Holding

The killing of Shyam Sunder was committed in private defence and amounts to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, and the conviction under Section 302 for the murder of Kishan Lal is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and is set aside, while the conviction under Section 304 stands.

Summary

The appellant Suresh Singhal and his father attended a meeting to resolve a property dispute, during which a scuffle broke out and the appellant was allegedly strangled by the deceased Shyam Sunder and his brothers. In the ensuing struggle the appellant drew his revolver and fired, killing Shyam Sunder; the second brother Kishan Lal also died, but the evidence did not conclusively show that the appellant fired the shots that killed him. The Court examined medical, ballistic and eyewitness evidence, finding that the shot that killed Shyam Sunder was fired from a distance after the appellant was released, indicating a reasonable apprehension of danger and invoking the right of private defence under Section 97 IPC. It held that the homicide fell within Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and that the conviction under Section 302 for Kishan Lal’s murder was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 was set aside, the conviction under Section 304 was upheld, and the appellant was deemed to have served the sentence already imposed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the right of private defence under Section 97 IPC to the appellant’s act of shooting the deceased.
Whether the homicide constitutes murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.
Whether the evidence, including ballistic reports, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant fired the shots that killed Kishan Lal.
Whether the scuffle and the appellant’s reasonable apprehension of death justify the use of lethal force.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 304, s. 307, s. 34, s. 97, s. 99

Subjects

private defenceculpable homicide not amounting to murderproperty disputeballistic evidencereasonable apprehensionSection 97 IPCException 2 to Section 300 IPCSection 304 IPC

Judgment

[2017] 2 S.C.R. 645

SURESH SINGHAL A
v.

STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)
(Criminal Appeal No.1548 of201 l)
FEBRUARY 02, 2017 B

[S.A. BOBDE AND L. NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 and 304 r/w s.34 - Double
murder - Dispute over sale of property - Prosecution case was that
on the fatefal day, deceased and his brothers were in the office of
PW-2 where appellant came with his father and another person -
c
As soon as they entered the office of PW-2, altercation took place
between the deceased and the appellant whereafter appellant (oak
out his revolver andfired shots - The two brothers died in the incident·
- Conviction of appellant and his father for murder - Challenged -
Held: Evidence proved that there was a scujjle in which the appellant D
was pinned to the floor and deceased attempted to strangulate the
appellant - In the scujjle, appellant may have pulled out his gun
and upon seeing the gun, the deceased may have released the
appellant -and started running upon which the appellant may have
fired the shot which hit deceased on back - This also explains the
E
trajectory of the shot in which the bullet entered the body below the
right shoulder, and travelled upwards without exiting - Medical
evidence was also to the effect that shot was fired from a distant
range - No doubt, the appellant exceeded the power given to him
by law in order to defend himself but the exercise of the right was in
good faith, in his own defence and without premeditation - The F
homicide in the instant case thus did not amount to murder in the
view of Exception 2 to s.300 - As regards the killing of second
brother, the office in which firing took place was a small area - Yet
PW-3 could not specifically state that appellant shot the second
deceased - Thus, it was not stated with certainty that the shots which
G
hit the second deceased were fired by the appellant - Conviction of
the appellant u/s.302 for murder is set aside and his conviction
uls. 3 04 is maintained - Since the appellant has already undergone
a sentence of l 31h years, he is sentenced u/s.304 to the period
already undergone.
H
645
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A Penal Code, 1860 - s.97 - Right to private defence - Held:
A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self-
defence into operation and it is not necessary that there should be
an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right
of private defence.
B Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. A close examination of the evidence showed
that a scuffle did take place. In this scuffle, the deceased alone,
or along with his two brothers tried to strangulate the appellant.
The appellant reached for his revolver, upon which the deceased
c released him and turned around to run away. At this point, the
appellant shot at him, either still lying down or having got up.
This probablizes and explains the fact that it was not a close shot
and that the bullet entered the body below the right shoulder of
the deceased at the back and travelled upwards. There was no
blackening, tattooing or charring around the bullet entry wound.
D In fact, the doctors specifically stated that the shot was fired from
a distant range. It is well known that the shooting from close
quarters chars or blackens the body. The statement of the doctor
that it was shot from a distant range has not been challenged in
the cross-examination. There is another reason which lends
E credence to the assumption that the shot was not fired from close
quarters, and that is the fact that the bullet did not exit the body.
Indeed this happens when the bullet being fired from a distance
loses its velocity. Thus, there was no reliable evidence to show
that the appellant shot the deceased at close quarters when he
was being strangulated. The shot was in all probability fired when
F the deceased released the appellant during the scuffle, and on
seeing him reach for his gun moved away to escape after tuming
around. [Paras 15-17] [653-G-H; 654-B-C, F-G]
2. Altogether 7 bullets were fired, and no empty cartridge
cases were recovered from the scene of the crime. One empty
G .32 bore Smith & Wesson revolver was recovered from the
appellant. One .32 bore Smith & Wesson revolver was recovered
from his father. One .22 HP rifle and nine empty cartridges were
also recovered from the roof of his house. One .32 bullet was
. taken out from the body of deceased. Three .32 bullets were
H recovered from the body of second deceased. All the .32 cartridge
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 647

cases were found to have been fired from a single .32 calibre fire A
arm, but none of them from any of the two .32 revolvers which
were seized. The .32 lead bullet recovered from the body of
deceased was fired from .32 calibre fire arm. The reports states
that this bullet could have been fired from the revolver seized
from the father of the appellant, and not from the revolver seized
B
from the appellant. However, a definite opinion was not given
for want of sufficient characteristic marks on the crime bullets.
The three bullets recovered from the body of the deceased could
not be linked with any of the .32 revolvers seized. The ballistic
expert report shows that none of the bullets were recovered from
the .32 weapon seized from the appellant. It is thus not possible c
to determine the weapon that was used by the appellant. [Paras
18, 20] [655-A-B, D-E]
Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (2010)
2 SCC 333 : [2010] 1 SCR 642 - relied on.
3.1 The appellant may have apprehended a danger to his D
life when the deceased and his brothers started strangulating
him after pushing him 'lo the floor. '
A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right
of self-defence into operation and it is not necessary that there
should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give E
rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the appellant
apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and is likely
to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.
Given the fact that the deceased and the others were attempting
to strangulate the appellant, it would have been unrealistic to F
expect the appellant to "modulate his defence step by step with
any arithmetical exactitude". This Court has held that a person
who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or
limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm even extending
to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or
upon being directly threatened. The appellant may have been G
put in such a position. [Paras 23, 24] [657-D-G]
3.2 No doubt that the appellant exceeded the power given
to him by law in order to defend himself but the exercise of the
right was in good faith, in his own defence and without
H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A premeditation. The homicide in the present case thus does not
amount to murder in the view of Exception 2 to Section 300 of
IPC. The Sessions Court and the High Court rightly observed
that the homicide was not the result of premeditation but rather,
as the evidence suggests, the shooting took place in a sudden
fight in the heat of passion. It is not possible to accept the
B
argument of the prosecution that the appellant took undue
advantage of the situation and used the gun even though the
deceased and his brothers were unarmed. Given the murd~rous
assault on the appellant and the possibility of being attacked again,
may be with arms or may be with the help of the other persons, it
c is not possible to attribute undue advantage to have been taken
by the appellant. In such a situation it would be unrealistic to
expect the appellant to calmly assess who would have the upper
hand before exercising his right of private defence. In the
circumstances of the case and the findings of the Sessions Court
and the High Court, the homicide falls within Exception 4 to
D
Section 300 of IPC and does not amount to murder. [Paras 25,
27 and 28) [657-H; 658-A, G; 659-A-C]
3.3. It is not possible to accept the argument that merely
because the father of the appellant had a gun, and that he could
have used it to save his son, he fired the shot. There is no
E foundation in the evidence of any of the witnesses to suggest
that the father of the appellant fired at the deceased from any
place in the room to save his son. Even otherwise, shooting at
two people grappling on the floor would have been a risk since
the shot could have injured either or both persons. The strong
F possibility is that there was a scuffle in which the appellant was
pinned to the floor and attempted to be strangulated.,by the
deceased. The appellant may have pulled out his gun and upon
seeing the gun, the deceased may have released the appellant
and started running upon which the appellant fired the shot which
hit him from the back side. This also explains the trajectory of
G the shot in which the bullet entered the body below the right
shoulder, and travelled upwards without exiting. In these
circumstances, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of causing death
to the deceased with the intention of causing death or of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and therefore guilty
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 649

of the offence under Section 304 of the IPC. The appellant has A
already undergone a sentence of 13 Y, years as on date. He is
thus sentenced to the period already undergone. [Paras 30-32)
[659-E-G; 660-A-B)
4.1. The appellant has also been convicted under Section
302 IPC for the murder of deceased-KL. PW-3 deposed that the B
appellant fired at his brother, and when PW-3 and his brothers
tried to catch hold of the appellant, the appellant told his father
to finish all the brothers. He then stated that the father of the
appellant took out a revolver from his pocket and both the
appellant aud his father started firing at him and his brother-KL.
He. stated that he received two bullets on his stomach, and one c
bullet grazed him over the neck portion in the front. When he
started running out, he was hit by another bullet on the back of
his right shoulder. When PW-3 and KL started running out, he
heard the appellant tell RL to go outside, get the gun from the
vehicle and that the fourth brother should not be spared. This D
witness survived the shooting with two bullets still lodged in his
body. The office in which the firing took place was a small area.
Yet this witness does not specify that the appellant shot him. He
generally states that appellant and his father started firing at him
and his brothers. Thus, it is difficult to say with certainty that the
shots which hit KL were fired by the appellant. In these E
circumstances all that can be said is that a shot from the appellant
may have hit KL or may not have hit KL. This benefit of doubt in
law must go to the appellant. [Paras 33-36) [660-C-G)
4.2. There is a serious doubt whether it can be held as
having been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant F
attempted to murder brother of the deceased for which he has
been convicted. It is not possible to approve the observation of
the High Court that because the appellant and his father were
armed "it is only the appellant and/or his father who could be
responsible for the firing resulting in the murder of KL and the G
deceased. The appellant killed the deceased in the exercise of
the right of private defence. His father may or may not have acted
out of the desire to protect the appellant. He did not share the
same intention as that of the appellant. It is not possible to
attribute common intention to kill the three brothers to both the
H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A appellant and his father. The conviction of the appellant under
section 302 IPC for murder of KL is set aside and his conviction
under section 304 IPC is maintained. Since the appellant has
already undergone a sentence of 13 Yz years as on date, he is
sentenced under section 304 IPC to the period already undergone.
[Paras 37-40) [660-G-H; 661-A-D]
B
Modi 's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology (25th Edition). p. 631" - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2010) 1 SCR 642 relied on Para 22
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.1548of2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2010 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 232of1997.
D Sushil Kumar, S. K. Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Aditya Kumar,
S. K. Sinha, Arun K. Sinha, Advs. for the Appellant.
P. K. Dey, R. K. Verma, Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, Ms. Sadhna
Sandhu, B. K. Prasad, Ms. Reena Rai, Ms. Shreyasi Chakraborty,
Manish, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. A. BOBDE, J. I. This appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 01.09.2010 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No.232 of
1997 filed by the appellant-Suresh Singhal against his conviction and the
sentence awarded to him. The appeal filed by the State seeking death
F penalty for the appellant and against the acquittal of Roshal Lal was
dismissed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.226of1997.
THE INCIDENT
2. The appellant was prosecuted for the incident that occurred
G on the 04.03.1991 at about 5.15 pm. The deceased-Shyam Sunder and
Kishan Lal, both brothers, were killed in the incident at the office of Lala
Harkishan Dass located at Rajendra Park, Nangloi. The statement of
Lala Harkishan Dass was recorded. He had arranged a meeting for
settling a dispute that had arisen between the appellant and the deceased.
The appellant had apparently agreed to sell a property through a property
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 651
rs. A. BOBDE, J.l
dealer, namely the deceased-Shyam Sunder. The purchasers were the A
Gurdaspur Party. Apparently there was some misunderstanding between
the parties and eventually a meeting was arranged at the office of Lala
Harkishan Dass.
3. The deceased-Shyam Sunder and his two brothers Hans Raj
and Kishan Lal were already at the office of Lala Harkishan Dass. The B
appellant-Suresh Singhal and his father Pritpal Singhal accompanied by
another man (Roshan Lal) reached the office at about 5.00 pm. As
soon as they entered the office, there was an altercation between the
appellant and the deceased. The appellant took out his revolver and
shot Shyam Sunder. Th.ereafter, the appellant and his father Pritpal Singhal
who had· come to the office in a car, left the car behind and fled the c
place in the car of anothe~ visitor.
In the incident Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal were killed.
4. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the murder of
Shyam Sunder under Sections 302 and 304 read with Section 34 oflndian D
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') for the murder ofKishan
Lal. His co-appeallant-Pritpal Singhal who died on 28.03 .2007, during
the pendency of the suit was also convicted under Section 307 read with
Section 34 of IPC for attempting the murder of Hans Raj. The third
accused Roshan Lal was acquitted.
E
WITNESSES TO THE SHOOTING
5. The actual shooting was claimed to have been witnessed by
Lala Harkishan Dass (PW-2), ljans Raj (PW-3) and Raj Kumar (PW-
4). Lala Harkishan Dass (PW-2) was declared hostile. Hans Raj (PW-
3) is the injured eye-witness, and the brother of the deceased-Shyam
F
Sunder.
6. Two distinct versions about the actual shooting have arisen
from the deposition of the witnesses. One version is that there was no
scuffle before which the appellant fired at the deceased. The other is
that there was a scuffle in which the appellant was attempted to be
strangulated. G

NO SCUFFLE
7. The first version is mainly deposed to by Hans Raj (PW-3).
Hans Raj is the brother of the deceased. He went to the office of Lala
H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A Harkishan Dass where the parties had decided to meet to resolve the
dispute. He deposed that the moment the deceased entered the room,
the appellant asked his brother-the deceased, to tell him what had
happened yesterday. The deceased got up and responded to it by asking
the appellant whether he had come to settle the dispute or to quarrel.
The appellant said that there won't be any quarrel but something different
B
would happen. This witness said that "he then took out a revolver from
his coat pocket and fired at my brother-Shyam Sunder." This is all that
the witness stated about the actual shooting. Thereafter this witness
stated that he tried to catch hold of the appellant but the appellant exhorted
his father to finish all the brothers. Thereafter, Pritpal Singhal took out a
c revolver from his pocket and both the appel !ant as well as Pritpal Singhal
started firing at him and his brother-Kishan Lal. In the firing he was
injured and received one bullet in his stomach. This version significantly
does not speak of any scuffle preceding the shooting. In the cross-
examination later on, he specifically stated in the cross-examination that
there was no scuffle in which the deceased tried to strangulate the
D
appellant. This witness thus clearly stated that the appellant shot the
deceased as soon as he rose.
8. The narration of this witness is significant since he suggests
that the deceased was sitting when the appellant entered the room and
after a menacing exchange of words, shot the deceased as soon as he
E got up.
9. Another witness Tarsem Kumar (P.W. 30) stated in his
deposition that "at that time, Shyam Sunder was sitting by my side on a
sofa and he said that he has been shot at with a bullet. I did not hear
anything except this. I did not even hear the noise of firing''.
F
I 0. PW-30 in his deposition suggests that the appellant shot him
from the front as he got up. This throws a doubt on the credibility of this
witness because the entry wound of the bullet is on the back of deceased,
and not in the front. Thus we are not inclined to accept the narration of
PW-30 and PW-3, who have both stated that the appellant fired at the
G deceased from the front.
SCUFFLE
11. The other versio1i deposed by Subhash Chand Mahajan (PW-
23) and Sarover Kumar (PW-27) is that there was a scuffle between
the three brothers i.e. deceased-Shyam Sunder, Kishan Lal and Hans
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 653
rs.
A. BOBDE, J.l

Raj on one hand, and the appellant-Suresh Singhal on the other hand. A
The deceased tried to strangulate the appellant as they fell during the
struggle, and thereafter pulled out his gun and shot the deceased. He
then exhorted his father to shoot the others.
12. Subhash Chand Mahajan (PW-23) stated in his cross
examination that he saw the appellant on the floor being strangulated. B
The witness stated that there was a scuffle and thereafter a shot fired.
13. The other witness Sarover Kumar (PW-27) belongs to the
Gurdaspur Party and as such is not a direct party to the dispute between
the appellant and the deceased. He stated that immediately after the
appellant-Suresh Singhal and Pritpal ~inghal arrived, there was a scuffle c
between.the appellant-Suresh Singhal on one hand and the three brothers
including the deceased-Shyam Sunder on the other. He deposed that
there were shouts of"Chhodo Chhodo" during the scuffle and then the
deceased-Shyam Sunder cried "Hai Mujhe Goli Lag Gayi" i.e. 'I have
been shot'. He stated that he immediately ran out of the side gate along
with the other persons and hid behind the cement bags. The testimony D
of this witness has remained unshaken in cross-examination. In fact in
cross-examination, the witness stated that a scuffle took place within
the twinkling of an eye after the appellant and the others entered the
office.
14. The stark difference between the two versions is that of the E
scuffle precedin.g the incident of the shooting. Whether there was a
scuffle or not determines the tenability of the main submission advanced
by Mr. Sushi I Kumar, the learned senior counsel, that the appel Ian! acted
in the exercise of his right of private defence and shot the deceased. It
may be noted that, both the Sessions Court and the High Court have F
found that there was a sudden fight in the course of which a common
intention developed between the appellant and his father to cause the
death of the deceased-Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal.
15. Having closely examined the evidence, we are of the view
that in fact a scuffle did take place. In this scuffle, Shyam Sunder alone,
G
or along with his two brothers tried to strangulate the appellant-Suresh
Singhal. The appellant reached for his revolver, upon which the deceased
released him and turned around to run away. At this point the appellant
shot at him, either still lying down or having got up. This probablizes and
,explains the fact that it was not a close shot and that the bullet entered
H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the body below the right shoulder of the deceased at the back and travelled
upwards.
NOT A CLOSE SHOT
16. The shot in question was obviously not a close shot. There
was no blackening, tattooing or charring around the bullet entry wound.
B In fact, the doctors specifically stated that the shot was fired from a
distant range. It is well known that the shooting from close quarters
chars or blackens the body. It would be germane to quote from "Modi s
Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (25th Edition).
p. 631" with reference to the above:-
c "When there is a close shot that is in the range of powder blast
and the flame is within one to three inches, for small arms there
is a collar of soot and grease (if present on the bullet) around the
circular wound of entry. Singed hairs may be seen ifthe body is
not covered with clothing. Partially burnt and unburnt grains of
D powder are blasted into the skin causing a tattooing which cannot
be easily wiped off. Wadding, pieces of clothing or other debris
may be found lodged in the wound. The entry wound of a revolver
fired very near or in contact with the skin is generally stellate or
cruciform in shape instead of being circular. When it is fired
beyond a distance of 12 inches, there are no powder marks of
E soot or heat effects around the wound. If the revolver is fired
close to the skin but held at an angle, the smudging and tattooing
is limited only to one side of the bullet hole. The wound of exit is
often larger than the wound of entrance, and its edges are
irregular and everted, but free from scorching and tattooing."
F 17. The statement of the doctor that it was shot from a distant
range has not been challenged in the cross-examination. There is another
reason which lends credence to the assumption that the shot was not
fired from close quarters, and that is the fact that the bullet did not exit
the body. Indeed this happens when the bullet being fired from a distance
loses its velocity. We have made these observations to support the
G
inference that there is no reliable evidence to show that the appellant
shot the deceased at close quarters when he was being strangulated.
The shot was in all probability fired when the deceased released the
appellant during the scuffle, and on seeing him reach for his gun moved
away to escape after turning around.
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 655
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

RECOVERY AND BALLISTIC EXPERT REPORT A
I 8. We must at this stage advert to the recovery from the scene
and the ballistic expert report. Altogether 7 bullets were fired, and no
empty cartridge cases were recovered from the scene of the crime.
One empty .32 bore Smith & Wesson revolver was recovered from
Suresh Singhal. One .32 bore Smith & Wesson revolver was recovered B
from Pritpal Singhal. One .22 HP rifle and nine empty cartridges were
also recovered from the roof of Pritpal Singhal's house. One .32 bullet
was taken out from the body of deceased-Shyam Sunder. Three .32
bullets were recovered from the body of deceased Kishan Lal.
I 9. The appellant and his father both had licensed revolvers but c
the forensic report does not definitely disclose that the bullets came
from the licensed guns belonging to the appellant and Pritpal Singhal.
20. Products of combustion of cartridge powder were detected
only in the barrel of the .32 revolver recovered from Pritpal Singhal.
Products of combustion of cartridge powder could not be detected in the D
barrel of the revolver recovered from the appellant or the .22 HP rifle.
All the .32 cartridge cases were found to have been fired from a single
.32 calibre fire arm, but none of them from any of the two .32 revolvers
which were seized. The .32 lead bullet recovered from the body of
deceased was fired from .32 calibre fire arm. The reports states that
this bullet could have been fired from the revolver seized from Pritpal E
Singhal, and not from the revolver seized from the appellant. However,
a definite opinion was not given for the want of sufficient characteristic
marks on the crime bullets. The three bullets recovered from the body
ofKishan Lal could not be linked with any of the .32 revolvers seized.
The ballistic expert report shows that none of the bullets were recovered F
from the .32 weapon seized from the appellant. It is thus not possible to
determine the weapon that was used by the appellant-Suresh Singhal.
PRIVATE DEFENCE
21. With regard to the evidence that the appellant was being
assaulted and in fact_ attempted to be strangulated, it needs to be G
considered whether the appellant shot the deceased in the exercise of
his right of private defence. Such a right is clearly available when there
is a reasonable apprehension of receiving the injury.
22. The right of private defence is contemplated by Section 97
of !PC which reads as follows:- H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A "Section 97. Right of private defence of the body and of
property.- Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions
contained in section 99, to defend-
First- His own body, and the body of any other person, against
any offence affecting the human body;
B Secondly -The property, whether movable or immovable, of
himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence
falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischiefor criminal
trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, rob-bery,
mischief or criminal trespass."
c In Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another', this court
laid down the following principles which emerged upon the careful
consideration and scrutiny ofa number ofjudgments as follows:-
"58. The following principles emerge on scrutiny of the following
judgments:
D
(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct .and is duly
recognised by the criminal jurisprudence of all civilised countries.
All free, democratic and civilised countries recognise the right
of private defence within certain reasonable limits.
(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one who is
E
suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending
danger and not of self-creation.
(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of
self-defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary
that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order
F
to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the
accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and
it is likely to be committed ifthe right of private defence is not
exercised.
(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon as a
G reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminous with the
duration of such apprehension.
(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate
his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.
'<2010) 2 sec 333
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 657
rs. A. BOBDE, J.l
.(vi) In private defence the force used by the accused ought not A
to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary
for protection of the person or property.
(vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead
self-defence, it is open to consider such a plea ifthe same ar'ises
from the material on record. B
(viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the right of
private defence beyond reasonable doubt.
(ix) The Penal Code confers the right of private defence only
when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.
c
(x)A person who is in imminent and reasonable dangeroflosing
his life or limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm
even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault
is attempted or directly threatened."
23. Having regard to the above, we are of the view that the
D
appellant reasonably apprehended a danger to his life when the deceased
and his brothers started strangulating him after pushing him to the floor.
As observed by this Court a mere reasonable apprehension is enough to
put the right of self-defence into operation and it is not necessary that
there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise
to the right of private defence. It is enough ifthe appellant apprehended E
that such an offence is contemplated and is likely to be committed if the
right of private defence is not exercised.
24. It was argued by Mr. P.K. Dey, learned counsel for the State,
that the deceased and his brothers were unarmed and there was no
need for the appellant to have used the gun. Given the fact that the F
deceased and the others were attempting to strangulate the appellant, it
would have been unrealistic to expect the appellant to "modulate his
defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude''. This Court has
held that a person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing
his life or limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm even
G
extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted
or upon being directly threatened. We are inclined to think that the
appellant had been put in such a position.
25. We have no doubt that the appellant exceeded the power
given to him by law in order to defend himself but we are of the view
H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 7] 2 S.C.R.

A that the exercise of the right was in good faith, in his own defence and
without premeditation. In this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce
the observation of Sessions Court which is as follows:-
"Since I feel that the prosecution witnesses are hiding something
at the introduction stage of the story, I will not impute a prior
B concert or intention to the accused. I have no doubt that tempers
got fayed at the spot itself and whatever happened was not a
result of prior meeting of minds amongst the accused persons."
26. The High Court has also observed as follows:-
"ln the facts and circumstances of the case, we find it difficult
to accept that the murder of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal
c had been preplanned. Had Suresh Singhal and his father late
Pritpal Singhal preplanned the murder, they would have chosen
some other place to execute their plan and would not have
done it in the office ofthe informant, in the presence ofa number
of persons. The convict Suresh Singhal and his father late
D Pritpal Singhal knew that a number of persons including the
informant Lala Harkishan Dass and the members of the
Gurdaspur Party would be present in the office of the informant
on that day and in the event of Krishan Lal and his brother(s)
having murdered there, all these persons would be eye-
witnesses against them. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that
E
they would have planned to commit murders at that place. It is
true that both of them were armed with loaded revolvers when
they came to the office of the informant on that day. But that
in our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, does
not necessarily mean that they had preplann~d the murder,
F though it does show that they were fully prepared to meet any
eventuality and go to any extent including use of the firearms
they were carrying with them."
27. The homicide in the present case thus does not amount to
murder in the view of Exception 2 to Section 300 of !PC'. We agree
G with the observations of the Sessions Court and the High Court that the
homicide was not the result of premeditation but rather, as the evidence
2"Exception 2. -Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good
faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to
him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right
of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than
H is necessary for the purpose of such defence." ·
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 659
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

suggests, the shooting took place in a sudden fight in the heat of passion. A
It is not possible to accept the argument of the prosecution that the
appellant took undue advantage of the situation and used the gun even
though the deceased-Shyam Sunder and his brothers were unarmed.
Given the murderous assault on the appellant and the possibility of being
· attacked again, may be with arms or may be with the help of the other
B
persons, it is not possible to attribute undue advantage to have been
taken by the appellant. In such a situation it would be unrealistic to
expect the appellant to calmly assess who would have the upper hand
before exercising his right of private defence.
. 28. In the circumstances of the case and the findings of the
Sessions Court and the High Court, we find that the homicide falls within c
Exception 4 to Section 3 00 of!PC 3 and does not amount to murder.
29. Mr. Sushi! Kumar, the learned senior counsel forthe appellant,
argued that since the evidence states that the shot was fired from a
distance and the deceased was on top of the appellant in the course of
the scuffle during which he was being strangulated, the fatal shot could D
have only been fired by Pritpal Singh al. According to the learned counsel,
he was the only other person who had a gun and had every reason to
exercise the right of private defence to protect his son from strangulation.
30. It is not possible for us to accept the argument that merely
because Pritpal Singhal had a gun, and that he could have use.ditto save E
his son, he fired the shot. There is no foundation in the evidence of any
of the witnesses to suggest that Pritpal Singhal fired at the deceased-
Shyam Sunder from any place in the room to save his son. Even
otherwise, shooting at two people grappling on the floor would have
been a risk since the shot could have injured either or both persons. It is
therefore, not possible for us to accept this submission. F

31. The strong possibility is that there was a scuffle in which the
appellant was pinned to the floor and attempted to be strangulated by
the deceased. The appellant may have pulled out his gun and upon seeing
the gun, the deceased may have released the appellant and started running
upon which the appellant fired the shot which hit him from the back side. G
This also explains the trajectory of the shot in which the bullet entered
the body below the right shoulder, and travelled upwards without exiting.
3
'·Exception 4.-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.,. H
•
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.

A 32. In these circumstances, we are of the view that Suresh
Singhal is undoubtedly guilty of causing death to Shyam Sunder with the
intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death and therefore guilty of the offence ·under Section 304 of the
IPC. We are informed that the appellant has already undergone a
sentence of 13 y, years as on date. We thus sentence him to the period
B
already undergone.
KISHAN LAL'S DEATH
33. The appellant has also been convicted under Section 302
IPC for the murder of Kishan Lal. Hans Raj (PW-3) deposed that the
c appellant fired at his brother, and when he (PW-3) and his brothers-Raj
Kumar and Kishan Lal, tried to catch hold of the appellant, the appellant
told his father to finish all the brothers. He then stated that Pritpal
Singhal took out a revolver from his pocket and both the appellant and
his father started firing at him and his brother-Kishan Lal. He stated
that he received two bullets on his stomach, and one bullet grazed him
D over the neck portion in the front. When he started running out, he was
hit by another bullet on the back of his right shoulder.
34. When he and Kishan Lal started running out, he heard Pritpal
Singhal tell Roshan Lal to go outside, get the gun from the vehicle and
that the fourth brother should not be spared.
E
35. It may be remembered that this witness survived the shooting
with two bullets still lodged in his body. The office in which the firing
took place was a small area. Yet this witness does not specify that the
appellant shot him. He generally states that appellant and his father
started firing at him and his brothers. Thus, it is difficult to say with
F certainty that the shots which hit Kishan Lal were fired by Suresh Singhal.
36. In these circumstances all that can be said is that a shot from
the appellant may have hit Kishan Lal or may not have hit Kishan Lal.
This benefit of doubt in law must go to the appellant.
37. For the reasons stated above specifically that Hans Raj (PW-
G
3) did not specify that the appellant shot him. There is a serious doubt
whether it can be held as having been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant attempted to murder Hans Raj for which he has been
convicted.
38. It is not possible for us to approve the observation of the
H
SURESH SINGHAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 661
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

High Court that because Suresh Singhal and Pritpal Singhal were armed A
"it is only the appellant and/or his father late Pritpal Singhal who could
be responsible for the firing resulting in the murder of late Kishan Lal
and the deceased-Shyam Sunder.
39. We have already held that the appellant killed the deceased
in the exercise of the right of private defence. Pritpal Singhal may or B
may not have acted out of the desire to protect Suresh. He did not share
the same intention as that ofSuresh. It is not possible to attribute common
intention to kill the three brothers to both the appellant and his father.
40. Hence, we allow this appeal partly and modify the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court to the extent that the c
conviction of the appellant-Suresh Singhal under section 302 IPC for
murder ofKishan Lal is set aside and his conviction under section 304
!PC is maintained, Since the appellant has already undergone a sentence
of 13 Y:z years as on date, we sentence him under section 304 IPC to the
period already undergone. The appellant is in jail. He be released
forthwith from the custody, if not required in any other case. D

Devika Gujral Appeal partly allowed.