Holding

Corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act is a quasi‑criminal offence that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the Supreme Court may set aside High Court findings where that standard is not met.

Summary

In the 1980 Punjab Legislative Assembly election, Surinder Singh was elected but his victory was challenged on two grounds of corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act, 1951: (1) alleged "undue influence" for disturbing an Akali Party meeting with firearms, and (2) alleged "bribery" for promising to have dangerous electric wires removed in exchange for votes. The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that both corrupt practices were proved and declared the election void. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined (i) the standard of proof required for corrupt practice, (ii) whether it could interfere with the High Court’s factual findings, and (iii) the specific allegations of undue influence and bribery. The Court held that corrupt practice is a quasi‑criminal charge and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; the High Court’s findings were not supported by such proof, and the alleged disturbances did not amount to undue influence, nor did the wire‑removal promise constitute bribery. Consequently, the election was upheld and the High Court’s decision set aside.

Issues considered

Whether allegations of corrupt practice under Sec. 123 of the Representation of the People Act must be proved on a pre‑ponderance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the Supreme Court may interfere with the High Court’s findings of fact in an election appeal.
Whether the disturbance of an election meeting amounts to "undue influence" under Sec. 123(2).
Whether appointing a polling agent charged with murder constitutes undue influence.
Whether promising to remove electric wires in exchange for votes constitutes "bribery" under Sec. 123(1)(A).

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Constitution of Indias. 136
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 3
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100, s. 116-A, s. 116-C, s. 123(1)(A), s. 123(2), s. 127

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practiceundue influencebriberystandard of proofRepresentation of the People ActSupreme Court appellate jurisdictioncivil appealelectoral law

Judgment

1059

A

SURINDER SINGH

v.
B
HARDIAL SINGH AND ORS.

October 29, 1984

[P.N. BHAGWATI, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND

RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J c
Constitutioii of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When would interfere
with findings of the High Court reached on assessmeni of evidence.

Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951

i-Section 123-Allegation of Corrupt Practice made in an election petition D
-How should be established-Whether on basis of preponderance of probabilities
as in civil litigation or "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as in Criminal trials.

ii-Section 1!6A (1)-Election appeal-Nature of findings offacts-If could
be interfered with by Supreme Court.
E
iii-Sec. 12 3 (2)-Corrupt Practice of" Undue influence"-Nature and proof
of-Whether disturbing election meeting a corrupt practice u/s.123(2)-Whether
appointment by the returned candidate of a person charged for murder as his
polling agent amounts to exercise of"undue 1"nfluence".

iv-Sec. 123 (/) (A)-Corrupt Practice of "Bribe"-Whether ameliorating
grievances of the public while canvassing for votes amounts to corrupt practice. F
The appellant was declared elected on May 31; 1980 to the Punjab
Legis1ative Assembly from a constituency known as Non-sbehra-Pamuan
Assembly Constituency. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, two voters of the Consti-
tuency challenged his election before the High Court on two grounds, namely,
(t) that the appellant's supporters disturbed a meeting of the Akali Party by
using fire arms and fatally injuring one and otherwise inflicting injuries on many G
others and thus he committed a corrupt practice of ''undue influence" u/s.
123 (2) of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951 ; and (2) that the appellant
in order to get the votes of one Bagicha Singh Chakiwala and his family
members as also of his brotherhood, promised to Bagicha. Singh to get the
uncovered electric wires, which were dangerously passing over his house,
removed aflcr paying its expenses etc. and so he approached the Punjab State H
A
1060 SUPREME cotlRT REPORTS [1985)'1 s.c.tt.
Electricity Board employees, put pressure on them and got the amount of ex·
penses deposited and the wires removed on 30th May 1980 i.e. one day before
the poll. Thus, the appellant had committed a corrupt practice of 'Bribery'
u/s. 123 (l) (A) of the Act. The High Court declared the election of the
-
...
appellant void holding that both the corrupt practices had been committed by
the appellant himself or through others with his consent and were covered by
ss. 123 (I) (A), (B) and (2) of the Act. Hence this appeal,

B The respondent-petitioners in addition to the above-mentioned two
grounds of challenge contended, (i) that the charges of corrupt practice should
be allowed to be estabJished .arr the basi-; of preponderance of probabilities as
in civil litigation and not by asking for proof of the alJegation beyond reason-
able doubt as in a criminal case ; (ii) that it was the practice of the Supreme
Court in election appeals not to enter into reappreciation of evidence and dis-
turb findings of fact reached by the High Court and therefore the Supreme
c Court should not attempt a re-appreciation of the evidence while dealing with
this appeal ; and (iii) that the appointment of Gurdial Singh, who had disturbed
the Akali Meeting and had also been charged for murder, by the appellant as
bis polling agent in the Gandiwind Polling Booth amounted to exercise of
"undue influence" within the meaning of the Act.

Allowing the appeal,
D
HELD : (1) Section 116-C makes it clear that an appeal to the Supreme
Court under the Act is to be treated as a Civil appeal and the jurisdiction to be
exercised is as extensive as in the case of an appeal from a matter disposed of
in exercise of original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 116-A (1) of
the Act clearly indicates that the appeal to this Court has to be disposed of by
e:ii;ercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the original
E
judgment of the High Court. In this view of the matter there can really be no
rule, whether statutory or evolved by this Court by long usage as alleged, that
the Court would not interfere with the findings of fact reached at the trial stage.
Ordinarily a finding reached on assessment of the eviden ce particularly
when it is oral would not be interfered with but where the Court is satisfied that
0 ~ account of a wrong approach to a matter, injustice has been done to one of
F the parties before it, it would not only be within the powers of the Court but it
would be its obligation to rectify the mistake and do justice to the party .
[1066fl..G, 1070G-HJ

Ramabhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fu/sinji & Ors. [1965] IS.C.R.
712 Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia & Ors. [1971] 3 S.C.R. 522.
Mohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan [1977] 2 S.C.C. 23. Laxminarayan v. Return-
G ing Officer [1974] I S.C.R. 822 & Sh. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh
Tohra & Ors. [1980] Suppl. S.C.C. 53, relied upon.

Sarju Prasad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ori. [1950] S.C.R.
781. Watt v. Thomas 1947 A. C 484. Narmada Prasad v. Chagan Lal [1966] I
S.C.R. 499. Prabodh Chand v. Mohinder Singh AIR 1971 SC 257. Sumitra Devi
v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Yadav [1973] 2 S.C.R. 920, Chand Singh v. Shiv Ram
H
SURENDER SinGH v. HARDIAL SINGH 1061
AIR 1975 SC 403, Vital Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 384 and
Laxmi Narain v. Chander Singh [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412 referred to. A
2. By a catena of decisions of this Court it has by now been very well
settled that allegations of corrupt practicedre quasi~criminal charges and the
proof that would be required in support of such allegations would be as in a
criminal charge:. Therefore, charges of corrupt practice are to be equated with
criminal charges and proof thereof would be not preponderance of probabilities
as in civil action but proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal trials.
. [1071A-B; 10750-C)
.'
Dr. M. Chenna Reddy•· V. Ramchandra Rao & Onr. 40 E.L.R. 390.
Magraj Patodia v. R.K. Bir/a & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118, Mohan Singh v.
Bhanwar Lal & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 12. Guruji Shrihar Ba/iram Jivatode v.
Vithalrao & On [1969] 2 S.C.R. 766. Mehant Shrea Nath v. Choudhry Ranbir c
Singh [1970} 3 S.C.C. 647, Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsu/ Huda & Onr. [1975] 4
S.C.C. 533, Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch . .Taswant Singh Chouhan & Ors. [ 1975} 4 S.C.C.
769, Surya Kant Roy v. Imamul Hak Khan [1973] I S.C.C. 531, Nizamuddin Ahmed
v. Narbada Prasad & Ors. [1976} 1 S.C.C. 1., D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan &
On [1976] 2 S.C.C. 455. Bir Chand-a Barman v. Ani/ Sarkar & o,,. [1976] 3 SCC
88. RamjJ Prasad Singh v. Ram Bi/as Iha & Ors. [1977] l S.C.C. 260, Lakshmi D
Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh & Ors. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412, Amolak Chand
Chhazed v. Bhagwandas Arya & Ors. [1977] 3 S.C.C. 566, Ramanbhai Nagjibhai
Patel v. Jasvant Singh Udeslngh & Ors. [1979] 3 SCC 142, Haji C.H Mohammad.
Koya v. I. K .S. M.A. Muthukoya [1979] 2 SCC 8, A. Younus Kunju v. R.S. Unrt/
& Ors. [1984] 3 SCC 346 & Manmohan Ka/ia v. Yash & Ors. [1984} 3 SCC 499 ~
followed.
E
3, Election disputes are not cases at common Jaw or equity but are strict
-r statutory proceedings and result of an election is not available to be interfered
with lightly, [1076B] .

Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh & Ors. [1954] 5 SCR 892 D. Venkata Reddy
v. R. Sultan & o,,. [1976] 2 SCC 455 ; followed.

4. Sectio.Q. 123 (2) of the Act defines 'undue influence'. Any dire t
.. , ., h cor
Id
n 1rect 1nter1ereoce or attempt to 1nter1ere Wit free exercise of the elccto I
right. by a candidate, his agent or any person with his consenr or the candidat~s
election agent has be~n made a corrupt practice u{s 123 (2) of the Act. Chapter
II of the Act deals with agents and refers to appointments of election agent,
polling agent and counting agent. Section 79 (d) defines "Electoral Right" t
mean' the right of a person to stand or not to stand as or to withdraw 0 ~
to withdraw from being a candidat~ or to vote or refrain from votin ~ no
election. [1080G· H ; 10790] g a any

. (5) The fact that firearm~ ~ere freely used first by Gurdial Singh and his
?arthy adnd thhenf by way .of retahat1on by Akali workers and gun shots resulted
tn t e eat o Daya Singh and thus a grave situation arose is real]
·1 I b Ynotvery
matena ua ess t at would amount to a corrupt practice wit"'o th ·
' w ·~~~
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R.
s. 123 (2) of the Act. Undoubtedly, disturbing the meeting as alleged is ont
A covered under sub·s. (2) of s. 123 of the Act and is clearly an electoral offence
dealt with bys. 127 of the Act. [1079H; 1080A]

(6) The High Court clearly overlooked the fact that disturbing the
election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence. For establishing
the link between the disturbance of the meeting and the returned candidate the
evidence is wholly oral in character and has to be scrutinised with greater rigour.
B Merely on the statements of son1e of the witnesses who were essentiaily Akali
Party workers or supporters a charge of corrupt practice could not have been
taken as proved. The approach of the learne4 trial judge to the matter is
contrary to law as settled by decisions of this Court relating to corrupt practice
and proof thereof. [1084B-C]

c (7) It is the admitted position that neither t~e Akali candidate S. Ranjit
Singh nor the appellant who was another contesting candidate came to the
place of the meeting so held on 20.5.80. There is evidence that the meeting
so convened was disturbed. The disturbance to the meeting is said to have
been caused by a group of people consisting of Gurdial Singh, Hardial Singh,
Rachhpal Singh, Ku1want Singh and Gurnam Singh. There is no specific plea
that these five persons we:e agents of the appe1Iant. Admittedly, by May 20,
D 1980, none of these persons was an agent of any of these classes of the
returned candidate. The only other aspects by Which the appeJlant
would be liable for the action of these five people would be if their act of
disturbing the meeting was with his consent. Consent is the life line to link up
the candidate with the action of the other petson which may amount to corrupt
practice and unless it is specifically pleaded and clearly proved in view of the
fact that all ingredients have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt the appellant
E cannot be charged for the action of Gurdial Singh and his group.
[1078B-D; 1083B] ..,.._
(8) Jn the instant case, though there is some oral evidence to implicate the
appellant, even for what folJowed the disturbance to the meeting, this Court
does not think in the absence of the plea such evidence can be entertained for
any effective purpose. The fact that protection had been extended by the
F appeUant to his supporter Gurdial Singh and members of his family even by
raising quarrel with the local police inspector would not lead to a backward
presumption of consent for the acts of Gurdial Singh. [1081F; !083A-B]

(9) It is difficult to accept the submission of the respondent that by
appointing a person charged for murder as polling agent the appellant bed
exercised undue influence. There is clear evidence also that l'Oting was free and
quite a large percentage of the voters had exercised their electoral right. These
are circumstances which clearly militate against the allegation of the election
petitioners that voters bad been threatened and their free exercise of electoral
right had been affected. Moreover, in the absence of requisite pleading, want of
any contemporaneous complaint in writing or otherwise to the public officers
within the polling booth and the nebulous nature of the oral evidence placed
from the side of the election petitioners, it cannot be said_ that any objection
ff 1»uld really be taken \o t)1e elec\ion on a~oun\ of Gurdial Sinl!h havins acted
SURENDER SINGH V. HARDiRL SINGH 1063

as poling agent in the particular electoral booth. [1083E·G;]
A
(10) A candidate is entitled to canvass for votes. One who is in the
field to be an electoral representative is also entitled to nourish his constituency.
Amelioration of grievances of the public is innocuous and cannot be construed
against a candidate. We agree that while nourishing is a legitimate activity, it
is of paramount importance that nourishing should not transgress the limit so
as to corrupt the electoral process. The appe11ant was already in the field as
a candidate for the legislature and was entitled to help the people in his con- B
stituency in a legitmate way. [l087E·G]

(11) There was no clear plea in the election petition that the money had
been deposited by the appellant though in paragraph 8 it was stated that on
28.5.1980 appellant had told Bagicha Singh that he (Bagicha Singh) should not
bother about the expenses involved. There is no oral evidence even to suggest
that the appellant caused the amount to be deposited. There is a presumption
c
that the person in whose name the receipt has been drawn up was the payer of
the amount and burden lay on him who wanted to contend that the facts were
other\\'ise. In these circuinstances, it cannot be accepted that the appellant had
got the estimated demand deposited with the authorties of the Board. Once the
allegation that the appellant had deposited the amount of Rs. 944 is discarded
his taking up of the cause of Bagicha Singh for early shifting of the elcctri~ D
wires over-hanging the first floor of his house Would not amount to 'bribe'. At
any rate, the evidence on record is only rof PW.12. That evidence even
if accepted as a whole would not be sufficient to establish the charae of corrupt
practice on this score. Oral evidence, particularly, coming from a tainted
source cannot form the sole basis of proof of corrupt practice. Therefore, the
High court was wrong in accepting the case of the election petitioners that the
appellant had committed corrupt practice for procuring the votes of Bag:icha E
Singh, merllbers of his family and his friends by gcttin& the over~hanging
electric wires removed. After all, if there be any scope for doubt, it must
resolve in favour of the appellant who was facing a quasi-criminal charge.
[1087B·D; G·H; 1088E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 463 of 1982 F

From the Judgment and Order dated the 21st January, 1982
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 4
of 1980.
G
H.L. Sibbal, D.N. Mishra.and K.K. Lahiri for the Appellant

Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, Man}il Singh Khaira and
Ms. Deepa Bhushan for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Co11rt was delivered by
ff
1064 SUPREME COURT REP ORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.

A RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal under section 116-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 ('Act' for short), is directed (
against the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court setting
aside the election of the appellant to the Punjab Legislative
Assembly from Constituency No. 25 known as Naushehra-Pannuan
Assembly Constituency. Election was held on May 31, 1980, and
B the result was declared the following day. Appellant was declared
elected with 26980 votes while respondent 3 Ranjit Singh lost with
26739 votes.

The election petition was filed by two voters of the constitu-
ency (respondents 1 and 2). Respondent 1 (PW. 5) was admittedly
c the counting agent of respondent 3. The election of the appellant
was challenged on two allegations of corrupt practice in the main,
namely, disturbing a meeting of the Akali Party at a place called
Hadur-Shah in Village Gandiwind on May 20, 1980, where the
appellant's supporters allegedly used fire-arms' and fatally injured
D one and otherwise inllicted injuries on many others. The relevant
allegations in support of this plea are to be found in paragraph 5 of
the election petition. The other was an allegation of corrupt prac-
tice of bribery with reference to Bagicha Singh Chakiwala. Appellant
with his supporters in the course of canvassing is said to have contac-
ted Bagicha Singh on May 28, 1980, at his village Chola-Sahib and
E asked for votes of his and members of his family. Bagicha Singh
was alleged to have told the appellant that uncovered electric wires
were dangerously passing over his house and despite his best of ....,._
efforts he has not been able to get them removed and the sum being
demanded for their removal was beyond his means. Bagicha Singh
is alleged to have told the appellant that if he got the same removed
F he would get the votes of himself, members of the family as also of
his brotherhood. Appellant promised to get the needful done and
approached the Punjab State Electricity Board employees and on •
putting pressure, got the same done on May 30, 1980, one day
before the poll. The relevant particulars of the allegation are
G
contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the election petition.

Several other allegations were made in paragraphs 6, 7 and 10
of the election petition relating to threats to electors of Gandiwind
on May 20,'1980, after the meeting was disturbed, improper recep-
tion of votes, reception of void votes, terrorisation of the voters at
H the booth on the day of polling, etc. but the same \lo not seem to be
. SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1065

relevant as the High Court has not relied on the same nor in the
A
course of hearing of this appeal have those allegations been pressed
into service. It is relevant to indicate here that neither the defeated
candidate nor the election petitioners had any personal knowledge
of the two incidents referred to above. Verification of the election
petition indicated that the allegation in paragraph 5 was true to the
information received from Gurmukh Singh, PW. 10 and Milkha B
Singh, PW, I I while information relating to the Bagicha Singh
episode was obtained from Darshan Singh, PW. 12.

At the trial, Hardial Singh, election petitioner I was examined
as PW. 5. Respondent 3 was, however, not examined as a witness.
The evidence in regard to both the incidents-Gandiwind meeting c
and Bagicha Singh episode-mainly consisted of oral statements of
witnesses.

Some documents, such as the FIR, injury reports, etc. and the
deposit receipt in regard to Bagicha Singh episode do not throw any
conclusive light inasmuch as they lack the material aspect of corre- D
lating the appellant with the events. The appellant had in his
written statement denied the allegations in so far as they implicated
him with the incidents. He examined himself and led other eviden-
ce to support his stand. The learned single Judge before whom
the election petition came up for trial accepted the evidence of the
E
election petitioners and held that both the corrupt practices had
been committed by the appe1lant himself or through others with his
consent and were covered by ss. 123 (I) (a), (b) and (2) of the Act.
The election was declared void.

Mr. H.L. Sibal appeared in support of the appeal and Mr. F
Shanti Bhushan represented the election petitioners. The appeal
has been heard at great length and detailed submissions have been
advanced by both sides. Mr. Shanti Bhushan emphatically conten-
ded that it was the practice of this Court in election ·appeals not to
enter into re-appreciation of evidence and disturb findings of fact
reached by the High Court. Therefore, we should not attempt a G
re-appreciation of the evidence while dealing with the appeal. He
next contended that election disputes were essentially civil in nature.
To require the allegations of corrupt practice to be proved as in a-
criminal charge was not the proper approach. With a view to
preserving the purity of the electoral process and sanctity of the
\lewocratic system to whi~h our country is wedded, it is meet and
H
1066 SUPREME COURTRT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.

proper that charges of corrupt practice should be allowed to be
A
established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities as in civil
litigation and not by asking for proof of the allegation beyond
reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. We are of the view that
these two contentions should be first dealt with in order that a
proper approach to the matter can be indicated and once that is
B done the materials available on record can be assessed for the
purpose of disposal of the appeal.

Section 116-C of the Act lays down the procedure in appeal.
It provides :

c "(!). Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the
rules, if any, made thereunder, every appeal shall be heard
and determined by the Supreme Court as nearly as may be
in accordance with the procedure applicable to the hear-
ing and determination of an appeal from any final order
passed by a High Court in the exercise of its original civil
D jurisdiction : and all the provisions of the Code of Civil
1·
Procedure, 1908 and the Rules of the Court (including pro-
visions as to the furnishing of security and the execution
of any order of the Court), shall, so far as may be, apply
in relation to such appeal ... "
E
This provision makes it abundantly clear that an appeal to
this Court under the Act is to be treated ·as a civil appeal and the
jurisdiction to be exercised is as extensive as in the case of an
appeal from a matter disposed of in exercise of original civil jurisdic-
tion of the High Court. Mr. Shanti Bhushan placed a series of
F decisions before us in support of his proposition regarding the extent
of interference available in an appeal. The first of these cases is
Sarju Prasad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.(1)
This was a regular civil appeal and not under the Act. This Court
quotedwith approval the observations of Viscount Simon in Watt v.
Thomas.(') Viscount Simon had stated, inter a/ia :
G
"But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be
regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial,
and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on

(!) [1950] $.C.R. 781.
H (2) [1947) A.C. 484.
SURENDER SINGH HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Mesra, J.) 1067

conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard
A
the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it
has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the '
trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great
wight."

Viscount Simon proceeded further to indicate :
B
"This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can
be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling
the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other
tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is
a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when c
estimating the valne of verbal testimony, has the advantage
(which is denied to Courts of appeal) of having the wit-
nesses before him and observing the manner in which
their evidence is given.''

There cannot be much dispute that ordinarily this rule is applicable D
to all appellate forums.

Mr. Shanti Bhushan then referred to the cases of Narmada
Prasad v. Chagan Lal(1); Prabodh Chand v. Mohinder Singh(') ; Sumi-
tra Devi v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Yadav(3 ) Chand Singh v. Shiv Ram(•);
Vital Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar(') ; and Laxmi Narain v. E
Chander Singh('). In each of these cases, depending on the facts
thereof, the Court has made an observation that the trial judge's
assessment was entitled to great weight and respect and was, there-
fore, not to be ordinarily interfered with. None of these cases,
however, indicated that this Court would not go into the matter if F
the facts and circumstances warranted a detailed examination or a
fresh assessment.
We shall presently refer to some of the decisions of the Court
where this aspect has also been examined. To start with is the case
of Ramabhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji and Ors.(')
G
Ol [19661 1 s.c.R. 499.
(2) AIR 1971 S.C 257.
(3) [1973] 2 S.C.R. 920.
(4) AIR 1975 SC 403.
(5) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 384.
(6) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412.
(7) p965j 1 S.C.R. nz. H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 1 S.C.R.

A disposed of by a five Bench. That was a case prior to amendment
• of the Act. Under the scheme then prevalent, election disputes
were tried by a tribunal and an appeal lay to the High Court and
the matter was before this Court by way of appeal by special leave.
Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Court held :

B "For, as soon as special leave is granted there is an
appeal before this Court and while dealing with such an
appeal. this Court exercises its civil jurisdiction. It is true
that the rules framed by this Court in exercise of its rule
l making powers do not contain any provision analogous to
O. XLI, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure which per-
c mits a party to support the judgment appealed against
upon a ground which has been found against him in that
judgment. The provision nearest to it is the one contain-
ed in o. XVIII, r. 3 of the Rules of this Court which
requires parties to file statement of cases. Sub-rule (I) of
D that rule provides that Part I of the statement of the case
shall also set out the contentions of the parties and the
points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It further pro-
vides that in Part II a party shall set out the propositions
of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the
party lodging the case and the authorities in support there-
E of. There is no reason to limit the provision of this rule
only to those contentions which deal with the points found
in favour of that party in the judgment appealed from.
Apart from that we think that while dealing with the
appeal before it this Court has the power to decide all the
points arising from the judgment appealed against and even
F
in the absence of an express provision like 0. XLI, r. 22
of the Code of Civil Procedure it can devise the appro-
priate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could
be no better way of supplying the deficiency then by draw-
ing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of
G Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as
are suitable. We cannot lose sight of the fact that normally
a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has
been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from
it. Considerations of justice, therefore, require that this
Court should in appropriate cases permit a party placed in
H such a position to support the judgment in his favour even
SURENDER SINGH v. IiARDiAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1069;
. upon grounds which were negatived in that judgment'~. 'J .
. ·..; ·_.: .·,'
A
The ratio of this decision makes the position clear that. an appeal
laid before this Court whether under a statute conferring a right
of appeal or as a result of. grant of leave under Article 136 ofthe
I
Constitution, opens up the normal civil appellate jurisdiction of the
Court to be exercised. B

;r In Bhanu Kuma~ Shast;i v~ llfoh~n 'Lal ··sukhadia and Ors.,<'>
Ray, J. (as _he ihen was), indicated : . ' ' . :•.. .'
r ,; .i·

·' ·:.-, "If the High_ Court ·has overlooked important and

. .,.,- '
.. crucial documents or or~! evidence,; such . evidence. will
justify this .Couittd support the contentions of: the respon-
c
.· dent that the findings of fact arrived at by tne'High Court·
'are itgainst clear 'and cogent 'proof of fads. :This C~urt
will;- therefore, be justified in recording the correct findings ..
' on ample and abundant materials which. have been 'over-.
· "looked and ignored by the High: Court•.. In 'the present D
· case; we have had occasion to .deal ·with ·these ·aspects. on
the rival contentions and ·recorded our findings." ·
·.·,~\. "':· - .. - '· '"' i·~-.-.:, .• ·.::'--:-'..\.·?,,·;
. , In _Sumitra Devi's case. (supra), a decision.· of a three. Judge
Bench on· which .Mr. Shanti Bhushan also relied, tne Court
1 · observed : E

~'It has been the consistent practice of this ·Court not
to interfere with findings on questions.of fact unless th~re,
is some grave or palpable error in the appreciation of the .
. evidence on the basis of which the findings were arrived at.''. •
.. :: F
In Jlfohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan,(') a three Judge'
Bench 'referred•with :approval to the ratio in Laxminarayan v.
Returning Officer<'> and said : · " · · "' :

. :. "The propositions enunciated by this Court-.: are well
established .and there can be no dispute with the proposi- · G
, tions mentioned above. In the instant case, however, we ·.
find that the approach of the learned. Judge was not .·

(I) [1971] 3 S.C.R. 522. .: . r
(2) [1977] 2 s.c.c. 23.
(3) [1974) I S.C.R. 822. HI
/
/
·. . '// ..
1010 Stil'REMI! COURT REPORTS· [198 5) 1 S.C.R.
correct. We have already pointed out a number of salient
A features appearing in the evidence which have rendered
the case of the petitioner inherently· improbable. The·
learned Judge appears to have overlooked these essential
features. · Further, the learned Judge himself had observed
·that issue No.I which he had framed was wide enough to
B Include the plea of the appellant, and even if the order of
the Returning Officer in rejecting the nomination paper on
the ground of the absence of the candidate or his proposer -..;
•
was wrong, it could still be supported on the ground that
the signature of the proposer was not genuine. The learned
Judge has not determined this ·aspect of the ·matter: . Jn
c these circlimstances, therefore, we feel that the judgment '
'r'·
of the High Court is erroneous both on fact and in Jaw and '
although the appellate Court is extremely slow in disturb-
. ing the findings of fact, in the instant case, we are satisfied
that the judgment of the High Court is against the .. weight
of the evidence on record and preponderance . of pro-
D babilities."
t .
In S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. G-;;rcharan Singh Tohra. and
Ors.,(1) it was again pointed out that if something is radically wrong
with the approach of the learned Judge trying the election petifun
E it would be for this Court to r.ectify the error. ·

The jurisdiction to exercise in an appeal under the Act, there-
fore, appears to be as wide as in any other civil appeal. Section
116-A (I) of the Act clearly indicates that the appeal to this Court
bas to be disposed of by exercising the same jurisdiction as is
F exercised in an appeal against the original judgment of the High
Court. In this view of the matter there can really be no rule,
· .whet'.ler statutory or evolved by this Court by Jong usage as alleged, y l
that the Court would not interfere with the findings of fact reached
at the trial stage. Ordinarily a finding reached on assessment of
the evidence particularly when it is oral would not be interfered ...•
G
.with but where the Court is satisfied that on account of a wrong
approach to a matter, injustice bas been done to one of the parties
before it, it would not only be within the powers of the Court but
it would be its obligation to rectify the mistake and do justice to
the party.

H . (I) [1980) Suppl. S.C.C. SJ.
SURENDER SINGH v; llARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) . 1071

r We shall now::turn to the other submission of Mr. Shanti /·A
Bhushan. ' By: a cat en a . 0f decioions of. this Court it has by now/
been very well settled that allegations of corrupt practice are quasi-
criminal charges and the proof that would be .required in supporf
.of such allegations would be as in.a criminal charge; Mr: . Shanti
Bhushan has canvassed.that the standard of proof.required in such
.. a case would be dependent upon the gravity of the charge·and there
is no justification to adopt the rule thaf in every case of allegation
·B

of corrupt. practice the standard applicable to j a~ criminal trial
involving a grave charge like niurder should be adopted .. He has
drawn'support from the observations of this Court in Dr. M. Chenna
Reddy v. V Ramchandra Rao & Anr' (1) It may be pointod 'out here
that the ratio in Chenna Reddy'• case runs counter to the current of C
judicial thought on the point. Jn· fact, quite close in' point of time
after Chenna Reddy's case came. the case or: Magraj Patadia v:
R.K. Bir/a & Ors. ('l Hegde, J. indicated:
I . ,, ·,: ~ ;· -, ·; · · • 'l.', - '

" in
·'.·'It is true that as observed Dr. M. Chenoa Reddy
,· v. V.•Ramachandra Rao& Anr., that a charge of corrupt
practice cannot be equated to a criminal charge in· all
respects. . While the accused in a criminal ·case can refuse
· to plead and decline to adduce evidence on his behalf and
yet ask the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt such is not the position in an election petition.
But the fact remains.that burden of proving the commission E
of the corrupt practice pleaded is on the petitioner and he
has to discharge that burden satisfactorily. In doing so he
cannot depend on preponderance of probabilities. . Courts
do not 'set at naught the verdict of the electorate e~~ept ·on
good grounds." · · · · ·' .
F
Charges · of corrupt practice have been ·dealt ·with by this
Court for over 20 years now in. election appeals under ·the ·Act.
The first important case which came before this Court was· disposed
of by a five judge bench in the case of Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal
& Ors. (3) Shah, J. (as he then was), spoke for the Court thus; G
"The onus of establishing a corrupt practice is undoub-
tedly un the person· who sets it up, and the onus is not

(I) 40 E.L.R. 390
(2) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118.
(3) (1964] S S.C.R. 12. ,. H
1072 .. SilPREME COURT REPORTS · [198511 S.C,R.
discharged on proof of mere preponderance of probability,
as in the trial of a civil suit; the corrU.pt_ practice must be -, : ·
established beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is
clear and unambiguous.""· · ..

Hegde, J. in Guruji Shrihar Baliram Jivatode ~. Vithalrao &
'B Ors.,(1) reiterated the proposition.by saying :.
•
·"It is trite to say th.it the burden of proving ev.eryone
-(
of the ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged is ori him . •
who alleges it; If. he fails to establish. any one of them to
the satisfaction of the Court he must fail.'' .
c
In Mahan/ Shreo Nath v. Choudhry Ranbir Singh, (2) it _was l~ '
again obse..Ved :

. "A plea in an· election petition· that a candidate or his
.election agent or any person with his consent has committed
D · ~-corrupt practice raises -~grave charg~, proof of which
· results in disqualification from taking part in. elections for
six years. The charge in its very nature must be established
by clear and cogent evidence by those who seek to prove it.
The Court does not hold such a charge proved merely on
E preponderance of probability: the Court requires that the
·conduct attributed to the offender is proved by evidence
which establishes it beyond reasonable doubt."

In Abdul Hussain Mir v. Slzamsul Jluda & Anr., '<3J 'Krishna
· Iyer, J. indicated :

"Charges, such as have been imputed here, are viewed
as quasi-criminal carrying other penalties than losing a .
. seat, and strong testimony is needed to subvert a Returning
Officer's declaration .....• Wheri. elections are challenged on
'
grounds with a criminal lain( the .benefit of doubt in
G. testimonial matters belongs to the returned candidate· ..
...
•
Oral evidence ordinarily is inadequate especially if it is of
indifferent quality or orally procurable.

(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 766.
(2) [19701 3 s.c.c. 647.
H (3) [197S) 4 S.C.C. S33.
•
'
SiJRINDER SINGH v. UARDiAL SiNGll (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1013
L 1
I'
In Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. Jaswant Singh Chouhan & Ors.I 1
) \~
A
Sarkaria, J. spoke for this Court in the following terms :

"Before considering as to whether the charges of
corrupt practice were established, it is important to remem-
ber the standard of proof required in such cases. It is well
settled that a charge of corrupt practice is substantially B
akin to a criminal charge. The commission of a corrupt
practice entails serious penal consequences. It not only
vitiates the election of the candidate concerned but also
disqualifies him from taking part in elections for a
considerably long time. Thus, the trial of an election
petition being in the nature of an accusation, bearing the c
indelible stamp of quasi-criminal action, the standard of
proof is the same as in a criminal trial. Just as in a
criminal case, so in an election petition, the respondent
against whom the charge of corrupt practice is levelled,
is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. A grave D
and heavy onus therefore rests on the accuser to establish
each and every ingredient of the charge by clear, unequvo-
cal and unimpeachable evidence beyond reasonable doubt;
It is true that there is no difference between the general
rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases, and the
difinition of "proved" in section 3 of the Evidence Act E
does not draw a distinction between civil and criminal .
cases. Nor does this definition insist on perfect proof
because absolute certainty amounting to demonstration is ·~
""I-
rarely to be had in the affairs of life, Nevertheless. the ...,'!
'
standard of measuring proof prescribed by the definition,
is that of a person of prudence and practical good sense. F •
'Proof' means the effect of the evidence adduced in the case.
Judged by the standard of prudent man, in the light of the , ,I
nature of onus cast by law, the probative effective of
evidence in civil and criminal proceedings is markedly
different. The same evidence which may be sufficient to G i.:,.;,,
regard a fact as proved in a civil suit, may be considered
,. / '
insufficient for a conviction in a criminal action. While in
the former a mere preponderance of probability may
constitute an adequate basis of decision, in the latter

(I) [197S] 4 S.C.C. 769.
H
1074 SUPRRME COURT REPORTS [1985j 1. S.C.R.
a far higher degreed of assurance and juicial certitude is
A
requisite for a conviction. The same is largely true about
proof of a charge of corrupt practice, which cannot be
established by mere balance of probabilitles, and, if after
giving due consideration and effect to the totality of the
evidence and circumstances of the case, the mind of the
B Court is left rocking with reasonable doubt-not being the
doubt of a timid, fickle or vacillating mind-as to the vera-
city of the charge, it must hold the same as not proved."

To the same effect are the following decisions of this Court
in Surya Kant Roy v. lmamul Hak Khan<lJ; Nizamuddin Ahmed v.
Narbada Prasad & Ors;(') D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan & Ors(3 l;
Bir Chandra Borman v. .foil Sarkar & Or,-.\4 ) Romji Prasad Singh v.
c Ram Bi/as Jha & Ors\•); Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh
& Ors(6); Amo/ak Chand Chhazed v. Bhagwandas Arya & Ors.(');
Ramanbhai Nagjibhai Patel v. Jashvant Singh Udesingh & Ors.(•);
Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya v. l.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya.;(')

D We may now refer to two decisions of this Court rendered
this year where the same question had arisen for consideration.
In A. Younus Kunju v. R.S. Unni & Ors.(10 ) one of us observed :

"There is total consensus of judicial opinion that a
charge of corrupt practice under the Act has to be proved
II
beyond reasonable doubt and the standard of proof is the
• same as in a criminal case ...... "

In Manmohan Ka/ia v. Yash & Ors.; (11) a three Judge Bench
reiterated ;
F
(I) [1973] I S.C.C. 531
(2) [1976] 1 s.c.c. 1.
(3) 11976] 2 s.s:;.c. 455
(4) [1976] 3 s.c.c. 88.
(5) [1977] 1 s.c.c. 260
G (6) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412.
(7) [19771 3 s.c.c;. 566
(8) [1979] 3 s.c.c. 142.
(9) [1979] 2 s.c.c. 8.
(10) [1984] 3 s.c.c. 346.
H (11) (19841 3 s.c.c. 4911.
StiREND BR siNGH v. HARDIAL siNGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1075
"It is now well settled by several authorities of this
Court that aa allegation of corrupt practice must be proved A
as strictly as a criminal charge and the principle of
preponderance of probabilities would not apply to corrupt
practices envisaged by the Act because if this test is not
applied a very serions prejudice would be caused to the
elected candidate who may be disqualified for a period of
six years from fighting any election, which will adversely
B •'
affect the electoral process." '
,
It is thus clear beyond any doubt that for over 20 years the posi-
tion has been uniformly accepted that charges of corrupt practice are
'
to be equated with criminal charges and proof thereof would be not c
preponderance of probabilities as in civll action but proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal trials. We are bound by the
decision of the larger Rench in Mohan Sing h's case (supra) as also
by decisions of coordinate benches and do not feel inclined to take
a different view. We also find no warrant for the contention of
D
Mr. Shanti Rhushan that a fresh look is necessary in the matter.
On the other hand we feel advised to follow the dictum of Lord
Devlin when he observed:

"Precedents keep the law p1·edictable and so more or
less ascertainable," E
Lord Chancellor Hailsham very appropriately summed up the
English practice when he said in Broom v. Cassell & Co.;(')

"Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an
indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the F
law and its application to individual cases. It provides a
least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can
rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for
or-derly development of legal rules."

A judge-made change in the law rarely comes out of a blue
sky. Rumblings from olympus in the form of obiter dicta will give G
warning of unsettled weather. Unsettled weather is itself, of course,
bound to cause uncertainty, but inevitably it precedes the acceptance
of a change. Such a situation has not arisen yet and, therefore, a
(I) (1972] I A.E,R. 801.
H
i076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] l S.C.R.
rethinking as suggested by Mr. Shanti Bhushan is not warranted.
A ' .,
- One more aspect should be referred to here before we proceed
to examine the facts of the case. A five judge Bench of this Court
in Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh -& Ors.;(') indicated that election
disputes are not cases at. common Jaw or equity but are strict
statutory prc;iceedings and result of an .election is not available to be
inte~fered with lightly. · lt was said :

"It is ·also well settled that it is a soUlld P~incipl~ ·of -(

natural justice that the success of acandidate who has won
, ,·· •
-. at 'all election should not be lightly interfered with and any
petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to
the requirements of the la\v. ; ..
This. view has been reiterated by this Court in Venkat;Reddy' s
case (supra). -. , - , _ . , " __ . , ,- .

We have already taken note of the position that _the eJe~iion
o• has be~-n Set aside in the pres-C_nt case .oil a fillding of comffiissio'n of
- two corrupt practices, one relating to the election meeting in Village
Gandiwind on :f..fay 20,' 1980, and the oth~r relating to the all_egatioij
of bribery in the matter of Bagicha Singh. _We shall now proceed'
to deal with these two aspects separate_ly. ·

The corrupt practices as alleged in the- election petition
have been ·found by the High Court to come within the ambit of
sub-sections (I) and (2) of s. 123 of the Act. The· legal position
is well settled, and it has not been disputed - before us,' th-at ·the
Act is a complete Code by . itself on the· subject of elections to
Parliament as also to the Staie Legislatures and an election can be _
declared void only .if one or the other of the 'stated grounds in s.
'100 of the Act is attracted. Section 100. (1) (b) provides that if
corru-pt practice is ·committed by a returned candidate or his · elec-
-_ tion agent or by any 'other person with the consent of the returned
candidate or his election agent, the election of the returned can-
didate shall be declared void.
G.
The r~levant provjsions ins. 123 may now be extracted :

"123. Corrupt practices-The following shall . be
deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this •
Act:- -

H 1 (1934) 3 S.C.R. 892. ,; '.
SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) l 077 l.
..
-.II!

(I) 'Bribery', that is to say, -
A
(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent
or by any other person with the consent of a candi-
date or his election agent of any gratification, to any
person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indi-
rectly, of inducing- B

(a) x x x x x

(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an
-
election, or as a reward to- c
(i) x x x x x

(ii) by any person whomsoever for himself or any other
person for voting ............ or inducing or attempting
to induce any elector to vote .......... ..
D
Explanation-For the purposes of this clause the
term 'gratification' is not restricted to pecuniary gra-
tifications or gratifications estimable in money and it
includes all forms of employment for reward but it does
not include the payment of any expenses bona fide in-
curred at, or for the purpose of, any election and duly E
entered in the account of election expenses referred to in
section 78.

(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or
indirect interference or attempt to interfere .on the part of
the candidate or his agent, or of any other person with F
the consent of the candidate or his election agent, with
the free exercise of any electoral right :
Provided that-

(a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions
of this clause any such person as is referred to there-· G l
in who-

(i) threatens any candidate or any elector, or any per-
son in whom a candidate or an elector is interested,
with injury of any kind including social ostracism and
excommunication or expulsion from any caste or
commnnity ; or
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] I S.C.R.

(ii) ............ shall be deemed to interfere with the free
A exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or
elector within the meaning of this clause."

We shall first deal with the Gandiwind incident of may 20,
e 1980. The election petition in paragraph 5 makes allegations with
reference to this incident. For convenience the contents of the
entire paragraph are extracted :

"5. That the respondent No. I along with Gurdial
0 Singh, Hardial Singh, Rachhpal Singh sons of Tara
Singh, .Kulwant Singh son of Sewa Singh, Gurnam Singh
son of Jinda Singh hatched a conspiracy not to allow the
akali candidate respondent No. 2 and his suppor- ·
ters to hold any meeting or do any canvassing
at Village Gandiwind on 20.5.1980. They had
D
collected at the house of Gurdial Singh at about 1. 30
P.M. where the above-mentioned decision was taken.
At about the same time the villagers were collecting for
a meeting at the place known as Hadur-Shah and that
meeting was to be addressed by S. Lehna Singh Tur,
E M.P. and respondent No. 2. At about 2 P.M. the afore-
said persons armed with fire arms except respondent No.
1 came out of the house of Gurdial Singh. Then the
respondent No. 1 told them not to allow the meeting to
proceed at any cost and himself stayed behind. On reach·
ing the meeting place, they stood by at one side of the
F Jalsa. At about 2. 30 P.M. when S. Lehna Singh Tur
reached at the meeting, these persons started shouting
slogans against respondent No. 2 and S. Lehna S_ingh and
in. favour of Respondent No. 1 and caused obstruction
in the proceedings of the Jalsa and did not allow S. Lehna
G Singh Tur to speak. When Piara Singh son of Inder
Singh, Daya Singh son of Ishar Singh requested them
not to do it and tried to stop them, they got into a rage
and started hurling abuses at respondent No. 2, S. Lehnll;
Singh Tur and others and suddenly started firing. On
this the people started running for shelter and a shot fired
by Gurdial Singh hit Daya Singh son of Isher Singh· on
his forehead who fell down and the shots fired by the
others hit Piara Singh son of Jnc;\er Singh, Kehar Sing son
•
SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1079

of GuJjar Singh and Kewal Singh son of Surain Singh.
A
All the aforesaid persons kept on firing shots which were
returned by some people."

The Akali Party had organised a meeting in the village to
make election propaganda for respondent No. 3 and PW. 4 was
the organiser. S. Lehna Singh, PW. 7 who was a sitting Member
8
of the Lok Sabha was to address that meeting. It is the admitted
position that the Akali candidate S. Ranjit Singh was not to, and
did not, come to the meeting. It is also the common case of both
the parties that the appellant who was another contesting candi·
date also did not come to the place of the meeting. There is
evidence, and Mr. Sibal for the appellant did not dispute the posi· c
tion, that the meeting so convened was disturbed. The distur-
bance to the meeting is said to have been caused by a group of
people consisting of Gurdial Singh, Hardial Singh, Rachhpal Singh,
Kulwant Singh and Gurnam Singh. There is no specific plea
that these five persons were agents of the appellant. Chapter II
of the Act deals with agents and refers to appointment of election D
agent, polling agent and counting agent. Admittedly, by may 20,
1980, none of these persons was an agent of any of these classes
of the returned candidate. The only other aspect by which the
appellant would be liable for the action of these five people would
be if their act of disturbing the meeting was with his consent.
E

There is evidence which the High Court has accepted that
when PW. 7 arrived at the meeting place and slogans in favour
of the candidate and PW. 7 were raised, Gurdial Singh and his
group raised counter slogans. Soon disorder spread. When PW.
4 and Daya Singh wanted to pacify the situation with a view to F
making the holding of the meeting possible, Gurdial Singh opened
fire from his rifle which hit Daya Singh on the forehead. Others
who were armed with 12 bore guns also fired their arms and with
pellets coming from their firearms many were injured. Though
Mr. Sibal made a serious attempt to combat the finding of the
High Court regarding the disturbance to the meeting, we are in· G
clined to agree with the High Court that the meeting convened by
the Akali Party in Village Gandiwind on may 20, 1980, where
PW. 7 was to address the electors was disturbed by Gurdial Singh
and others. The fact that firearms were freely used first by
Gurdial Singh and his party and then by way of retaliation by
Akali workers and gun shots resulte(! the (!eatb of Daya Singh ff
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 S.C.R.

A and thus a grave situation arose is really not very material unless
that would amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of s.
123 (2) of the Act. According to Mr. Sibal, disturbing an election
meeting is not undue influence and for the matter of that a
corrupt practice, but has been separately provided for in s. 127 of
the Act and is an electoral offence. Section 127 provides :

) B
"127. Disturbances at the election meeting-

(1) Any person who at a public meeting to which this
section applies acts, or incits others to act, in a dis-
orderly manner for the purpose of preventing the tran-
c saction of the business for which the meeting was called
together, shall be punishable with fine which may extend
to two hundred and fifty rupees.

(2) This section applies to any public meeting of a
political character held in any constituency between the
D date of the issue of a notification under this Act calling
upon the constituency to elect a member or members and
the date on which such election is held ......... "

Undoubtedly the meeting in question is squarely covered by
sub-s. (2) of s. 127 and the role assigned to Gurdial Singh and t,is
E
group would certainly bring it within sub-s. (\) of that section.
It is not open to doubt that Gurdial Singh and his snpporters in
the event of the allegations being accepted had committed an elec-
toral offence within the meaning of s. 127 of the Act.

F The question that bas next to be considered is whether dis-
turbing such a meeting would also amount to undue influence
under s. 123 (2) of the Act. Direct or indirect interference or
attempt to interfere with free exercise of the electoral righ by a
candidate, his agent or any person with his consent or the candi-
date's election agent has been made a corrupt practice. "Elec-
G toral Right" has been defined in s. 79 (d) of the Act to mean
the right of a person to stand or not to stand as or to withdraw or
not to withdraw from being a candidate or to vote or refrain from
voting at any election.' In paragraph 5 of the election petition
there is no allegation of any threat. It is proper at this stage to
refer to the pleadings in paragraph 6 of the election petition where
it bas been pleaded ; · ·
SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1.081
"That later on the same day aforesaid assailants
threatened that any body who will support or vote for res-
A
pondent No. 2 shall meet the same fate as Daya Singh.
Gurdial Singh son of Tara Singh along with others created
such a terror in the Village that subsequently it became
very dfficult and risky for anyone to canvass for respondent
No. 2 in this village". B
Disturbing the meeting as alleged in paragraph 5 of the elec-
tion petition in our view is not covered under sub-s. (2) of s. 123 of
the Act and is clearly an electoral offence dealt with bys. 127 of
the Act. The allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the election
petition would perhaps come withins. 123 (2) (a) (i) of the Act. In
paragraph S of the election petition the following fact had been
pleaded :

"Then the respondent No. 1 told them not to allow
the meeting to proceed at any cost and himself stayed
behind". D
If this statement of fact is accepted consent of the appellant
for disturbing the meeting can be found but in the absence of any
specific plea that it was appellant's instruction that the electors
should be threatened, the facts alleged in paragraph 6 of the elec-
tion petition cannot be accepted to have been with the consent of the E
appellant. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for respondents 1

7
and 2 has not disputed, and in our opinion rightly, that allegations
of corrupt practice have to be strictly pleaded with material parti-
culars and evidence beyond the ambit of plea would not be permit·
ted to be led. Though there is some oral evidence to implicate the
appellant, even for what followed the disturbance to the meeting, F
we do not think in the absence of the requisite plea such evidence
can be entertained for any effective purpose.

Though in paragraph 5 of the election petition the link between
the appellant and Gnrdial Singh and his group was pleaded in the
manner extracted above, oral evidence was led particularly by PWs. G
10 and 11 about the details of instructions given by the appellant to
create disturbance at the meeting. The learned trial judge applied his
mind to the evidence and came to held :

"Whether that omission from the election petition was
dµe to the fact that they had not given these facts to the q .
1082 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 S.C.R.
petitioner, whom, as per their testimony they had met a
A
few days after the announcement of the election result; or
had given the version, and the petitioner did not retain in
his memory the version that was given to him when instruc-
ting the counsel, who drafted the petition. Be that as it
may, the fact remains that the version remains omitted
B from the petition. I am, therefore, out of abundant cau-
tion, not prepared to go to the extent of accepting the
version of these two witnesses that they had heard respon-
dent No. 1 telling Gurdial Singh and bis co-accused to
disturb the meeting and the latter having assured him that
they would do the needful".
c
We agree with the said conclusion of the learned trial Judge
in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Mr. Shanti Bhushan next contended that even if the conversa-
tion between the appellant arid Gurdial Singh and his group is
D discarded, the fact that the appellant had come to the house of
Gu~dial Singh in Village Gandiwind cannot be disbelieved. Learned
counsel for .both sides have placed the entire evidence ohhe wit·
nesses twice over before us. Mr. Sibal has asked us to discard the
evidende of PW, 10 and 11 in support of the visit of the appellant
to the house of Gurdial Singh while Mr. Shanti Bhushan has
contended that the defects highlighted by Mr. Sibal do not make
the evidence ·liable to rejection. In our opinion, it is totally unne-
cessary to go into this aspect of the matter as we have already found
that even if the appellant had consented to disturbing the meeting
it did not amount to "undue influence" so as to be a corrupt practice
F within the meaning of the Act.

Evidence was led again without any material pleading that the
appellant had used his influence to protect Gurdial Singh from

G
police harassment as also to ensure that he was not arrested. It is
not dispnted that Gurdial Singh was an Akali supporter at previous
elections and continued his allegiance to the Akali Party until a few
c··
months before the election of 1980. On account of personal dis·
putes with some of the Akali members he switched over his support
to the opposite faction. It is not in dispute, however, that ·Gurdial
Singh was a supporter of the appellant and had even worked as his .
polling agent in the Gandiwind booth. To extend protection to a
H • supporter, particularly, a fresh but powerful supporter, is norm~!
SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SiNGH (Ronganath Misra, J.) 1083
human conduct. The fact that protection liad.lieen extened by the
A
appellant to Gurdial Singh and members of his family even by
raising quarrel with the local police inspector would not lead to a
backward presumption of conserir for the acts of Gurdial Singh,
Consent is the life line to link up. the ,cartdidate with the action of
the other person which may amonrit to corrupt practice anq unless
it is specifically pleaded and clearly proved-in view of the fact that B
all ingredients have to be proved beyond 'reasonable doubt-the
appellant cannot be charged for the action of Gurdial Singh and his
. ' ~·
gro~p. ·

In paragraph 7 of the election petition allegation was made
of exercise of undue influence on the date of polling bf appointing c
Gurdial S!ngh as appellant's polling agent in the Gandiwind polling
booth. Some bra! evidence has been 'led in ~upport. of that plea. The
field of operation of the· polling agent is within. the polling booth
it&elf where the polling agents of the contesting candidates would be
present, the Presiding Officer of thb 'pelling booth and ;other public
functionaries would also be present. · No 'complaint in ·writing had D
been given against the illegal activity of Gurdial Singh within the
polling booth. Contemporenous attention of the Presiding Officer
could.have been drawn to sucli nefarious act, if any. There is no
. ' ' 1
evidence that the Presiding Officer or the polling officers had been
notified o.f any such complaint. . There is clear evidence also that
voting was free and quite a large perc~r,itage .of the voters ha.d exer- E
cised their electoral right. These are circumstances which clearly
militate against the allegation of the ~le~iion petitioners .that voters
· had been threatened and their free exercise· of electoral right had
been .affected. It is difficult for us to accept the submission of Mr.
Shanti Bhushan that by appointing ;l. per.son charged for murder as
polling agent the appellant had exercised undue influence. It is not F
\ his contention that Gurdial Singh hjts not the requisite qualification
for being appointed as a polling agent and his appointment was bad
in law. Mr. Sibal has indicated that until then there was only a
charge of murder and he made a statement from the Bar that
t Gurdial Singh has been acquitted of the charge in due course, with · G
that we are of course not concerned. In tii'e absence' of requisite
pleading, want of any contemporaneous comlaint in writing or
otherwise to the public officers within the polling booth and the
nebulous nature of the oral evidence placed from the side of the
election petitioners, we are not inclined to 'agree with. Mr. Shanti
~huslian that any objection coqld really be taken to· the election on
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.
account of Gurdial Singh having acted as polling agent in the parti-
A
cular electoral booth.

The High Court clearly overlooked the fact that disturbing the
election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence. For
establishing th~, link between the disturbance of the meeting and the
returned candidate the evidence is wholly oral in character and has
B
to be scrutinised with greater rigour. Merely on the statement of
some of the witnesses who were essentially Akali Party workers or
supporters a charge of corrupt practice could not have been taken
as proved. The approach of the learned trial judge to the matter
is·contrary to law as settled by decisions of this Court relating to
c corrupt practice and proof thereof.

Even if the charge of this corrupt practice fails, i( the other is
accepted the decision of the High Court cannot be interfered with
because one corrupt practice would be sufficient to have the election
declared as void. We shall, th~refore, now proceed to examine the
D material with reference to the B~gicha Singh episode.

The requisite pleading for this rpart of the allegation is avail-
able in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the election petition. It is appropriate
that we extract the same for convenience :

E •·s. That ou 28. 5. 1980 the respondent No. I visited
villaged Chola-Sahib and there while requesting for votes,
he went 'io the house of Mistri Bagicha Singh Chakiwala
and asked him for his vote and votes of other family mem-
bers and friends. During this some others belonging to
the village had also collected around him. Shari Bagicha
Singh told him that the uncovered electric wires were dan-
gerously·passing above his house and despite his best efforts
be has not been able to get them removed and the sum
being demanded for their removal was beyond his means.
He further told him that whosoever gets this job done will
get his family's votes and he would help him get the votes
G
of his brotherhood also. On this the respondent No. I
said that be would get the needfnl done and they should
not bother, about the expenses involved ·in case they promi-
sed him th•~ votes of his brotherhood. On this Bagicha
Singh said tnat respondent No. 2 had also come to him
H pnd we had put our problem to him also l111t he ha\! sait;I
$\JRBNDER SINGH v. ltARDIAt. SiNGH (Jtanganath Misra, J.) 1085
that he would help them get the wires shifted after the elec·
tion. On this the respondent No. 1 said that he would get A
the needful done before the election and pay the expenses
also. On this Bagicha Singh agreed to poll all the votes of
his family and also assured that he would help respondent
No. 1 in getting the votes of his brotherhood as well".
"9. That the respondent No. I approached the Punjab B
State Electricity Board Employees concerned and put pres·
sure on them and also get the amount deposited and the
wires were removed on 30. 5. 1980. The respondent No. I
is guilty of having committed the corrupt practice of bribery
as defined under section 123, sub-sections A & B of the
Act and his election is liable to be declared void under sec·
c
tion 100 of the Act on the ground of this commission of
this corrupt practice of bribery. The respondent No. I
has received more than 200 ·votes by committing this
corrupt practice and the election of respondent No. I has
been materially affected and' but for the votes obtained by D
respondent No. I by the commission of this corrupt prac·
tice, the respondent No. 2 would have obtained a majority
of valid votes and he has a right to be declared as elected".

Commission of cofrupt practice per se makes the result of elec·
tion void when the corrupt practice is coinmitted by the returned E
candidate. The allegation here is that the appellant, the returned

• candidate, had personally committed the corrupt practice. The
evidence shows that Bagicha Singh is a resident of Chola-Sahib.
On September 13, 1978, notice was given to him by the Electricity
Board that he should demolish his construction on the first floor as
it was too close to the over-hanging electric wire. A second notice
was given to the same effect on July 13, 1979. Within a week, i.e.
F

on July 20, 1979, Bagicha Singh made the initial deposit of Rs. JOO
with a view to shifting of the over-hanging electric wires as such
shifting would save the construction from being required to be
demolished. The estimate had not been prepared notwithstanding
the deposit of Rs. 100. When the matter stood at such stage, on G
May 28. 1980, appellant is alleged to have approached Bagicha
Singh at his house in the course of election propaganda.
The requisite pleadings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the election
petition were on the basis of disclosure made by PW .. ,12. That. H
Ii
witness stated in his evidence :
i086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 1 s.c.k.

•·s. S!'rinder Singh Ka\ron and others including myself
A while canvassing for votes, reached the house of Bagicha
Singh. Makian Singh was present in the house of Bagicha
Singh. When S. Surinder Singh Kairon asked for his votes
and for getting the votes of his Biradri, he replied that he
had a bit of problem of getting the over-hanging electric
B wire removed from his house. He went on to say that altho-
ugh he had depostied Rs. 100 about two years back yet the
department had not taken any action and they were asking
for a further deposit .of Rs. 1000 which amount he did not
have and that when S. Ranjit Singh visited him, he had
told him also the same thing. S. Ranjit Singh is said to
c have told him that he would get it done after the election
was over. Bagicha Singh made it clear that anybody who
wonld solve his problem would get his own and family
votes. Thereupon S. Surinder Singh said that he would
get the needful done before the polling date and that he
should not worry. They canvassed two more house and
D thereafter I left them".

The evidence of PW. 12 does not mention anything about the
financial aspect involved in the deal though the election petition
refers to that part of it. From the documentary evidence it appears
E that on May 29, 1980, the.estimate was prepared and Rs. 944 was
required to be deposited. The S.D.O. of the State Electricity Board
at Sarhalli sent his estimate. to the Executive Engineer whose office
was located. at Patti, some distance from Sarhalli. The estimate was
drawn in the name of Bagicha Singh. The deposit appears to have
been made on May 30, 19_80, in the name of Bagicha Singh also and
F tb_e removal.was done on the same day. PW.6 is tb.e S.D.O. who
has produced some of the papers and has spoken about events with
reference to the record. Ile was not there at the relevant time and
h\IS candidly admitted that he was not personally aware of enything.
That an old pending matter where no action was being taken has
G
been done too quickly is not open to doubt. We are prepared
to assume on the basis of, sµbmissions made by Mr. Shanti
Bhushan that in the facts of the.case, Sardar Su~inder Singh was
likely to have taken some interest in ameliorating the difficulties of
Bagicha Singh ; otherwise where there was no movement for about
a year since the deposit of Rs. '!00 everythiug could not have been
. ' .· . ·~'

H.' done overmght.
StlRINDER siNGH v. llARDiAL SiNGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 10.81

The demand of Rs.944 as per the estimate had been . raised,
A
PW.6 has said that the demand was against Bagicha Singh and the •
deposit has been made and the receipt in the name of Bagicha
Singh has been prepared. It was bound to be so. The material
aspect for consideration is as to who deposited the amount. Was it
Bagicha Singh or was the source the unseen hands of the appellant ?
On this material particular there is practically no evidence. We ,B
cannot accept the submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that in the ·'
facts of the case learned trial judge was ' right in accepting the case
of the election petitioners that Surinder Singh deposited the money.
We have already taken note of the fact that there was no clear
plea in the election petition that the money had been deposited by
Surinder Singh though in paragraph 8 it was stated that on 28.5.1980 c
appellant had told Bagicha Singh that he (Bagicha Singh) should not •
bother about the expenses involved. There is no oral' evidence even
to suggest that Surinder Singh caused the amount to be deposited.
There is a presumption that the person is whose name the receipt
been drawn up was the payer of the amount and burden lay on him
who wanted to contend that the facts were otherwise. We cannot D
therefore, in these circumstances, accept the. conclusion of the
learned trial judge which is vehemently supported by Mr. Shanti
Bhushan that Surinder Singh had got the estimated demand deposit-
ed with the authorities ofthe Board. ·

A candidate is entitled to canvass for votes. One who is in
" E
the filed to be an electoral representative is also entitlen to nourish
his constituency. As pointed out by th.is Court in Bhanu Kumar
Shastri' s case, amelioration of grievances of the Public is innocuous
and cannot be construed against a candidate. We agree that while
nourishing is a legitimate activity, it is of paramount importances F
that nmirishiug should not transgress the limit so as to'corr~pt the
electroal process. The appellant was already in the field as a
candidate for the legislature and was entitled to help the people in
his constituency in a legitimate way. On.ce the allegation that he had
deposited the amount of Rs. 944 is discarded, his taking up of the
cause of Bagicha Singh for early shifting of the electric wires over- G,
hanging the first floor of his house would not amount to 'bribe'. At
any rate, the evidence on record is only of PW. 12. We do not
think that evidence even if accepted as a whole would be sufficient
to' establish the charge of corrupt practice on this score. : This'
Court has rightly indicated that oral evidence, particularly, coming
from a tainted source cannot fmm the sole basis of proof H
1088 SbPRm.ill COURT REPORTS t198SJ i s.c.il.
of corrupt practice. In You11us Kunju' s case, (supra) it has been
A
stated :

"Admittedly all these witnesses were the workers of the
appellant. There is overwhelming material on the record,
and even counsel fairly admitted, that the election was
fought on party basis and there was sharp division of the
B
electorate on tb:e basis of political parties. That being the
position workers at the election with party alignment would
necessarily be political supporters of the respective candi-
dates and when called as witnesses they would support their .'
stand. Instances are not uncommon where such witnesses
c support their respective candidates and their cases though
the same be far from truth. In such circumstrnces we do
not think on the oral testimony of these four witnesses the
charge of publication of objectionable materials can be said
to have been established."

D PW.12 was a supporter of the Akali Party as stated by him
though he also indicated that he had accompained the appellant
in the course o_f canvassing for votes to Bagicha Singh's house. A
sum total view of the evidence, in our opinion, falls short of the
legal requirement for finding corrupt practice. Here again, we are
of the view that the High Court went wrong in accepting the case
E of the election petitioners that the appellant had committed corrupt
practice for procuring the votes of Bagicha Singh, members of his
family and his friends by getting the over-hanging electric wires
removed. After all, if there be any scope for doubt, it must resolve
in favour of the appellant who was facing a quasi-criminal charge.

F The appeal has to succeed. We accordingly reverse the deci-
sion of the High Court and uphold the election of the appellant.
The finding of the High Court that ])e was guilty of corrupt practice
under ss. 123(1) and (2) stands vacated. Parties are directed to
bear their own costs throughout.
G

M.L.A. · Appeals allowed,