried
  along with Hazura Singh-original accused no. 2, Narata Singh-
F original accused no. 3 and Kaushalya - original accused no.
  4 for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 3048 of
  the IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge Yamuna Nagar in
  Sessions Case No. 60 of 1994. Appellant is the husband of
  deceased Anita ("the deceased" or "Anita"). Accused no. 2
G is his father, accused no. 3 is his uncle and accused no. 4 is
  his mother.

         3. The deceased was daughter of Ram Lal. Admittedly,
    she was married to the appellant on 24/04/1994. According to
    the prosecution, the accused were not satisfied with the quality
H
      SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                    833
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
and quantity of the dowry given at the time of marriage. They      A
used to taunt and beat the deceased. At times, they used to
keep her hungry. She had informed her brothers and father
about this ill-treatment and harassment. Her brother Ashok
Kumar and his brother-in-law Pawan Kumar went to the house
of the accused and protested. At that time the accused told        B
Ashok Kumar that if he had so much affection for his sister he
should give Rs.60,000/- for the business of the appellant. Ashok
Kumar expressed his helplessness to meet the demand. Ashok
Kumar sent his younger brother Satish Kumar tO bring the
deceased home, but, the accused told him that he should take       c
the deceased home after some days. On 22/07/1994 the uncle
of the appellant i.e. accused no. 3 - Narata Singh went to the
house of the parents of the deceased and told them that Anita-
the deceased had committed suicide by burning herself. Ashok
Kumar accompanied by his father, brother Satish Kumar and          D
brother-in-law Pawan Kumar went to the house of the accused.
The burnt dead body of Anita was found kt:;pt on a cot in the
verandah. Ashok Kumar, then, went to P.S. Yamunanagar and
lodged FIR Exhibit-PK. On completion of investigation the
accused came to be charged as aforesaid.
                                                                   E
     4. The prosecution examined, inter alia, PW-6 Satish
Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar, who unfolded the prosecution
story about the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased. PW-9
Dr. V.K. Nagpal conducted the post-mortem and gave report
Exhibit-PH. PW-11 Maharaj Singh, DSP, who conducted the            F
investigation, gave details of investigation.

     5. The accused denied the allegations of demand of dowry
and harassment to the deceased. The appellant in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. stated         G
that the deceased was well looked after. Lot of affection was
shown to her. When she was carrying, proper medical treatment
was given to her. She developed complications and pregnancy
had to be terminated. The doctors told her that whenever she
conceives she will have problem of bleeding. The deceased
                                                                   H
    834    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013] 14 S.C.R.


A was last examined on 19/07/1994. After her abortion the
  deceased was in depression and, therefore, she committed
  suicide. The accused examined three doctors. They are DW-
  1 Dr. Mrs. Iqbal Kaur, DW-2 Dr. Fitu Mago and DW-3 Dr. C.
  Vijayendra. DW-4 Anil Kumar, the brother-in-law produced
8 letter Exhibit-OF received by him from the deceased.

      6. The trial court by its judgment and order dated 01/08/
  1998 convicted the appellant and other accused for offence
  punishable under Section 304-8 of the IPC and sentenced them
  to undergo RI for seven years each. The accused were also
C convicted for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC
  and sentenced to suffer RI for two years each. They were
  ordered to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default, they were
  directed to undergo RI for six months. The substantive
  sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
D
       7. The accused carried an appeal to the Punjab and
  Haryana High Court. The High Court acquitted accused nos. 2
  to 4 on the ground that allegations made against them were
  vague and that they were living separately from the appellant.
E The High Court, however, confirmed the conviction and sentence
  of the appellant, hence, this appeal to this Court.

       8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Nidhesh
  Gupta submitted that since on the same set of evidence all the
  other accused have been acquitted the appellant should also
F have been acquitted because no part of the evidence involves
  the appellant alone. Counsel submitted that there is nothing on
  record to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty
  or harassment by the appellant. Counsel submitted that, in any
  case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the alleged
G cruelty and harassment was in connection with dowry. The
  allegations are too general and vague. No specific allegations
  are made against the appellant therefore Section 3048 of the
  IPC is not attracted. Presumptions under Section 3048 of the
  IPC and Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also
H do not arise in this case. The witnesses have made only bald
       SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                   835
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
statements. No independent witnesses like neighbours have           A
been examined to prove that the deceased was treated with
cruelty. Thus, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3048
of the IPC is not sustainable. In this connection counsel relied
on Surinder Kaur and anr. v. State of Haryana1, Durga Prasad
and anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2 and Geeta Mehrotra and        8
anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and anr3. Counsel further
submitted that so far as demand of Rs.60,000/- is concerned,
no date of demand is mentioned, therefore, it is not possible
to say that this alleged demand was made soon before the
death. Moreover, the demand was made for business of the            c
appellant, therefore, it cannot be called a dowry demand. In this
connection counsel relied on Vipin Jaiswal (A-I) v. State of
Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor. 4 • Drawing
our attention to letter Exhibit-OF dated 16/07/1994 counsel
submitted that this letter was written by the deceased just 15
                                                                    0
days before the date of incident to DW-4 Anil ~umar, who is
brother-in-law of the appellant. In that letter she has made no
grievance about the alleged harassment or cruelty. In fact, she
has made fond reference to the members of the appellant's
family. This shows that allegations of harassment and cruelty
                                                                    E
are false. Counsel also drew our attention to the evidence of
the doctors examined by the appellant in support of his defence.
He submitted that it is clear from their evidence that while the
deceased was pregnant she was bleeding and, therefore, her
pregnancy had to be terminated. The deceased was told that
she may not cqnceive a child. Thereafter, the deceased went         F
into depression. She appears to have committed suicide while
in depression. In the circumstances, the appellant cannot be
convicted under Section 3048 and 498A of the IPC. His
conviction and sentence deserves to be set aside.
                                                                    G

1. · (2004) 4 sec 109.
2.   (2010) g sec 73.
3.   (2012i 10 sec 741.
4.   (2013) 3 sec 684.                                              H
    836      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A      9. Learned counsel for the State of Haryana Mr. Kamal
  Mohan Gupta submitted that PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7
  Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have unfolded the
  prosecution case. They are reliable and trustworthy witnesses.
  They have described the ill-treatment. meted out to the
B deceased and the demand of dowry made by the appellant.
  Counsel submitted that the demand of Rs.60,000/- related to
  the appellant's business. The evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar
  and PW-7 Ashok Kumar makes reference to the specific date
  of demand and specific amount, which was demanded by the
c appellant. Counsel submitted that deceased Anita died within
  94 days of marriage. There can be no doubt that her death
  caused by burns was otherwise than under normal
  circumstances. The conviction of the appellant is legal and
  perfectly justified and, Jherefore, the appeal be dismissed.

D         10. The evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok
    Kumar, brothers of the deceased, gives us the prosecution
    story. PW-7 Ashok Kumar is the complainant, hen·ce, we shall
    first advert to his evidence. He stated that the deceased was
    married to the appellant on 20/04/1994. The accused were not
E   satisfied with the quality and the quantity of the dowry given by
    them at the time of marriage. They used to taunt the deceased
    and the deceased had told him about this many times. The
    accused used to demand Rs.60,000/- for the business of the
    appellant or for getting him some job. PW-7 Ashok Kumar
F   further stated that once he and his brother-in-law Pawan Kumar
    visited the house of the appellant to request the accused to
    treat the deceased properly. According to him, the accused told
    him that if he had so much affection for his sister he should pay
    Rs.60,000/- to them. He expressed inability to do so. On 05/
G   07/1994 the deceased came to their house and even at that
    time she told them about the demand of Rs.60,000/-. PW-7
    Ashok Kumar further stated that on 21/07/1994 they received
    a message that Anita $hould be taken home. He sent his·
    brother PW-6 Satish Kumar to bring his sister home but the
H   accused did not send her. On 22/07/1994 Narata Singh, uncle
      SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       837
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
 of the appellant, came to their house and told them that Anita        A
 had committed suicide. PW-7 Ashok Kumar went to the house
 of the accused along with his brother PW-6 Satish Kumar, his
 father and brother-in-law·Pawan Kumar. He saw the dead body
  of his sister kept in a verandah. He, then, lodged FIR Exhibit-
  PK. It is pertinent to note that in the FIR also PW-7 Ashok          B
  Kumar has stated that the accused demanded Rs.60,000/-, for
  the business of the appellant or for getting him some job. PW-
 6 Satish Kumar corroborates PW-7 Ashok Kumar. PW-6
  Satish Kumar also stated that accused were not satisfied with
  the dowry and they used to taunt his sister for br!nging less and    c
  inferior quality of dowry. He stated that the accused used to beat
 the deceased and keep her hungry and the deceased used to
 tell them about the misbehaviour of the accused whenever she
  came home. He further stated that on 05/0711994 the deceased
  told him· that the accused are demanding Rs.60,000/- for             0
· investing in the business of the appellant. They expressed their
  helplessness to pay the amount. The accused continued to beat
  the deceased. He further stated that on 21/07/1994 PW-7
  Ashok Kumar received a message from his sister that she
  should be brought to their house. He, then, went to the
  appellant's house to bring the deceased home. The accused            E
  asked him to fulfill their demand before taking his sister with
  him to his house. He returned home alone. PW-6 Satish Kumar
  further stated that on 22/07/1994 Narata Singh, uncle of the
  appellant came to their house and informed them that Anita had
  committed suicide. He went to the house of the appellant along       F
  with his father and brother and found that the dead body of
  Anita was kept in the verandah. Thus, the evidence of these
  two witnesses establishes that the deceased was treated with
  cruelty. She was subjected to harassment in the appellant's
  house because the dowry given in the marriage was                    G
  inadequate and not of good quality. It is also established that
  the accused wanted Rs.60,000/- for investing in the appellant's
  business or for getting him some job.

      11. The fact that the marriage took place on 20/04/1994          H
    838     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 14 S.C.R.


A   is not disputed. Anita died on account of burns in the
    appellant's house. Her death was otherwise than under normal
    circumstances. She died just within 94 days of the marriage. It
    is true that the relatives of the appellant have been acquitted
    on the ground that there are no specific allegations against
8   them. It is argued that, therefore, the appellant should also be
    acquitted because the allegations are general as against him
    also. We are unable to agree with this submission. There is a
    great difference between the allegations levelled against the
    relatives of the appellant and the appellant. The entire
c   prosecution story revolves around the appellant. The demand
    of Rs.60,000/- relates to the appellant. The witnesses are
    specific on this point. PW-7 Ashok Kumar has stated so in the
    FIR also. Therefore, the appellant's case stands on a different
    footing.
D      12. It is further argued that neither PW-7 Ashok Kumar nor
  PW-6 Satish Kumar have stated the exact date on which they
  went to the house of the accused when the demand for
  Rs.60,000/- was made and, therefore, it is not possible to
  locate the date on which demand for Rs.60,000/- was made ..
E Resultantly, it is not possible to say whether the demand was
  made soon before the death of Anita. We have no hesitation
  in rejecting this submission.

        13. Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states
F that when the question is whether a person has committed the
  dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon before her
  death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty
  or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
  the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry
G death. Section 3048 of the IPC states that where the death of
  a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
  otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years
  of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
  was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
  relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
H
       SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       839
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such           A
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Thus, the words 'soon before' appear in Section 1138 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 3048 of the IPC.
For the presumptions contemplated under these Sections to
spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or         8
harassment was caused soon before the death. The
interpretation of the words 'soon before' is, therefore, important.
The question is how 'soon before'? This would obviously
depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The cruelty
or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset      c
of people which varies fr9m person to person. Cruelty can be
mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different
shades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing
or humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her
or her near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic
                                                                        0
resources or essential ameniti!=!S of life. It can be putting
restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk
to the outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing_pain and
harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty
and related harassment has a different impact on the mind of            E
a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a lasting
impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity
may remain etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore,
'soon before' is a relative term. In matters of emotions we
cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case           F
to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case
of dowry death.

      14. In this connection we may refer to judgment of tbis
Court jn Kans Raj v. State of Punjab 5 where this Court                 G
considered the term 'soon before'. The relevant observations
are as under:

      " ....,..... "Soon before" is a relative term which is required
5.   c2000) 5 sec 201.                                                  H
    840       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A         to be considered under specific circumstances of each
          case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing
          any time-limit. This expression· is pregnant with the idea
          of proximity test. The term "soon before" is not synonymous
          with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the
B         expression "soon after'' as used and understood in Section
          114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would
          imply that the interval should not be too long between the
          time of making the statement and the death. It
          contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier
c         noticed, has to be understood and determined under the
          peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry
          deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty
          or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a
          particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct.
          Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the
D
          cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to
          have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before
          death" if any other intervening circumstance showing the
          non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record,
          before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It
E         does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched
          to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect
          of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential
          death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The
          demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such
F         demand and the date of death should not be too remote
          in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as
           having become stale enough."

       Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of
G dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and
  the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied.
  But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on facts and circumstances
  of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach
  of the court within the confines of law.
H
      SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       841
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
      15. The evidence of brothers of Anita show that after            A
marriage Anita was unhappy in the matrimonial house because
ofthe ill-treatment meted out to her. Anita died otherwise than
under normal circumstances in her husband's house within three
months and four days of marriage. It is, indeed, a very short
period. The cruelty was spread over the short period covering          B
the date of her marriage till her death displaying a course of
conduct. In her case, in our opinion, cruelty caused to her on
any day from the date of her marriage i.e. 20/04/1994 till the
date of her death i.e. 22/07/1994 could be cruelty caused 'soon
before' her death. Therefore, even if date of their visit to the       c
appellant's house, when the demand was made, is not stated
by Anita's brothers in the court, that hardly makes any
difference. In any case, the brothers have stated that on 05/07/
1994 Anita came to their house and told them about the
demand. Anita died shortly thereafter.                                 0
     16. That takes us to the next submission that Rs.60,000/-
were demanded after the marriage for the business of the
appellant, and, therefore, it is not a dowry demand. In this
connection, reliance is placed on Vipin Jaiswal. In that case the
appellant therein was married to the deceased on 22/02/1996.           E
The case of the prosecution was that ever since t~e marriage,
the deceased was subjected to physical and mental torture by
the appellant and others for not getting sufficient dowry. The trial
court convicted all the accused under Sections 3048 and 498A
of the IPC. The High Court acquitted the relatives of the              F
appellant-husband, but, confirmed his conviction. It is pertinent
to note that while acquitting the appellant this Court took note
of the fact that the deceased had left a suicide note in which
she had stated that nobody from her husband's family was
responsible for her death. The High Court while noting that the        G
allegations against the appellant were general in nature stated
that the demand of Rs.50,000/- was made six months after the
marriage and that was for enabling the appellant therein to
purchase a computer and for setting-up his own business. This
Court held that demand made for purchasing a.computer, six             H
    842      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A   months after the marriage, was not a demand in connection
    with marriage and was not a dowry demand within the meaning
    of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Vipin Jaiswal
    is not applicable to the present case. Explanation to Section
    3048 of the IPC states that for the purpose of this sub-section,
8   dowry shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the
    Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
    Act, 1961, so far as it is material to this case, states that dowry
    means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
    given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to
c   the other party to the marriage at or before or at any time after
    the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said party.
    Thus, the emphasis is on property or valuable security given
    'at or before' or 'at any time after' the marriage in connection
    with marriage. The amount or things demanded must, therefore,
D   have a nexus with the marriage. In this case both the brothers
    i.e. PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar, brothers of
    the deceased, have clearly stated that the accused were
    unhappy by the quality and quantity of the dowry and the
    deceased was being taunted and beaten-up for that. The words
E   'insufficient and inferior quality of dowry' are important. They
     indicate that the transaction of giving dowry was not complete.
     Sufficient quantity of dowry was not given and that transaction
    was sought to be completed by asking for Rs.60,000/- after the
     marriage for the business of the appellant. This demand has a
     connection with the marriage. Therefore, in our opinion Vipin
F    Jaiswa/ is not applicable to the present case.

       17. We are mindful of the fact that in Vipin Jaiswa/ this
  Court relied upon Appasaheb and anr. v. State of
  Maharashtra6 • In that case the accused was convicted under
G Section 3048 read with Section 34 of IPC. The incident had
  taken place on 15/09)1991. The deceased was married to the
  accused about 2 Y2 years prior to the date of the incident. The
  deceased consumed poison and died in the house of the
  accused. The allegations were that there was a demand for
H a. c20on a sec 121.
       SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                    843
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
money and consequent beating of the deceased. The evidence           A
disclosed that the demand was made for defraying expenses
of manure etc. This Court held that a demand for money on
account of some financial stringency or for meeting some
urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be
termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally            B
understood. This Court held that being a penal provision
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 will have to be
construed strictly.

      18. It is true that penal provisions have to be construeq
strictly. However, we may mention that in Murlidhar Meghraj          C
Loya v. State of Maharashtra 7 this Court was dealing with the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Speaking for this
Court, Krishna Iyer, J. held that any narrow and pedantic, literal
and lexical construction of food laws is likely to leave loopholes
for the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law and should        D
be discouraged and criminal jurisprudence must depart from
old canons defeating criminal statutes calculated to protect the
public health and the nation's wealth. Similar view was taken
in Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra 6 • In State
of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni9 , while dealing         E
with Section 135 of the Customs Act and Rule 126-H(2)(d) of
the Defence of India Rules, a narrow construction given by the
High Court was rejected on the ground that that will emasculate
these provisions and render them ineffective as a weapon for
combating gold smuggling. It was further held that the provisions    F
have to be specially construed in a manner which will suppress
the mischief and advance the object which the legislature had
in view.

      19. While we reiterate what this Court has said in             G
Appasaheb that a penal statute has to be construed strictly, in
light of Kisan Trimbak and Natwarlal Damodardas, we are of
1.   (1976) 3 sec 684.
8.   (1977) .1 sec 300.
9.   (1980) 4 sec 669.
                                                                     H
    844      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 14 S.C.R.


A the opinion that penal statute, even if it has to be strictly
  construed, must be so construed as not to defeat its purport.
  Harassment of a married woman in an Indian household is a
  peculiar phenomenon. In most cases it is seen that the husband
  or the members of his family are never satisfied with what they
B get as dowry. The wife's family is expected to keep fulfilling this
  insatiable demand in some form or the other for some period
  of time after marriage. Such demands are also fulfilled by
  parents of the wife for fear of their daughter being ill-treated.
  The courts of law cannot lose sight of these realities. The
c presumption under Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act,
   1872 and the presumption under Section 3048 of the IPC have
  a purpose. These are beneficent provisions aimed at giving
  relief to a woman subjected to cruelty routinely in an Indian
  household. The meaning to be applied to each word of these
  provisions has to be in accord with the legislative intent. Even
0
  while construing these provisions strictly care will have to be
  taken to see that their object is not frustrated.

       20. As stated by this Court in Appasaheb a demand for
  meeting financial stringency may not fall within the ambit of the
E term 'dowry' as defined under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
  Similarly, a demand of money made six months after marriage
  for setting-up computer business of the husband may not be
  covered by the term dowry as stated in Vipin Jaiswal. But, in
  this case, the demand is made to complete and fulfill the
F demand of dowry made prior to the marriage. The appellant's
  grievance was about the inferior and insufficient dowry given
  by the deceased's family and after marriage that was sought
  to be fulfilled by asking for Rs.60,000/- for setting-up appellant's
  business or for getting him some job. Insufficient dowry given
G to the appellant was sought to be supplemented by the demand
  of Rs.60,000/-. The present case, therefore, stands on a
  different footing. Section 3048 of the IPC is clearly attracted
  to this case.

          21. It was argued that the evidence of the doctors
H
      SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       845
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
examined by the appellant show that the deceased's pregnancy           A
was terminated, that she was told that she may not conceive a
child again and, that, thereafter, she was in depression. It is
argued that, therefore, she committed suicide. It is not possible
to accept this submission. Even if the pregnancy of the
deceased was terminated, that would not necessarily lead to            B
depression. In fact, DW-3'Dr. C. Vijayendra, who terminated
the pregnancy of the deceased stated that it is not necessary
that a patient may suffer from depression after termination of
pregnancy. Neither DW-1 Dr. Mrs. Iqbal Kaur or DW-2 Dr. Mrs.
Ritu Mago stated that the deceased was in depression. They             c
stated that there was no imminent danger to the life of the
deceased. No medical record was produced to show that the
deceased was in depression and she was taking medicine for
the same. There is nothing on record to show that the deceased
was told that she will never conceive a child. It is not, therefore,
                                                                       D
possible to say that the deceased committed suicide because
she was in depression. Reliance was placed on a letter,
allegedly written by the deceased to her husband's brother-in-
law. It was submitted that this letter does not indicate that the
deceased was tortured or harassed. In fact, in this letter the
deceased has fondly referred to the members of the appellant's         E
family. PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar have not
admitted that this letter was written by their sister. It is also
improbable that the deceased would write a letter to the
brother-in-law of her husband. Assuming that she wrote such a
letter, she would never complain about the ill-treatment meted         F
out to her in her matrimonial house to the brother-in-law of her.
husband. In any case, even if this letter is held to be genuine,
that does not dilute the evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and
PW-7 Ashok Kumar. This submission, therefore, does not
impress us and is rejected.                                            G

    22. None of the judgments relied upon by the appellant's
counsel help the appellant. They turn on their own facts. In
Surinder Kaur the demand was made 2 'i.-'2 years prior to the
death of the deceased and, therefore, it was held that                 H
   846      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A allegations were not proximate to the death of the deceased
  hence, Section 3048 of the IPC was not attracted. In that case
  the appellants before this Court were the relatives of Surinder
  Kumar, the husband of the deceased. There were no direct
  allegations against them. Considering all these circumstances
8 they were acquitted. This case will have no application to the
  present case.

       23. In Durga Prasad the appellants were convicted under
  Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC. This Court acquitted them
  by giving benefit of doubt on the ground that except for certain
C bald statements made by the witnesses alleging cruelty and
  harassment to the deceased-wife no other evidence was
  produced to prove that she committed suicide because of
  cruelty and harassment. This case is also not applicable to the
  instant case because here the demand of Rs.60,000/-
0 specifically relates to the appellant, therefore, it cannot be said
  that qua the appellant there are no specific allegations. Here
  the harassment and cruelty is inextricably linked to the appellant.

        24. In Geeta Mehrotra the High Court had refused to quash
E the complaint filed against the appellant(1) •. who was sister-in-
  law of the complainant and appellant(2), who was brother-in-
  law of the complainant, under Sections 498A, 323, 504 and 506 '·
  of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
  1961, on the ground that the question of alleged lack of territorial
F jurisdiction cannot be decided by it under Section 482 of the
  Cr.P.C. The High Court left it open to the appellants to move
  the trial court. While quashing the proceedings this Court took
  note of the fact that the marriage between the complainant wife
  and her husband was dissolved by an ex-parte decree of
  divorce. This Court was of the view that in the circumstances
G proceedings initiated prior to the divorce decree ought not to
  be prosecuted further. This Court also took into consideration
  the fact that there were no l?Pecific allegations against the
  appellants, who were relatives of the husband. It appears that
   in the complaint there was only a casual reference to the
H
      SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       847
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
appellants. The instant case stands on different footing because      A
here evidence is adduced and the appellant is convicted. The
brothers of the deceased have stated on oath that Rs.60,000/
- were demanded for the appellant's business and for that
amount the deceased was harassed and treated with cruelty.
That cruelty led to her death in unnatural circumstances.             B

     25. Before closing, the most commonplace argument must
be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted that
independent witnesses have not been examined. When
harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the four
walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get independent     C
witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates of the house
and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness
it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never
depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery
witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away           D
from courts. This is more so with neighbours. In bride burning
cases who else will, therefore, depose about the misery of the
deceased bride except her parents or her relatives? It is time
we accept this reality. We, therefore, reject this submission.
                                                                      E
      26. We are, therefore, of the view that the prosecution has
successfully proved its case against the appellant. The trial court
and the High Court have concurrently held the appellant guilty
of offences punishable under Sections 3048 and 498A of the
IPC. We have no hesitation in endorsing the view taken by the
                                                                      F
trial court which is confirmed by the High Court. The appeal is,
therefore, dismissed. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds
stand cancelled. He shall surrender to the concerned court.

Kalpana K. Tripathy                               Appeal dismissed.