Holding

Section 34 IPC does not apply to the appellants for murder; their conviction is altered to Section 304 Part II read with Section 34.

Summary

The case involves four accused who stopped the complainant and his son; one accused thrust a knife into the son, causing his death. The trial court convicted all four under Section 302/323 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and the High Court affirmed the conviction. Two of the accused (Surinder Singh and Raja Singh), who were unarmed, appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that there was no evidence of a common intention to murder and thus Section 34 could not be invoked for murder. The Supreme Court held that Section 34 requires proof of a shared intention to commit the specific offence and, in the absence of such proof for the two appellants, the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 was inappropriate. Consequently, the Court altered their conviction to Section 304 Part II read with Section 34, imposing a seven‑year imprisonment, and allowed the appeal in part.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 IPC applies to the appellants for the murder charge in the absence of evidence of a common intention to kill.
Whether the appellants can be convicted under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 instead of Section 302.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304 Part II, s. 323, s. 34

Subjects

Section 34 IPCjoint liabilitycommon intentionmurderculpable homicide not amounting to murderconviction alterationcriminal law

Judgment

SURINDER SINGH @CHHINDA AND ANR. A
l'
STATE OF PUNJAB

-· AUGUST 31, 2006

[ARIJIT PASAYA T AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 34, 302, 304 & 323: Murder-Joint liability-
Accused persons attacked complainant and his son-Son succumbed to the
injuries-Trial Court found all the four accused persons guilty of committing
offence under Section 3021323 rlw Section 34 /PC and sentenced them
c
accordingly-Affirmed by High Court-Filing of appeal by two of the
convicts-Held: Accused-appellants were not armed with weapons-Though
they had allegedly restrained the movement of the deceased but there was
no definite evidence to show that they shared common intention/motive to
commit murder of the son of the Complainant-However, they came along D
with other two accused who were armed with weapons, and after the incident,
all of them left together-Under the circumstances, it would be inappropriate
to punish the accused-appellants for offences under Section 302 rlw Section
34 IPC-They could appropriately be convicted under Section 304 Part fl
rlw Section 34-The conviction is altered accordingly.
E
Section 34-Joint liability-Scope of-Discussed

According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, when the complainant
... along with his son and two others were going towards the market, on the way,
four persons including appellant stopped them. One of them allegedly gave a
lathi blow on the head of the complainant. When his son came to his rescue,
F
two of the accused persons caught hold of him and other accused thrust a
knife in his chest, and he fell down. The complainant raised a hue and cry,
and the accused persons fled away. The victim was taken to a Civil Hospital,
where he succumbed to the injuries. An F.l.R. was lodged by the complainant
and others in the Police Station. The Police investigated the matter and G
submitted the charge-sheet. The trial Court found all the accused persons
" guilty and convicted them for committing offences under Section 302/323 r/
w Section 34 IPC and sentenced them accordingly. Accused persons preferred
an appeal, which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal,
\ 671 H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A which is preferred by only two of the accused persons.

Accused-appellants contended that since the prosecution has not
brought any cogent evidence to show that they had shared common intention
in committing the murder of the son of the complainant, Section 34 IPC is
inapplicable.
B
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 34 IPC has been enacted on the principle of joint
liability in doing a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and
does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is
C the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 IPC, if such criminal act is done in
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the
crime.1675-F-GI
D 1.2. Direct proofof common intention is seldom available and, therefore,
such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from
the proved facts and circumstances of the case. In order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of
E all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged
with the aid of Section 34 IPC, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment;
but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true
contents of the Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act
jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it
individually.1675-G-H; 676-AI
F
As/10k Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109, relied on.

1.3. The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a
crime is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not
necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an
G offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same
common intention in order to attract the provision. 1676-81

Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118, referred to.

H 1.4. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section
SUR IN DER SINGH@CHHINDA v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB [PASA YAT . .I.] 673

34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in A
law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the
deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is
intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between
acts ofindi\'idual members ofa party who act in furtherance of the common
intention of all or to pro\'e exactly what part was taken by each of them. B
(676-E-FI

Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR {1993) SC
1899 and Harbans Kaur v. State of Hw)'·ana, (2005( 9 SCC 195, relied on.

r 2. In the instant case, when the factual scenario is seen the application C
of Section 34 IPC appears to be inappropriate so far murder of the deceased
is concerned. In addition, the appellants were not armed. But the evidence is
clear that they restrained movement of the deceased when there was a quarrel.
There is, however, no definite evidence that the common intention was murder.
But the fact that two co-accused were armed with knife and lathi is of relevance
and significance. They came together and left together. That being so, the D
conviction is altered applying the principle as set forth. Appropriate con\'iction.,,
will be under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Custodial
sentence of seven years wauld meet the ends of justice. [676-A; 677-A-B[

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cirminal Appeal No. 903 of
~ E
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2005 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 282-DB of 1997.

Kuldip Singh for the Appellant.
F
R.K. Rathore, A.A.G., M.K. Verma and Arun K. Sinha for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
G
Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the appeal
filed by the appellants and thereby confinning the judgment of conviction and
sentence passed by karned Sessions Judge, Rupnagar. The appellants were
convicted for offences punishable under Section 302/323 read with Section 34
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC' ). Accused appellant-Narinder H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Singh was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for commission of
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC with a fine ofRs.5,000/- with default
stipulation. He was, further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
six months in terms of Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC and to pay a fine
of Rs.200/- with default stipulation. Accused-appellant, Amarjit Singh was
B sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for commission of offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and to pay a fine of
Rs.2.500/- with default stipulation. He was further sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months in terms of Section 323 IPC and to pay
a fine of Rs.200/- with default stipulation.

C Prosecution case as unfolded during trial is as follows:

Statement was given by lnderjit (PW 8) to AS! Sukhjit Singh in Civil
Hospital, Marinda on 10.4.1996 at 11.50 P.M. lnderjit stated that he along with
his son Pawan Kumar (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased'), Amarjit Singh
son of Ram Singh and Ved Parkash were coming from their house and going
D towards the market for some domestic work. When they reached near the
house of one Khushal Singh, at about 9.00 P.M., accused Narinder Singh @
Nita armed with a knife like a dagger, Amarjit Singh @ Amba armed with a
lathi, Surinder Singh@ Chhinda and Raja Singh son ofGurmukh Singh who
were not armed met them. Accused persons stopped them and stated that ·
they wanted to talk to them. As complainant lnderjit went forward, accused
E Amarjit Singh gave a lathi blow or. his head. Pawan Kumar, the son of the
complainant, came forward to rescue him. Raja Singh and Surinder Singh
caught hold of Pawan Kumar and Narinder Singh @Nita thrust a knife in the
chest of deceased who fell down. On this, Inderjit fell upon his son to save
him. Thereafter, accused Raja Singh, Surinder Singh and Amarjit Singh gave .
p fist and slap blows to the complainant. Complainant raised a hue and cry.
Accused persons fled away from there. Amarjit Singh son of Ram Singh, Ved
Parkash and the complainant then took deceased to Civil Hopsital, Marinda,
but his life could not be saved.

The motive for the commission of the offence was that some days
G earlier, Narinder Singh@ Nita had teased the complainant's daughter Nirmla
Devi. Complainant had reprimanded him and hot words were exchanged
between them. Due to this, appellants committed the murder of the deceased.
On the basis of this statement, formal FIR, Ex. PJ, was registered on 11.4.1996
at 12.05 A.M. in Police Station Marinda. Special report reached the Additional
H Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rup Nagar on 11.4.1996 at 3.00 A.M.
SURINDERSJNGH@CHHINDAv STATEOFPUNJAB [PASAYAT,.1.] 675

In order to further its case, prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. A
PWs 8 and 9 were stated to be eye-witnesses. Though PW-9 partially departed
from his statement made during investigation. the residue was considered
relevant. The trial Court on analysis of the evidence found the accused guilty
and convicted the accused persons and sentenced them.

Accused persons filed appeal before the High Court and questioned B
correctness of trial Court's judgment.

The High Court did not find any substance in the appeal and dismissed
- the same. Stand before the High Court was that there is no material to find
the accused guilty.
c
Accused Amarjit and Narinder have not preferred any appeal against
High Court's judgment. This appeal is by Surinder and Raja.

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Section 34 has no
application so far as the appellants are concerned. The prosecution has not D
brought any cogent evidence to show that the appellants had shared any
common intention for the murder of the deceased.

Learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand suppo11ed
the judgment of the courts below. With reference to the FIR registered in
Police station, Rup Nagar it was submitted that same clearly discloses that E
the presence of the accused persons at the time of assault has been established.

· Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of jcint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence F
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of
a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct
proof of common intention is seldom available and, tilerefore, such intention
• can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge G
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the
aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of theo crime. The true contents of the H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the
position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually
by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Puniab, AIR (1977) SC
I09), the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime
is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that
B the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly
must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character,
but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision.

As it originally stood the Section 34 was in the following terms:
..
c "When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done
by him alone."

In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words "in furtherance
D of the common intention of all" after the word "persons" and before the word
"each", so as to make the object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted
in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR ( 1945) Privy Council 118.

Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be
found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading
E to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of
the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the
accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same
manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a
case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual
F members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or

-
to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in
Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899,
Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular l
accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some
G overt act on the part of the accused. These aspects have been highlighted
in Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana. [2005] 9 SCC 195.

When the factual scenario is seen the application 0f Section 34 of the
IPC appears to be inappropriate so far murder of the deceased is concerned.
In addition, the appellants were not armed. But the evidence is clear that they
H restrained movement of the deceased when there was a quarrel. There is,
SURINDERSINGH@CHHINDA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASAYAT,J.) 677

however, no definite evidence that the common intention was murder. But the A
fact that two co-accused were armed with knife and lathi is of relevance and
significance. They came together and left together. That being so, the
conviction is altered applying the principle set out above. Appropriate
conviction will be under Section 304 Part II lPC read with Section 34 lPC.
Custodial sentence of seven years would meet the ends of justice.
B
Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.