SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S. S. DESWAL & ORS.versusVIRENDER GANDHI & ANR.

                         [2020] 1 S.C.R. 395                            395


 SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S. S. DESWAL & ORS.                       A
                                 v.
                  VIRENDER GANDHI & ANR.
             (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1936-1963 of 2019)
                        JANUARY 08, 2020                                B
         [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.s. 138, 143-A and 148
– Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 – s.s. 389, 482 – Respondent
No.1 retired from a firm – Various cheques were issued by the
                                                                        C
appellants in favour of respondent against the retirement dues – All
the cheques were dishonored – Complaints were filed by the
respondent No.1 against the appellants u/s. 138 N.I. Act – Judicial
Magistrate held appellants Nos. 1 & 2 guilty and were accordingly
convicted – In appeal, appellants filed application u/s. 389 Cr.P.C.
for suspension of sentence – The Appellate Court vide order dated       D
01.12.2018 suspended the sentence during the pendency of the
appeal, subject to furnishing of bail and also subject to deposit of
25% of the amount of compensation awarded – Appellants were
convicted and was ordered by the Appellate Court to deposit amount
of Rs.9,40,24,999/- – Appellants filed application u/s.482 Cr.P.C.
                                                                        E
and sought quashing of part of the order which imposed a condition
to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation – The High Court
dismissed the petition filed u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. – The Supreme Court
also dismissed the criminal appeals – The Appellate Court vide order
dated 20.07.2019 held that appellant having not complied with the
direction to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation, the order       F
of suspension of sentence shall be deemed to have been vacated –
Another petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants against the
order dated 20.07.2019 was also dismissed – On appeal held: The
order dated 01.12.2018 was upheld by the Supreme Court, therefore
any submission questioning the order of the Appellate Court directing
                                                                        G
the suspension of the sentence subject to deposit of 25% of the
compensation amount needs no further consideration – It is for the
Appellate Court who has granted suspension of sentence to take
call on non-compliance and take appropriate decision – What order
is to be passed by the Appellate Court in such circumstances is for
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                                395
396           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     the Appellate Court to consider and decide – However, non-
      compliance of the condition of suspension of sentence is sufficient
      to declare suspension of sentence as having vacated – The Appellate
      Court was right in taking the view that order of suspension of
      sentence shall be deemed to have been vacated.
B           Dismissing the appeals, the Court
            HELD : 1. The Supreme Court having already upheld the
      order of the Appellate Court dated 01.12.2018 suspending the
      sentence subject to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation
      any submission questioning the order of the Appellate Court
C     directing the suspension of sentence subject to deposit of 25%
      of the compensation amount needs no further consideration. By
      dismissal of the criminal appeals of the appellants on 29.05.2019
      by this Court the challenge stands repelled and cannot be allowed
      to be reopened. [Para 12] [404-C]
D            2. The second round of litigation which was initiated by the
      appellant by filing application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
      against the order dated 20.07.2019 passed by the Additional
      Sessions Judge by which he held that the appellant having not
      complied with the direction dated 01.12.2018 to deposit 25% of
      the amount of compensation, the order of suspension of sentence
E     shall be deemed to have been vacated. The order dated 20.07.2019
      was an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge on account
      of failure of the appellant to deposit 25% of the amount of
      compensation. The suspension of sentence on 01.12.2018 was
      subject to the condition of deposit of 25% of the amount of
F     compensation, when the condition for suspension of sentence
      was not complied with, Additional Sessions Judge was right in
      taking the view that order of suspension of sentence shall be
      deemed to have been vacated. Challenge to order dated
      20.07.2019 has rightly been repelled by the High Court by its
      elaborate and well considered judgment dated 10.09.2019.
G     [Para 13] [404-D-F]
            3. The High Court is right in its opinion that question No.2
      as framed in Vivek Sahni’s case was not correctly considered.
      When suspension of sentence by the trial court is granted on a

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     SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                        397
                 VIRENDER GANDHI

condition, non-compliance of the condition has adverse effect on        A
the continuance of suspension of sentence. The Court which has
suspended the sentence on a condition, after noticing non-
compliance of the condition can very well hold that the suspension
of sentence stands vacated due to non-compliance. The order of
the Additional Sessions Judge declaring that due to non-
                                                                        B
compliance of condition of deposit of 25% of the amount of
compensation, suspension of sentence stands vacated is well
within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and no error has
been committed by the Additional Sessions Judge in passing the
order dated 20.07.2019. [Para 18] [406-G-H; 407-A]
      4. It is for the Appellate Court who has granted suspension       C
of sentence to take call on non-compliance and take appropriate
decision. What order is to be passed by the Appellate Court in
such circumstances is for the Appellate Court to consider and
decide. However, non-compliance of the condition of suspension
of sentence is sufficient to declare suspension of sentence as          D
having been vacated. [Para 19] [407-B]
      G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019) 10 SCALE 168;
      Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal and others
      v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341 – referred to.
      Ajay Vinodchandra Shah v. State of Maharashtra                    E
      (2019) 4 Mah LJ 705 ; Vivek Sahni and another v.
      Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. CRM-M-29187 of 2019
      (O&M) – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
                                                                        F
(2019) 10 SCALE 168            referred to             Para 9
(2019) 11 SCC 341              referred to             Para 15
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1936-1963 of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2019 of the High Court    G
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M Nos. 37243, 37249,
37250, 37257, 37259, 37434, 37442, 37445, 37446, 37448, 37450, 37451,
37463, 37466, 37474, 37477, 37495, 37497, 37498, 37503, 37533, 37534,
37536, 37537, 37545, 37547 & 37550 of 2019 (O&M).
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398            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv., Ajay Marwah, Advs. for the Appellants.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
             1. These appeals have been filed against a common judgment of
B     the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 10.09.2019 dismissing 28
      petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
            2. Brief facts of the case giving rise to these appeals are:
             Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are partners of appellant No.3, M/s. Bhoomi
      Infrastructure Co., now known as GLM Infratech Private Limited.
C     Respondent No.1, Virender Gandhi, who was also a partner of the Firm
      retired with respect of which Memorandum of Understanding dated
      30.11.2013 was entered into. A cheque No.665643 dated 31.03.2014
      drawn on Canara Bank amounting to Rs.45,84,915/- was issued by the
      appellant to respondent No.1 against the part payment of the retirement
D     dues. Similarly, 63 other cheques were issued by the appellants in favour
      of respondent arising out of the same transaction. On 06.04.2015,
      respondent No.1 deposited cheque No.665643 in his Bank that is
      Karnataka Bank Ltd., Sector-11, Panchkula. The cheque was
      dishonoured and returned vide memo dated 07.04.2015 with the remarks
      “funds insufficient”. Other 63 cheques were also dishonoured.
E
            3. Respondent No.1 sent the statutory demand notice under Section
      138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as
      “NI Act”) on 06.05.2015. Complaints were filed by respondent No.1
      against the appellants under Section 138 of the NI Act before the Judicial
      Magistrate, Ist Class, Panchkula. In all 28 complaints were filed. The
F     complaints were decided by Judicial Magistrate vide his judgment dated
      30.10.2018 holding the appellant Nos.1 and 2 guilty for the offence
      punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, who were accordingly
      convicted. By order dated 13.11.2018 the appellants were sentenced to
      undergo imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay jointly and
      severally an amount equal to the amount involved in the present case i.e.
G
      cheque amount plus 1% of this amount as interest as well as litigation
      expenses.
             4. The appeal was filed by the appellants against the judgment
      dated 30.10.2018 and sentence dated 30.11.2018 in the Court of Sessions
      Judge, Panchkula. In the appeal the appellants had filed an application
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     SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                             399
        VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence. The learned         A
trial court has suspended the sentence of the appellants by order dated
13.11.2018 for 30 days. The Appellate Court vide order dated 01.12.2018
entertained the appeal and suspended the sentence during the pendency
of the appeal, subject to furnishing of bail bond and surety bond in the
sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount and also subject to
                                                                             B
deposit of 25% of the amount of compensation awarded by the learned
trial court in favour of the complainant. The appellants were directed to
deposit the amount within four weeks by way of demand draft in the
name of the Court.
       5. The appellants were convicted in all 28 cases and the total
amount to be deposited under the order of the Appellate Court was, in all    C
cases, Rs.9,40,24,999/-. The appellants preferred an application seeking
extension of time to deposit the amount of 25% of the compensation
amount. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application on
19.12.2018 granting time to deposit the amount till 28.01.2019. The
appellants filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing   D
of the part of the order dated 01.12.2018 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Panchkula, whereby the said Court has imposed a
condition to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation while suspending
the sentence.
       6. The High Court vide its judgment dated 24.04.2019 dismissed        E
the petition of the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and other
connected petitions. The appellants preferred Special Leave
Petition(Criminal) Nos.4948-4975/2019 before this Court against the
judgment dated 24.04.2019 of the Hight Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh.
                                                                             F
       7. This Court vide its judgment dated 29.05.2019 dismissed the
criminal appeals arising out of the SLPs(Criminal). Learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Panchkula in view of the non-compliance of the order
dated 20.07.2019 directed the appellants to surrender in the trial court
within four days. The appellants were also not present when the case
was taken by the Additional Sessions Judge on 20.07.2019. Another            G
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the appellants challenging
the order dated 20.07.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge.
The 28 petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants have
been dismissed by the impugned judgment of the Punjab and Haryana
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400            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     High Court dated 10.09.2019. Aggrieved by which judgment these appeals
      have been filed by the appellants.
             8. Shri Balbir Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
      appellants questioning the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated
      20.07.2019 and judgment of the High Court submits that by mere non-
B     deposit of 25% of the amount of compensation as directed on 01.12.2018
      cannot result in vacation of suspension of sentence. Learned counsel
      submits that the direction to deposit 25% of the compensation as directed
      by the trial court could not have been made under Section 148 of the NI
      Act. Section 148 of the NI Act having come into force on 01.09.2018
      could not have been relied by the Courts below. Since, the complaint
C     was filed in the year 2015 alleging offence under Section 138 of the NI
      Act which was much before the enforcement of Section 148 of the NI
      Act. He further submits that non-deposit of 25% of the amount of
      compensation could not lead to vacation of the order suspending the
      sentence rather it was open to the respondents to recover the said amount
D     as per the procedures prescribed under Section 421 Cr. P.C.
             9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that this Court in
      Criminal Appeal No.1160 of 2019 (G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana)
      decided on 30.07.2019 has held the provisions of Section 143A of NI
      Act to be prospective only that is to apply with respect to offence
E     committed after insertion of Section 143A w.e.f. 01.09.2018. He submits
      that both Sections 143A and Section 148 inserted in NI Act by amendment
      Act 20 of 2018, hence Section 148 was not attracted in the present case
      which was only prospective and could have been utilised in offences
      which were committed after 01.09.2018. He has also placed reliance on
      the judgment of Bombay High Court in Ajay Vinodchandra Shah vs.
F     State of Maharashtra, (2019) 4 Mah LJ 705 and another judgment
      of Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh dated 18.07.2019 in
      CRM-M-29187 of 2019(O&M)(Vivek Sahni and another vs.
      Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.).
            10. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for
G     the parties and have perused the records.
             11. The appellants had challenged the order dated 01.12.2018
      passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula by which while
      entertaining the criminal appeal of the appellants, Appellate Court has
      suspended the substantive sentence of the appellants subject to deposit
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     SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                               401
        VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

25% of the compensation awarded by the trial court in favour of the            A
complainant. The petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the
appellants questioning the order dated 01.12,2019 were dismissed by the
High Court vide its judgment dated 24.04.2019 against which judgment
the appellants have also filed SLP(Criminal)Nos.4948-4975 of 2019)
which were dismissed by this Court on 29.05.2019. All arguments raised
                                                                               B
by the appellants questioning the order dated 01.12.2018 have been
elaborately dealt with by this Court and rejected. The submissions
regarding challenge to the order dated 01.12.2018 of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge which have been addressed before us have
been considered by this Court and rejected. It is useful to refer paragraph
8., 8.1 and 9 of the judgment of this Court which are to the following         C
effect:
         “8. It is the case on behalf of the Appellants that as the criminal
      complaints against the Appellants Under Section 138 of the N.I.
      Act were lodged/filed before the amendment Act No. 20/2018 by
      which Section 148 of the N.I. Act came to be amended and                 D
      therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made
      applicable. However, it is required to be noted that at the time
      when the appeals against the conviction of the Appellants for the
      offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were preferred,
      Amendment Act No. 20/2018 amending Section 148 of the N.I.
      Act came into force w.e.f. 1.9.2018. Even, at the time when the          E
      Appellants submitted application/s Under Section 389 of the Code
      of Criminal Procedure to suspend the sentence pending appeals
      challenging the conviction and sentence, amended Section 148 of
      the N.I. Act came into force and was brought on statute w.e.f.
      1.9.2018. Therefore, considering the object and purpose of               F
      amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and while suspending
      the sentence in exercise of powers Under Section 389 of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure, when the first appellate court
      directed the Appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/
      compensation as imposed by the learned trial Court, the same can
      be said to be absolutely in consonance with the Statement of             G
      Objects and Reasons of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.
      Act.
          8.1. Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics
      of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing
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402      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object and
      purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was
      being frustrated, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section
      148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in an appeal
      challenging the order of conviction Under Section 138 of the N.I.
      Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted Accused
B
      - Appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20%
      of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By the
      amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot be said that
      any vested right of appeal of the Accused - Appellant has been
      taken away and/or affected. Therefore, submission on behalf of
C     the Appellants that amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act
      shall not be made applicable retrospectively and more particularly
      with respect to cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018 shall not
      be applicable has no substance and cannot be accepted, as by
      amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, no substantive right of
      appeal has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore the
D
      decisions of this Court in the cases of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra)
      and Videocon International Limited (supra), relied upon by the
      learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants shall
      not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore,
      considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
E     amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, on
      purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended,
      we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended,
      shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of
      conviction and sentence for the offence Under Section 138 of the
      N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the
F
      offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to
      amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018. If such a
      purposive interpretation is not adopted, in that case, the object
      and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act would
      be frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been committed
G     by the learned first appellate court directing the Appellants to
      deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by
      the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as
      amended.


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SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                               403
   VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the Appellants           A
that even considering the language used in Section 148 of the N.I.
Act as amended, the appellate Court “may” order the Appellant
to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine
or compensation awarded by the trial Court and the word used is
not “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested with the first
                                                                          B
appellate court to direct the Appellant - Accused to deposit such
sum and the appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which
according to the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants would
be contrary to the provisions of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as
amended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 of
the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects          C
and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act, though
it is true that in amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the word
used is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall”
and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception
for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended
                                                                          D
Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the Appellate
Court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant-
Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of
the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original
complainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant-
Accused Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure               E
to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed
considering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the
N.I. Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded
by the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amount
is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the
                                                                          F
order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may
be directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by
the Appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act
is purposively interpreted in such a manner it would serve the
Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of
the N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Negotiable            G
Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to
provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence
of the dishonoured of cheques. So as to see that due to delay
tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques
due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining stay in the
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404            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured
            cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the
            court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having
            observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the
            cheque transactions, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend
            Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, such a purposive
B
            interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons
            of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Section
            138 of the N.I. Act.”
             12. This Court having already upheld the order of the Appellate
      Court dated 01.12.2018 suspending the sentence subject to deposit 25%
C     of the amount of compensation any submission questioning the order of
      the Appellate Court directing the suspension of sentence subject to deposit
      of 25% of the compensation amount needs no further consideration. By
      dismissal of the criminal appeals of the appellants on 29.05.2019 by this
      Court the challenge stands repelled and cannot be allowed to be reopened.
D            13. The second round of litigation which was initiated by the
      appellant by filing application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was against the
      order dated 20.07.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
      Panchkula by which Additional Sessions Judge held that the appellant
      having not complied with the direction dated 01.12.2018 to deposit 25%
E     of the amount of compensation, the order of suspension of sentence
      shall be deemed to have been vacated. The order dated 20.07.2019 was
      an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge on account of failure
      of the appellant to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation. The
      suspension of sentence on 01.12.2018 was subject to the condition of
      deposit of 25% of the amount of compensation, when the condition for
F     suspension of sentence was not complied with, learned Additional Sessions
      Judge was right in taking the view that order of suspension of sentence
      shall be deemed to have been vacated. Challenge to order dated
      20.07.2019 has rightly been repelled by the High Court by its elaborate
      and well considered judgment dated 10.09.2019.
G            14. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the
      judgment of this Court dated 30.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1160
      of 2019 (G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana). This Court in the above case
      was considering provisions of Section 143A of the N.I. Act which was
      inserted by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 by which Section 148
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     SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                             405
        VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

of the N.I. Act has been inserted. This Court took the view that Section     A
143A is prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences
were committed after the introduction of Section 143A i.e. after
01.09.2018. In paragraph 22 of the judgment following has been held:
      “22. In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must,
      therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to         B
      cases where offences were committed after the introduction of
      Section 143A, in order to force an accused to pay such interim
      compensation.”
       15. The judgment of this Court which was delivered in the case of
the present appellants i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos.917-944 of 2019              C
(Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal and others vs.
Virender Gandhi) (in which one of us M.R.Shah, J was also a
member) was also cited before the Bench deciding the case of G.J.
Raja. This Court in its judgment dated 29.05.2019 has rejected the
submission of the appellants that Section 148 of N.I. Act shall not be
made applicable retrospectively. This Court held that considering the        D
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of
the N.I. Act, on purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act
as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the
order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence   E
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment Act
No.20/2018 i.e. prior to 01.09.2018.
        16. The Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case has noticed the judgment
of this Court in the appellants’ case i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s case
and has opined that the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’s    F
case was on Section 148 of the N.I. Act which is a stage after conviction
of the accused and distinguishable from the stage in which the interim
compensation was awarded under Section 143A of the N.I.Act. When
the Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case(supra) itself has considered and
distinguished the judgment of this Court in appellants’ own case i.e.
Surinder Singh Deswal’s, reliance by the learned counsel for the             G
appellants on the judgment of this Court in G.J. Raja’s case is misplaced.
It is useful to refer to paragraph 23 of the judgment in G.J. Raja’s case
which is to the following effect:

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406            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A              “23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this Court in
            Surinder Singh Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 8
            SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act which was also
            introduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from
            01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be retrospective in operation.
            As against Section 143A of the Act which applies at the trial
B
            stage that is even before the pronouncement of guilt or order of
            conviction, Section 148 of the Act applies at the appellate stage
            where the Accused is already found guilty of the offence Under
            Section 138 of the Act. It may be stated that there is no provision
            in Section 148 of the Act which is similar to Sub-Section (5) of
C           Section 143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact, no such
            provision akin to Sub-section (5) of Section 143A was required as
            Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction,
            are adequate to take care of such requirements. In that sense
            said Section 148 depends upon the existing machinery and
            principles already in existence and does not create any fresh
D
            disability of the nature similar to that created by Section 143A of
            the Act. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh
            Deswal (2007) 13 SCC 492 stands on a different footing.”
            In view of the above, the judgment of this Court in the case of
      G.J. Raja does not help the appellants.
E
             17. The judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vivek
      Sahni and another(supra) which has been relied by the learned counsel
      for the appellants has been noted and elaborately considered by the
      High Court in the impugned judgment. In paragraph 14 and 15 of the
      impugned judgment of the High Court reasons have been given for
F     distinguishing the Vivek Sahni’ case.
             18. The High Court is right in its opinion that question No.2 as
      framed in Vivek Sahni’s case was not correctly considered. When
      suspension of sentence by the trial court is granted on a condition, non-
      compliance of the condition has adverse effect on the continuance of
G     suspension of sentence. The Court which has suspended the sentence
      on a condition, after noticing non-compliance of the condition can very
      well hold that the suspension of sentence stands vacated due to non-
      compliance. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge declaring that
      due to non-compliance of condition of deposit of 25% of the amount of
H
      SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.                              407
         VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

compensation, suspension of sentence stands vacated is well within the         A
jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and no error has been committed by
the Additional Sessions Judge in passing the order dated 20.07.2019.
       19. It is for the Appellate Court who has granted suspension of
sentence to take call on non-compliance and take appropriate decision.
What order is to be passed by the Appellate Court in such circumstances        B
is for the Appellate Court to consider and decide. However, non-
compliance of the condition of suspension of sentence is sufficient to
declare suspension of sentence as having been vacated.
      20. Insofar as the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Ajay
Vinodchandra Shah (supra) which has been relied by the learned                 C
counsel for the appellant, it is sufficient to observe that the High Court
did not have benefit of judgment of this Court dated 29.05.2019 in
Surinder Singh Deswal’s case. The judgment of the Bombay High
Court was delivered on 14.03.2019 whereas judgment of this Court in
appellants’ case is dated 29.05.2019. In view of the law laid down by
this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’s case decided on 29.05.2019,              D
the judgment of Bombay High Court in Ajay Vinodchandra Shah’s
case cannot be said to be a good law insofar as consequences of non-
compliance of condition of suspension of sentence is concerned.
       21. It is further to note that even Bombay High Court while
modifying the direction to deposit 25% of the amount of total compensation     E
directed the accused to deposit 20% of the amount of compensation
within 90 days.
       22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit
in the submission of the appellants. The appeals are dismissed.
                                                                               F
Ankit Gyan                                                Appeals dismissed.




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